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Introduction
1. Philosophy in Contemporary Culture:
Between Science and Literature?
Philosophizing, in general, seems to move between two extreme 
models, that of science and that of literature. The more it moves away 
from one, the closer it comes to the other. These differing models 
are not interchangeable, not mutually accessible, nor are they 
commensurable. Each powerful move in one or the other direction 
gives birth to violent questions about philosophy's future, status, 
place and role in culture (see Chapter 6).
What has changed with the advent of postmodern philosophy to 
the philosophical scene is that the equilibrium worked out over the 
years has been altered and the scale has begun to move in the 
direction of literature. Not that until recently philosophy had science 
as its model (for, since Hegel and Nietzsche, philosophers have not 
needed science for their identity), but it surely was at a safe distance 
from literature.1 Postmodern philosophy seems to have brought with 
it, among other things, a much higher valuation of literature and its 
models for philosophical investigations. This influence can be seen 
first of all in Continental, mainly French, philosophy, but also 
in historiography, sociology or anthropology. But is philosophy 
gradually turning into literature? And, what, in the long run, is the
1 Sociology had very similar hesitations for a long time, as Wolf Lepenies shows 
in his Between Literature and Science: the Rise of Sociology, transl. by R.J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). See Chapter 3.
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significance of its deviation from science and toward literature (see 
Chapter 1)? The issue is one of growing modesty, moderation and 
caution in philosophical discourse as opposed to its more traditional 
certainty and to the modern, Enlightenment conviction of the 
infallibility of science. The advent of postmodernity came also to 
mean the end of the traditional modern figure of the intellectual, with 
his specific roles and tasks in modern, mainly Continental, culture 
(see Chapter 2).
The fundamental paradigm of the Western tradition -  the 
paradigm of knowing as descended from Plato -  is currently being 
eroded. This paradigm is not as attractive to contemporary culture as 
to earlier times. Indeed, there have always been opponents who 
doubted that "man's essence is to be a knower of essences," as 
Richard Rorty put it in his magisterial Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature.2 Postmodern thinking in philosophy has exposed doubts over 
the hegemony of only one vision of the human being (according to 
which his paradigmatic activity is precisely that of knowing). The 
exposure of these doubts has begun to undermine the predominant 
conception of philosophy. It may be the case that man apart from 
knowing -  paradigmatically by means of science and science-oriented 
philosophy -  also feels, self-creates, and takes care of himself. In 
postmodern culture, sentiment is opposed to reason and solidarity is 
counterbalanced by self-creation (Richard Rorty), the Platonic 
commandment "you shall know!" is opposed by the (also Platonic) 
suggestion "take care of himself!" (in the late Michel Foucault), the 
"wisdom of philosophy" is confronted with the "wisdom of the 
novel" (in Milan Kundera's Art of the Novel). Thus, even if philosophy 
is not threatened with the extreme of becoming literature, it is 
confronted with a possible change in its predominant conception in 
the future. The change in its relationships with science makes it 
necessary to consider new alliances as well as to look for new
2 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 
p. 367. See my book on Rorty's Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern 
Thought (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 1996), Chapter 3, "Anti-Platonism 
of Rorty's Thought".
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supporters and new strategic treaties. As postmodern philosophy has 
succesfully put into question the universal model of philosophy, 
perhaps philosophers might want to look for philosophical answers 
that are somehow more transitory, less binding and much more local 
in time and space (see Chapter 4).
It seems to me that the traumatic events of the last century have 
caused enormous transformations in philosophical thinking (see 
especially Chapter 4). The changes in Continental philosophical 
consciousness at the end of the 20th century cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account the wars and revolutions of 
the last century as well as the social and political engagement of 
philosophers (and, in the context of Part 1 of the volume, intellectuals) 
in consort with them. Indeed, philosophy in this century has been a 
field of ideological battles, of struggles not only for its own future as a 
discipline, but also for the future of the university, the nation, the 
state, Europe and, even, the world. I see postmodern philosophy as, 
among other things, a return to a philosophy of the awareness of the 
historicity of thought as well as of the philosopher's weighty, 
individual responsibility for his philosophical proposals.
No matter where Continental postmodern thought took root 
(from Marx, Freud, structuralism or the French Hegel, as read by 
Alexandre Kojeve in the 1940s and later confronted with the French 
"new Nietzsche" in the 1960s and 1970s3), it is closer to literature than 
to science (see Chapter 7). The role of philosophy in culture is 
changing from a provider of fundamental knowledge in synthesis 
with science and theology, to a superscience of global and universal 
aspirations, and finally to a substitute of religion for the secular 
intellectual.
From a cursory review of some of philosophy's recent roles, one 
can see that the relationship in question has become more and more 
transitory: philosophy as a weapon in struggles with the political and
3 See Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Lectures on the 
"Phenomenology of Spirit", ed. by Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) 
and The New Nietzsche. Contemporary Styles o f Interpretation, ed. by David B. Allison 
(New York: Delta, 1977).
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economic status quo; philosophy as an individualistic "care of the 
self" or (Nietzschean in spirit) "aesthetic of existence"; philosophy as 
advanced and high-level cultural criticism. All the above examples, 
present in the recent philosophical discourse, are commonly referred 
to as "postmodern". Surely, there are different types of post­
modernisms and types of philosophy. The result, though, is a 
growing awareness that there is no pre-existing entity called 
philosophy that determines precisely what it is and is not. Therefore, 
increasingly, philosophy is what is named philosophy by the 
participants in philosophic discourse. It is they, those deeply involved 
both in contemporary culture and in traditional philosophical ques­
tions, who determine the new conceptualizations of philosophy 
according to more or less contemporary needs.
Thus, there is no longer only one relationship between science and 
philosophy, be it of concert or of antagonism. Rather, I believe, there 
are as many relationships as there are conceptions of philosophy -  
meaning precisely conceptualizations, that is to say, answers to the 
question: "what is philosophy?" A multitude of viewpoints, a 
multiplicity of possible descriptions, a diversity of perspectives and 
horizons have long been a genre specific of literature and the novel 
since the time of Cervantes. Milan Kundera, in his exciting The Art of 
the Novel, says that the novel is a utopia, a "paradise of individuals" in 
which everyone can have his own view, everyone can be right. Before, 
the world of the novel and that of traditional philosophy never fit 
together since they were nourished by different ideals. Today the 
kinship between these two spheres may be greater than ever before 
(see Chapter 1).
Even so, philosophy will never become literature. It has a different 
history in respect to which each successive philosopher and each 
successive philosophy describes his and its own place. To participate 
in the "history of the novel" is to be part of the great tradition of the 
novel; to participate in the "history of philosophy" is to be part of the 
great tradition of philosophy. The novelist and the philosopher 
choose a different history and a different tradition for themselves, but 
at the same time they attempt to expose and transcend their most 
important predecessors in literature and in philosophy (see Chapter 1).
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The choice of predecessors to transcend is the beginning of a search 
for identity, the beginning of fashioning a self-image. In this sense 
there would be no novel "in general" as there would be no 
philosophy "in general". The morals provided by philosophy and by 
the novel flow from reading the history of philosophy and the history 
of the novel (according to both Rorty and Kundera). Is there thus a 
danger of philosophy becoming literature? No, there is not, as they 
differ in their respective traditions without which -  or outside of 
which -  neither of them can exist.
What positive aspects would result if postmodern philosophy 
turned philosophy, in general, away from science? First, there would 
be an end to the Enlightenment ethos of personal participation in 
constant progress, the ethos of the individual moving along on an 
infallible road leading humanity to future happiness (the ethos 
discussed in the majority of essays in Part 1 as embodied by modern 
intellectuals). Second, there would appear a greater sensitivity to the 
here and now -  rather than to, and instead of, sanctioning a promised, 
future telos. Third, there would be a deepening awareness of the 
heteronomity and heterogeneity of different philosophical discourses, 
an awareness of the riches issuing out of cultural differences. Fourth, 
there would be an expanding discussion of the public role of the 
philosopher, of the expectations directed toward him and of the 
possible fulfilment of the social hopes invested in him. Fifth, finally, 
there would emerge a re-evaluation of the self-image of the 
philosopher: is he a social engineer, a scientist or a poet? Is he a 
private or public thinker?4 Is there a way in which perhaps he could 
be a combination of these? Each role has had in the twentieth century 
its influential actor, each of them brings about different dangers and 
different possibilities. Whatever the fate of the "postmodern turn" -  
and regardless of the fact whether, with the passage of time, it will 
really be a "turn" or just a momentary and transitory change in 
philosophical thinking -  some questions have been forcefully posed 
as to the definition of the philosopher and his role in culture -  his
4 These are the questions underlying Richard Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). See Chapter 1.
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tasks, obligations, place and finally (social, political and intellectual) 
responsibilities. Although neglected and disregarded by analytic 
philosophy, these questions have led, in Continental philosophy in its 
postmodern variation, to extremely important discussions both in 
France and the US. They will not be, I suppose, without repercussions 
for philosophy in general, even though they emerged out of local 
struggles and local needs (as was the case at the end of the eighties 
with discussions about the Nazi entanglements of Heidegger's 
philosophy after the publication of Victor Farias' book Heidegger et le 
nazisme and about the young Paul de Man's wartime journalism5).
The oscillation of philosophy between science and literature is at 
the same time the philosopher's oscillation between the scientist 
(including the social engineer) and poet. In antiquity, the debate 
between philosophy and poetry was won by the former and, 
consequently, Plato banned poets from the polis. In postmodernity, 
banned poets may perhaps be returning as victors and trying to ban 
(traditional, epistemology-oriented and universalistic) philosophy. 
Yet what has changed since the ancient polis is that literature, poetry 
and philosophy have all acquired their own histories -  none of which 
can by any means be banned from culture (see Chapter 1). It may be 
that postmodern philosophy was just another reminder, stronger than 
all previous ones, that the world changes much more radically than 
traditional philosophy can see from its perspective of sub specie 
aeternitatis. It may also be that postmodern philosophy was just 
another philosophical reminder that the world is approaching the 
global age, especially in culture, morals, and politics.
5 For "Heidegger affair", see especially the books and papers by Hugo Ott, Jurgen 
Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, Tom Rockmore, Joseph Margolis, Luc Feery and Alain 
Renaut, Thomas Sheehan, Dominique Janicaud, Hans Sluga, Jacques Derrida, Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Franfois Lyotard, Francois Fedier, Richard Wolin, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and many others. For the "de Man affair" see especially the books and 
papers by Jean-Luc Nancy, Catherine Gallagher, Werner Hamacher, Wlad Godzich, 
Dominick LaCapra, Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Hartman, Alice Yaeger Kaplan, Ortwin 
de Graeff, J. Hillis Miller, Rodolph Gasche, Lindsay Waters, Christopher Norris and 
others. All the books and papers on these two themes appeared generally between the 
mid-eighties and mid-nineties.
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Thus, while on the one hand philosophy is growing more 
alienated from culture -  moving closer to science -  and becoming 
more culturally dead, on the other hand it is moving further away 
from science, accepting in increased measure literature's conventions, 
forms, and even tasks and obligations. The world of textualism is 
quite tempting for philosophy, and it is definitely far distant from a 
traditionally scientific, not to mention scientistic, account of the world 
(see Chapter 6). As there is no one single philosophy, so there is no 
one single postmodern philosophy (there are rather individual, 
idiosyncratic, unique projects of particular postmodern philosophers. 
Perhaps it is even better to speak of Rorty's, Lyotard's, Derrida's, or 
Foucault's philosophies rather than of their neopragmatism, 
postmodernism, deconstruction or archeology/genealogy). One point 
can surely be made with respect to the different postmodern 
philosophical proposals -  namely, that they generally manifest an 
aversion or distaste for the scientific method. They eschew scientific 
discourse in philosophy and the means and goals traditionally 
ascribed to science while expressing admiration for the aims and 
methods of literature and the arts.
It is still hard to think of the postmodern turn at the moment; it 
doesn't threaten the dominant paradigm of philosophy with collapse. 
And though philosophy finds a growing number of anomalies within 
itself, the road to critical mass is still a distant one. The questions 
posed by postmodern thinking are fundamental in nature, but they 
can still be easily ignored in mainstream philosophy. Yet what they 
propose is an examination of philosophy and philosophers (but also 
sociology and sociologists, history and historians, anthropology and 
anthropologists etc.) in a new cultural setting, in which everything 
(that has over the ages been so carefully gathered together and so 
intensely discussed) has to be re-tested. There are probably two roads 
open to philosophy at the moment: either it becomes ever more 
scientific, and thereby alienated from culture, or it moves closer to 
literature and as a consequence becomes powerless. The scientific 
road would lead philosophy away from society at large; the literary 
road would remove from philosophy the cultural authority 
traditionally accorded it by society. Philosophy is confronted by a
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more dramatic crossroads than the other humanistic disciplines since 
it was precisely philosophy that once was the "queen of the sciences" 
and the ground of all the other disciplines. A "philosophical point of 
view" used to be extremely important and the philosopher's voice 
over the centuries has attempted, with varying results, to dominate 
the cultural conversation. In a contrary vein, postmodern philosophy 
no longer wants to dominate the conversation, to be the foundation 
for the whole edifice of culture or to look for "philosophical" 
solutions to all traditionally "philosophical" questions.
Consequently, the relationships between philosophy and science 
on the one hand and literature on the other have changed. Though the 
relationship of philosophy with science has not changed much in 
mainstream philosophy, enormous transformations are occurring 
within its tiny postmodern segment. Science within this new 
constellation is no longer a model or an ideal, and the heretofore 
bilateral exchange of influence moves in one direction only. 
Specifically, postmodern philosophy undermines the traditional 
foundations of science and science's unshaken belief in certain and 
unfailing methods. It questions science's belief in its emancipatory 
significance for culture and humanity in general; it questions the 
emancipatory significance of intellectuals in postmodemity, or late 
modernity. In a word, postmodern philosophy performs a negative, 
destructive task for the purpose of deepening our awareness of the 
dangers of the Enlightenment -  and the modern -  belief in Reason 
(much as postmodern philosophy itself, in varying degrees, has 
ceased to believe in Progress, History, or Truth). The participation of 
philosophy and literature (or, to be more exact, of some philosophers 
and some writers) in the most traumatic events of the twentieth 
century gives much food for thought. This question involves their 
respective roles in changing the world and mankind, constructing a 
paradise on earth and fitting whole nations and societies into a 
dimension politically chosen in advance.6
6 For this theme, see especially Chapter 4 and generally Zygmunt Bauman's 
consistently negative accounts of modernity in such books as Modernity and the 
Holocaust (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989), Modernity and Ambivalence (Oxford: Polity Press,
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Paradoxically enough, by moving away from science and getting 
closer to literature, postmodern philosophy has a chance to become -  
or is already here and there becoming -  moralist. The recent Jacques 
Derrida in his texts on "ethics" and "responsibility" or the late Michel 
Foucault in his vast project of the "history of sexuality" and 
"aesthetics of existence", and surely Zygmunt Bauman in all his 
recent reflections on the "postmodern ethics," are such moralists.7 A 
turn from science, from epistemological thinking in philosophy and 
legislative thinking in ethics, opens hitherto totally unknown 
possibilities to this segment of philosophy, bringing it, potentially at 
least, closer to life, to the individual and the community. Philosophy 
itself will decide what obligations it will take upon itself as it 
confronts its past adventures with modernity. If critical mass be 
reached some time in the future, a transformation of philosophy 
might take place, and if not, what we today call postmodern 
philosophy may simply cease to be called philosophy.
2. Power and Knowledge:
The Modem Intellectual and the Modem University
It is interesting to try to see the relationship between the concept of 
postmodernity (as used in the philosophy of culture) and that of 
globalization or the global age (as used in many non-philosophical 
areas, but also in the philosophy of education). "Postmodernity" was 
certainly the catchword at the beginning of the nineties, just as 
"globalization" was the catchword at the the end of the decade and
1991) and Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1987).
7 Jacques Derrida, Specters o f Marx. The State o f the Debt, the Work o f Mourning and 
the New International, transl. by P. Kamuf (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) 
and Points... Interviews, 1974-1994, transl. by P. Kamuf et al (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995); Michel Foucault, Dits et ecrits 1954-1988, ed. by Daniel Defert 
and Francois Ewald, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994) and The Essential Works o f Foucault 
1954-1984, ed. by Paul Rabinow, vol. 1. Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth (New York: The 
New Press, 1997); Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern Morality 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) and Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
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continues to be until today. To see how the relationship between 
power and knowledge changes, it is interesting to look at the two 
magisterial products of modernity discussed in the present volume: 
the modern (and usually leftist) intellectual engaged in changing the 
world (Part 1), and the modern nation-state focused, and welfare-state 
supported, institution of the university (Part 2).
As Andy Green noted, "historically, education has been both 
parent and child to the developing nation state. The national 
education system as a universal and public institution first emerged 
in post-revolutionary Europe as an instrument of state formation. It 
provided a powerful vehicle for the construction and integration of 
the new nation-state and became one of its chief institutional 
supports. Since then, few nations have embarked on independent 
statehood without recourse to its ideological potential; even the older 
states, at least in periods of war and crisis, have continued to view 
education as a valuable source of national cohesion and a key tool for 
economic development. However, the role of the nation-state is now 
changing, and with it the place of education".8 The place of higher 
education especially, let us add, is changing; which is of greatest 
interest to us in the second part of the present volume.
Two modern achievements, the modem figure of the intellectual 
and the modern institution of the university, have been undergoing a 
radical crisis of identity. As we develop this theme in Chapter 12, the 
decline of the philosophical project of modernity is turning out to be a 
painful process for modern culture: once again it has to reformulate 
the aims of its social institutions (for us here, the aims of the 
university) and the tasks of its cultural heroes (for us here, the tasks of 
the intellectual). If it is successful, the institutions and cultural heroes 
in question will regain their cultural vitality; if it is not, they will fall 
into cultural sterility. The traditional modern figure of the intellectual 
seems untenable in a more and more postmodern cultural 
surrounding. The modern institution of the university may face a 
similar fate in a more and more globalized surrounding: either it is
8 Andy Green, Education, Globalization and the Nation-State (London: McMillian 
Press, 1997), emphasis mine.
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going to accept the rules of bureaucratic, consumer-oriented 
corporations, or it will have to try once again to find a new regulative 
idea which would have to be as transformative as the role suggested 
for the university two hundred years ago by German Idealists and 
Romantics. The breakthrough in the conception of the university two 
hundred years ago was an event equal in importance to the vast social 
and cultural transformations of that time. It is hard to tell whether 
there will appear new ideas about the university comparable in 
significance.
As Zygmunt Bauman in The Individualized Society remarks, the 
present educational crisis is first and foremost "a crisis of inherited 
institutions and inherited philosophies". They were meant for a 
different kind of reality and they find it increasingly difficult to 
absorb, accommodate and hold the changes "without a thorough 
revision of the conceptual frames they deploy. ... Among many 
aspects distinguishing modern civilization from other modes of 
human cohabitation, the marriage between knowledge and power is 
perhaps the most conspicuous and seminal. Modern power seeks 
enlightenment and guidance in scholarship, while modern knowl­
edge follows August Comte's succinct yet precise recipe savoir pour 
prevoir, prevoir pour pouvoir -  to know in order to have the power to 
act. And since modern civilization has been all along mostly about 
acting, about making things different from what they were and about 
using power to enforce change -  the marriage placed the practitioners 
of knowledge, the discoverers of new truths and disseminators of old 
ones, either close to or in competition with the rulers and in the top 
rank of spiritual authority".9 Traditionally, the practitioners of 
knowledge were located at modern universities; nowadays, however, 
they are increasingly outside academia and in the for-profit sector of 
the economy (see Chapter 10).
The questions about the modern university and about the modern 
intellectual are inseparable from a more general question about 
modernity as a large cultural, social and political project. The 
institution of the university may be soon affected by the gradual
9 Zygmunt Bauman, The Individualized Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).
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completion of this project. Another modern product, the figure of the 
intellectual in the form we are familiar from Zola to Sartre (and 
perhaps even to the middle Foucault) in France, as it is discussed in 
the present volume, is already affected by it. It is both the intellectual 
and the modern institution of the university that turn out to be 
closely, for better or for worse, associated with modernity. Doubts 
about modernity go hand in hand with doubts about the figure of the 
intellectual and the modern university. Therefore, incidentally, one 
can often hear that "the confidence of intellectuals in their own 
activities has been reduced and there is no one available to speak for 
the university".10 Undoubtedly, in this context it is interesting to 
study the relationship between the figure of the modern intellectual 
and the institution of the modern university -  from the perspective of 
the tasks imposed on both by the that large-scale project. Thus, the 
history of the university and the history of the intellectual in the 20th 
century being parallel, the present volume consists of essays in the 
philosophy of culture (devoted to the intellectual) and in the 
philosophy of education (devoted to the modern university) and 
attempts to link the two modern themes together.
10 Anthony Smith and Frank Webster, "Changing Ideas of the University" in The 
Postmodern University? Contested Visions of Higher Education in Society, ed. by Anthony 





The Novelist as Cultural Hero of Modernity? 
On Richard Rorty's New Pragmatism
l.
Let us begin with a generalisation: Richard Rorty's approach to 
literature is consistently -  to use his own opposition -  "solidarity- 
related"; what he calls the "other side", literary self-creation, remains 
programmatically and intentionally undiscussed. One gets the 
impression that literature, and the novel in particular, is being 
burdened with an ("unbearable") heaviness of responsibility. Does the 
novel in Rorty's reflections appear as a source of multifarious 
metaphors, of whole worlds born out of a writer's imagination? Is 
there in it another dimension, where mundane obligations no longer 
bind the human being and where one can give rein to usually hidden 
desires and passions? The answer is in the negative.
The world of fiction of which Richard Rorty writes is a 
pragmaticized one, where fiction itself is supposed first to build, and 
then defend, a democratic, liberal order. At the other extreme, there is 
philosophy with its right to choose self-creation (encapsulated, 
perhaps, in fragments of Derrida: telecommunicational fantasies from 
The Post Card or quasi-polemics from Limited Inc.). The situation as 
outlined by Rorty might be described in the following manner: while 
the writer has to be responsible (in a manner similar to Sartre's 
conception of litterature engagee), the philosopher may indulge in a 
certain amount of irresponsibility, or may cease trying always to say
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something relevant about social problems. It is as if, after more than 
twenty five centuries, the "poets" are being ordered back into the polis 
and made to think about the state and laws, which relieves at least 
some philosophers from the respectful Platonic duty of "enlightening 
the darkness" of the world.
In today's intellectual climate, it is probably easier to accept a new 
role for philosophers than to contemplate placing some of the burden 
of responsibility for the success of what are, like it or not, contingent 
experiments in liberal democracy, on the shoulders of poets. In taking 
one step forward, Rorty seems to be taking two steps backwards, as 
his pragmatism does not permit the abandonment of society to the 
mercy of spiritless technocrats and social engineers of the future. 
(Interestingly, the opposite direction is taken by Derrida, who accords 
this "strange institution called literature" the right of tout dire, of 
saying everything, and the power of breaking away from existing 
rules and conventions, of questioning and dislocating them. The 
writer can say whatever he wants to, or whatever he is able to, from 
the safety of an institutional zone protected against any censorship, 
since for Derrida the institution of literature is closely linked to "the 
coming about of the modern idea of democracy".1 So while in Rorty 
literature "fights" for democracy, in Derrida literature can already 
"make use" of its charms.) The picture one gets from Rorty's 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, and related essays in Philosophical 
Papers, is that philosophy and poetry are, to a large extent, on the 
"private side", while on the "public" side one finds the novel together 
with politics. For Rorty, conceptual difficulties in philosophy and 
individual idioms in poetry do not seem to change the world; instead, 
the key to social reality is held by liberal politics and the novel that 
shapes human sensitivity. This very pragmatic solution rejects the 
roles and obligations which culture traditionally ascribes to literature 
and philosophy. What I wish to investigate here is what may have 
pushed Rorty to such conclusions (as I read them) and where he finds 
justification or support for them.
1 Jacques Derrida, Acts o f Literature, ed. by D. Attridge (New York: Routledge, 
1992), p. 37.
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A pragmatic line of reasoning is seemingly simple, and certainly 
convincing: liberal society does not need "philosophical foundations" 
any more. The natural sciences are no longer, as Rorty puts it, "the 
most interesting or promising or exciting area of culture"2 and the 
imagination of the youth is moved by the arts and politics. The 
cultural hero of postmodernity is a "strong poet", rather than a 
warrior, priest, sage or natural scientist who is searching for objective 
truth. Ironists do not take philosophers as their moral advisors any 
more, as the whole French and German Enlightenment tradition 
would wish, but turn instead to literary critics, as they fear getting 
stuck in one single vocabulary -  the one in which they have been 
educated. Therefore they change perspectives, and compare re­
descriptions by various figures against each other rather than against 
their "originals". Finally, they read a lot of books (which is a guiding 
trait of intellectuals), "spending] more of their time placing books 
than placing real live people".3 Literature, together with literary 
criticism, has more to say and more to do; traditional philosophy is 
culturally less interesting and in this account offers less. Thus, various 
possibilities suggest themselves: either we deal only with literature, 
or we try to think of another possibility of the other, of philosophy, 
taken off the Kantian pedestal, or we think philosophy through with 
the help of a specific kind of literature (as Frenchmen do, from 
Bataille through Klossowski and Foucault to Derrida), or -  finally -  
we remain silent in the manner of the young Wittgenstein, pretending 
that nothing has changed in philosophy in the time of postmodernity. 
And that last possibility will probably be the cultural end of 
philosophy.
Culture and society need many "vocabularies of moral de­
liberation" (as Rorty calls them in his text on Freud, "Freud and 
Moral Reflection"4) which constantly have to be coined, developed,
2 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 52 (hereafter referred to as CIS).
3 Ibidem, p. 80.
4 Richard Rorty, "Freud and Moral Reflection" in his Essays on Heidegger and 
Others. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
p. 156 (hereafter referred to as PP 2).
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transformed and updated as the world changes. The Kantian 
idealistic morality of duty, with one side of moral philosophy falling 
to pieces (the other side being politics, as in Marx or Bentham), 
caused an essential pauperization of possibilities of moral 
deliberation. The result of this closing of possibilities of moral 
philosophy (of ethics) was in Rorty's view the opening of possibilities 
of enriching moral reflection by "novelists, poets and dramatists".5 
Culture could not stand void -  so it was filled with the nineteenth- 
century novel. And since then "literature" has cared more than 
"philosophy" for the said vocabularies of moral deliberation, the 
central role in culture of which can only be doubted if a "human 
nature" common to all (an essence from which philosophers were the 
only ones entitled to deduce, and pass on to others, how one ought to 
behave) is believed.
So far I have made reference to the "self-creation"/"solidarity" 
and the "private"/"public" distinctions, but one can easily add to 
them other pairs, more or less metaphoric, coming from Rorty's work, 
such as "sublimity" and "decency", "private narcissism" and "public 
pragmatism", "private irony" and "liberal hope" or "Trotsky" and the 
"wild orchids".6 All of these seem to be different accounts of a 
fundamental Rortyian opposition between the romantic and the 
pragmatic ("romantic" as used in "Nineteenth-Century Idealism and 
Twentieth-Century Textualism", and "pragmatic" in the sense of 
"Pragmatism and Philosophy"7). Pragmatic and romantic conceptions 
of philosophy are the two reactions to "Plato-Kant canon", two 
different and opposite responses to metaphysics (as well as to Husserl 
with his vision of philosophy als strenge Wissenschaft). As philosophy 
can no longer be science in an unquestionable way, let it be politics -  
Dewey's answer -  or metaphor -  the answer of Heidegger after his
5 Ibidem, p. 156.
6 Richard Rorty, CIS, pp. 73-96; Richard Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", 
Common Knowledge, vol. 1, no. 3,1992.
7 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 139-159 (hereafter referred to as CP); Richard Rorty, 
"Pragmatism and Philosophy" in After Philosophy. End or Transformation, ed. by 
K. Baynes et al. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 26-66.
After Philosophy: The Novelist as Cultural Hero of Modernity? 29
"turn" (to put the thought in the form of another of Rorty's essay 
titles, "Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics"). These 
are answers going in opposite directions, for it is not easy to make 
politics metaphorical or metaphor political (suffice it to say that 
Walter Benjamin was afraid of the aestheticization of politics8; and 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in Iris Heidegger, Art, and Politics called 
National Socialism, "national-aestheticism"9). These are two incom­
mensurable, metaphilosophical conceptions of the role of philosophy 
in culture. But Rorty would be willing to be at the same time -  and 
this is a key point of my reading -  both pragmatist and "strong poet", 
both utopian social engineer and visionary, so as to both serve his 
community and make use of the intellectual pleasures derived from 
self-creation. For he bears in mind that in the future we will not be 
turning to the philosophers for rescue and advice as our ancestors 
turned to the priests: "we shall turn instead to the poets and the 
engineers, the people who produce startling new projects for achieving 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number".10
Rorty consistently avoids choosing between the romanticism of the 
poet and the pragmatism of the politician and social engineer; we 
have to agree here with Nancy Fraser who says that "it is the desire to 
overcome the implacable split between public and private life that is 
at the root of many theoretical and political difficulties".11 It may be 
perhaps so that while the romantic need turns Rorty towards 
philosophy, the pragmatic one directs his attention to literature, and 
to the novel in particular. Philosophy, as inessential for and 
insignificant in today's culture and as devoid of transformative 
powers as it seems to be, is located by Rorty in the same camp as 
poetry, while the novel which transforms vocabularies of moral
8 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art. in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" in 
his Illuminations, transl. by Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1973).
9 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics. The Fiction o f the Political, 
transl. by Ch. Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 86.
10 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 26, emphasis mine.
11 Nancy Fraser, "Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty between Romanticism 
and Technocracy" in Reading Rorty, ed. by A. Malachowski (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990), p. 311.
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deliberation and shapes liberal sensitivity gets closer to politics and 
liberal social engineering. Theory is "de-politicized", politics "de- 
theorized", as Thomas McCarthy puts it in his reaction to Rorty.12 13
Philosophy -  following Zygmunt Bauman in Intimations of 
Postmodernity13 -  either hides behind the silent walls of the Academy, 
or allies itself to literary criticism and poetry. The direct link between 
(philosophical) theory and (political) practice is broken. As Rorty puts 
it, "we philosophy professors are people who have a certain 
familiarity with a certain intellectual tradition", much "as chemists 
have a certain familiarity with what happens when you mix various 
substances together",14 and nothing more.
To sum up briefly: the pragmatic impulse, the ideals of liberal 
democracy, and the priority of democracy over philosophy all push 
Rorty's thinking towards literature as a kind of democratic utopia 
(and towards the novel, as Milan Kundera's "paradise of 
individuals"). The romantic impulse, on the other hand -  from 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind to Derrida -  pushes his thinking 
towards the self-creational kind of philosophy.15 There is no third 
way. Tertium non datum. Both impulses constitute at the same time his 
liberal sensitivity -  what is important is other people's suffering, their 
pain and humiliation -  as well as what he has referred to differently 
over the years as "self-enlargement", "self-invention", or -  in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature -  "edification" (derived from 
Gadamer's Bildung in Truth and Method16). Both impulses are 
constantly present, and both give birth to confessions such as, on the 
one hand, "what matters is our loyalty to other human beings
12 Thomas McCarthy, "Ironie privee et decence publique" in Lire Rorty. Le prag- 
matisme et ses consequences, ed. by J.-P. Cometti (Paris: Editions de l'eclat, 1992), p. 94.
13 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (New York and London: Rout- 
ledge, 1992), p. 16.
14 Richard Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", op. cit., p. 152.
15 See Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. by Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge, 
1996) -  for a recent Rorty/Derrida encounter.
16 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1980), p. 360 (hereafter referred to as PMN). See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and 
Method (New York: Routledge, 1975).
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clinging together against the dark",17 and on the other hand: "the 
pragmatist philosopher has a story to tell about his favorite, and least 
favored, books -  the texts of, for example, Plato, Descartes, Hegel, 
Nietzsche, Dewey and Russell"18, or, to put it even more strongly: 
"nothing is more important than saving our liberal institutions"19 (the 
pragmatic impulse) and "redescribing ourselves is the most important 
thing we can do"20 (the romantic impulse). It is difficult to abandon 
either of the two sides, nor can they be brought into agreement with 
each other: the only solution seems to be the public-private split. 
Hence, perhaps, Rorty's specific attitude towards literature (and the 
novel) that satisfies the need for communal thinking as opposed to a 
post-philosophical attitude to philosophy that satisfies the need for 
"privatized thinking". Let us add that this is merely a general 
tendency in his considerations rather than some rigid distinction. We 
will attempt now to place his philosophical reflections on literature in 
the wider context of his views on the role and place of philosophy in 
contemporary culture.
2.
Rorty, in asking -  in a quite pragmatic manner -  what literature and 
philosophy can give us, elevates the former by juxtaposing its 
usefulness with the apparent uselessness of traditional philosophy. 
He brings them close to each other, treating them as "two kinds of 
writing". He does not make use of criticism already traditional today, 
that is, showing the philosophical background of literary works (their 
themes, questions, oppositions and conceptuality) as if this were the 
second "bottom" of literature, nor does he seek the "literariness" of 
philosophical works. As a matter of fact, he does not change the status
17 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 166.
18 Richard Rorty, "Texts and Lumps" in his Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. 
Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 82 
(hereafter referred to as PP 1).
19 Richard Rorty, "Brigands et intellectuels", Critique, 493-494,1988, p. 485.
20 Richard Rorty, PMN, pp. 358-359.
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of literature; instead, together with his whole conception of 
philosophy as developed since Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature 
(1979), he takes off from philosophy in terms of the place accorded to 
it so far (at least since Kantian times).
For in the cultural conversation going on, the philosopher has so far 
had a privileged position: the first and the last word belonged to him; 
it was he who knew best as he knew the widest -  philosophical -  
context of questions and answers. For it was he who used to decide, 
in the last instance, about the claims to knowledge of all the other 
domains of culture. Rorty says that the central concern of the all 
hitherto existing philosophy was
a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into
areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and
those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing so).21
Thus, on the one side of that landscape there was philosophy as a 
Kantian "tribunal of pure reason"; on the other side of it there were 
claims made by all other areas of culture which philosophy either 
rejected or accepted. Philosophy would "ground" knowledge claims, 
since it was a "foundational" discipline, overwhelming and 
legitimating other domains. The abandonment of the Kantian 
perspective (still being reinforced in the twentieth century by 
Russell's and Husserl's ideal of a "scientific" and "exact" philosophy) 
would be an attack on the philosopher's self-image; it would be an 
abandonment of the idea that his voice "always has an overriding 
claim on the attention of the other participants in the conversation".22 
To be more precise, this would cause the collapse of the idea that 
there is some "philosophical method" or some "philosophical point of 
view" which enables the philosopher, thanks to his profession, to 
express interesting opinions, ex officio, on the subjects of, for example, 
psychoanalysis, the moral dilemmas of humanity or the value of 
literary works. Philosophy in Rorty's account becomes less important 
and thereby the philosopher himself, the philosopher whose opinions
21 Ibidem, p. 3.
22 Ibidem, p. 392.
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have so far been important owing to the importance of the 
philosophical discipline itself, becomes less important. Philosophy 
cannot escape from history, which prompts Rorty to ask why it was 
assumed to be an autonomous discipline, foundational for the whole 
of culture? It was the case, he explains, because the German idealists 
of the nineteenth century told us that such a discipline was the "hope 
of mankind"23, and we kept believing them. To sum up, Rorty, in 
elevating literature, places philosophy at the same time on an equal 
footing with other disciplines, devoid of any of its old privileges. Old 
philosophy, or philosophy with a capital "P", as Rorty sometimes 
claims, is a dubious domain, considering, pragmatically, its twentieth- 
century failings on the one hand, and its cultural deadness on the 
other.
Rorty neither applies philosophical conceptuality to literature, nor 
seek its "philosophical core", "blind spots" or unsaid "margins" to 
which one can supposedly get by removing surface layers of 
vocabulary or style. He does not ask a question about the essence of 
literature, asking instead about what it is doing, or how it is working, 
for example, he suggests that the novel improves human sensitivity 
to suffering and cruelty (which is, incidentally, a peculiar, liberal- 
pragmatic reduction of the richness of literary senses and benefits). 
Here a question arises as to whether Rorty is interested in literature as 
literature or perhaps as a better, more effective tool than -  for instance 
-  philosophy? Is not Rorty's writing about literature instrumental with 
respect to literature, since what is perhaps at stake is merely 
literature's juxtaposition to philosophy? That is, showing what post- 
Philosophical philosophy ought to be, or might be, by means of 
idealizing, or even caricaturing, literature and, in broader terms, so- 
called highbrow literary culture. Today's "supremacy of literary 
culture"24, placing literature in the center of culture and treating both 
science and philosophy as literary genres (as did the philosophers he 
described as "textualists") may be a result of Rorty's new ideal (once 
the sciences -  in philosophy and in culture -  are not that ideal any
23 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 148.
24 Ibidem, p. 150.
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more). Testimony to this is the way in which he accounts for the work 
of the literary critic -  as strong misreading. What, according to Rorty, is 
the way of reading texts in literary criticism and in literature? Given 
Rorty's perception that there is no such method, that there are no 
general, ahistorical and permanent criteria of evaluation, he prefers 
self-creational possibilities (which may mean imposing one's own 
vocabulary on someone else's text, a redescription carried out in one's 
own terms rather than in terms of a given text or inherited ones).
Another question25 -  is not Rorty producing for his own 
pragmatic needs a picture of literary criticism that suits him, on the 
basis of, for example, philosophical conceptions or their application. 
Literary criticism would be an outlet for the self-creational desires of 
the critic or the philosopher. The text would serve only the critic's 
own aims. In this instance, Rorty's "method", following Harold 
Bloom, might be as follows: the critic shapes the text for his own 
needs, imposing onto it a vocabulary which "may have nothing to do 
with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author, and seeing what 
happens".26 Rorty applies that "method" -  and admits it explicitly -  
in his discussions of Derrida. When Jacques Bouveresse (in a 
congenial volume on Rorty and his responses: Lire Rorty. Le 
pragmatisme et ses consequences) reproaches him that he makes the 
Derrida he needs, Rorty answers that he takes from him whatever he 
wants, rejecting what is left. He uses him as a grain to be ground in 
his own mill (comme le ble pour mon propre moulin).27 And he justifies 
this approach in terms of being a "strong misreader" endowed with 
the right to his own redescriptions. He is rightfully proud that he can, 
as he puts it, "get more out of the text than its author or its intended 
audience could possibly find there".28 Literature replaces philosophy 
as a "presiding cultural discipline", as science in the nineteenth
25 See Michael Fischer, "Redefining Philosophy as Literature: Richard Rorty's 
'Defence' of Literary Culture" in Reading Rorty, ed. by A. Malachowski, op. cit., 
pp. 233-243.
26 Richard. Rorty, CP, p. 151.
27 Richard Rorty, "Reponse a Jacques Bouveresse" in Lire Rorty, ed. by J.-P. 
Cometti, op. cit., p. 156.
28 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 152.
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century was replaced with philosophy as a secular substitute of 
religion.
In the nineteenth century, the secular intellectual began losing 
faith in science in the same fundamental way that the Enlightenment 
lost its faith in God.29 Rorty says that, in the nineteenth century, 
"'philosophy' became, for the intellectuals, a substitute for religion", 
since
[i]t was the area of culture where one touched bottom, where one found the
vocabulary and the convictions which permitted one to explain and justify
one's activity as an intellectual, and thus to discover the significance o f one's life.30
In other words, as noted right at the beginning: philosophers are 
important, because philosophy is important. But in the nineteenth 
century, with the beginning of what Rorty calls the culture of the man 
of letters, that is the culture of the "intellectual who wrote poems and 
novels and political treatises, and criticisms of other people's poems 
and novels and treatises"31, the importance of philosophy began to be 
doubted. Consequently, scientists became isolated at the beginning of 
the twentieth century from the majority of intellectuals, just like 
theologians had been isolated before. Poets and novelists became, to 
use Rorty's favorite formulation, the moral teachers of the youth, and 
the more philosophy wanted to be "scientific" or "exact", the more it 
drifted away from the rest of culture and thereby the more absurd 
became its traditional claims to being a foundational discipline for the 
whole of culture.
Rorty, within the framework of C.P Snow's dichotomy of "scientific 
culture" and "literary culture", seems to place philosophizing, together 
with literary criticism and poetry, within the latter culture, with all the 
consequences thereof.32 Who is the "literary intellectual" or -  in the 
broadest Rortyan terms, "cultural critic" -  and what is his role in 
culture? He feels he may comment on everything in culture that is
29 See ibidem, p. 228.
30 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 4, emphasis mine.
31 Ibidem, p. 4.
32 See Thomas McCarthy, "Ironie privee et decence publique" in Lire Rorty, ed. by 
J.-P. Cometti, op. cit., p. 91.
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going on around him. He is a prefiguration of a philosopher of the 
"post-Philosophical" era, one who has abandoned traditional 
pretensions to Philosophy (with the capital "P"). This is Rorty's 
congenial description: "He passes rapidly from Hemingway to Proust 
to Hitler to Marx to Foucault to Mary Douglas to the present situation 
in Southeast Asia to Ghandi to Sophocles".33 He is a "name dropper", a 
master at using proper names as sets of descriptions or ways of seeing 
the world. He specializes in searching for similarities and differences 
between big visions of the world painted in the most general lines. 
Deprived of historical constants, doomed to redescriptions of 
redescriptions, he is doomed to be quickly forgotten. Not finding 
immortal sentences or true statements, he leaves behind merely mortal, 
ever-changing vocabularies. According to Rorty, the "temporalization 
of rationality" discovered by Hegel in his Phenomenology was one of the 
most significant steps on the road to pragmatic incredulity towards -  
atemporal and ahistorical -  Philosophy.34
Rorty's account of the relationship between philosophy and 
literature, while convincing, is perhaps too simple. It is similar to the 
approach taken by Zygmunt Bauman in Intimations of Postmodernity35, 
where it is suggested that, in the past, philosophy and literature 
(when the former was still Philosophy) stood on opposite sides of a 
dichotomy, paradigmatic cases of the oppositions subjective/objective, 
rational/irrational, scientific/non-scientific, doxa/ episteme (opinion 
and knowledge), contingent/universal, and historical/ahistorical 
(and still earlier the opposition of logos and mythos, that is to say, 
philosophers and poets). Nowadays -  if one were to abandon the 
traditional account of truth, objectivity and rationality -  philosophy 
would not stand on the side of the objective, the rational, and the 
atemporal. One side of the dichotomy would have to disappear, and 
the dichotomy itself would share its fate. So what might separate 
philosophy and literature today? The answer common to Rorty and
33 Richard Rorty, CP, p. xl.
34 Ibidem, p. xli.
35 See Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodemity, op. cit., p. 215. See also my 
essay: "Zygmunt Bauman and the Question of the Intellectual in Postmodemity" in 
the present volume.
After Philosophy: The Novelist as Cultural Hero of Modernity? 37
Bauman is different books, different traditions, and, finally, a 
different history; for philosophy, like literature, cannot escape from 
its history and historicity, although it is sometimes difficult to 
remember that (the philosophy of Rorty himself is just a contingent 
product of liberal American culture of the end of the twentieth 
century). It so happened, but it could have happened in a quite different 
way. In a word, philosophy today can daringly envisage only what 
Hegel so beautifully called "grasping one's time in thought".
Philosophy and literature see the present (and the past) in 
different styles, one could say (referring to Nietzsche, Deleuze and 
Derrida): in terms of their contingent vocabularies, which are 
endowed with different degrees of sensitivity and embedded in 
different conceptualizations shaped by their respective histories. But 
claims by both disciplines to be coining a neutral vocabulary (since 
discovering such a vocabulary is totally out of the question) are 
equally unjustified. What is significant is Rorty's attitude to the 
practical achievements of both spheres of culture. He advises us to 
compare the role played by novelists and literary critics in liberal 
democracies in the Western world with the apparently rather 
insignificant role played by philosophers.36 Whose sensitivity to pain 
was changed by traditional philosophy? Did the latter manage to 
change the world for the better?
If one assumes all of Rorty's points of departure, it may turn out 
that philosophy is merely "a kind of writing". But all those who see 
some specific, universal and emancipatory tasks for philosophy, those 
who seek one never-changing "philosophical context" in which one 
can place in front of a philosophical tribunal of reason all other 
disciplines and all other participants in a cultural conversation, would 
find it very difficult to agree with such a seemingly reductionist 
argument. As to whether philosophy is outdated as a profession, 
Rorty answers that "professions can survive the paradigms that gave 
them birth".37 For the philosopher who is able to answer the question 
of an inquisite student "what Hegel meant" will always be needed. 
The practical problem -  "who will be teaching Hegel" -  guarantees
36 See e.g. Richard Rorty, "Brigands et intellectuels", op. cit., p. 486.
37 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 393.
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the survival of philosophy today, like questions of, for example, 
Heidegger tomorrow, or of Rorty the day after tomorrow. For who 
else if not the philosopher is able to provide us with that 
"commentary on the details of the tradition", the depth and extent of 
which distinguishes the philosopher from "the amateur, the 
philistine, the mystic, or the belletrist"?38
3.
What is required now is a brief excursus on Rorty's attitude towards 
the history of philosophy -  for the choice of one's own history of 
philosophy determines the self-image of the philosopher. Rorty says 
that "the self-image of a philosopher -  his identification of himself as 
such (rather than as, perhaps, an historian or a mathematician or a 
poet) -  depends almost entirely upon how he sees the history of 
philosophy". The adoption of a new vocabulary, he continues, an 
independent gesture on the part of every philosopher -  "is motivated 
almost entirely by a perception of one's relation to the history of 
philosophy".39 The choice, between Hegel or Plato40 (between, on the 
one hand, philosophy seen as "one's time grasped in thought", and 
on the other, "an escape from conversation to something atemporal 
which lies in the background of all possible conversations") is made 
simply by reading the history of philosophy and drawing a moral 
conclusion.41 A similar attitude to the history of the novel is taken by 
Milan Kundera, one of Rorty's recent favorites. Perhaps it would be 
easier to understand Rorty's attitude towards philosophy, as well as 
his account of the history of philosophy, by comparing it with 
Kundera's account of the novel and its history from The Art of the 
Novel. Let us first add, though, that what binds Rorty, Lyotard or
38 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 41.
39 Ibidem, p. 41.
40 On Rorty's relations with Plato and Hegel see two chapters in my book: Rorty's 
Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought (Poznan: Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe IF UAM, 1996).
41 See ibidem, p. 174.
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Foucault so closely with Kundera, are histories, stories, micrologies, 
written narratives.42 Without developing that theme, for there is not 
enough space for it here, let us use a couple of well chosen citations. 
Kundera's claim: "I am making stories, juxtaposing them and that is 
how I am asking questions"43 is echoed by Lyotard when he says that 
he is merely "telling ... a story, unfolding a little story of my own"44 
and advising us to "set to work forging fictions rather than 
hypotheses and theories"45. Rorty's response might be, as already 
noted, that he is telling stories about his most and least favored books, 
and Michel Foucault's agreement might be found in the following 
statement: "I am fully aware that I have never written anything other 
than fictions" (and Maurice Blanchot elaborates, "I am a fabulist 
composing fables whose morals one would be unwise to wait for").46
Rorty seems to want philosophy -  together with the novel -  to 
recognize that the world is ambiguous, that there is no single, absolute 
truth but a multitude of relative and contradictory truths. He would 
like to accept Kundera's "wisdom of the novel" (la sagesse du roman) 
which is the "wisdom of uncertainty". He is seduced, paradoxically 
enough, by the truthfulness of an ambiguous and relative world that 
philosophy does not want to accept. "The world of a single Truth" is 
not only a totalitarian world, as Kundera presents it. It is also, let us 
add, the world of traditional philosophy, a world made of a different 
material than the "relative world of the novel". "Totalitarian truth 
excludes relativity, doubts, questions and can never accept what I 
would call the spirit of the novel".47 The method of truth, of 
epistemologically-oriented traditional philosophy deriving from Kant, 
of the truth of philosophy as foundational discipline for the rest of
42 An excellent account of Rorty as a narrativist is presented in David Hall, Richard 
Rorty. Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism (New York: SUNY Press, 1994).
43 Milan Kundera in Kundera. Materiaiy z sympozjum [Kundera. Conference 
Documents], (London: Polonia Book, 1988), p. 149.
44 Jean-Frangois Lyotard, "Lessons in Paganism" in The Lyotard Reader, ed. by 
A. Benjamin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 125.
45 Ibidem, p. 118.
46 Foucault/Blanchot (New York: Zone Books, 1990), p. 94.
47 Milan Kundera, The Art o f the Novel, transl. by L. Asher (New York: Grove Press, 
1986), p. 19.
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culture, is similar. The "wisdom of the novel" seems closer to Rorty 
than the "wisdom of philosophy", if I can put it that way, as the former 
took better care of the freedom of the individual -  for it is the novel that 
is a "fascinating imaginary space where no one is the owner of truth 
and where everyone has the right to be understood".48 In the face of the 
dangers facing a fragile and unstable culture, it comes in handy to find 
that the "precious essence of the European spirit is, like in a silver 
jewelry box, in the history of the novel, in the wisdom of the novel".49 
And Rorty, the philosopher, the pragmatist, believes in it for he is 
convinced by his liberal opinions and his philosophical views. The 
wisdom that allowed the West to shape itself in the way it is shaped 
today did not come from philosophers, nor was it defended by 
philosophers. It came mainly, according to Rorty, from a literary 
imagination, from the sensitivities and loud voices of writers, which 
was given to them only temporarily,50 even incidentally, by the project 
of modernity that may be coming to its completion.
4.
The point is not that the philosopher has to write about literature; 
instead, the point may be that he re-thinks the very knot of relations 
between philosophy and literature. It is sometimes not the 
investigation of how philosophy approaches its "object" and 
"sharpens" its philosophical "tools" (Hegel) that lies at the heart of 
the question; it may also lie in the relations between the two. In 
Derrida, deconstruction is an intended re-thinking of the two 
domains at the same time. Is Rorty's project similar to Derrida's? Or is 
it perhaps manifestly philosophical, instrumentally making use of 
literature for more pragmatic needs (for example, for the 
devalorization and denigration of Philosophy with the capital "P")? It 
is worth noting that the attitude of Zygmunt Bauman to literature is
48 Ibidem, p. 130.
49 Ibidem, p. 130.
50 Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard, Tombeau de I'intellectuel et autres papiers (Paris: Galilee, 
1984), pp. 9-23.
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similar: he does not investigate today's blurring of boundaries, the 
merging of the two genres, but uses the literary genre as an example, 
a case from history described by the pen of a man of letters, an object 
of a sociological deliberation (with reference, for example, to Kafka 
and his Diaries from Modernity and Ambivalence51). Derrida is different 
-  his aim -  as Positions explain -  is to "deconstruct practically the 
philosophical opposition between philosophy and myth, between logos 
and mythos" which can be done only textually, with the help of 
an "other writing", neither "philosophical", nor "literary".52 De- 
construction of the opposition between philosophy and literature 
gives birth to a metaphilosophical (for the very opposition is 
philosophical) or a no-longer-philosophical undertaking.
Rorty does not hide his intentions towards literature. He exposes 
its past, present and future to a simple test -  to the question of its 
utility, of its benefits for developing liberal democracies. (He admits it 
explicitly in his polemic with Umberto Eco when he says that he 
imposes on each book his own "grid", which is the narrative of "the 
pragmatist's progress"53). So he contrasts, for instance, the public 
uselessness of Heidegger's philosophy against the public benefits 
derived from reading Dickens' novels, and thus confronts a 
philosophical theory with a literary narrative. The novel, in his view, 
has turned out to have been more fruitful than philosophy in the 
history of the modern West, which is to say that "when you weigh the 
good and the bad the social novelists have done against the good and 
the bad the social theorists have done, you find yourself wishing that 
there had been more novels and fewer theories".54 It is thanks more to 
"our novelists than to our philosophers or to our poets" that the West 
has worked out an "increased ability to tolerate diversity", by means 
of a realization of and a sensitivity to intolerance.55
51 See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991) and 
Franz Kafka, Die Tagebucher 1910-1923, ed. by Max Brod (Frankfurt am Main, 1967).
52 Jacques Derrida, Positions (London: The Athlone Press, 1987), pp. 53,53, 71.
53 Richard Rorty, "The Pragmatist's Progress" in Umberto Eco, Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 91.
54 Richard Rorty, "Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens" in PP 2, p. 80.
55 Ibidem, p. 81.
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Perhaps the single most important approximation can be seen in 
Rorty's introductory statement that for ironists theory has become 
"a means to private perfection", rather than a tool for social 
communication.56 Thus we are on the one side of Rorty's fundamental 
opposition between the private and the public,57 within which there 
appears still another opposition: ironist writers who are fully private 
and ironist theorists who do not totally abandon their public mission 
(despite being socially totally "useless"). The former -  writers like 
Proust -  remain in their writings in relation to their own, private, 
idiosyncratic past, rewinding objects, people and events (using, for 
instance, that memoire involontaire), making redescriptions of their 
surrounding in their own vocabulary, in their own terms. They aim at 
autonomy, redescribing in their works those who once described 
themselves. They free themselves from foreign authorities, showing 
their relativity, their finiteness, their transitoriness.
Ironist theorists, on the other hand, still retain vestiges of public 
ambitions. They write about Europe, the march of the Spirit or Being, 
they invent -  as Rorty puts it -  "a larger-than-self hero".58 They want 
to remain in relation to a past which is broader than their own -  
preferably the past of a species, a race or a class. They are not content 
with merely ordering small things in their own way (details, 
accidents, or narratives); they also want to describe a big and 
important thing, and draw their power from it. To sum up, they 
prefer affiliation to self-creation. What is disharmonious in their 
works is their (immodest) feeling of superiority as philosophers, 
coming from the belief that it cannot be by any means so that certain 
beloved, philosophical words -  words like "Aristotle", "physis" or 
"Parmenides" to Heidegger -  are nothing more but their private 
counterparts of other words beloved by others (far more numerous, 
incidentally), such as "Combray" or "Gilbert" from Proust's 
Remembrance o f the Things Past. "Proust succeeded because he had no
56 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 96.
57 See Rorty's reaction in "Response to Marek Kwiek" to my discussion of his 
"private/public split" in "On Some Rorty's Evolution", Ruch Filozoficzny, vol. L, no. 2, 
1995 (Warszawa), pp. 195-200.
58 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 100.
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public ambitions -  no reason to believe that the sound of the name 
'Guermantes' would mean anything to anybody but his narrator"; 
and "Heidegger thought he knew some words which had, or should 
have had, resonance for everybody in modem Europe, words which 
were relevant not just to the fate of people who happen to have read a 
lot of philosophy books but to the public fate of the West".59 But, as a 
matter of fact, these words are not endowed with different 
significance -  they are merely private sets of (favorite) words. Europe 
and its fate do not depend more on a list of books read by Heidegger 
or on any other list of any other books, comments Rorty. When one 
contrasts Nietzsche's or Heidegger's ironist theorizing with the 
modern novel, it turns out that the former is just "one of [several] 
great literary traditions" -  comparable to the novel if we take into 
consideration its achievements, but much less significant if we take 
into account its influence on politics, social hopes and solidarity.60
As Kundera tries to show, the novel has invented its own -  
imaginary -  democratic utopia, a future society in which nobody 
dreams of thinking that God, Truth or the Nature of Things is on his 
side. In such a utopia nobody would dream of thinking that there is 
something more real than pleasure or pain. A democratic utopia 
would be a community in which the most important virtues of mind 
would be tolerance and curiosity -  rather than the search for truth.61 
In such a Utopia people would suffer and cause far less pain than 
they do today; it would be a utopia of brotherhood realized in many 
currently unimaginable ways.
5.
Thus, Rorty tends to write of such writers and of such literature 
which is (or in his reading can be) socially -  not even only 
individually or self-creationally -  useful. For even when he writes of 
Nabokov -  and he does that superbly -  he does it in order to show
59 Ibidem, p. 118, emphasis mine.
60 Ibidem, p. 120.
61 Richard Rorty, "Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens", op. cit., p. 75.
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that although he was a writer aiming at autonomy (self-creation), 
nevertheless he studied the cruelty inherent in the search for that 
autonomy. So, paradoxical as it may seem, Orwell and Nabokov get 
closer and closer to each other in Rorty's reading -  as he puts it, "both 
of them warn the liberal ironist intellectual against temptations to be 
cruel".62 And the fear of causing pain, of being cruel, constitutes in his 
view the liberal sensitivity.
Let us say a couple of words about French postmodern thought: 
their engaging in discussions of (non-representational) literature was 
a wholly critical undertaking. French culture resisted the 
representational paradigm -  so philosophers started to deal with 
"literature of illegibility" (Sollers) or "opaque speech" (Foucault).63 
Since Mallarme, literature has no longer wanted to reflect the world, 
to be "a copy of a copy", to stand on the other end from the world 
itself. It wants instead to become a full part of that world and not 
merely a mirror of nature. The language of literature does not want to 
represent reality -  there is an awareness of a "fundamental 
inadequation" (as Barthes says in his "Inaugural Lecture" at College 
de France64) between the linguistic order and the order of the world; 
the category of representation has become a banner-like object of a 
critical investigation -  and rejection -  in the French humanities in 
recent decades. The myth of mimesis that has constituted art (together 
with literature) since Ancient Greece, is violently questioned in the 
works of Bataille or Artaud -  and in those of their post-war 
commentators. Rorty's thinking about literature is of a completely 
different nature -  and pertains to a completely different sort of 
literature. It is Dickens and Proust, Nabokov and Orwell, and finally 
Kundera -  but Kundera the literary theorist and essayist, the author 
of Art of the Novel rather than as the author of his novels. This is, to be 
sure, a philosophical (to be more precise, a pragmatic) choice on 
Rorty's part -  "details" and "cruelty", the concern for pain hidden 
under the mask of aestheticism, as well as moral protest -  and the
62 Richard. Rorty, CIS, p. 144.
63 See Chapter 5 in the present volume.
64 Roland Barthes, "Inaugural Lecture, College de France" in A Barthes Reader, ed. 
by Susan Sontag (New York: Noonday Press, 1988), p. 465.
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"depreciated legacy of Cervantes" is an instance in the face of which 
one accounts for one's writing. Obviously, both philosophy and 
literature may be just literary genres, two kinds of writing. Rorty 
never said that philosophy is literature -  they are separated by the 
abyss of tradition and history, that is, on the one hand one has Father 
Parmenides, on the other Father Cervantes, on the one Kant and on 
the other Flaubert. Philosophy can be seen as a "family romance"65, 
and philosophers as commentators on certain writers of the past.
In Rorty's account of literature, one can focus on the importance 
of his attempts to blur the traditional opposition: the moral and the 
aesthetic (that is, by way of an example, literature with a "moral 
message" and literature that is "merely aesthetic"). Rorty in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity draws a distinction between books 
that help us to become autonomous subjects and books that help us to 
become less cruel. Among the latter -  those referring to cruelty rather 
than to autonomy -  there are books treating of the influence of 
practices and social institutions on other people and those pertaining 
to the influence of our personal idiosyncrasies on others. Instead of 
the traditional distinction between "moralists" and "aesthetes", Rorty 
suggests the basic question to determine a genre of a given work 
ought to be: "what purposes does this book serve?"66 The purposes to be 
considered are not the good and the beautiful, but either the 
maintenance of an old, existing absolute vocabulary or the working 
out of a new absolute vocabulary (there seem here to be remote 
analogies to the Kuhnian distinction between "normal science" and 
"revolutionary science"). Books that transform a final vocabulary 
form the tiniest but perhaps the most important part of all -  for they 
can transform the most.
A reminder: there is no "nature of literature", Rorty stresses. The 
aim of some writers (Plato, Heidegger, Proust or Nabokov) is to find 
"private perfection", the aim of other writers (Dickens, Mill, Dewey, 
Orwell, Habermas or Rawls) is to serve "human freedom". They 
cannot be evaluated on a common scale, making some inferior or
65 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 92.
66 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 142.
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superior to others. Just like there is no "aim of writing", there is also 
no "aim of theorizing".67 It does not help to contrast both kinds of 
"writers" (rather than philosophers and writers, let us add) with each 
other -  writers of "self-creation" against writers of "solidarity" -  as 
there is no higher, synthesizing account that could grasp self-creation 
and justice, private perfection and solidarity, in a single view. It was 
precisely the search for such a "synoptic vision", a single account, that 
first brought about and then directed Rorty's interest in philosophy. 
How is one to bring one's "Trotsky" and one's "wild orchids" into 
agreement, he asks in an autobiographical text, how is one to be at the 
same time a "friend of humanity" and an "intellectual and spiritual 
snob"?68 The answer to that pervasive question appears only in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, for in Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature this question, fundamental to Rorty's thought, remained 
untouched (although that text contains many themes forecasting 
Rorty's solution to the problem).69 The answer which is given 
simultaneously takes away from philosophy the hope of ever 
reaching such an account, such a vision (which is impossible on the 
level of theory): it states that the vocabulary of self-creation is private, 
non-shared and incompatible with argumentation, whereas the 
vocabulary of justice is public and common, a means serving, 
precisely, argumentation. These two vocabularies, like the aims that 
Rorty's two kinds of writers have in common, as well as the 
requirements of self-creation and of solidarity, are "equally valid, yet 
forever incommensurable", in his memorable expression.70 Between 
the private and the public there seems to be no opposition, but 
instead a tension -  and incommensurability.
Coming to the end of this little story, let us say that literature (and 
the novel in particular) has a settled position in Rorty's philosophical 
conception: in the face of the powerlessness of Continental 
philosophy on the one hand and the cultural demise of analytic 
philosophy on the other, in the face of the restricted influence of
67 Ibidem, p. 141.
68 Richard Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", op. cit., p. 143.
69 See prefiguartions of "self-creational" themes in PMN, e.g. pp. 359-360.
70 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. xv.
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philosophy in general on delicate matters of social life in a time of the 
collapse of the traditional Enlightenment figure of the intellectual, the 
chance, perhaps the last chance, of shaping liberal sensitivity is 
provided by the novel (and let us bear in mind that we belong to a 
culture that was not only nourished by the "Bible, Socrates, Plato, and 
the Enlightenment" but also, as Rorty says, by "Rabelais, Montaigne, 
Sterne, Hogarth and Mark Twain").71 That may be the reason why 
Rorty invests all his "pragmatic" hopes in literature, leaving 
philosophy with the role of adviser or of "Romantic", of individual 
self-creation. Thereby he replaces the critical and yet softened tooth of 
philosophical thinking (partially saved in Lyotard's idea of 
"resistance through writing"72 or "bearing witness to differends" 
from The Differend, in the late Foucault's texts on Kant and the 
Enlightenment,73 or in Derrida's attempted transcendence of both 
philosophy and literature in order to deconstruct their philosophical 
opposition by means of particular "acts of reading") with the 
sharpened and newly valued tooth of the novelist. Nevertheless, his 
general perspective is rather pessimistic: intellectuals cannot do much 
today, aside from those writers among them that are most needed by 
liberal society. As for the philosopher, well, let him for the moment 
just advise us that it is important to read novels...
71 Richard Rorty in Lire Rorty, ed. by J.-P. Cometti, op. cit., p. 184.
72 Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard, "An Interview", Theory, Culture b  Society, vol. 5, 1988, 
p. 302.
73 Michel Foucault, "Qu'est-ce que les Lumieres?", Magazine litteraire, no. 309, 
1993, pp. 63-73; Michel Foucault, "The Art of Telling the Truth" in Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture, ed. by L.D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 86-95.
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From a (specifically postmodern) French perspective, these issues 
could be seen as partly obsolete. And Rorty could be seen as a 
traditional metaphysician engaged in outdated, modern questions 
that should have been rejected as uninteresting a long time ago. In 
this context, let us merely think about the country and patriotism, the 
citizen and his/her national loyalty, the figure of the intellectual and 
his/her social responsibilities, as well as about the reformulation of 
Sartrean "engagement" in the form of the opposition between 
"agents" and "spectators" of the public arena (or about, in very harsh 
terms, the Left's "disengagement from practice [that] produces 
theoretical hallucinations".2 In Achieving Our Country, Rorty is in the 
midst of current public concerns -  again, as a philosopher, 
intellectual, academic and citizen. I find that multi-faceted side of 
Rorty is very interesting and highly provocative -  to philosophers, 
intellectuals, academics and citizens alike. He constantly reaches for 
new audiences and appears to be inspiring to new readers; that is 
partly where his genius comes from.3 The academic Left in Rorty's 
view is generally publicly and politically irrelevant in any direct way. 
Rorty's pragmatism and its applications contained in the book, on the 
other hand, are certainly not.
1.
When reading Achieving Our Country, it is important to bear in mind 
that Rorty is American. Therefore, his view of the Left, of the 
intellectual, of the nation-state, patriotism, cosmopolitanism and 
globalization must be seen in this particular American context (the 
most obvious counter-example would be, in most general terms, 
peculiarly "French" perceptions of all the above). I am in agreement 
with Rorty when, in the opening paragraph of the book, he says that
2 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 94.
3 See David L. Hall, Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet o f the New Pragmatism (New 
York: SUNY Press, 1994) and Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers, 
vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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"[e]motional involvement with one's country -  feelings of intense 
shame or of glowing pride aroused by various parts of its history, and 
by various present-day national policies -  is necessary if political 
deliberation is to be imaginative and productive".4 However, I would 
also be inclined to supplement the involvement to which Rorty refers 
with other involvements he rarely mentions: the emotional 
involvement with one's smaller or bigger region (for example, with 
Europe), or with the planet, which still sounds awkward, but for 
some people is increasingly important in describing their emotional 
identities and loyalties. Rorty's approach to America raises issues of 
parallel loyalties and parallel emotional involvement: global loyalties 
(and global concerns) are the best examples here.
The problem is how to balance parallel loyalties in a time of the 
(relative) decline of the nation state and its confrontation with new 
supranational and regional, political and economic entities. America, 
with its strong patriotic feelings, national consciousness and national 
pride, especially following 11 September 2001, is one of the world's 
few counter-examples to the general trends. Europe, on the contrary, 
is in the process of a deep-reaching social, political and economic 
integration. What counts to many in terms of their emotions and 
loyalties, are certainly their national "countries", but also their 
"regions", or their "Europe", or, finally, their "planet". In other 
words, what is increasingly visible to many, with the advent of 
globalization and its technological and communication revolutions, is 
the global dimension. So the questions are: what does "global 
citizenship" mean, both in the world and in the United States? What 
is the sense of "cosmopolitanism" and "patriotism" today? What is 
global democracy and global awareness among citizens of nation­
states?5 Rorty's book is clearly about America, and it is obviously not 
a good place to look for discussion of the above issues.
Without getting into too much detail at this point, I would suggest 
that Rorty, in his explicitly "American" book, is somehow stuck (and
4 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 3.
5 See David Held and Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, 
Global Tranformations. Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
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rightly so) in the perspective of (Ulrich Beck's) "first modernity" and 
he clearly underestimates the "second modernity", i.e., he remains 
attached to the national rather than post-national framework of 
thinking. It was Zygmunt Bauman who was the first to formulate the 
following advice (and he clearly had in mind sociologists when 
suggesting a "sociology of postmodernity" rather than "postmodern 
sociology"): "the model of postmodernity, unlike the models of 
modernity, cannot be grounded in the realities of the nation state, by 
now clearly not a framework large enough to accommodate the 
decisive factors in the conduct of interaction and the dynamics of 
social life".6
Rorty's preoccupation with the American nation, patriotism, and 
the country clearly shows his public preferences: the United States in 
its local contexts (although he understands the global context very 
well and is simply not developing this aspect much further beyond 
his sketchy discussions about globalization). America is a special 
place and a special nation. More importantly though, it plays a special 
role in the theories and practices of globalization.7 Rorty tells us a 
different story -  an important story, but still parallel to other possible 
stories grounded in new, possibly "second", "post-national", 
"cosmopolitan" accounts of America, its Left and its intellectuals. It 
would be interesting to see how the told and untold (national and 
post-national) stories interrelate.
To sum up, it would be useless to look in Rorty for a perspective 
that would not be American, and especially for a global perspective. 
However, this is not surprising if we take into consideration his 
numerous declarations of the cultural and geographical deter­
mination of his new pragmatism and his frequent references, from 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature onwards, to "us relatively leisured 
intellectuals, inhabiting a stable and prosperous part of the world", 
i.e., to American academics.8
6 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodemity (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 65.
7 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization. A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
8 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 
p. 359.
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2.
Whenever Rorty, in many of his books and papers, uses the term 
"intellectual" in all its ambivalence (of which he is perfectly aware) 
with respect to America, a feeling surfaces that the term does not fit 
his American usage. However, there is no other term of similar calibre 
in English. "The intellectual" was born in Continental France a 
hundred years ago and what immediately comes to mind is the Zola- 
to-Sartre (and perhaps to the "middle" Foucault) sequence of 
generally leftist thinkers, writers, artists and academics.9 The word 
carries with it the images of protests, rallies, declarations, marches, 
riots and petitions.10 The intellectual, as Sartre put it in a memorable 
formula, is "someone who meddles in what is not his business and 
claims to question both received truths and the accepted behavior 
inspired by them, in the name of a global conception of man and of 
society".11 This is also echoed in Edward Said's conception of the 
intellectual as "disturber of the status quo".12 In the past two decades, 
Rorty has repeatedly mentioned that the last American intellectual 
was Dewey.13 The word itself is unpopular, often sounds awkward 
and sometimes offensive (as Allan Stoekl put it in his Agonies of the 
Intellectual): "[b]ut have we ever had a Zola, a Sartre, even a Foucault 
-  let alone a Heidegger?"14 It is very difficult to discuss the future of 
the Left in the context of modern intellectuals as their age may 
already have ended (in a modern and Continental sense of the term 
and in Continental francophone postmodern philosophy). At the
9 See Keith A. Reader, Intellectuals and the Left in France Since 1968 (London: 
MacMillan, 1987); Allan Stoekl, Agonies of the Intellectual (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1992).
10 See Jean-Frangois Sirinelli, Intellectuels et Passions Frangaises: Manifestes et 
Petitions au XXe siecle (Paris: Fayard, 1990).
11 Jean-Paul Sartre, "A Plea for Intellectuals" in his Between Existentialism and 
Marxism, transl. by J. Mathews (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 230.
12 Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual (London: Vintage, 1994), p. x.
13 For the early Rorty on Dewey see Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982).
14 Allan Stoekl, Agonies o f the Intellectual, op. cit., p. 2.
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same time, there is no other word to substitute for the one Rorty uses, 
either in Europe or in the United States.
The authority of the modern intellectual was founded upon the 
idea of history that is developing toward its "natural" end -  toward 
the emancipation of humanity from "poverty, ignorance, superstition 
and lack of entertainment".15 The intellectual was listened to as a 
"spokesman of universality", a "conscience of us all", says Foucault in 
turn.16 Or, as Rorty puts it in a different way, philosophy since the 
times of the Enlightenment became for the intellectual a substitute for 
religion, became that part of culture in which one "would find the 
vocabulary and the convictions which permitted one to explain and 
justify one's activity as an intellectual, and thus to discover the 
significance of one's life".17
An intellectual par excellence was a writer speaking from the 
position of man, humanity, nation, proletariat etc.; describing and 
analyzing the current situation from the point of view of the 
abovementioned entities, identifying himself with a subject endowed 
with a universal value and, in the name of it, advising what people 
should do in order for the progress to last. "Responsibility of an 
intellectual is inseparable from a (shared) idea of a universal 
subject".18 But that idee d'un sujet universel, just like the idea of 
unquestionable universality, belongs to the times from Zola to Sartre, 
at least in France.19 These are the times of modem commitment 
legitimated by the metanarrative of emancipation (a part of a cultural 
"project of modernity") that may already be over. What is perhaps the 
case is that the cultural fertility of a certain historical proposal has 
been exhausted, and thus the role of an intellectual legitimated within 
that project, and by that proposal, may have collapsed.
15 jean-Frangois Lyotard, "An Interview", Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 5,1988, p. 302.
16 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power" in Power/Knowledge (Brighton: Harvester 
Press, 1980), p. 126.
17 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature, op. cit., p. 4.
18 Jean-Frangois Lyotard, Tombeau de L’intellectuel et Autres Papiers (Paris: Galilee, 
1984), p. 12.
19 See Dernieres Questions Aux Intellectuels, ed. by Pascal Ory (Paris: Olivier Orban, 
1990); Pascal Ory and Jean-Frangois Sirinelli, Les Intellectuels en France, de TAffaire 
Dreyfus a nos jours (Paris: Armand Colin, 1986).
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Rorty is very concrete in his thinking about "intellectuals" -  he 
generally speaks of the American intellectual of the end of the 
twentieth century as one who works at the university. On the other 
hand, Zygmunt Bauman, Jean-Frangois Lyotard and Michel Foucault 
write about the intellectual "in general", basically by abstracting from 
the national situation in England, France or anywhere else. Although 
Rorty often reminds us about the different situation of the intellectual 
in different countries, he clearly restricts his reflections to the 
American intellectual, both in his earlier writings and, certainly, as 
emphasized by the very subtitle -  "Leftist Thought in Twentieth 
Century America" -  in Achieving Our Country. He is very consistent 
about this in the book -  a story about the American intellectual today 
seen in the context of his/her intellectual and political transformation 
in the twentieth century, as if a contemporary version of Julien 
Benda's "betrayal of the intellectual".
3.
We come now to the issue of modern thought, postmodern thought, 
and the global age. The question is to what extent even postmodern 
thought (post-Nietzschean, non-foundational, postmetaphysical, 
interpretive rather than legislative etc., referring to various sets of 
descriptions by various thinkers) must take into account recent social, 
cultural (and economic) changes brought about by globalization? 
What does globalization mean for the new pragmatism in this 
particular case? What is philosophically -  from the pragmatist's point 
of view -  more significant to the society or to the state (with some 
notable geographical exceptions): the demise of the cultural and 
philosophical project of modernity, or the dawn of the global age, 
with its hardly acceptable but omnipresent priority of economy and 
market, to democracy and the state (which is Rorty's "money" 
perspective, mentioned several times in Achieving Our Country as the 
one totally absent among the academic Left)? Sociology keeps trying 
to develop its new post-national "framework of reference" with the 
works of Giddens, Bauman and Beck who are afraid of their
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discipline becoming obsolete and irrelevant in an increasingly 
postnational and globalizing world.20 What about philosophy? What 
can Rorty's new pragmatism do vis-a-vis the social and human 
challenges of globalization?
These are very serious challenges, but it was Rorty who suggested 
that some questions die with their epochs, and it is uninteresting to 
ask others when a new epoch is just round the corner. The questions 
of democracy, to give an example, seem to require a brand new 
context today, perhaps a brand new language on the part of social 
sciences (the best arguments in favour of it were provided recently by 
Ulrich Beck, and David Held with his collaborators).
Rorty's excellently pessimistic contemplation of the world of 
globalization testifies to his understanding that quite soon some 
problems raised in Achieving Our Country may indeed become 
obsolete. It is very hard to align his explicit pessimism about future 
developments in society and the economy related to globalization 
processes with the "hopeful" and "future-oriented" brand of 
philosophizing presented thus far. (The pragmatist theme of "hope", 
Rorty's trademark, will be discussed separately in more detail below). 
Somehow Rorty's "possible world", reminiscent of Orwell's 1984 and 
seen as a potentiality of globalization (and developed not so much as 
a "possible world" anymore in inter alia "Globalization, the Politics of 
Identity, and Social Hope" from his recent Philosophy and Social 
Hope21) is as gloomy as Foucault's studies of the omnipresence and 
omnipotence of power from the 1970s. It is useful to give an example 
of Rorty's perception of the dark side of globalization here (with 
which I am, I must hasten to add, in full agreement):
Globalization is producing a world economy in which an attempt by any one 
country to prevent the immiserization of its workers may result only in 
depriving them of employment. The world economy will soon be owned by a 
cosmopolitan upper class which has no more sense of community with any 
workers anywhere than the great American capitalists of the year 1900 had
20 See e.g. Anthony Giddens, Consequences o f Modernity (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991).
21 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (New York: Penguin Books, 1999).
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with the immigrants who manned their enterprises ... This frightening 
economic cosmopolitanism has, as a by-product, an agreeable cultural 
cosmopolitanism ... If the formation of hereditary castes continues 
unimpeded, and if the pressures of globalization create such castes not only 
in the United States but in all the old democracies, we shall end up in an 
Orwellian world ... The aim will be to keep the minds of the proles elsewhere 
-  to keep the bottom 75 per cent of Americans and the bottom 95 per cent of 
the world's population busy with ethnic and religious hostilities, and with 
debates about sexual mores.22
It is interesting to note the consistently philosophical dimension of 
Rorty's suggestion to American intellectuals to "tell inspiring stories" 
in the opening paragraphs of Achieving Our Country. "Those who 
hope to persuade a nation to exert itself need to remind their country 
of what it can take pride in as well as what it should be ashamed of. 
They must tell inspiring stories about episodes and figures in the nation's 
past -  episodes and figures to which the country should remain true. 
Nations rely on artists and intellectuals to create images of, and to tell 
stories about, the national past. Competition for political leadership is 
in part a competition between differing stories about a nation's self- 
identity, and between differing symbols of its greatness".23 "Telling 
stories" is exactly what (pragmatist) philosophers should do. As 
Rorty explains in "Texts and Lumps" (reprinted in Philosophical 
Papers, vol. 1), "the pragmatist philosopher has a story to tell about his 
favourite, and least favoured, books -  the texts of, for example, Plato, 
Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey and Russell. He would like other 
people to have stories to tell about other sequences of texts, other 
genres -  stories which fit together with his".24 "Telling stories" is one 
of the strongest and most visible themes in Rorty's philosophical 
writings generally. It marks his passage from (grand) theories to 
narratives, from telling the truth to maintaining the conversation of 
humankind, present already in his Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature
22 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., pp. 85-88.
23 Ibidem, pp. 3-4, emphases mine.
24 Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativity, and Truth. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 81, emphasis mine.
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(1979) and criticized strongly ever since. However, there is a crucial 
difference between telling stories about past philosophers and 
their books and telling (inspiring) stories about a nation's past: 
philosophers write about past books, intellectuals qua intellectuals 
write about past events. Both do so while thinking about the future. But 
the competition between them in both philosophy and in public life is 
similar, and here comes another set of Rortyan themes: that of 
persuasion, rhetoric and pragmatic effectiveness.25 The most persuasive 
stories about past philosophy win (and hence our changing view of 
what counts and what does not count, or what is still useful and what 
is dead, and who our intellectual predecessors are in philosophy and 
who are not -  all of which form our very personal philosophical 
identity, as do, apparently, the most persuasive accounts of our 
national pasts). Just as "interesting philosophy is rarely an examination 
of the pros and cons of a thesis" and usually it is a "contest"26 between 
an old and a new vocabulary (vision, metaphor, utopia), so public life 
should be a competition of "differing stories" about a nation's past, 
leading to the inspirational belief in its future.
Rorty presents in his writings a very clear "division of labour" 
between philosophers on the one hand, and artists, novelists and 
intellectuals on the other. Increasingly, in Rorty's account, ironist 
philosophy becomes publicly useless at best, dangerous at worst; it 
becomes "more important for the pursuit of private perfection rather 
than for any social task".27 On the other hand, to achieve more human 
solidarity and less human suffering, it is ethnography, journalism, the 
movie, and, especially, the novel that are more useful than "the 
sermon and the treatise",28 i.e., more useful than traditional theology 
and philosophy. Surprisingly enough, artists and novelists in Rorty 
are located on the public side of life (and that of solidarity), while
25 Marek Kwiek, Rorty's Elective Affinities: The New Pragmatism and Postmodern 
Thought (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 1996).
26 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 9.
27 Ibidem, p. 94.
28 Ibidem, p. xvi.
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philosophers, especially ironists opposed to metaphysicians, are 
located on the private side (and that of self-creation). What actually 
leads in Rorty to moral change and human progress is the novel 
rather than philosophy.
One of the serious mistakes of the followers of postmodern French 
philosophy in America (from whom the members of the academic 
Left predominantly recruit themselves) be it (some) admirers of 
Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Lacan or, finally, Paul de Man, is the 
belief that philosophy can be applied directly to politics. The crucial 
passage (from Rorty's "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?") 
draws an important distinction between a "private writer" and a 
"writer with a public mission":
The quarrel about whether Derrida has arguments thus gets linked to a 
quarrel about whether he is a private writer -  writing for the delight of us 
insiders who share his background, who find the same rather esoteric things 
as funny or beautiful or moving as he does -  or rather a writer with a public 
mission, someone who gives us weapons with which to subvert 
"institutionalized knowledge" and thus social institutions.29
Philosophers with "a public mission" are dangerous, and politics 
is not exactly attacking social institutions from the inside of 
the academy with (theoretical) "weapons" provided by decon­
structionism, feminism, or Foucauldianism in their various mani­
festations.
Rorty's criticism of the academic Left and academic politics did 
not start with Achieving Our Country. It goes back (at least) as far as 
1989 when he delivered the Romanell Lectures at the University of 
Virginia (reprinted as "De Man and the Academic Cultural Left" in 
Essays on Heidegger and Others), as well as to his "Two Cheers for the 
Cultural Left" and his entry about "Deconstruction" in The Cambridge 
History o f Literary Criticism in the mid-1990s. It is crucial to see Rorty's 
criticism in Achieving Our Country in the context provided by his 
earlier philosophical writings about the academic Left and his
29 Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 120, emphases mine.
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pragmatic criticism of Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and De Man. 
Otherwise it is relatively easy to misunderstand the philosophical 
motives behind his harsh criticism. Let me recall just a few ideas from 
"De Man and the American Cultural Left", already expressed in 1989:
The American Cultural Left, however, influenced by Foucault as well as De 
Man, sees the contemporary democratic states, including our own, as either 
imperialist powers or disciplinary societies or both ... Just as the Marxists in 
the 1930s thought of Dewey as "the philosopher of American imperialism", 
so the contemporary Cultural Left views us pragmatists as at best socially 
irresponsible and at worst apologists for a repressive ideology.30
The cultural Left in that older description, much intensified in 
Achieving Our Country a decade later, wants the "special talents and 
competencies" (of philosophers, historians or literary critics) "to be 
directly applicable to political purposes", wants its specialized skills 
to be "politically relevant".31 Or in still another description, the 
academic Left, as does Hillis Miller, "takes both literature and 
philosophy far too seriously".32 If, for reading Achieving Our Country, 
we needed Rorty's single previous paradefinition of the "cultural 
Left", it would be (following Henry Gates) a "'Rainbow Coalition' of 
deconstructionists, feminists, people working in gay and ethnic 
studies, and so on. Members of the cultural Left typically believe that 
we have recently acquired a radically new understanding of 
the nature of language and of literature" and they are deploying 
"new philosophic-literary weapons" to "reinvigorate leftist social 
criticism" 33 Foucault, Derrida and De Man play, for today's radicals 
of the Left, the role that Marx, Lenin and Trotsky played fifty years 
ago, in Rorty's description in "Deconstruction". At the same time 
Rorty is well aware that deconstructionist literary criticism is merely 
one of the symptoms of a much deeper change of, and distrust 
towards, the self-image of the Western intellectual.
30 Ibidem, p. 133.
31 Ibidem, p. 133.
32 Ibidem, p. 136.
33 Ibidem, p. 129.
Agents, Spectators, and Social Hope: Richard Rorty and American Intellectuals 61
That is the picture of the academic Left that reappears in many of 
Rorty's texts from the 1990s onwards, and it is crucial to understand 
this context while reading Rorty's bashing of the Left in his book on 
intellectuals. Rorty's academic Left in more philosophical terms is 
represented by those who took melancholic and pessimistic 
postmodern French philosophy (combined with Nietzsche in French 
interpretations of Deleuze, Klossowski or Derrida) "far too seriously" 
and who believed they had found a "method" for reading the social 
fabric that was subversive, revolutionary and, primarily, "scientific". 
Rorty, on the other hand, is optimistic, future-oriented, reformist and 
clearly "methodophobic" (against theory, against method, giving 
priority to democracy above philosophy; priority to literary culture 
above philosophical and scientific culture). At the same time the 
academic Left represents for Rorty an "unfortunate regression to the 
Marxist obsession with scientific rigour".34
Thus there are serious philosophical reasons, apart from clearly 
public and political ones, why Rorty cannot agree with the academic 
Left: the distrust of a scientific method, an ironic stance towards the 
public; the sharing of "hope" as opposed to gaining access to 
"knowledge" and, at the forefront, a disbelief in the usefulness of 
"theory" in solving social problems and advancing revolutions.
4.
Let us recall now the serious charges leveled against the Left in 
Achieving Our Country and discuss them in more detail. Firstly, the 
difference between the current academic Left (with the reservations 
outlined above about the scope of the term used) and the Left of the 
1930s is that between "agents" and "spectators".
Paradoxically enough, Rorty seems to agree with the diagnosis 
provided by Allan Bloom in his Closing o f the American Mind that "the 
spirit of detached spectatorship ... may already have entered such a 
student's soul".35 Incidentally, for both it is Nietzsche who is to be held
34 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 37.
35 Ibidem, pp. 9,11.
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responsible for the degeneration of the American academy (Bloom's 
story was distinctly about "how higher education has failed democracy 
and impoverished the souls of today's students"36). Because the current 
academic Left becomes spectatorial and retrospective, it therefore 
"ceases to be a Left".37 Furthermore, it has "no projects to propose" and 
"no vision of a country to be achieved".38 It is a "spectatorial, 
disgusted, mocking Left"39 It prefers to "theorize"40 and to have 
"knowledge" rather than to share "hope".41 It represents "a retreat 
from practice to theory"42 and lacks "national pride".43
Rorty uses formulations that go to the very heart of the disciplines 
the Left especially likes to cultivate, the books it tends to write, the 
lessons it tends to teach its students, and to the heart of its current 
public status. The formulations are devastating and it is certainly hard 
to forget the most biting of them, especially for those who have not 
yet realized the depth of the dividing line between French 
postmodern philosophy in its various versions (and in different 
American appropriations) and Rorty's new pragmatism.44 Rorty uses 
the power of his rhetoric to denounce publicly the cultural pessimism 
of the Left in sentences like "hopelessness has become fashionable in 
the Left -  principled, theorized, philosophical hopelessness",45 or to 
denounce its social utility when he states that "it exaggerates the 
importance of philosophy to politics, and wastes its energy on 
sophisticated theoretical analyses of the significance of current 
events",46 which reminds us of Vincent Descombes' criticism of 
contemporary French thought in his reflections on "philosophy of
36 Allan Bloom, The Closing o f the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1988).
37 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 14.
38 Ibidem, p. 15.
39 Ibidem, p. 35.
40 Ibidem, p. 36.
41 Ibidem, p. 36.
42 Ibidem, p. 37.
43 Ibidem, p. 38.
44 See Marek Kwiek, Rorty's Elective Affinities, op. cit.
45 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 37.
46 Ibidem, p. 37.
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current events", as well as Rorty's leading theme of the "priority of 
democracy to philosophy".
The Left in Rorty's view provides no clues for reading the world, 
and for passing from theory to practice. As he put it in a memorable 
criticism of Frederick Jameson: "[A]fter reading Jameson, you have 
views on practically everything except what needs to be done".47 The 
thinking of the Left is too abstract, "too high to encourage any 
particular political initiative".48 Not only do Leftist scholars produce 
"many thousands of books which present scholastic philosophizing at 
its worst" but they also offer "the most abstract and barren 
explanations imaginable" 49 Finally, their "spectatorial approach" to 
the problems of the country and its "disengagement from practice" 
produces "theoretical hallucinations".50 These are harsh words 
indeed, clearly resulting from Rorty's public passion and backed by 
philosophical assumptions of his new pragmatism.
The academic Left, in Rorty's reading, retreats from secularism 
and revives ineffability.
We are told over and over again that Lacan has shown human desire to be 
inherently unsatisfiable, that Derrida has shown meaning to be undecidable, 
that Lyotard has shown commensuration between oppressed and oppressors 
to be impossible and that events such as the Holocaust or the massacre of the 
original Americans are unrepresentable.51
At the same time the Left is unable to "engage in national politics". If 
globalization is the single most important social challenge to America 
at the turn of the century, Rorty's denouncement of the Left as having 
nothing to say about it sounds like a serious charge. There is 
admittedly a challenge, but "it is not the sort of Left which can be 
asked to deal with the consequences of globalization".52
47 Ibidem, p. 78.
48 Ibidem, p. 78.
49 Ibidem, p. 93.
50 Ibidem, p. 94.
51 Ibidem, pp. 36-37. See also Richard Rorty, "Discussion entre Jean-Fran^ois 
Lyotard et Richard Rorty", Critique, no. 456,1985.
52 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 91.
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One line of criticism about Rorty's account of globalization and its 
effects concerns his optimistic belief that "we intellectuals, who are 
mostly academics, are ourselves quite well insulated, at least in the 
short run, from the effects of globalization".53 I cannot agree with 
Rorty here. This paper is not an appropriate forum in which to 
develop the theme of "the university and globalization" but it is 
certainly true that the world of economy and of the market is 
knocking at what have thus far been the closed doors of the academy. 
The literature about market forces invading the university, "the 
entrepreneurial university", "academic capitalism", "leasing the ivory 
tower", as well as about the end of collegiality, the introduction of 
economic rationality and corporate governance in higher education, 
threats to academic freedom and increasing market orientation 
abound worldwide. The countries affected most strongly are, for 
example, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as those 
countries, mainly in Latin America, which are reforming their higher 
education systems under the influence of the World Bank. It is a 
crucial topic in thinking about intellectuals if intellectuals, as Rorty 
rightly claims in the case of America, are mostly academics. The 
transformations pertaining to academics pertain at the same time to 
intellectuals -  and it is not a cultural-philosophical version of French 
theorists (the collapse of the figure of the intellectual associated with 
the end of modernity as a cultural project, the end of the 
Enlightenment ideals of the power/knowledge etc.), but a very 
practical version described by numerous anglophone sociologists and 
higher education scholars in recent decades.54
5.
Rorty's hotly debated proposal to "put a moratorium on theory"55 is 
hardly surprising in the context of his new pragmatism. It is fully 
understandable in the case of the philosopher for whom it is clear that
53 Ibidem, p. 89.
54 See Chapter 10.
55 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 91.
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America does not need further political revolutions, but merely small 
steps in the spirit of reformism. The theory of social democracy is not 
needed for reforms in laws or regulations or for step-by-step 
piecemeal changes. Big theories are useful for major political 
revolutions but do not seem to come in handy in small revisions of 
what is already achieved. Additionally, it is also useful to see the 
proposal in a strictly American sense where "theory" (in academic 
circles) simply means any French-inspired postmodern way of 
thinking (as in a once famous collection of essays, Against Theory, or in 
Paul de Man's Resistance to Theory). It would be tempting to limit 
Rorty's proposal to "postmodern theory" but clearly it is wider and 
concerns abstract social theorizing instead of concrete engagement for 
a particular cause on the part of the academic Left.
The academic Left seems to play the tunes of scholarship and 
citizenship at the same time: those of professors of prestigious 
universities and those of devastating critics of the system and 
unmaskers of its dirty political tricks. For them "reformism is not 
good enough",56 but at the same time they have nothing to say about 
an alternative system. As Rorty puts it:
"[T]he system" is sometimes identified as "late capitalism", but the cultural 
Left does not think much about what the alternatives to a market economy 
might be, or about how to combine political freedom with centralized 
economic decision making. Nor does it spend time asking whether 
Americans are undertaxed, or how much of a welfare state the country can 
afford, or whether the United States should back out of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. When the Right proclaims that socialism has failed, 
and that capitalism is the only alternative, the cultural Left has little to say in 
reply. For it prefers not to talk about money. Its principal enemy is a mind-set 
rather than a set of economic arrangements ... 57
It is useful to remember, at the same time, that the registers of 
scholarship and leftist (or civic) engagement are different. The 
academic Left should not be criticized by Rorty for the thousands of 
intelligent or naive books they wrote, as they come as part and parcel
56 Ibidem, p. 78.
57 Ibidem, pp. 78-79.
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of the academic enterprise and we would be arriving at a very 
difficult question about which books, in the long run, are intelligent 
and which are not (let us think of Hegel or Nietzsche in this context, 
and their extremely difficult prose, hardly readable to their own 
German contemporaries). It is not the books and the theories per se 
that beg criticism; it is the lack of their public and social relevance, 
accompanied by explicit pretensions of taking part in a social 
revolution. Rorty's criticism of all books and theories presented by the 
academic Left qua scholars is misguided. On the other hand, his 
criticism of books and theories that are declared "weapons" in 
political struggles with "the system", political, subversive acts of 
resistance, seems absolutely right. (Thinking of Sartre in this context, 
let us recall his famous statement in "What is Literature": "[a] day 
comes when the pen is forced to stop, and the writer must then take 
up arms".58) I am in agreement with Rorty when he criticizes the 
cultural Left for being haunted by "ubiquitous specters",59 especially 
by "power" in a Foucauldian sense. However, it would certainly be 
much more useful in political terms if the Left saw the power as 
described in current globalization debates -  the power as analyzed in 
political science, political economics and some sections of sociology. I 
refer to the power of, for example, transnational corporations, 
transnational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
or the World Bank, to power in the context of the changing relations 
between the market and the state, or the economy and politics, and 
the whole complex of issues associated with these global shifts which 
are analyzed in contemporary globalization studies. Certainly, Rorty 
is right when he argues that the academic Left cannot be asked to deal 
with the consequences of globalization (including Zygmunt Bauman's 
"human consequences" of it).
With reference to Rorty's persuasive rhetoric, it is interesting to 
note his mocking observation that it is only humiliations for reasons
58 See Jeremy Jennings & A. Kemp-Welch, Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus 
Affair to Salman Rushdie (London & New York: Routledge, 1997) and Intellectuals in 
Twentieth-Century France. Mandarins and Samurais, ed. by Jeremy Jennings (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1993).
59 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 94.
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other than economic status that count for the Left: "nobody is setting 
up a program in unemployed studies, homeless studies, or trailer- 
park studies, because the unemployed, the homeless, and residents of 
trailer parks are not "others" in the relevant sense".60 Rorty is indeed 
correct here, but it would be hard to avoid "real politics" (and keep 
substituting it with "cultural politics") if the Left began "talking about 
money". Under globalization pressures, talking seriously about 
almost anything politically relevant without clear reference to 
"economy" (and market) looks misguided. It is one of the most 
pervading themes of the global age -  the replacement of "politics" 
with "economy", the addition of an economic dimension to all social 
discussions, in various parts of the world and with different 
intensity.61
I am very hesitant about Rorty's dismissive attitude towards 
"taking the long view" and "looking beyond nationhood to a global 
polity" and his view of both as "useless".62 Rorty is correct if he 
means future philosophical visions of "the theory", or of the generally 
French philosophy-inspired humanities. Philosophy, and especially 
postmodern French philosophy, may even be an obstacle in carrying 
out useful public-relevant long-term analyses. But forward-looking 
scholars such as Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, 
David Held, Saskia Sassen, Manuel Castells and very many others 
seem to be producing inspiring ideas while taking long views 
(although it is true that none of them is a philosopher). Looking 
forward towards the global age is publicly useful in the long run and 
it may be useless in both the short and long run for the current 
politics of the Left. It is often the level of abstraction that is an obstacle 
in political work. Theoretical language, although necessary, is 
generally useless in politics, including leftist politics. Again, it is 
useful to bear in mind the scholarship/politics split in this context.
60 Ibidem, p. 80.
61 See Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization? transl. by Partick Camiller (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2000); Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
62 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 98.
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So what, according to Rorty, is the Left to do? -  "To start 
proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real 
people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can 
be cured by governmental action".63 The problem is that the Left 
Rorty analyzes is an academic Left and is very weak in the outside 
world. The Left is to speak of "specific social practices and specific 
changes in these practices".64 For the time being it is loud but 
powerless, engaged but abstract, committed but theoretical, 
revolutionary and hallucinatory in books but hopeless in deeds. 
Rorty's critical attitude is reinforced by pretences the Left makes, 
through its revolutionary rhetoric combined with its inability to see 
the outside world. The main problem is how to combine being an 
academic and being a leftist activist, a part of the political movement. 
Rorty is an academic but he never sees his books as revolutionary acts 
of engaged politics, and his philosophical theories as subversive 
"tools" to be used to change "the system". Scholarly books are 
scholarly books, we could try to generalize, and politics is politics. 
"Piecemeal reform within the framework of a market economy"65 -  
Rorty's scope of actions for the Left today -  is far away from 
revolutionary visions of the postmetaphysical and non-phallogocenric 
total revolution.
6 .
It is interesting to think of Rorty's criticism of the "academic Left" 
(often referred to as the "Foucauldian" Left) in the context of his 
overall view of Michel Foucault. Foucault, in Rorty's Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity (1989), is an ironist unwilling to be a liberal. One 
can see some incoherence here, for the liberal is someone for whom -  
according to the definition by Judith Skhlar often referred to in this 
book -  "cruelty is the worst thing we do". Foucault's philosophy is
63 Ibidem, p. 99.
64 Ibidem, p. 103.
65 Ibidem, p. 105.
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filled with images, descriptions and analyses of cruelty over the 
recent centuries. And yet what is crucial for Rorty's new pragmatism 
is social "hope", rather than descriptions and analyses of cruelty: 
"liberal ironists are people who include among these ungroundable 
desires their own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the 
humiliation of human beings by other human beings may cease".66 
The theme of "hope" appears in many of Rorty's texts, including titles 
such as "Method, Social Science, and Social Hope" from Consequences 
of Pragmatism, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope" from Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity or "The End of Leninism, Havel, and Social 
Hope" from Truth and Progress. Finally, his recent Penguin collection 
of essays is entitled Philosophy and Social Hope and has an entire 
section entitled "Hope in Place of Knowledge: A Version of 
Pragmatism" and also includes such texts as "Failed Prophesies, 
Glorious Hopes" or "Globalization, the Politics of Identity and Social 
Hope". I take "hope" to be one of the most important themes in 
Rorty's philosophy. To put it in broad terms, that part of French 
philosophy which followed Heidegger and Nietzsche (often having 
previously abandoned Marx and Hegel) does not seem to leave much 
social hope for the future, being a disillusioned discourse about 
reality rather than a hopeful proposal for the future.67 That is exactly 
what Rorty, as a liberal and democrat, is unable to accept.
The two poles -  hope/hopelessness and the present/future 
(connected with a different attitude towards utopias in the two 
traditions) -  can be seen as determining significant differences 
between Rorty and the majority of French postmodern philosophers. 
It also marks the difference between Rorty and the "academic 
Left" in Achieving Our Country. To quote Rorty again: "hopelessness 
has become fashionable on the Left -  principled, theorized, 
philosophical hopelessness".68 The two poles also include: optimism 
versus melancholy; belief in the salutary power of democracy versus
Agents, Spectators, and Social Hope: Richard Rorty and American Intellectuals 69
66 Richard Rorty, Contingent, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. xv -  emphasis mine.
67 Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980).
68 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country, op. cit., p. 37.
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well-grounded in Rorty's philosophy. Hence Rorty's harsh treatment 
of the major part of contemporary French philosophy in the 1990s. 
(When Michel Foucault takes hope away from his thinking, he 
becomes dangerous. As Rorty puts it in an interview: "Foucault has 
been the most influential figure on the culture of the American Left, 
but his influence has been dangerous. The result has been the 
'disengagement' of intellectuals"78).
The difference between Rortyan pragmatists and the philosophers 
from the Nietzsche-Heidegger-Foucault line (whom the "academic 
Left" in Rorty's descriptions took to heart) consists also in the fact that 
they did not share optimism about the future of liberal, democratic 
societies. Thus, for Rorty's new pragmatism, "hope" has priority over 
"knowledge", "tomorrow" over "yesterday", and finally, "demo­
cracy" over "philosophy". It is crucial to remember, while reading his 
criticism of the Left in Achieving Our Country, that the choices Rorty 
makes in his prioritizing are very well-grounded in his way of 
thinking about philosophy and philosophy's role in culture and, 
consequently, in his account of intellectuals in society.
It is also important to bear in mind while reading Achieving Our 
Country that the intellectuals from the (academic, cultural, 
Foucauldian, etc.). Left do not have much in common with Rorty's 
"liberal ironists". Constructing the figure of the "liberal ironist", 
Rorty notes his own differences with "an ironist who is unwilling to 
be a liberal" and with "a liberal who is unwilling to be an ironist": 
with Michel Foucault and with Jurgen Habermas.79 Neither of them 
fit into his utopia sketched in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 
although for different reasons. According to Rorty,
the citizens of my liberal utopia would be people who had a sense of the 
contingency of their language of moral deliberation, and thus of their 
consciences, and thus of their community. They would be liberal ironists -  ... 
people who combined commitment with a sense of the contingency of their own 
commitment.80
78 Richard Rorty in Giovanna Borradori, The American Philosopher, op. cit., p. 111.
79 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 61.
80 Ibidem, p. 61, emphasis mine.
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Under such conditions, Foucault is not allowed into Rorty's utopia 
because he lacks commitment in the specific Rortyan sense of sharing 
the "hope" mentioned above, while Habermas is committed and full 
of the social hope in question, but does not have a sense of the 
contingency of his own vocabulary of moral reflection. Certainly, 
considerable parts of Rorty's arguments against Foucault can be 
employed against the "academic" Left more generally.
As in the Foucault-Habermas story, Rorty's disagreement with the 
Left is both philosophical and political. Rorty had no doubts 
(contrary, for example, to Habermas81) about possible "we's": 
according to the idea of the "priority of democracy to philosophy", 
the "we" of liberals is quite satisfactory and there is no need to look 
for another "we". Therefore Rorty's differences with Foucault are 
"political", as opposed to his "merely philosophical" differences with 
Habermas.82 It is also interesting to contrast Rorty's and Habermas's 
belief in the significance of philosophy in culture. Rorty does not 
accept "radical social theory", choosing instead (at best) "continual 
social criticism" (in a typescript entitled "Habermas, Derrida and the 
Functions of Philosophy"). That is to say, he prefers criticism as 
provided by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, and 
movie-makers as they are able to show pain and humiliation in their 
tiniest details. What then would guard Rorty's utopia against pain 
and humiliation? Only "particular descriptions" that would force 
reforms. "Only particular descriptions of injury and concrete 
suggestions about ways of avoiding injury".83
Rorty is more dubious than Habermas about the social utility of 
philosophy. Instead, he advises that most of one's liberal hopes for 
the relief of unnecessary, socially-countenanced pain and humiliation 
be put into novels, articles and reports that make specific kinds of 
them visible, and in proposals for changes to social arrangements, 
such as laws, company regulations, administrative procedures or 
educational practices.84 The tone used in Achieving Our Country is
81 See e.g. Jurgen Habermas, The New Conservatism (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989).
82 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 67.
83 Ibidem, p. 17.
84 Ibidem, p. 21.
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very similar indeed to that already employed in Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity: we have enough theory (including 'theory' which is 
mainly of postmodern French inspiration) on the Left; we now need 
concrete proposals for changes in laws and regulations.
In his social thinking, Rorty is clearly in favour of the concrete 
rather than the universal and his choice is motivated by a political 
judgement of rich North Atlantic constitutional democracies, which 
do not need "unmasking" any more and in which "communication" 
is already "undistorted" (to refer to Foucault and Habermas). 
Although such a political choice may be risky, and perhaps mistaken, 
it would be shown only by 'trial and error' rather than by 
(Habermas's) strong theoretical strategies.
Rorty leads his discussion with Lyotard, in turn, towards "our 
different notions of how politically conscious intellectuals should 
spend their time".85 As to whether one should "bear witness" (to 
differends, truth, or the past) this is a question about the intellectual's 
self-image. Reformism or revolution, progress through utopian 
fantasies or through bloodshed -  that is the choice; Rorty has no 
hesitations about his pragmatist choice regarding what to do and 
what to suggest to others:
[W]e Deweyans have a story to tell about the progress of our species, a story 
whose later episodes emphasize how things have been getting better in the 
West during the last few centuries, and which concludes with some 
suggestions about how they might become better still in the next few.86
The difference is the difference in seeing their own tasks, different 
traditions and different obligations. Perhaps in broader terms, 
Lyotard's inclination to look toward the past, against any utopia and 
utopianism, fearing violence and totalitarianism, in a "future- 
oriented" (Rorty) America may sound strange. French philosophers 
are haunted by spectres of the bloody past, a memoire du crime, while 
American philosophers do not seem haunted by any historical event
85 Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativity, and Truth, op. cit., p. 222.
86 Ibidem, p. 212.
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with a similar degree of intensity. The French look with fear to the 
past and wonder what to do so that the past never returns; Americans 
look forward and are bold in inventing social utopias.
7.
Rorty returns to the above philosophical ideals in Achieving Our 
Country once again: there are few new themes present there, but it is 
their new presentation and new application for new, non- 
philosophical audiences that makes this book special and appealing. 
It makes use of the full array of Rorty's pragmatist ideals, with very 
scarce reference to his utopia of "liberal ironists" and to his prolonged 
critical debates with postmodern French philosophy and the Left 
inspired by it. Rorty's criticism of the "academic Left" seems to be a 
small part of a much wider challenge that this version of philosophy 
has been for American social thought over the past two decades. The 
book reaffirms Rorty's firm stance toward the relationship between 
philosophy and politics, expressed many times during the past 
decade or so and is best summarized in his own words in "Truth 
Without Correspondence to Reality" (1994):
It is unfortunate, I think, that many people hope for a tighter link between 
philosophy and politics than there is or can be. In particular, people on the 
left keep hoping for a philosophical view which cannot be used by the 
political right, one which will tend itself only to good causes. But there never 
will be such a view; any philosophical view is a tool, which can be used by 
many different hands.87
This is one of the most manifest differences between Rorty and the 
academic Left, and yet another underlying philosophical theme of 
Achieving Our Country.
87 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, op. cit., p. 23.
Chapter 3
Wolf Lepenies:
Homo Europaeus Intellectualis Revisited
l.
Questions about the intellectual's place and role in society, his tasks 
and obligations, the status he ascribes to himself and that society 
ascribes to him have recently become a significant part of the ongoing 
discourse in the humanities. There are different reasons in different 
countries for this, but whether in English-speaking countries, in 
Germany or, especially, in France, questions about the intellectual 
have been important points of reference in numerous discussions at 
the end of the 20th century. Lepenies' thinking convincingly shows 
that the dominating French discourse on the subject requires a 
significant supplement today, for it depicts merely a part of a larger 
whole which does not confine itself to France alone French questions 
about the intellectual (from the Dreyfus affair at the turn of the 20th 
century to Sartre to, in turn, le silence des intellectuels in the eighties of 
the last century) do not exhaust the catalogue of all the questions that 
can and should be asked today; nor do they restrict our account of the 
issue of the intellectual to the adventure of being seduced by the 
Marxist (or Stalinist) thinking which started with the October 
Revolution of 1917 progressing to the middle of the seventies on the 
part of French writers and philosophers, followed only by their 
disappointment with and gradual distancing from it after the 
Algerian war of independence and the events of 1956 (for it is, indeed, 
possible to see the history of French intellectuals of the 20th century
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also from such a perspective); furthermore, these questions, heading 
mainly back through history -  and mainly to that of the 20th century 
France -  basically pass in silence the present and the future.1
And that is perhaps the most important difference in a discourse 
devoted to the intellectual between Germany (and America) on the one 
hand, and France on the other. The cultural specificity of these 
countries can here account for a lot: America, with the exception of 
Dewey in the thirties, seems not to have had great, public intellectuals, 
nor to have had great discussions about their social engagement and 
the responsibility associated with them and deriving right from French 
history. The socially engaged intellectual like Sartre who not only 
speaks -  but who is listened to as well -  does not find a comfortable 
place in the German tradition (and let us remind ourselves here of 
Lepenies from Between Literature and Science: the Rise of Sociology:
In Germany, writing and reading are traditionally solitary acts, and a
literature consciously concerned with affecting society and firmly anchored
in it has always been counted superficial and un-German.1 2
Perhaps that is the reason why melancholic French thinkers seem to go 
in their discussion backwards, while American and German theorists, to 
risk for a moment a simple overgeneralization, look forward, past the 
present towards the future. America is traditionally a "future-oriented 
country" with its own myths and dreams of the promised land; "the 
American dream" is not the one from intellectual treatises, being rather a 
part and parcel of the social world subjected to a hard test no sooner than 
by the Vietnam war, and most recently by the September the 11th 
tragedy.3 Neither Edward Said, nor Paul Bove, Noam Chomsky or
1 See Tony Judt, Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1992); Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century France. Mandarins and 
Samurais, ed. by Jeremy Jennings (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) and Jeremy 
Jennings and Anthony Kemp-Welch, Intellectuals in Politics. From the Dreyfus Affair to 
Salman Rushdi (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).
2 Wolf Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology, transl. by R.J. 
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 204.
3 The University, Globalization, Central Europe, ed. by Marek Kwiek (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2003).
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Richard Rorty -  to name but a few from among those writing most 
extensively in the USA on the subject of the intellectual at the end of the 
20th century -  return to the moral dilemmas of past events. They rather 
put a different question: what is to be done today?
In a similar manner, German thinkers seem to have looked with 
amazement, at least until it became an international debate, at the 
fierce French discussions on the political engagement of Martin 
Heidegger in 1933, which took place at the end of the eighties -  
regarding the case rather as closed, at least in Germany.4 The French 
specificity, on the other hand, seems to consist in asking questions 
about the present via detours taken with the help of questions asked 
about the past; hence recent returns to Dreyfus, Benda, Sartre, often 
just in order to settle current philosophical accounts and wage current 
philosophical wars.5 So, while thinking about the question of the 
intellectual today, it is important to bear in mind the fact that our 
discourse about this figure remains in the shadow of a historically 
based French discourse on the subject, neglecting to a large extent the 
simultaneously ongoing (not so dramatic, heroic, spectacular!) 
German and American discourses.
2.
The theme of the "intellectual" plays a key role in Wolf Lepenies' 
writings; it seems that his work from Melancholie und Gesellschaft to 
Die Drei Kulturen to Aufstieg und Fall der lntellektuellen in Europa as 
well as to his inaugural lecture in College de France given in 1992 (La 
fin de I'utopie et le retour de la melancolie. Regards sur les intellectuels d'un 
vieux continent) and, finally, numerous articles published in recent 
years can be read right from the perspective of the modern 
intellectual. In the present text I intend to trace Lepenies' account of
4 Marek Kwiek, Dylematy lozsamosci: wokol autowizerunku filozofa w powojennej mysli 
francuskiej [The Dilemmas of Identity. On the Self-Image of the Philosopher in Post- 
War French Thought] (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 1999).
5 See Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas nietzscheens, par Alain Boyer et al. (Paris: 
Grasset, 1991).
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the intellectual and to locate it within the opposition that has 
structured Lepenies' thinking in the recent quarter of a century or so: 
that of melancholy and utopia. The knot of melancholy-utopia- 
intellectual is a knot of three inseparable elements in his thought. 
None of them exists independently in his works: "Melancholy and 
utopia -  it is between these two poles that resides the greatness and 
misery of European intellectuals".6 It is one of the most stimulating, 
most constant -  and fruitful -  themes in his work; the one that 
provides insight into his account of violence and revolution, terror, 
totalitarianism, as well as today's post-Cold-War world. The pair 
provides Lepenies with tools to analyse the situation of intellectuals 
in the West and in the East of Europe after 1989. It turns out today 
that the pair of melancholy/utopia not only enables one to see the 
past of intellectuals from a different perspective, but also enables us 
to take a careful look at their place in today's world, after the -  
simultaneous, as he stresses -  downfall of the two great utopias of 
modernity: the communist utopia of ends and the capitalist utopia of 
means. Lepenies shows us in his works that the pair of 
melancholy/utopia is useful in discussing the role of the intellectuals: 
the specific melancholy of intellectuals which derives from the 
inadequacies of the world they live in and which they are not able to 
change, and their utopia which derives from the inhibition of action 
and transference of unsatisfied dreams from this world to a better 
one. The utopia Lepenies writes about derives from intellectuals' 
melancholy and, at the same time, is a means to cure them from it.
Utopia in Lepenies' account is a product of the representatives of 
a social class that has lost its public and political significance, or a 
class that aspires to have such significance knowing that it is (here 
and now) impossible. Utopia is a shadow of melancholy, its twin. It is 
born whenever a social activity is blocked and reduced to helpless 
passivity. When the possibilities of action decrease, reflection grows, 
but the intellectual-melancholic suffers because he is not able to act -  
he can only think.
6 Wolf Lepenies, La fin de I'utopie et le retour de la melancolie. Regards sur les 
intellectuels d'un vieux continent (Paris: College de France, 1992), p. 20.
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Weltschmertz, melancholy, and hypochondria resulted from the enforced 
hypertrophy of the realm of reflection, from imposed loss of an ability to 
exercise real power, and from the consequent pressure to justify one's 
situation.7
The intellectual turns away from the world in which he is unable to 
act, he retreats from society into himself, suffers from his own fate as 
well as that of the world itself, trying to express this common fate 
(like Paul Valery -  who tries to changer ses doulers en oeuvre) and, 
finally, suffers for what he is left with -  which is merely reflection. 
Homo europaeus intellectualis, as Lepenies named him in his lecture 
given in College de France, is not a social scientist attempting to 
conquer the world in order to understand and to provide prognoses 
about it, nor is he the scientist or the technician. He is the melancholic, 
the intellectual who is chroniquement insatisfait, who thinks and 
doubts, and finally retreats from this world in search of a better one, 
experiencing his powerlessness.
What Lepenies shows in his Melancholy and Society is that utopian 
thinking derives from the lack of satisfaction with the intellectual's 
social status quo. This lack of satisfaction does not in any way lead -  
nor in its intention is supposed to lead -  to action. Utopias, as 
presented by Lepenies, are not revolutionary manifestos which show 
the point of departure (the present miserable state of affairs), the 
point of arrival (the future radiant and happy society) and the ways 
supposed to lead from the former to the latter. It is already in the case 
of the first utopia presented by Robert Burton in Anatomy of 
Melancholy from 1621 that Lepenies expresses the idea in a clear 
manner: Burton "designed his utopia of England because as a poor 
intellectual he could never hope to put his ideas into practice", and 
Utopians, in general, "would not think and design in such a way if 
they were able to act".8 The intellectual-melancholic-utopian while 
producing utopia is a therapist (with respect to himself and his class) 
rather than a revolutionary. Utopia is born out of melancholy and is a
7 Wolf Lepenies, La fin de I'utopie et le retour de la melancolie, op. cit., p. 61.
8 Wolf Lepenies, Melancholy and Society, transl. by J. Gaines and D. Jones 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 146.
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means to fight it. It is supposed to cure its producer rather than the 
world -  to cure him from his chronic lack of satisfaction, unfulfillment 
of his public and political aspirations, and depravation of dreams of 
participation in real political power. Utopia does not call for action -  
"precisely because it is documented in literature, utopian thought is a 
sign of inhibition of action" (p. 146). Action is impossible, and the 
intellectual is an unhappy, unfulfilled man of action.
Utopia as a product of the intellectual-melancholic is organised by 
the notion of order: if in a better world there is no melancholy, then 
there is also no place in it for boredom: utopia
divides time to the last dot, since it would appear easiest to create new life in 
order to preserve utopia (Campanella). Free time does not exist in utopia, 
because there are no empty spaces available to be excluded from the plan. 
Work as well as leisure time is regimented.9
To get rid of melancholy, boredom, ennui, the utopian plan must be 
all-encompassing and order and boredom must be mutually 
exclusive. But the crucial point is that the notion of order, plan, and 
the finite space of possibilities collides with and finally makes 
impossible the very reflection on it. Utopia of the melancholic- 
intellectual is born out of reflection about inadequacies of this world 
but leads to a picture of a better world in which, to quote Lepenies 
once again, "there is no longer any place for reflection, because 
everything is 'in order'".10 When there is no longer any place for 
reflection, one can speak of paradise (for what might one want to 
change in an absolutely perfect world?); when there is no longer any 
place for reflection, though, one can also speak of the hell of 
totalitarianism (in which any change cannot be even thought of). In 
utopia, history unexpectedly stops, comes to a standstill and finds its 
end. Time stops as it is measured by changes. In the new world of 
utopia -  born out of complaints about the inadequacies and 
imperfections of the present world -  nothing else can be changed, or
9 Ibidem, pp. 91-92.
10 Ibidem, p. 147.
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as Lepenies puts it, the space created is "definitive".11 Utopia has 
managed to dispel boredom, get rid of melancholy, make 
hypochondria go -  by stopping time and history.
Let us just remind ourselves that the themes of the "end of history" 
and the "end of thinking" have been present in philosophy at least 
since Hegel's Phenomenology o f Spirit: together with Hegel as a "judging 
self-consciousness" and Napoleon as an "acting self-consciousness", 
history had become completed at the moment of the battle of Jena. 
Hegel cannot do without Napoleon, and the other way round in this 
account -  it is in Napoleon that Hegel finds his certainty of being a sage 
(rather than a mere philosopher) who possesses Absolute Knowledge, 
for it is owing to him that the reality he is describing in Phenomenology 
is definite. The question about man after the end of history -  as well as 
about the intellectual after the end of it -  is a key one for Alexandre 
Kojeve, a great commentator of Hegel in France, who exerted a peculiar 
and long-lasting influence upon the whole generation of French 
thinkers and writers in the period of, roughly, 1930-1960. Kojeve 
would ask what "post-historical" man is supposed to do if action that 
negates reality is no longer necessary, being rather irrational as the 
post-historical world is the world of embodied truth? What about 
human happiness and human satisfaction? Is not man doomed to 
suffer from post-historical boredom? What is he supposed to do with 
his "unemployed negativity" -  the negativite sans emploi of Georges 
Bataille, still another reader of Hegel -  and whom is about to be the 
intellectual, the bearer of this jobless negativity after the end of history? 
What happens with the negativity of someone who, all of a sudden, has 
nothing more to do or, to ask a more fundamental question, and 
following the path indicated in Lepenies' of the impossibility of 
reflection in utopia the moment history comes to a standstill: when 
everything is finally known, and when society is finally perfect, what 
will the intellectual be able to do and will be able to know? (What will 
happen with the whole tradition dating back to Ancient philosophy 
according to which the essence of being human is knowing?) What will 
he be able to write if writing is associated with the ongoing -  1
11 Ibidem, p. 148.
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changeable, never-ending, unpredictable -  history which is about to 
end? Lepenies' answer is unambiguous on this point: with the ban on 
melancholy in the society of the future, there will be no longer any 
place available for reflection, or for the intellectual for that matter. 
Hegel's questions (am I not God if I have possessed Absolute 
Knowledge and have become the first Sage?) that have haunted French 
twentieth-century thought from Kojeve, Bataille, Blanchot to Denis 
Hollier, find in Wolf Lepenies their explicit answer. The following 
could be said: utopia as a product of the melancholic-intellectual is a 
world of which he is no longer a part. The perfect world does not need 
people whose task consists in looking for its imperfections (for "it is 
certainly true that intellectuals can best fulfil their mission as heretics 
and as critics, as deviants and as oppositionals", Lepenies adds 
elsewhere.12 None of the social roles enumerated by him above is 
needed in the world of utopia; furthermore, each of them can easily 
become dangerous there. "Dans l'utopie, la melancolie est strictement 
interdite"... The interdiction existing in literary utopias is in fact 
transformed in societies claiming to be the realisation of utopias into 
the "duty of imposing happiness" -  with the help of violence, if need 
be. Happiness, joyfulness, youthfulness are all characteristics of utopias 
realised so far, like faith, in making new man. The new man in new 
society has to be happy. He is not entitled to express in public his 
unhappiness, his melancholy or lack of satisfaction. He is not allowed 
to discuss, think, or write.
In the suggested opposition between die klagende Klasse and die 
Menschen guten Gewissens (or as he puts it elsewhere I'esp'ece qui se 
plainte and les hommes de bonne conscience,13 Lepenies goes beyond the 
traditional opposition of the "two cultures" put forward by C.P. 
Snow. He shows that the two poles: melancholy and utopia, do not 
affect social scientists, e.g. sociologists. Sociology is precisely the 
"third culture" born out of the impossibility of becoming a "social"
12 Wolf Lepenies, "The Failure of the Interpreting Class or Intellectuals in the Two 
Germanies", New Literary History, vol. 22, no. 4,1991, p. 914.
13 Wolf Lepenies, Aufstieg und Fall der Intellektuellen in Europa (Frankfurt: Campus 
Verlag, 1992), p. 17; Lafinde l’utopie et le retour de la melancolie, op. cit., p. 18.
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version of natural sciences on the one hand, and the impossibility of 
choosing the option of literature in describing social world on the 
other. The division Lepenies has in mind does not come between the 
culture of humanists and men of letters on the one hand, and that of 
natural scientists on the other. The whole book entitled Die drei 
Kulturen (and translated into English as Between Literature and Science: 
the Rise o f Sociology) is devoted to the contest between the men of 
letters on the one hand and the social scientists on the other in 
claiming to offer the key orientation for modem civilisation, to 
constitute the guide to living appropriate to industrial society as well 
as to the very status of knowledge about industrial society that has 
been taking place from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. 
No longer is the dilemma of choosing between the natural sciences 
and the humanities, that old contest between Naturwissenschaften and 
Geisteswissenchaften, at stake; the point of Lepenies' analyses is the 
controversy between the literary intelligentsia and that of 
representatives of the social sciences, which, in turn, refers us to the 
controversy between the culture of reason and the culture of feelings, 
Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment14 (or, on a different plane, the 
dangers of a scienticisation or literaturisation of sociology). The 
tension pervading his works and born between complaining 
humanists and self-complacent social scientists does not appear in the 
opposition of the "two cultures". Social science is located beyond the 
alternative that the intellectuals, i.e. artists and writers, face: 
melancholy or utopia, being at the same time "par dela la melancolie 
et en-de^a de l'utopie".15 The traditional opposition of "two cultures" 
requires a significant supplement in the form of a "third culture", the 
culture of the social sciences, or sociology in particular. Otherwise the 
history of twentieth-century intellectuals -  as well as earlier 
"intellectuals avant la lettre" -  will be incomprehensible.
The intellectual does not act although he wants to. He wants to 
but he cannot. Deprived of real influence on the exercise of power, he
14 See also Wolf Lepenies, "Alexander von Humboldt -  His Past and His Present", 
BerliNews. 31 Mai, 1999.
15 Wolf Lepenies, La fin de l'utopie et le retour de la melancolie, op. cit., p. 20.
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retreats from this world to a better world of reflection. Since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Lepenies says in "The Future of 
Intellectuals",16 the Enlightenment dreams about interpreting and 
changing the world began to fade when Napoleon had changed the 
map of Europe. Engineers to carry out technical progress and 
bureaucrats to manage the masses were needed; there was no longer 
any place left for an unproductive intellectual elite believing that 
principles could govern society. As the author comments on this 
period, "the result was resignation and revolt on the part of 
intellectuals. They consoled themselves with the idea that their realm 
was not of this world".17 In Lepenies' narrative, basically there is no 
significant place accorded to the "Dreyfus affair" in France and the 
birth of the term "intellectual" in France at the very end of the 
nineteenth century; as opposed to Bernard-Henri Levy from Les 
Adventures de la liberte, he passes over that particular moment as a less 
important one than two other events: possibly Diderot's article about 
the "philosopher" written for his Encyclopedia that ascribes modest 
Enlightenment tasks to the philosopher, and the Russian October 
Revolution of 1917. The year 1917 in his account completed 1789 -  
"the intellectuals had at last changed the world too".18 Communism 
and then fascism would promise the fulfilment of an old dream that 
ideas can become part of reality. The attractive force of communism 
to intellectuals Lepenies explains by means of its relation to action -  
after the collapse of fascism "only one ideology of action remained, 
and it was towards this ideology that the handicapped man of action, 
the intellectual, directed himself, whether he agreed with it or not".19 
If one wanted to supplement Lepenies' narrative about the 
"handicapped man of action" with some details of the French context, 
then it would be worth pointing out that the fascination communism 
exerted on French intellectuals was strongly shaken for the first time 
in 1954 with the advent of events in Algeria. After the manifesto of
16 Wolf Lepenies, "The Future of Intellectuals", Partisan Review, vol. 61, no. 1,1994.
17 Ibidem, p. 116.
18 Ibidem, p. 117.
19 Ibidem, p. 117.
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"121 intellectuals" in connection with the Algerian war, there 
appeared a new kind of ideology directing intellectuals towards the 
Third World (see the career of Frantz Fanon). To quote Levy:
our intellectuals had still not been cured. Certainly, they no longer cared for 
the Soviet Union or believed in Stalin. But their faith in genuine, authentic 
revolution, which would put an end to the ills of the West, remained intact.20
3.
Lepenies' proposals and intuitions go in another direction, though. 
He is not concerned about the revival of Vengagement as presented by 
Sartre in "What Is Literature?"21 2, nor is he concerned about the tasks 
put forward by Michel Foucault to the French intellectual when he 
tried to go beyond the Sartrian conception of the intellectual as a 
writer in his unfinished and unelaborated opposition -  intellectuel 
universel/intellectuel specificjue.72 The year 1989 is a key date here; 
Lepenies on numerous occasions stresses that "1989 has not only 
happened to the East. It has happened to the West as well".23 We shall 
focus on the consequences it brought about for the constellation of 
questions about melancholy-utopia-intellectuals. First of all, some­
thing happened to melancholy, something happened to utopia, and 
something happened to the intellectuals, both in the West and in the 
East of Europe. The dream of a free world of parliamentary 
democracy became reality in Central and Eastern Europe (as Lepenies 
wrote in his Italian lectures of 1992, "Die Utopie von gestern schien
20 Bemard-Henri Levy, Adventures on the Freedom Road. The French Intellectuals in 
the 20th Century, transl. by R. Veasey (London: The Harvill Press, 1995), p. 43.
21 See Pascal Ory and Jean-Fran^ois Sirinelli, Les Intellectuels en France, de FAffaire 
Dreyfus a nos jours (Paris: Armand Colin, 1986).
22 Allan Stoekl, Agonies of the Intellectual (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1992); Keith A. Reader, Intellectuals and the Left in France since 1968 (London: 
MacMillan, 1987).
23 Wolf Lepenies, "Science and Scholarship after the End of History" (Bonn, 1995), 
P-3.
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zur Wirklichkeit von heute geworden".24 Melancholy caused by the 
lack of public and political influence gave way to euphoria -  and 
there appeared the phenomenon of "active melancholics", 
intellectuals who, in a manner unexpected to others as to themselves, 
after years spent in opposition, gained power. The traditional balance 
in the constellation of the three elements in question was lost: is it 
possible to be the intellectual and to rule at the same time? Is it 
possible to be simultaneously a man of action and a melancholic? Is it 
possible to be a utopian and govern society? What is to be done -  and 
thought -  when the then traditional concept of the intellectual ceases 
referring to intellectuals in power? Who are they to become -  former 
intellectuals, former melancholics, former Utopians? How is the 
Central European political "culture of intellectuals" to face the 
Western European "culture of experts".
Intellectuals in Central Europe were brought to the offices of 
power by mechanisms which are totally unknown in the West from 
first-hand experience; to return to Lepenies:
Their fight for human rights, the classic ideal of the modern European 
intellectual, has endowed the intellectuals of east and central Europe with 
certain unalienable rights and with a degree of political credibility which no 
intellectual in the West has been able to acquire. They also display ... a fresh 
emotional enthusiasm which has been absent from the discussions of 
Western intellectuals for a long time.25
Neither their political nor economic experience brought them to 
power -  it was due to their "artistic sincerity" and "moral probity" 
that they gained it.26 Lepenies' fascination with intellectuals from 
behind the former Iron Curtain is a function of his disappointment 
with the West. The moment of measurement of their place and role in 
the two parts of Europe seems to be crucial here. From this measuring 
operation, the former come as victors. Linnaeus' description: levis,
24 Wolf Lepenies, Aufstieg und Fall der Intellektuellen in Europa, op. cit., p. 47.
25 Wolf Lepenies, "The Failure of the Interpreting Class or Intellectuals in the Two 
Germanies", op. cit., pp. 915, 916.
26 Ibidem, p. 916.
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argutus, inventor -  versatile, shrewd, inventive -  with respect to homo 
europaeus, the highest form of homo sapiens, fits European intellectuals 
from the East best. In 1989 there returns to Europe the hero who 
disappeared as a species in the 20th century and who was to never 
come back. Between the social role played by and social recognition 
ascribed to the intellectual in the two parts of Europe, there arises an 
asymmetry. The contrast in question is best shown in the following 
sentence: "The fight for human rights must be a concern for 
intellectuals; the adjustment of the value-added tax is none of their 
business".27
Lepenies in his studies referred to extremely important events 
whose status nevertheless may turn out to be merely ephemeral. No 
matter what happens -  of which the author of Aufstieg und Fall der 
Intellektuellen in Europa is perfectly aware and of which he writes -  th 
e end of the twentieth century witnessed a heroic comeback of a hero 
who, as a part of society rather than a solitary figure, was born a 
hundred years ago in France and labelled himself I'intellectuel. 
Lepenies says that:
at the end of the century we are realising, with the fall of the communist 
regimes in eastern Europe, a rehabilitation of the intellectual. We are 
watching his heroic comeback to the political stage.28
And it is precisely in such a situation, under such circumstances, that 
intellectuals, forced by historical developments, are entitled to break 
the rule given by Kant and taken from Bacon: de nobis ipsis silemus, let 
us keep silence about ourselves. The year 1989 once again gave an 
impetus to return to a reflection on the political and public role of the 
intellectual. For they played an important role in the events of that 
year.
The events of 1989 (as well as earlier and later developments) 
seem not to have found a conceptual elaboration and not to have led 
to theoretical repercussions in the discourse devoted to the 
intellectual. Perhaps the greatest influence these events have exerted
27 Ibidem, pp. 911,914.
28 Ibidem, p. 917.
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is on two philosophers-sociologists: Zygmunt Bauman and Wolf 
Lepenies, both for different reasons closely connected with Central 
Europe. No matter whether one reads such collective volumes in the 
English speaking world as Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics, Academics or 
Knowledge and Power. The Changing Role of European Intellectuals or 
Intellectuals and Public Life, or finally such French discussions about 
intellectuals as books written by Bernard-Henri Levy, Pascal Ory or 
Jean-Frangois Sirinelli, the references to the events of 1989 and to the 
"return of the hero" are invisible in the West.29 Levy, for instance, 
notes in passing merely the following:
In Tienanmen Square, in Prague, and at the Berlin Wall, we looked for signs
of an epoch drawing to a close, an epoch in which intellectuals had perhaps
enjoyed their greatest influence.30
And it was right there that the "asymmetry" Lepenies has in mind 
started to be visible. The theme in question was never elaborated on 
by the thinkers in question.
What are the specific types of intellectuals that Lepenies can see in 
Central Europe? First, "active melancholics" and second, "non-profit 
intellectuals".31 Both types can be encountered only in this part of the 
world. "Active melancholics" are the intellectuals who after 1989 took 
power in the post-communist countries (to a varying degree and for a 
varying period of time, let us remind ourselves); they are such 
"moralists" already referred to in this text who, being actors, 
dramatists, philosophers, poets, film directors, artists, musicians, 
"retained a measure of moral credibility, dignity and ability to inspire 
the young",32 and who participated in opposition movements and then 
in successful revolutions. "Non-profit intellectuals", a species extinct in
29 See Dernieres questions aux intellectuals, ed. by Pascal Ory (Paris: Olivier Orban, 
1990); Jean-Francois Sirinelli, lntellectuels et passions francaises. Manifestes et petitions au 
XXe siecle (Paris: Fayard, 1990).
30 Bernard-Henri Levy, Adventures on the Freedom Road, op. cit., p. 7.
31 Wolf Lepenies, La fin de I'utopie et le retour de la melancolie, op. cit., p. 26; "Science 
and Scholarship after the End of History", op. cit., p. 14.
32 Wolf Lepenies, "The Failure of the Interpreting Class or Intellectuals in the Two 
Germanies", op. cit., p. 915.
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the West for a long time, in the mental changes that Europe awaits can 
play a crucial role in science (just like, in Lepenies' view, "competent 
rebels" can play such a role in the economy and "cosmopolitan 
patriots" can play it in democracy). The key question about the 
"mentality gap" existing between the East and the West, with respect to 
three of the most important domains: science (culture), economics, 
democracy,33 34shows the place of culture as the most significant in the 
ongoing transformation. While, according to Lepenies, in the economy 
and politics the East merely joins the West (i.e. a free market replaces 
central planning and parliamentary democracy replaces one-party 
dictatorship), in the sphere of culture the East can meet the West. Let us 
listen carefully to the following quotation:
I wish to argue that this [cultural system of our societies -  MK] is an area 
where we in the West should take the recent historical developments on our 
continent as a most welcome opportunity to learn from each other instead of 
simply using it as a pretext to teach others.M
This possibility of learning from each other35 -  in the domain of 
culture, without any experiments of looking for a "third road" in the 
economy or in politics -  would allow one to retain the diversity of 
cultural orientations which traditionally formed the richness of 
Europe. Lepenies' conclusions are far-reaching. If 1989 "has happened 
to the West as well", to remind ourselves of his fundamental 
conviction, then the West should try to make use of the lessons given 
by history. The culture of experts showed its limitations because 
nobody expected such a possibility: "the defeat of communism is thus 
much less a reason for triumph than for modesty -  for all of us".36 The 
error of the Western political culture of experts consists, in Lepenies' 
view, in cherishing the illusion of a final victory, as if forgetting about 
the failure of the utopian convictions of this culture which 
accompanied the end of the socialist utopia. For capitalism is a utopia
33 Wolf Lepenies, "Science and Scholarship after the End of History", op. cit., p. 2.
34 Wolf Lepenies, "Intellectual Responsibilities. Institution Building in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Some Consequences for the West" (Pisa, 1994), p. 3.
35 Wolf Lepenies, "Cultures of Knowledge", Nature, 5 April, 410, 2001.
36 Wolf Lepenies, "Science and Scholarship after the End of History", op. cit., p. 4.
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of means, not being a utopia of utopian ends. The point was put 
explicitly in a Paris lecture when he said that:
capitalism since its origins has been supported by the conviction that the 
progress of science and technology constitutes an infallible means to 
transform the entire world into a vast universal civil society. This illusion has 
to be renounced today.37
The end of the utopia of ends influenced the end of the belief in an 
irresistible progress of science and technology. Not to take the 
connection between the two utopias into consideration is both 
dangerous and myopic.
It is only from such a perspective that the following theme can be 
looked at: Lepenies belief in the necessity of connecting the Europe of 
thought and the Europe of politics, cultural elites and political ones. If 
culture and the world of thought are to go hand in hand with today's 
transformations in the East and in the West, then the crucial figure is 
the intellectual traced in the present text all the time. Hence, studying 
"the relative advantages of backwardness"38 in the East, Lepenies 
concludes that the experiences that the figure of the "non-profit 
intellectual" brings about can help in a self-analysis of Western 
intellectuals today. To show the idea in a nutshell, let us quote two 
sentences from two texts: "we should even take his example as a 
chance for changing some of our own intellectual attitudes" and "he 
will do something we badly need: he will teach us differences".39 When 
a narrow culture of experts fails, then it is necessary to return -  in a 
critical manner -  to the tradition of the Enlightenment and its 
"philosophe". It turns out once again that the ethos of the 
Enlightenment intellectuals is revived with the help of Central 
European intellectuals, while the history of modem intellectuals is the 
history of their own overestimation of themselves -  Diderot's 
"philosophe" returned to the European stage, with the propriety,
37 Wolf Lepenies, La fin de Vutopie et le retour de la melancolie, op. cit., p. 27.
38 Wolf Lepenies, "Science and Scholarship after the End of History", op. cit., p. 13.
39 Wolf Lepenies, "Intellectual Responsibilities", op. dt., p. 13; "Universal Problems 
and Partcular Mentalities in our Future Sodety" (Sienne, 1995), p. 9.
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personal courage, commitment to civil society and unshakable belief in 
the possibilities of reason in making the social world better, all of which 
characteristics are being exhibited precisely by "the intellectuals who 
came to power in the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe".40
The lost ethos of personal courage and intellectual modesty 
(rather than self-complacency) was what was found in 1989 according 
to Lepenies. And if he writes about the relative advantages of 
backwardness and about learning from each other, then he surely 
means the potential cultural gains that can be provided by the clash of 
the culture of cynical experts and that of sentimental moralists. If 
culture is to fulfil its fundamental tasks -  and perhaps the most 
important is the shift in mentalities -  then the Enlightenment 
intellectual has to come to the stage once again in the manner he did 
in Eastern Europe. Have Lepenies' dreams about the spiritual 
uplifting of Western Europe due to the events of 1989 come true? No, 
they have not, for in his view the West has not thought over its 
victory, has not paused for a while to reflect on itself:
we were unwilling to draw the consequences of 1989 with respect to a change 
of our mentalities. Because everything was changing in the East, we were 
convinced that everything could stay the same as ever in the West.41
4.
Thus, the key task for the intellectual could be described in the 
following manner: although the time of utopia is over (note the title 
theme of la fin de I'utopie in a College de France lecture), the intellectual 
is not entitled to look for his shelter once again in melancholy (the title 
theme of le retour de la melancolie). The best example can be taken from 
those "active melancholics" of Central and Eastern Europe who help in 
rehabilitating the figure of the intellectual and bring to mind the 
Enlightenment ethos. Denis Diderot can become a founding father
40 Wolf Lepenies, "The Future of Intellectuals", op. cit., p. 112.
41 Wolf Lepenies, "From the History of Mentalities to a Politics of Mentalities", 
Budapest Review of Books, vol. 5, no. 1,1995, p. 8.
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figure in a return to the Enlightenment in thinking about the 
intellectual: he not only warned against an overestimation of the role of 
reason but also of his own role. As Lepenies describes him,
his intellectual does not live in an ivory tower, and his daily life is not one of 
exile. Because he knows that humankind can live only in society, he aims to 
develop fully his own sociability, to make himself useful and pleasing to his 
neighbours. Civil society is just as commendable for him as an earthly 
divinity: he knows its principles better than anyone else and sees in its 
perfection his highest aim.42
The question about the knot of melancholy-utopia-intellectual 
finds here its answer for today: in a world without utopia, the 
intellectual cannot fall back into melancholy and he should turn to the 
tradition of (non-Eurocentric) Enlightenment in his search for an ideal 
of social commitment. For the first time in the twentieth century, let 
us add, the intellectual has a chance to go beyond the charmed circle 
of melancholy/utopia. It is for the first time that he is not seduced by 
the "ideology of action" -  which previously turned out to be so 
disastrous for several generations of writers, philosophers, and artists 
engaged in a revolutionary changing of the course of the world.
Lepenies tries to return the intellectual to the tradition of a non­
overestimation of his own possibilities -  his role, status, and place in 
society -  but, at the same time, introduces culture to a crucial place in 
the transformations occurring in the world. Minimal changes have 
suggested that the economy and politics do not suffice in the face of 
the challenge confronting the form of the utopia-free world: culture, 
science and the arts are to return to an essential place in social life. 
The question is whether Lepenies does not excessively heroicise 
"active melancholics" -  the intellectuals of the East excessively 
celebrate the political "culture of moralists", and excessively admire 
"non-profit intellectuals" as potentially example-giving figures? 
Obviously, his discussions do have necessary restrictions and 
quantifiers, but, it seems, he needs the figures painted the way he 
paints them to draw a contrast with the situation of the intellectual in
42 Wolf Lepenies, "The Future of Intellectuals", op. cit., p. 112.
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the West. The more colourful the Central European post-communist 
world is, the more powerful the contrast he wants to focus his 
attention on is. And he is appealing to a Western world, so the 
contrast in question plays a pedagogical, so to speak, role. One could 
say that both elements of the opposition are "ideal types", never 
encountered in reality in the long run. But although the reality 
prompts us with an answer that there is less and less "non-profit 
intellectuals" in the rapidly commercialising world of culture and the 
arts, that moralists who had led revolutions and headed opposition 
movements were long ago deprived of power in democratic elections 
in favour of cold experts (who are often far away from what Lepenies 
referred to in College de France as probite morale and engagement 
courageux en faveur des droits de Vhomme, to say the least), and that the 
"fresh emotional enthusiasm" from debates and discussions of the 
years following 1989 have long gone -  just to stick to Polish grounds -  
nevertheless the human type shown by Lepenies is extremely 
stimulating. Was it the case and were the people around actually like 
that? How has the East changed until today, and what will be the 
direction of these changes in the long run? How about the idea that 
we here take the economy, and democracy into account -  and learn 
differences from each other? Are we here becoming a "poorer West", 
desperately trying to make up for lost decades? Lepenies is one of few 
thinkers in the West who clearly sees these questions and tries to 
expose them, inspiring both the sides in question. In the fervour of 
ideological controversies about the "end of history", philosophical 
debates about the "death of the intellectual" and sociological 
discussions about the "collapse of communism", Lepenies' discourse 
about the intellectual from the perspective of melancholy and utopia 
and his attempt to make us return to the tradition of the 
Enlightenment philosopher sound very interesting indeed.
C hapter 4
Zygmunt Bauman and the Question 
of the Intellectual in Postmodernity
l .
Zygmunt Bauman is one of the few contemporary thinkers with 
whom it is worthwhile to think together about our postmodern 
condition. Thinking together with him does not necessarily mean 
following his roads and accepting his conclusions. However, it may 
also mean thinking in a way which is parallel to his thinking, one that 
sometimes crosses with it at some points of convergence, sometimes 
departs from it for various, often idiosyncratic and individual 
reasons. Although reading Bauman requires close attention, as his 
particular works are interrelated and mutually complementary, 
nevertheless the attention paid to them is amply rewarded.
Consideration of Bauman's thinking is rewarding because the 
perspective of his sociological hermeneutics (as he sometimes calls his 
thinking) is extremely productive for today's thinking of culture. It is 
productive in itself as well as confronted with proposals and 
suggestions of other postmodern critics and critics of postmodernity, 
especially (in a strong sense of the term) philosophical ones. A 
peculiar paradox, at least as far as I can see it, is the notion of Bauman 
as philosopher: Bauman's questions have a stronger appeal to a 
philosophical discourse of postmodernity than to a sociological one. 
There is a growing number of sociological volumes devoted to 
"intellectuals" of today, but none of them seems to compare in their 
intellectual horizons with diagnoses and suggestions of the author of 
Legislators and Interpreters. The controversy that has recently taken
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place in France and in the USA among philosophers finds in Bauman 
its most interesting supplement. Therefore, crossing traditional 
disciplinary boundaries, it is worthwhile to read him in the context of 
philosophical discussions, as it is precisely in these discussions that 
Bauman's voice -  although indirect and rather from behind main 
currents of a philosophical discourse of today -  is a voice that 
deserves the highest attention. And let the author of Intimations of 
Postmodernity forgive me the fact that I am trying hard here to 
associate him with what perhaps is not dearest to him, not closest to 
his thinking from his own perspective (i.e. with postmodernism and 
neopragmatism, to use these two vague terms). The point is, though -  
and let us provide it as legitimacy of a sort -  that habent suafata libelli: 
books have their own fate, their fate depends on the direction we 
push them in (i.e. we -  readers), depends on what books we will put 
them next to in a great library of humanity. Their fate depends on 
what we will manage to do with them, for what purpose we will be 
able to use them, what interests we will have while reading them and 
writing about them. Nietzsche wrote about it, Walter Benjamin did, 
finally Richard Rorty used that saying when he was asked what 
provides legitimacy for his reading of Donald Davidson on the one 
hand and Jacques Derrida on the other.1 Davidson does not seem too 
sympathetic to Rorty's endeavours, which reduce him to an 
intellectual shield in struggles of Rorty's neopragmatism with its 
opponents. Derrida, until very recently, has kept silence on the 
subject. But great polemics are taking place all the time. Moreover, 
they are highly interesting. There emerge groups of "defenders" of 
both philosophers against their Rortyan "pragmaticization" who take 
care of purity and undisturbed transmission of their masters' views...1 2
1 See Richard Rorty, "Reponse a Jacques Bouveresse" in a splendid volume Lire 
Rorty. Le pragmatisme et ses consequences (Paris: L'eclat, 1992), p. 156, or the answer 
Rorty gave to F. Farrell's complaints from Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism: 
"... I do not think it matters whether Davidson would or would not be sympathetic 
to such an extrapolation. If you borrow somebody's idea for a different purpose, 
is it really necessary to clear this novel use with the originator of the idea?", a 
typescript, p. 1.
2 See my Rorty's Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought 
(Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 1996). Let me provide only two examples
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Given a certain (a)methodological charity, perhaps it not so 
interesting to get into details of the essence of "misunderstanding" in 
such readings of works of Davidson, Derrida (or Bauman, for that 
matter) that suggest (be they even non-existing) connections and 
parallels, because the fate of books is as contingent as our whole 
postmodern being. There are no non-contingent and universal 
foundations, thus there is also no author's foundation of a text that a 
priori provides him with greater rights and more important voice in 
the "cultural conversation" taking place. The voice of the author, 
traditionally important, has already become at the same time one of 
many equally valid voices of readers and commentators. On the one 
hand, one has to take into consideration that "modesty of the age" 
about which Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe writes almost in the form of 
the manifesto in his La Fiction du politique3, on the other hand it is just 
with the help of the power of precisely that modesty that philosophy 
has a still greater possibility -  a chance? -  to become a commentary to 
already written and currently being written philosophical works: a 
commentary to a still enlarging and changing canon of works, a 
commentary to commentaries. And a commentary always gives birth 
to a (Bloomian) temptation of a "strong misreading", a "poetic 
misprision", since, as he says in The Anxiety of Influence, the meaning of 
a poem can only be a poem, but another poem -  a poem not itself.4
of that: Frank Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism -  the Recovery of the World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) the opening sentence: "... Richard 
Rorty, in his various writings, has given an unreliable account of recent philosophy. 
He gets certain figures wrong, Davidson in particular...", p. xi. On the other hand, see 
obsessively anti-Rortyan Christopher Norris from his four recent books about Derrida, 
deconstruction or "truth" about postmodernism.
3 "... Could it not be derisory to claim that one is engaged in philosophy, or -  still 
worse -  that one is a philosopher?", asks Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in his Heidegger, 
Art and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 1.
4 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
p. 70. "Strong poets" make the history of poetry by misreading one another -  it might 
be asked whether "strong philosophers" could not be making the history of 
philosophy by misreading one another, by producing their own idiosyncratic 
sequences of philosophers (just like Rorty creates and uses the sequence "Plato-Kant" 
or "Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida")? The majority of "proper" interpretations of 
philosophy is worse than mistakes, says Bloom. "Perhaps there are only more or less
w
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Thus, let us imagine here -  Bauman's poem read in the mirror of 
other poems... What inclines one to make such a reading is also an 
extremely metaphorical and highly individual style of his writing. It 
happens in Bauman, let us bear this in mind, that a whole book is 
supported by several metaphors chosen with impressive erudition and 
ingenuity. It is difficult to imagine a "rational" discussion of a 
traditional philosopher with metaphors; a metaphor can be confronted 
with another metaphor, but it is not comfortable in the way arguments 
are. Just like in the case of Rorty, the construction of an "ironist" 
produces a distance and pushes the edge of irony in two opposite 
directions at the same time ("I am saying this, but maybe I am saying 
that? I am saying this, but only 'ironically', how could I take it 
'seriously'" etc. etc.), depending on the actual direction of an attack and 
the sophistication of polemics. In Bauman, the support of his vision of 
modernity and postmodemity on several carefully chosen metaphors 
may bring about similar helplessness of a (traditional) critic. For, let us 
ask, what is the meaning of the opposition of "legislators" and 
"interpreters", "pilgrims" and "wanderers" really supposed to be? 
What is the meaning of metaphors of "vagabonds", "nomads", 
"tourists" or "flaneurs", especially if we like at look at them with the 
cold eyes of an analyst of the present and decoder of texts devoted to it 
-  strangers and insensitive beings to the poetry of words and the magic 
of pictures? The method of decoding, deciphering -  just like one 
deciphers the truth -  must fail here totally. What a reader is left with is 
the (Nietzschean) awareness of perspectival character of interpretation: 
getting out of what the whole history of Western metaphysics has 
always required him to do, as Derrida noted for the first time in his 
discussion with Levi-Strauss in "Structure, Sign and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences".* 5 One cannot get away with 
deciphering metaphors because in struggling argumentatively with 
a metaphor, and consequently refuting it, one remains with a 
meaningless, devoid of significant senses, text.
creative or interesting misreadings"..., p. 43. Rorty's redescriptions and re- 
contextualizations versus Romantic "genius" in poetry?
5 See Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences" in Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 292.
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Metaphors are fundamental in Bauman's thinking of the world -  
let us listen to a characteristic statement from Two Essays on 
Postmodern Morality; as the metaphor of a nomad as an ideal type is 
"imperfect and misleading", the only unambiguous task left is: "to 
look for other metaphors...."6 Bauman confronts an old metaphor 
with a new one. Instead of confronting it with argumentation against 
an old metaphor, a scrupulous investigator of postmodernity does not 
confuse levels in thinking of the world and in feeling it, neither in 
himself, nor in confrontations with others. Who fights with the help of 
metaphors, dies by metaphors, it could be said. Is metaphor a 
contribution to a picture of a status of the postmodern intellectual? 
Because it is difficult to argue with a metaphor, it is also difficult to 
argue with someone who "passes rapidly from Hemingway to Proust 
to Hitler to Marx to Foucault to Mary Douglas to the present situation 
in Southeast Asia to Ghandi to Sophocles", as Richard Rorty says in 
his Consequences of Pragmatism about the post-Philosophical 
intellectual.7 It is difficult to argue with someone who is a "name 
dropper", an expert of proper names with which he plays, someone 
afraid of getting stuck in one vocabulary, one -  be it even self-chosen 
-  perspective, one and privileged view of the world. Bauman and his 
metaphors... Metaphors in Bauman's texts... An explicit -  practical -  
end of a certain way of practising the humanities, philosophy, be it 
even sociology; an end of a certain figure of the humanist to which 
modernity managed to get us accustomed. Perhaps the beginning of a 
new way of thinking of culture in the post-legislative, post­
metanarrative, post-Philosophical epoch (as that state is called by 
Bauman, Lyotard and Rorty, respectively)?
In Bauman, that way of thinking derives from a deep and 
irreducible suspicion of the project of Modernity, which finally, 
through its "gardening" dreams, had led to the Holocaust, after 
which "nothing will be the way it was". Lyotard in Le Differ end calls 
Auschwitz le signe d'histoire or Tevenement, Lacoue-Labarthe names it
6 Zygmunt Bauman, Dwa szkice o moralnosci ponowoczesnej [Two Essays on 
Postmodern Morality] (Warszawa: Instytut Kultury, 1994), p. 20.
7 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1982), p. xl.
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a caesura {la cesure) of the speculative in his La Fiction du politique; 
apart from saying with the latter that in Auschwitz "God died", that a 
dark, so far unseen side of modernity manifested itself, one can also 
say that (German) speculative philosophy with its emancipatory 
wishes, supported by Reason and History, died there as well. That 
philosophical side is studied by Germans and Frenchmen, from 
Theodor W. Adorno in Negative Dialectics, Emmanuel Levinas e.g. in 
his texts about Blanchot, the whole recent German Historikerstreit -  
the dispute of German historians with the participation of Habermas 
and Tugendhadt, to Lyotard from Heidegger et "les juifs", Lacoue- 
Labarthe in La Fiction du politique, and many others. How to 
"philosophize after Auschwitz" -  that was the question put forward 
for the first time by Adorno, and in that form it has been present in 
our culture ever since. By his own means, on his own, and following 
his own paths, Zygmunt Bauman comes to similar, fundamental 
questions about modernity in his Modernity and the Holocaust. Let us 
listen to him:
Modernity, as we remember, is an age of artificial order and of grand societal 
designs, the era of planners, visionaries, and -  more generally -  "gardeners" 
who treat society as a virgin plot of land to be expertly designed and then 
cultivated and doctored to keep the designed form.8
It seems to be one of the most beautiful (para)definitions of 
modernity, obviously, knowing Bauman's fagon de parler -  a 
metaphorical one. Let us think of it for a while and let us read it 
slightly differently, from a different side and in different vocabularies. 
"Planners" and "visionaries" may be -  let us assume the following 
descriptions as a "possible world" -  traditional intellectuals of the 
period of modernity, those of great ambitions and superior status in 
culture; more or less important, more or less philosophically-minded, 
those who planned the Jacobean Terror and those who planned the 
Bolshevik terror. (How different faces can assume metaphors of 
planners can be testified by "glass houses", in Poland, following
8 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), p. 113.
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Stefan Zeromski and German Glasarchitektur, the hope for "bright" 
future, while for George Orwell -  the nightmare of an accomplished 
utopia, the man subjected to the gaze of the Other, deprived of 
intimacy, as it is obsessively present in Sartre, Foucault or Barthes, 
which is beautifully shown -  under a general label of "the denigration 
of vision" -  in Martin Jay's impressive study9). Bauman's gardener is 
not Jerzy Kosinski's Gardener from Being There -  he is rather a self- 
conceited erudite, aware of his exceptional place in culture, 
interpreter of the present and planner of the future. Gardeners taking 
care of a "virgin plot of land" -  society, rather than society seen as e.g. 
"English garden" in which work consists in cultivation and 
maintenance of the status quo. Gardeners as executioners -  those who 
pull weeds out of the social plot of land (supported by the great idea 
of "racial hygiene") or who kill (be it even with Zyklon B) bugs, fast 
disseminating and parasitic on assumption. Sanitary action, hygienic 
challenge, getting rid of filth and bugs. They were specific gardeners, 
indeed. So in modernity a virgin plot of land needed planning -  and 
that was done by experts in ideas hired by Leviathan, and needed 
putting into practice, for which Leviathan had different personae.
What might the euphemism "to keep the designed form" used by 
Bauman in the above quotation mean? It might mean, for instance, 
terror to which precise, disciplined and rational bureaucracy was 
employed; and that bureaucracy lacked just a grand vision of a 
perfect society, a vision of a better and more just world (which will be 
e.g. Judenfrei, or in which there will be no bourgeoisie or no other 
"weeds"). "Modern dreams are given absolute power" -  says 
Bauman, and thereby modern genocide is born. And these grand 
visions are postmodern metarecits, Lyotardian great narratives from 
his La Condition postmoderne to which one can only feel distrust today; 
"gardener" vision of modernity is the vision in which telos is already 
known -  the end of present sufferings (and crimes) is future 
happiness planned by smart minds here and now. Given a traditional 
role and modern status of intellectuals, these smart minds are never
9 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes. The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
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lacking, they are being created and they create themselves. 
Fortunately, there are fewer and fewer gardeners today. Fewer and 
fewer candidates for gardeners. For it is no longer that easy to 
cultivate the garden, and the Idea of future Emancipation no longer 
appeals to human hearts.
2.
Zygmunt Bauman's books are a perfect pretext to -  as well as a 
perfect point of departure for -  the discussion of postmodernity. 
Bauman's texts can be located in a certain wider manner of thinking 
about culture and society present today, and perhaps therefore we 
would like to assume in that essay the following as (sort of) guiding 
principle: we will be reading Bauman and commenting on his texts 
directly, we will be undressing his metaphors and suggesting 
different ones, linking his thinking with that of those he never refers 
to, or does it rarely and unwillingly. We will be presenting a more 
general commentary to a more detailed one, taking samples from his 
various books and looking at them through a magnifying glass of a 
philosophical investigation. We will place some fragments in 
"proper" contexts, listening carefully to the author's intentions, some 
others we will violently pull out of the context, without taking into 
account possible damage and destruction of harmony of the author's 
well-groomed garden of thought. Bauman's text will be providing 
life-blood to our reflection, it will be giving it more power with power 
of its own.
Let us take into consideration the opening sentence from Freedom 
published in 1988. This sentence he borrows from the so-called 
common knowledge, merely in order to promptly repudiate it: "You 
can say what you wish. This is a free country".10 The author 
dismantles it and listens to its possible senses when he says (e.g.) that
We can do what we wish, without fear of being punished, thrown in jail, 
tortured, persecuted. Let us note, however, that the expression is silent about 
how effective our action will be. "Free country" does not guarantee that what
10 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom (London: Open University Press, 1988), p. 1.
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we do will reach its purpose, or what we say will be accepted. ... And so the 
expression tells us also that being in a free country means doing things on 
one's own responsibility. One is free to pursue (and, with luck, to achieve) 
one's aims, but one is also free to err.11
And there is no way to disagree with the above. We can, however, 
look at the above sentences from a different perspective of the person 
who made a living of speaking and writing, whose task it was to 
speak and write, who was even listened to: from the perspective of 
the man of letters endowed with the Enlightenment authority, one of 
those les philosophes, an inhabitant of la republique des lettres and then -  
following the "Dreyfus affair" -  just I'intellectueld2
So: "You can say what you wish. This is a free country". 
Philosophy (and, more generally, the whole culture of today), despite 
misleading appearances of having found a solution to that problem 
by way of taste, decency, even the law, is still having trouble within 
itself with those who are taking that statement too seriously. 
Questions of an ethical nature are being born all the time. Nobody 
knows for sure which standards to appeal to, as together with the 
exhaustion of the Enlightenment project (which has brought its own 
figure of the intellectual to highest peaks), what is also getting 
exhausted is the power that place was still recently giving and which 
those in question made use of. As long as it was clear what the role 
and place of the intellectual in culture was (an intellectual in a 
European, especially French sense of the term, rather unknown in the 
United States, which seems not to know or have known such role as 
played by Habermas in Germany or Sartre and later -  at least 
functionally -  Foucault in France), it was easy to pass judgements on 
others as the canon of behavior then was as known as the model of 
one meter from Sevres near Paris. Today, however, in a totally new 
and -  still -  unexpected situation, there appear questions for which 12
11 Ibidem, p. 1.
12 See in this context about the "Dreyfus Affair" the chapter "Emil Zola: the 
Citizen Against the State" from The Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience by Egal 
Feldman (Wayne State University Press, 1981) or Jean-Denis Bredin, The Affair. The 
Case of Alfred Dreyfus (New York: George Braziller, 1986), the third section entitled 
"Two Frances", pp. 245-358.
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there are no ready answers. Numerous philosophers participate in 
thinking about these questions. A question is a spark from which an 
interesting polemic takes its origin.
Let us take the following point into consideration, departing for a 
moment from Bauman's books to take a long detour to return to them 
after a while: what may underlie such a concentration of attention 
and energy on seemingly simple questions about the life on the one 
hand, and the work on the other hand, of several twentieth century 
philosophers and theorists, or on absurd and seemingly easy to refute 
theses of several inspired historians (revisionists) of the Holocaust. 
So, to put it clearly: for instance, Martin Heidegger, Paul de Man, 
Robert Faurisson (bearing in mind relative insignificance and 
caricatural nature of the latter figure). What Heidegger said, as well 
as what he did not say in keeping silent when others were speaking 
out against or leaving a Germany full of hatred at the time, and when 
others were speaking having returned to post-war Germany. Why did 
Heidegger remain silent right until his death? Even in the interview 
with Heidegger that appeared in Der Spiegel, his silence was indeed 
"unbearable" and "inexcusable", as Lyotard and Lacoue-Labarthe 
say.13
Was Paul de Man a hidden anti-Semite, when he was writing in 
war-time Belgium? Was he an anti-Semite later on, at Yale? What is 
common to Nietzsche, Heidegger, de Man, and Derrida in all these 
ethical contexts? What is going to happen to deconstruction (as an 
American school of literary criticism) in the light of all these 
"revelations", widely used e.g. by the press? And finally Robert 
Faurisson, who explicitly negates the existence of gas chambers in 
Auschwitz: What did he betray and break away from that he was able 
to incite such an intellectual storm in France? Surely he must have 
betrayed something, for, just like in the case of previous questions, 
the wounds were so painful that they required years of polemics from 
various French thinkers. How to "live with Faurisson" (to treat that 
casus a little bit wider), how to "discuss" with him, without bringing
13 As Jean-Frangois Lyotard in Heidegger and "the jews" (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1990) and Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe in already referred to Heidegger, Art 
and Politics put it.
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him to the (undeserved) level of a partner in discussion who is 
endowed with equal rights? These are ethical questions in France and 
in the United States (although, it is important to bear in mind, that, in 
Lyotard's formulation, L'affaire Heidegger est une affaire frangaise). 
These are some of the questions asked by philosophers who take their 
culture seriously and who have sensitive ears to what is going on in 
it. How frail must be the place in culture of the intellectual in France 
today if a Faurisson is able to annoy to such an extent so many 
eminent philosophers?
Pierre Vidal-Naquet, in all his essays from the volume Les 
Assassins de la memoire: 'Un Eichmann de papier' et autres essais sur le 
revisionisme, returns constantly to one fundamental question: if is one 
to get into "polemics" with the theses of revisionists, how might one 
not ennoble them by means of locating them within a scientific 
debate? How does one write knowing that the discussion with 
Faurisson is, as he puts it, "absolutely impossible"14, how to fight 
with lies and bad faith -  and fight or not fight?
These and similar questions are being currently asked all over the 
world, in books and articles, during seminars and conferences. What 
is this "freedom of the intellectual" and what is his ethics today? 
When leaders of human souls feel disturbed, they seek out solutions 
to the disturbance through self-analysis, they deal with themselves or 
with their predecessors, they look for their own definitions of 
themselves (and therefore Zygmunt Bauman says in Legislators and 
Interpreters that all definitions of intellectuals are "self-definitions"15). 
When their self-image is shaking, so is their place in culture, their life­
long vocation, the meaning of their work as well as the effort to 
question the reality. It is not accidental that the questions about 
thinkers shown here as examples are important today; some twenty 
years ago nobody would have cared much about them, no one would 
have paid so much attention (let us also remember that, generally, 
they are still not important in America except for some Continentally-
14 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory. Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 2.
15 Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, Post-Modernity and 
Intellectuals (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), p. 8.
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minded thinkers).16 A well-formed, modern ethos of the intellectual is 
commonly known; it seemed to be present in culture for good. Now 
culture changes its mind and seems to take rights and privileges away 
from the intellectual.
Within the horizon that interests us here, let us take into 
consideration, by way of an example, a couple of great figures from 
philosophy of the recent two hundred years, philosophers who 
determined the shape of today's Continental philosophy -  (Kojeve's) 
Hegel and (Derrida's and Deleuze's) Nietzsche. Alexandre Kojeve 
said: "... the future of the world, and thereby the meaning of the 
present and the sense of the future, will depend, in the final analysis, 
on the contemporary interpretations of Hegelian works"17. To shorten 
it and to disregard nuances -  the future of the world will depend on our 
reading o f Hegel. It is important today to remember the earnestness of 
that belief and the constant presence of it in the tradition of 
philosophy, common, incidentally, also to Husserl from his last 
lectures in Prague and Vienna and to Heidegger after Kehre to whom 
one can attribute a (paraphrazed) saying -  the future of the (German) 
world -  but also that of Europe -  will depend on our reading of 
Holderlin). Let us read Hegel and let us read Holderlin, let us read 
the Thinker and let us read the Poet, and we shall influence the world 
directly and effectively...18 The questions about Hegel, as is well
16 Perhaps one should separate an intellectual's "speaking" from his "writing"? 
Perhaps the intellectual is only the one who is writing (starting with -  written -  Zola's 
"Manifesto of the Intellectuals"), although one can also look at the collection of famous 
pictures: Sartre and Foucault, two giants of post-war France, Foucault speaking with a 
megaphone, Sartre handing in leaflets to passers-by. Smiling, happy, speaking to the 
crowd gathered around. May '68 is in turn a (written) "narrative explosion" (Lyotard), 
but also a madness of loud speaking after years of silence, the beginning of struggle 
with the "confiscation of a discourse", as Foucault and Deleuze called it. So perhaps 
he should speak -  but only if he had written before?
17 Alexandre Kojeve, cited in Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 9.
18 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe wrote about Holderlin -  whose "imagined Greece" 
influenced the German imagination starting with Hegel, then through Nietzsche and 
finally Heidegger -  in the volume Typography, Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), in the text "Holderlin and Greeks", pp. 236-247.
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known, dominated (almost) whole French post-war thought -  as 
Michel Foucault said in L'Ordre du discourse in 1970: "our whole epoch 
is trying to disengage itself from Hegel". Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit, in an anthropologized reading of Kojeve used to dominate a 
great part of the French philosophical imagination for over a quarter 
of a century.19 A violent contrast to -  and antidote against -  Hegel 
became Nietzsche, but not the Nietzsche as seen over the period of 
thirty years by Walter Kaufman in the USA (in his influential 
Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist) but rather the Nietzsche 
as seen first by the French of the sixties (and then later in the eighties 
in America by e.g. Alexander Nehamas and Richard Rorty20). 
Nietzsche who is light and "perspectival", the author of "Truth and 
Lies in the Extra-Moral Sense" rather than the author of The Will to 
Power, a self-creator who asks about "style" (Derrida) and who has a 
"sense of humor" (Rorty), rather than a philosopher full of 
seriousness and convinced of his "mission", "used" (or "abused") 
later on by still more serious philosophers like Heidegger.
The passage from Hegel to Nietzsche took place in French culture 
in the sixties, and since then it is quite rare to hear someone saying 
that the (Kojevian) "future of the world" may depend on the reading 
of Nietzsche, or of any other philosopher. The philosopher who is 
most explicit about it is Richard Rorty, which brings violent storms to 
his philosophizing from both sides, both from the (philosophical and 
political) right and from the left, that is also what Zygmunt Bauman 
says, although not in a vocabulary of philosophy and that of 
philosophy but in the vocabulary of sociological reflection or in 
fundamental metaphors built by him. Bauman's "powerlessness of an 
intellectual", his gradual "retreat to the Academy"21, subsidized and
19 Of which reminds Vincent Descombes in his Modern French Philosophy (op. cit.) 
in a chapter on "Humanization of nothingness", pp. 9-54.
20 See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche. Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985) and Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
21 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodemity (London: Routledge, 1992). Let 
us listen to these descriptions: "Having reached the nadir of their political relevance, 
modem intellectuals enjoy freedom of thought and expression they could not dream
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devoid of any contact with resistant matters of reality, his interpretive 
rather than legislative reason, his metaphors of a "vagabond" and a 
"tourist" -  translated into philosophical language -  may just mean the 
awareness of the end of traditional attitudes not of a philosopher, but 
of intellectuals in general. His Intimations of Postmodernity, Legislators 
and Interpreters, and finally Modernity and Ambivalence seem to testify, 
in a totally different language, to the same phenomenon of 
postmodern world: diagnozed by Lyotard I'incredulite a I'egard des 
metarecits, incredulity common and justified, brings about a crisis of 
the producer of those metanarratives (as Lyotard put it crudely in his 
Tombeau de I'intellectuel). Reading Bauman in such a context -  among 
such thinkers as Foucault, Rorty, Lyotard or his favorite, Baudrillard -  
may turn out to be extremely instructive, accounting for the very 
same phenomena in a different vocabulary, in totally different 
metaphors, and within a different tradition of thinking about culture 
in general.
One can think whether it might not be the case that the pair 
Hegel/Nietzsche is somehow parallel to that of modern and 
postmodern intellectuals, such as Hegel (from behind whom Kojeve 
the Marxist and the Heideggerian is winking at us), and Nietzsche, 
who is depicted as standing in opposition to Hegel in the strongest 
way perhaps by Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy. In asking what 
Hegel was doing -  and what Nietzsche was doing, and how French 
thought made a radical passage from the former to the latter, we are 
really asking about a (new) figure of the intellectual today, as the 
change of his or her status may be also a consequence of that passage. 
Nietzsche may turn out to be a key turning point for today's 
discussions, from Derrida and Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari in Anti- 
Oedipus, Lyotard in Economie libidinale, or -  in the USA where 
discussions of Nietzsche became fervent in the eighties with Allan 
Bloom on the one hand (with his "Nietzscheanized America") and
of at the time that words mattered politically. This is an autonomy of no practical 
consequence outside the self-enclosed world of intellectual discourse" (p. 16). 
Paradoxically enough, at least apparently, the growth in the irrelevance of legitimation 
-  traditionally provided to the state by intellectuals -  brings about the growth in 
intellectual freedom that, at the same time, stops to mean anything in practice.
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Richard Rorty on the other (in whom Nietzsche is opposed to 
Heidegger -  the one who "took philosophy (too) seriously", as he 
says in the title of one of his reviews22). "The New Nietzsche", to hint 
at David Allison's influential volume, becomes in that context an 
important question today, and the link between the "intellectual", 
"freedom" and Nietzsche may be a link of a fundamental importance.
Thus, to sum up, one could think of two opposite poles in 
thinking about the role of philosophy. At one pole there would be 
Hegel (and Kojeve) who link the fate of the world to philosophy (as 
well as a "serious" Heidegger -  who tells us to read Holderlin -  and 
even the "last metaphysician" and the "inverted Platonic" Nietzsche 
in the reading of the latter) At the other pole there would be the same 
Nietzsche, but this time as a model of self-creation, some one who is 
not bothered by the fate of the world because has different questions 
and different concerns (closer e.g. to Marcel Proust). The differences 
of positions taken appear still today e.g. when what Heidegger did 
(wrote, said) in the famous year of 1933 is being discussed. Lyotard 
and Lacoue-Labarthe write that Heidegger's silence about the 
Holocaust is impardonnable, while Rorty wants to separate 
Heidegger's "life" from his "work" saying that the latter as a person 
turned out to be "a nasty figure", which, nevertheless, does not affect 
much his philosophy (and it is easy, according to him, to conceive of 
"another possible world" in which he actually leaves Germany -  and 
we are still reading his philosophy today unchanged23).
3.
Having finished that somehow long detour, let us have a quick look at 
a certain traditional and well-rooted model in sociological and 
philosophical thinking of culture; Zygmunt Bauman says about it the 
following:
22 Richard Rorty, "Taking Philosophy Seriously", New Republic, April 1988.
23 Richard Rorty, "Another Possible World", Proceedings on Heidegger's Politics, 
October 1988.
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All wills are free, but some wills are freer than others; some people, who 
knowingly or unknowingly perform the function of educators, instil (or 
modify) the cognitive predispositions, moral values and aesthetic preferences 
of others and thus introduce certain shared elements into their intentions and 
ensuing actions.24
And here we are, with that one simple sentence, in the very heart of 
controversies that we are interested in -  from the Platonic notion of 
basileia (leading to philosophers-kings), from the "Seventh Letter", via 
Kant's "Was ist Aufklarung?" and its Foucauldian interpretations, via 
Hegel -  for whom it was a period of "madness", as he puts it, when 
he though of himself as being an incarnation of the Absolute Spirit (as 
a mortal can only be God for Kiryllov from Dostoyevsky's The 
Possessed), to Heidegger's Ftihrung and his belief that the philosopher 
can be a part of something greater, e.g. of that "movement" glorified 
perhaps for purely philosophical reasons rather than personal and 
mean ones... The quotation from Bauman leads us also to the 
consideration of the belief from Marx' "Theses on Feuerbach" that Die 
Philosoiphen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber 
draufen, sie zu verdnder, which Derrida takes into account in his 
Specters de Marx.25 It is one of constant motifs of the tradition of 
philosophy: there is a group of people who know more than others 
due to having access to a truth, who disclose truth with the help of 
their intellects and -  if need be -  present it to the world in a softer, 
more common way. The religious metaphor of a shepherd and the 
herd fits here perfectly, a philosopher-prophet would always tell 
people "what to do". He is an unquestionable authority because he 
knows the deepest (the metaphors of removing surface layers of 
appearances to get to a hidden essence!) context, the philosophical 
one. An authority that looks at things and judges them "from a 
philosophical point of view", that is, from the point of view of the 
world, humanity, the universal rather than the particular, the eternal 
rather than the contingent, etc. The conversation with the philosopher
24 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom, op. cit., p. 6.
25 See Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx. L'Etat de la dette, le travaille du deuil et la 
nouvelle Internationale (Paris: Galilee, 1993).
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required the interlocutor to raise (Platonic "cave" metaphors again!) to 
a philosophical level. As Rorty wrote in his Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature -  the philosopher expressed his opinion about all questions, and 
his voice was the most important one in almost any discussion (as he 
was supported by the authority of philosophy itself).
Bauman says that "the free individual, far from being a universal 
condition of humankind, is a historical and social creation".26 
Freedom of an individual cannot be taken for granted, it is a relative 
novelty in the history of mankind, "a novelty closely connected with 
the advent of modernity and capitalism".27 Bauman's melancholic 
remark about the advent -  and possible departure -  of freedom has to 
be supplemented by a more optimistic vision. This vision must be 
supported by an awareness of common contingency, the vision of 
freedom as a historical, social creation, but also one that human 
beings create themselves: the vision of freedom in self-creation and 
through self-creation in the situation in which there is no other "road 
to freedom". And when Bauman refers (allusively) to Orwell from 
Animal Farm -  why there are supposed to be voices of equal and more 
equal, free and freer wills -  then one could suggest an answer that 
such voices and such wills may be coined in arduous, individual 
effort, and that, surely, their freedom and significance of their voices 
do not come today from some legitimacy, from power of the 
discipline they represent, in the name of which they express their 
views. So, given that the place traditionally (historically and socially) 
accorded to the intellectual in culture is becoming more and more 
barren, one perhaps might attempt to enrich the standing of the 
intellectual on a quite different basis, with one's own effort, with the 
help of power of one's own projects. Rorty's "freedom as recognition 
of contingency"28 and Bauman's (quoted from Agnes Heller) motto 
about "transforming our contingency into our destiny" from 
Modernity and Ambivalence may have a lot in common. However, there 
is one important exception -  Rorty's account leads optimistically to
26 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom, op. cit., p. 7.
27 Ibidem, p. 7.
28 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 47.
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the awareness of the possibility of surpassing oneself, Bauman's 
account may (though does not necessarily have to) lead to fatalism. 
That fatalism can be heard in Agnes Heller:
An individual has transformed his or her contingency into his or her destiny 
if this person has arrived at the consciousness of having made the best out of 
his or her practically infinite possibilities. A society has transformed its 
contingency into a destiny if the members of this society arrive at the 
awareness that they would prefer to live at no other place and at no other 
time than here and now.29
It seems better not to feel fulfilled, to aim always at something 
which cannot be reached, rather than to live with the possibility that 
one is a citizen of the only accessible, and at the same time the "best" 
of possible worlds (as we remember Faust promising to give in to 
Mephistopheles in Goethe the moment he is satisfied with a 
"moment", saying "Let it last! It is beautiful!"). It may be better not to 
fix the level of possibilities on the one of reality. It may be better to 
trust (Romantic) imagination, with all postmodern reservations, than 
(totalitarian) self-complacency of inhabitants of Oceania or Eurasia. It 
is important to remember about threats of fatalism and of melancholy 
of that Bauman's vision.
Thus freedom in Bauman's account is a construct to which we are 
not allowed to get accustomed because the world, of which it is a 
product, is contingent itself, and may disappear any time at all. That 
is a philosophically justified melancholy, but it may be also connected 
with the type of melancholy or pessimism so evident in Michel 
Foucault -  in his account of "power". Freedom, Bauman says, is not a 
property, a quality that belongs or does not belong to an individual, 
rather "freedom exists only as a social relation": "It makes sense only 
as an opposition to some other condition, past or present".30 Just like 
there are no free and coerced, there are also no ruling and ruled, those 
who hold power and fight to maintain it and those who are deprived
29 Agnes Heller quoted in Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Oxford: 
Polity Press, 1992), p. 234.
30 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom, op. cit., p. 7.
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of it and dream of having it, as "power is everywhere", it is of a 
"capillary" nature, as it penetrates everything... Freedom is a relation 
rather than a property that some (chosen) possess and others 
(temporarily worse-off) do not possess, but might, if only they made 
more of an effort, took another step on the road leading to 
emancipation, if they only wished to -  preferably by means of the 
revolution which would "seize" power. Power in this account is not 
something that one seizes, then losses, power works from a multitude 
of points, from below, in a word: "power is everywhere; not because 
it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere", as 
Michel Foucault says in the first volume of his History of Sexuality 31 
One does not "have" freedom (Bauman) just like one does not "have" 
power (Foucault) Freedom -  like power in such an account -  exists 
only between individuals. Both accounts are pessimistic. The first 
leaves little room for the will to individual freedom, the second leaves 
little room for hope for resistance, for which Foucault was reproached 
many times during his life and afterwards.32
If we were to look for one important moment to the most famous 
Odyssey of Spirit, the Hegelian Phenomenology, then it would be that 
the idea of freedom can organize thinking about history and history 
of philosophy. From the freedom of an "oriental despot", and only 
his, via freedom of some, that is to say, freedom of that "tip of an 
iceberg" in Ancient Greece in Hegel's memorable expression, to the 
culmination of freedom in the period of (post)revolutionary France -  
in a radical contrast to that "misery" of German life, on the one hand; 
on the other hand the dialectic of Herrschaft und Knechtschaft and 
struggle for recognition, freedom is only recognized as freedom by 
the Other, who is deprived of it (who promptly, however -  owing to 
his work -  turns out to be more free than his master as the latter
31 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. An Introduction, vol. I (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1978), p. 93.
32 The role of "hope" with reference to Foucault is most important to Richard 
Rorty. The reproaches I have in mind come e.g. from Michael Walzer from the text on 
"lonely politics of Michel Foucault" in his The Company of Critics or from Edward Said 
from his "Foucault and the Imagination of Power" in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. by 
D. Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
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appears from a distance to be just a dead end of history, une impasse 
existentielle, as Kojeve says of him33).
The Idea of Emancipation turns out today to be a more and more 
modern illusion, perhaps the most persistent metanarrative. 
Incredulity towards it, however, is something else than incredulity 
towards freedom. There is perhaps the possibility of freedom without 
the Idea of Emancipation. How is one to reconcile a lack of arche and 
telos with a lack of simple history as an incarnation of the Idea of 
emancipation of the humanity (Napoleon on the outskirts of Iena 
would be such a simple history), preferably with the help of the 
power of Reason appreciated by Enlightenment -  with dreams of 
"free man" mentioned in declarations and constitutions of the times 
of the Revolution? It seems, to push the differences to an extreme, that 
the answer today might be the (Nietzschean-Bloomian-Rortyan) self­
creation, but it might also be the (Baumanian-Baudrillardian) fatalism 
and melancholy, to sketch here caricatures of two extreme 
possibilities of attitudes. Since how is one to describe such statements 
as Bauman's: "In our society, individual freedom is constituted as, 
first and foremost, freedom of the consumer"34 from Freedom or "[n]o 
determination, no chance; just a soft, pliable game without set or 
predictable denouement, a game which exhausts itself fully in the 
aggregate of players and their moves. ... This world promises no 
security but no impotence either; it offers neither certainty nor 
despair; only the joy of a right move and the grief of a failed one" 
from a gloomy, para-Baudrillardian picture drawn in Mortality, 
Immortality and Other Life Strategies.35
Indeed, the first choice to be made would be to abandon "the 
vocabulary parasitic on the hope of (or determination for) 
universality, certainty and transparency", because we are fully aware 
of the omnipresence of contingency. The question arises, however, 
whether or not we can afford the luxury of "abandoning all hopes" 
(to refer to a classic formulation)? Instead of lost hopes there may be
33 Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction a la lecture de Hegel (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), p. 25.
34 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
35 Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1992), p. 187.
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enough room for other hopes, smaller, more moderate. One of these 
might perhaps be (philosophical, literary, artistic, emotional etc.) self­
creation. Then there might be a chance that one may be a consumer, 
which may be inescapable today, but not a consumer first and 
foremost. "Freedom of a consumer" and the very Baudrillardian la 
societe de consommation are strongly pessimistic motifs if one is to use 
them to study the postmodern society. Sometimes Bauman, like 
Baudrillard and Foucault, does not leave the reader much to hope for. 
Bauman may appear to be as a grave-digger of modernity, one who 
enters postmodernity with a sense of depression. At other times, 
Bauman presents a bright and ravishing picture of today's culture, as 
in Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern Morality and in Postmodern 
Ethics, to which I devote the last section of my paper.
4.
Bauman's books are to a large extent works of a moralist in the best 
sense of the term who is bothered by moral dilemmas of modernity 
and postmodemity. Life in Fragmants and Postmodern Ethics seem to be 
the culmination of these moral deliberations.36 Let us confine ourselves 
here to the former book, though. Bauman says in it the following:
There is neither cause nor reason for morality; the necessity to be moral, and 
the meaning of being moral, can neither be demonstrated nor logically 
deduced. And so morality is as contingent as the rest of being: it has no
36 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); Life in Fragments. 
Essays in Postmodern Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). As Bauman put it clearly in 
Postmodern Ethics, "I suggest that the novelty of the postmodern approach to ethics 
consists first and foremost not in the abandoning of characteristically modem moral 
concerns, but in the rejection of typically modem ways of going about its moral 
problems (that is, responding to moral challenges with coercive normative regulation in 
political practice, and the philosophical search for absolutes, universals and foundations 
in theory). The great issues of ethics -  like human rights, social justice, balance between 
peaceful co-operation and personal self-assertion, synchronization of individual conduct 
and collective welfare -  have lost nothing of their topicality. They only need to be seen, and 
dealt with, in a novel way" (Postmodern Ethics, op. cit., pp. 3-4, emphasis mine).
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ethical foundations. We can no more offer ethical guidance for the moral
selves, no more "legislate" morality, or hope to gain such ability ...37
However, today's loss of belief in foundations as such is not by any 
means reducible to the past belief that ethical foundations have not 
been discovered yet, a fact that the author makes clear. What results 
from it for us, those living in postmodemity? It means for us 
sharpening of our own moral responsibility, as we are "facing the 
chaos", which is to say at the same time that we are "forced to stand 
face-to-face with [our] moral autonomy and so also with [our] moral 
responsibility".38 The postmodern world appears to Bauman as a chance 
for one's own responsibility and one's own choice rather than the 
responsibility and choice grounded in metanarratives. Each moral step 
is difficult because it is one's own step; we are deprived of any big 
moral background and big moral advisors of modernity. So, the 
consciousness of contingency is total. We ourselves are contingent as 
children of time and chance (as Rorty likes to put it), our personality is 
contingent, as well as society in which we are leading our (contingent) 
lives. Philosophy that we are dealing with assumes a contingent form, 
the form determined just by other contingencies (as a great skeptic Odo 
Marquard says in a subtitle of a fragment from his Apologie des 
Zufdlligen: "We human beings are always more our contingencies than 
our choices"39). We are drowning in an ocean of contingencies having 
lost the grounds of a clearly fixed determination... Deprived of a 
supporting point, accustomed to it for such a long time, we are waving 
our hands crying for help that will never come because it cannot 
come... "Ethical paradox of postmodemity" -  "moral responsibility 
comes together with the loneliness of moral choice", as Bauman says in 
In timations of Postmodemity.. .40
How is one to live in a moral world devoid of traditional 
foundations? How is one to live in a post-1989 world "without an
37 Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments, op. cit., p. 18.
38 Ibidem, p. 43.
39 Odo Marquard, In Defence of the Accidental (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), p. 118.
40 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodemity, op. cit., p. xxii.
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alternative" (i.e. without the other pole of a nourishing utopia)? How 
is one to live if philosophy is supposed to be just a (Rortyan) 
"conversation of mankind"? How, and for how long, one can -  
meaningfully, usefully and "interestingly" -  converse about 
philosophy within the framework of a philosophical language game? 
What at the same time, however, is the alternative to that postmodern 
cultural conversation (of those "name-droppers" from Rorty's 
Consequences of Pragmatism) -  perhaps the only alternative is a much 
worse deep illusion of one's own philosophical necessity and, in 
broader terms, the necessity of philosophy itself...
Bauman writes about "ethically non-grounded morality" -  
"uncontrolled and unpredictable". The loneliness of moral choice is 
that of man devoid of higher than "here and now" senses, of plans 
further than the hie et nunc generation. But it is always to be bom in 
mind that the greatest fear (at least in modernity) had always come 
from those in whose eyes had been sparked by the certainty of a rightly 
chosen Idea, rightly chosen telos, rather than from mere psychopaths. 
Telos used to sanctify crimes of today, sanctify present wrongs, being a 
bright point in the future which gives birth to darkness on the earth 
today (let us remind here of Bakunin and Nietshayev's "Catechism of 
the Revolutionary": "the revolutionary breaks any possible connection 
with a civilized world. If he is in touch with it, it is only in order to 
destroy it" or "What ought to be moral for the revolutionary is what co­
operates with revolution, what ought to be immoral and criminal for 
him is what stands in its way"). "Legislative", modem thinking brings 
about "gardener" practice, weeds are being pulled out on the basis of 
hygienic procedures. A legislator-gardener as a modern incarnation of 
evil, evil that is bom simply because someone "knows better" what 
others want? How, in Max Horkheimer's words, to "be on the side of 
the temporal against merciless eternity"? How to live when no 
"horror!" (to use the unforgettable expression of Kurtz from the ending 
of Conrad's The Heart of Darkness) can be explained by means of tension 
between (inexisting but promised) future and (all-too-known) present? 
When the present is no longer merely another point of a pilgrimage to a 
known goal, no longer another -  still higher each time -  stage in 
coming to the promised land, no longer another suffering here for the
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sake of future brightness there? Bauman says that modernity "was an 
effort to make sure that in the end it would be proven that it had not 
been in vain; to force the legitimation in advance to confirm itself ex 
post facto" :41
Obviously, the "effort" here may be also a soft euphemism: one 
could perhaps just say: it was often hatred, a crime, a lie (not the 
Greek, "noble" one). Obviously, hatred, crime and lie which were 
modern and rational -  because, as Bauman says, "feelers of 
hesitations go deep: to the very heart of the 'project of Modernity'".42 
Modernity and the Holocaust is a moving testimony to Bauman's 
disappointment first, Bauman's disappointment, then his disbelief 
and anger, then, finally, his accusation of modernity. Therefore the 
author does not spare philosophers of modernity when he says that 
"universality was the weapon and honor of philosophers" -  but today 
little in the world seems to depend on what, and if anything at all, 
they are saying, as "the philosophers' truth ran short of eligible 
bachelors to be married to; there seems to be no escape from 
spinsterhood".43 There is no longer any history -  there is just a 
chronology, there is no progress -  just development, no great plans -  
just contingency, and in Bauman's view philosophers are not to 
blamed for it. As, in his vivid description summarizing in a way a 
hundred or so years of history of philosophy, "it is not the 
philosophers who failed to place the groundless and contingent being 
on secure foundations; it is rather that the building gear has been 
snatched from their hands, not in order to be given to others, less 
deserving and trustworthy, but to join the dreams of universal reason 
in the dustbin of dashed hopes and unkept promises" 44 Thus today's 
culture -  in a common view of Bauman on the one hand, and 
"postmodernists" (in its European rather than American sense of the 
vague term) on the other -  seems not to be looking for successors of 
philosophers, nobody seems to compete with them today, as they
41 Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments, op. cit., p. 22.
42 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, op. cit., p. 65.
43 Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments, op. cit., p. 25.
44 Ibidem, p. 25.
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used to compete with priests and scientists in the past. Great 
metanarratives -  with the one of Emancipation in the forefront -  have 
been severely dirtied and dreadfully abused. Hence incredulity, 
hyper-sensitivity and carefulness of the philosophical discourse of 
postmodernity. Especially considering the fact that while the role of 
normative, universal ethics seems to be commonly criticized, the 
sense of justice and injustice (Lyotard's "wrong" as opposed to a mere 
"damage", his tort and his dommage) or the sensitivity to pain and 
humiliation (e.g. in Rorty's utopian figure of a "liberal ironist") are 
still growing. Philosophers, to sum up, do not give their privileges to 
someone else as they received them once from priests, it is rather that 
the very privileges disappear, turning out to be a useful illusion 
produced for the needs of modernity...
To return to Bauman, "Legislators cannot imagine an orderly 
world without legislation; the ethical legislator or preacher cannot 
imagine a world without a legislated ethics".45 The decline of ethics 
does not necessarily have to mean the decline of morality, in a new 
vocabulary of moral deliberation of -  post-ethical, post-legislative -  
postmodernity, one of the key words will surely be responsibility. As 
people at large with unprecedented freedom given to them may be 
building their moral identity just on responsibility. Moral autonomy 
may be constituted by responsibility itself. Is philosophy (together 
with ethics) in such a case a merely (intellectual) "vagabondage", just 
like a philosopher is a postmodern "vagabond" of the philosophical 
tradition? Is philosophical vagabondage to endure the test of time, 
will it reconcile with its relatively inferior status granted to it by 
postmodern culture? "The path of vagabondage is created during the 
journey itself" and nobody knows where it will lead us to -  "the point 
is not to lose the ability to move" (Bauman).
I want to stop my discussion of Bauman and the question of the 
intellectual with the following quotation from his Copernican Lectures 
given in Toruh, Poland (and let me add that it is one of the most clear- 
cut and courageous descriptions of what may be going on in the 
humanities at the moment): "the stakes is the value of the capital
45 Ibidem, p. 36.
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accumulated by old-fashioned firms called philosophy, sociology, or 
the humanities, in which we all are at the same time paid functionaries 
and shareholders. The stakes is the current use and exchange value of 
commodities gathered over the years in firm's warehouses. The stakes 
is the usefulness of firm's statutes and regulations which we have 
learnt by heart, and in the application of which we have become 
masters. The stakes is the peace of mind, blissful certainty of authority, 
the sense of meaningfulness of what one is doing..." If Bauman is right 
in his diagnosis, there is a lot of work to be done.
Chapter 5
Between the Community and the Text. 
French Philosophy, Politics, and the Figure 
of the Intellectual -  from Sartre to Foucault
1.
Those who love wisdom (philosophers, and then sages1) and those 
who love power has always exerted a mesmeric influence on one 
another. The roads of the philosopher and the City, the philosopher 
and the ruler, the roads of truth and politics has always crossed, with 
various results. We know from history famous alliances, commented 
on over the centuries, taken either (more often) as a warning or (less 
often) as an ideal to be imitated by future generations: Plato and 1
1 See A. Kojeve's lecture from 1938-1939 about "philosophy and wisdom" from 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (transl. by J.H. Nichols, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1968): it 
was Hegel who was supposed to have become the first Sage rather than the 
Philosopher, that is, the man who was the incarnation of Absolute Knowledge. To 
claim that required of him "unheard-of audacity" (p. 76), not to say divinity, which, as 
Bataille reminds us in The Inner Experience, bordered on madness. "It is true, one 
cannot reach wisdom if one does not believe in one's own divinity", Kojeve will note. And 
Bataille will echo him: "... in a portrait of him as an old man, I imagine seeing 
exhaustion, the horror of being in the depths of things -  of being God. Hegel, at the 
moment when the system closed, believed himself for two years to be going mad" 
(Inner Experience, transl. by L.A. Boldt, New York, SUNY Press, 1988, p. 110). Thus 
Hegel had the audacity, courage, boldness to go beyond many of those who only 
sought wisdom by claiming that it was him who had finally reached it. What is one 
supposed to say with respect to the "divine Hegel" and the "divine Kojeve", or even, 
from a different perspective, the "divine (Leo) Strauss"? Les philosophes ne m’interessent 
pas,je cherche des sage..., Kojeve will frankly say.
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Dionysius from Syracuse, Aristotle (already wiser, being rich with 
Platonic experience) and Alexander the Great, Hegel and Napoleon 
(e.g. in Kojeve's version) or, later, Friedrich of Prussia (in Popper's 
version and as his own "contribution to the war"), finally Heidegger 
and Nazism as well as Lukacs and Stalinist Marxism. These were 
different alliances, with different degrees of intensity, conviction and 
faith, and derived from different motivations -  from naivete and 
noble outbursts of spirit, heart, and mind, to collaboration with evil 
and a choice of the lesser evil, to cold philosophical and political 
calculation. Each pair of relationships referred to here would require 
a separate analysis and a reflection specific to them, for something 
radically different was needed during the various periods in the lives 
and philosophy of Hegel and Heidegger, and still different were the 
motives of Lukacs.2 I would not like to leave the impression that I am 
unaware of the huge abysses separating the aforementioned 
philosophers' alliances with power however (I am intentionally using 
the word "alliance" in a rather ambivalent and indeterminate sense). 
These were different philosophers and these were different powers: it 
is difficult to compare any of the two cases -  Plato's and Aristotle's 
relation to power is incommensurable3, just like (at first sight) might 
seem the involvements of the closest in time to each other and to us, 
Heidegger and Lukacs. The only thing I want to show at this 
introductory stage of my discussions is the fact that even the greatest 
philosophers (or should one perhaps say: especially the greatest?) 
have entered into or have been dragged into complicated relations 
with power, regardless of whether we consider Ancient Greece, Rome
2 See e.g. Tom Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1995, pp. 148-149) who categorically rejectsany comparison between the political 
involvements of Heidegger and Lukacs, by pointing to the fact that the latter harshly 
criticisizedStalinism and never hid the nature or the extent of his engagement, which 
cannot be said of Heidegger (which is perhaps best shown in a political biography by 
Hugo Ott, translated as Martin Heidegger. A Political Life, London: Basic Books, 1993, 
especially Chapters IV and V).
3 Which is strongly stressed by Hannah Arendt in a brilliant text "Truth and 
Politics" from Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought which refers 
the reader back to Aristotle's statements in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics.
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or post-Weimar Germany. I am convinced that the junction of truth 
and politics, philosophy and power, the question of the "spiritual" or 
"intellectual" revolution, of the thinking/action distinction, of 
"Epicurean gardens" on the one hand and political and philosophical 
"propaganda" on the other hand (to refer here to the famous debate 
between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojeve4), of the "microphysics" 
of power as opposed to its Marxist account etc. etc. -  that all these 
remain today -  as they almost always did -  as the most important 
points of focus for thought, both about the past, as well as, first of all, 
about the present and the future.
2.
This way of thinking about philosophy and politics seems to be 
strictly connected with the account of the philosopher's place in 
society or -  in the attempt made here to give a definition of the role -  
more generally, of the writer in culture. It is surely worthwhile to 
think over and refer to each other these three separate, although 
related, categories: the philosopher, the intellectual, and the writer. 
For the time being, let us think about "writing" in the broadest sense 
so that we can try to picture and then sketch out their differing 
choices and obligations, decisions and expectations, as well as those 
which are accorded to them by others. I would like to trace a common 
ethos in French thinking starting at the end of the nineteenth century 
to current postmodern times. I have chosen France because it is the 
French shadow that is darkest with respect to the philosopher and the 
intellectual, it was there that until recently (or perhaps still?) they 
were highly respected with their place having been inscribed in the 
social structures and cultural atmosphere since les philosophes and the 
Dreyfus affair.
4 Leo Strauss' "Epicurean" attitude, a strictly isolated way of life for a philosopher 
who lives "outside the world", practices pure theory with no necessary connection to 
"action" is "fundamentally mistaken", according to Kojeve (see especially their debate 
recently expanded with years-long correspondence in V. Gourevitch and M. Roth's 
edition of Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, New York: The Free Press, 1991, p. 151).
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Let me say the following at the very beginning: I want to trace two 
themes that have been struggling and coexisting for over a hundred 
years, to show their constant presence and unchangeable opposition 
on the basis of a couple of examples. One of the themes we want to 
call the communitarian, the other we want to call the textual, not 
without some parallels and analogies to Richard Rorty's pair of 
solidarity and self-creation (from his brilliant and highly influential 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity), as writers following the former 
theme think mainly about "community" and "society", those 
following the latter think mainly about the "text". It is not a 
traditional opposition between knowing the world and expressing 
one's self, that of knowing and expression, though. Marxian 
opposition in the Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach remains closed within 
the world -  the command being to "change" the world, rather than to 
"interpret" it. The opposition that I want to draw here -  starting in 
French culture with Zola on the one hand and Flaubert on the other5 -  
takes into consideration both the world and the text. And in such a 
form seems to exist in Sartre with his opposition between "poetry" 
and "committed" literature, in Barthes with "writers" and "authors", 
in Hegel in the influential account by Kojeve and in Nietzsche 
according to Deleuze (from Nietzsche and Philosophy), as well as in the 
opposition between dialectic and transgression, until a doubtfully 
successful attempt to step outside it by Michel Foucault in his 
"intellectuel universel"/"intellectuel specifique" opposition. 
(Furthermore, I would like to see in the Rortyan distinction between 
self-creation and solidarity the same, European, French roots, the 
same contradictions and questions that existentialists -  whose
5 The opposition between Zola and Flaubert is perhaps one of the strongest out of 
many possible examples and it can be seen e.g. in the following statement by Sartre 
from "Introducing Les Temps modemes": "The writer is situated in his time; every word 
he utters has reverberations. As does his silence. I hold Flaubert and the Goncourts 
responsible for the repression that followed the Commune because they did not write 
a line to prevent it. Some will object that this wasn't their business. But was the Calas 
trial Voltaire's business? Was the administration of the Congo Gide's business?" 
-  Jean-Paul Sartre, “What is Literature?" and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988), p. 252.
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heroism is so manifest in Rorty -  found themselves in. If I were to 
find in French culture a figure of a philosopher of somehow 
analogous hesitations -  and a similar attempt to get out of them -  I 
would point, paradoxically enough and not without doubts, at 
Georges Bataille who stood at the same time on the side of Hegel and 
on the side of Nietzsche and did not want to unite dialectics with 
transgression, but wandered in his thought from one to the other -  
which is shown by Foucault in his "Preface to Transgression", a 
contribution to the issue of Critique devoted to Bataille. (Despite the 
difference in cultures, time and space, despite the lack of any traces of 
Bataille in Rorty's thinking, the inability, or rather the peculiar, 
programmatic and still being justified unwillingness to choose 
between Hegel and Nietzsche, or between solidarity and self-creation, 
seems to bind the two together, separating them, at the same time, 
from e.g. Sartre, Barthes, or Deleuze).
Thus, to return to the main line of argument -  we get the 
"community" and the "text". It is worth noting that "community" 
(communaute) has recently become one of the most important terms on 
which some interesting philosophical discussions focus and whose 
point of departure is often Bataille's thought and his subsequent 
projects (Contre-Attaque, College de Sociologie, Acephale) -  let it 
suffice to remember here the books by Jean-Luc Nancy, Maurice 
Blanchot and Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard.6 I suppose that the opposition 
distilled here is one of constants in French thinking over the last 
hundred years or so -  what gets changed is the point of gravity, 
bringing the scales to the earth either on the one, or on the other side.
I take Barthes' attempt of a description of the situation in 
"Authors and Writers" to be paradigmatic. Who is the writer and 
who is the author -  who is our textualist and who is our 
communitarian? What is at stake is, to be sure, the relationship to 
words, to language. The author works in words, acts in words, the
6 See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, transl. by P. Connor and others 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991); Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable 
Community (New York: Station Hill Press, 1988); Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Different!. 
Phrases in Dispute, transl. by G. van Den Abbeele (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988).
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word itself is neither an instrument, nor a tool, nor a vehicle for him. 
He asks the question "how to write?" and, paradoxically enough, as 
Barthes puts it, that "narcissistic activity has always provoked an 
interrogation of the world".7 The author takes literature as an aim and 
the world keeps returning it to him as a means (somehow like in 
Kant's "asocial sociality" or Hegel's "cunning of reason", let us add). 
Literature in his view is non-realistic but it is precisely owing to that 
very unreality that allows it to ask questions of the world, that gives 
literature the power to "disturb the world". It would be absurd to ask 
him about his own commitment -  his ("true") responsibility is 
towards literature, just like in Milan Kundera's ideas of the "wisdom 
of the novel" and its "history" from The Art o f the Novel and, 
especially, from his recent Les Testaments trahis.8 The author is the one 
who desires to be the author, his subject matter is the "word".
This is not the case with the "writer", merely a writer, to 
remember Barthes' priority right at the beginning. The writer writes 
in order to communicate to the world, he has political aims for which 
the word is just a means, an insignificant vehiculum. He bears witness, 
proves, demonstrates, instructs, gives lessons; language for him 
"supports a praxis, it does not constitute one", language is an 
instrument of communication, a mere vehicle of "thought".9 The
7 Roland Barthes, "Authors and Writers" in A Barthes Reader, ed. by S. Sontag 
(New York: The Noonday Press, 1982), p. 187.
8 See Milan Kundera, Les Testaments trahis (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), especially the 
leading idea that the novel is le territoire ou le jugement moral est suspendu. It may be the 
case that Zygmunt Bauman goes in the very opposite direction, as can be seen from 
his text "Angst in Postmodemity, or on Truth, Fiction, and Uncertainty" (unpubl. 
typescript). Bauman opposes Kundera to Eco saying that what separates them are 
different experiences, of totalitarianism and of postmodemity, respectively. Truth 
relegated from the real world may find its shelter -  precisely in the world of fiction, in 
the novel. The novel would not have to be the "paradise of the individuals" as in 
Kundera from The Art of the Novel, as the postmodern world does not lack diversity, 
but it may be that the world of constant truths can no longer get through today's 
polyphonicity. Unlimited possibilities seem to be provided by the world itself, so the 
shelter for a coherent vision of the world may be fiction. At the same time, Bauman's 
vision is an alternative to the one drawn by Rorty in his "Heidegger, Kundera, and 
Dickens" in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
9 Roland Barthes, "Authors and Writers", op. cit., p. 189.
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author is like a priest, the writer -  like a clerk. Textual authors and 
communitarian writers form a typology that derives straight from the 
reversal of Sartre's opposition in his renowned text "What Is 
Literature?": Barthes reverses this hierarchy claiming that all 
interesting men of letters were ecrivains rather than ecrivants, 
protesting against Sartre's degradation of poetry and the edification 
of prose. Out of the same opposition: aestheticism and language 
games versus social and political commitment, Barthes supports the 
other pole to Sartre, forming (in his Zero Degree Writing) an alternative 
outline of history of literature since the times of Flaubert -  precisely, 
since 1848 -  until the present, within which the "task of the author" is 
not "taking a position", as Sartre of that period explicitly wants and in 
which the function of the author is not, or at least is not only and 
exclusively, appeler un chat un chat and modern literature is not that 
"cancer of words" but in which Flaubert and Mallarme (as well as the 
later no more socially useful Proust and the surrealists) occupy a 
significant place.10 1As Sartre notes, and it is important to bear that in 
mind:
A day comes when the pen is forced to stop, and the writer must then take
up arms. Thus, however you might have come to it, whatever the opinions
you might have professed, literature throws you into battle.11
And the writer takes up arms, but in Sartre's ideal the very act of 
writing is arms, as is the pen serving to help the oppressed rather 
than the oppressors, for to understand the society in which he lives, 
the writer has just one way -  to accept the point of view of its least
10 See Jonathan Culler, Roland Barthes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 
chapter "Literary Historian". Sartre says the following: "The simplest surrealist act -  
Breton will write twenty years later -  is to get out into the street and shoot, as long as 
one can, with one's luck, towards the crowd". That is precisely what Paul Hilbert, the 
hero of the Sartrian "Herostrate" did, when he decided to "kill half a dozen of them", 
only half a dozen as the gun had only six bullets... See Roman Kubicki, Zmierzch sztuki. 
Narodziny ponowoczesnej jednostki? [The Decline of Art. The Birth of The Postmodern 
Individual?] (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Humaniora, 1995).
11 Jean-Paul Sartre, "What Is Literature?", op. cit., p. 69. This is recalled by Allan 
Stoekl in his excellent book Agonies of the Intellectual (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1992), p. 307.
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privileged members.12 Which obviously gives birth to unhappy 
consciousness and bad conscience as Sartre in "Introducing Les Temps 
modernes" puts it:
That legacy of irresponsibility has troubled a number of minds. They suffer 
from a literary bad conscience and are no longer sure whether to write is 
admirable or grotesque. ... The man of letters writes while others fight. One day he's 
quite proud of it, he feels himself to be a cleric and guardian of ideal values; the 
following day he's ashamed of it, and finds that literature appears quite 
markedly to be a special form of affectation. In relation to middle-class 
people who read him, he is aware of his dignity; but confronted with 
workers, who don't, he suffers from an inferiority complex.13
The balance between literature-profession and literature-martyrdom, 
between saving through literature and the total uselessness of it, gave 
an impulse for the writing of Roads of Freedom and shaped the figure 
of Mathieu as a young intellectual looking (like Sartre himself) for his 
place in the world and gradually growing to political commitment; it 
also produced a later "judgement of Baudelaire" as well as the 
monstrous-sized study of Flaubert.
Sartre turned to Julien Benda with a (famous) reproach that the 
clerk is not among the oppressed as he is "unavoidably a host of 
oppressing classes and races". The writer is expected to write in a 
simple and comprehensive manner, his language is supposed to be 
transparent and unambiguous rather than to form an amoral and 
aberrational "poetic prose" in which transparent meaning is covered 
with unclear and ambiguous senses. While for Sartre, Flaubert was 
the beginning of the end of French prose, for Barthes he was a turning 
point for literature engaging -  precisely -  with itself.
For Sartre -  the giant of hard work -  the question of writing was 
fundamental: "What is writing? Why does one write? For whom? The 
fact is, it seems that nobody has ever asked himself these questions",
12 As he will say a little later, in "A Plea for Intellectuals" (from Between 
Existentialism and Marxism, New York: Pantheon, 1974, p. 255), a speech given in Japan 
in 1968.
13Jean-Paul Sartre, "Introducing Les Temps modernes", op. cit., p. 250, emphasis 
mine.
Between the Community and the Text 129
he will note at the beginning of "What Is Literature?". There are many 
reasons to write; it may be an escape from the world, it may also be a 
tool to conquer the world. But "one can flee into a hermitage, into 
madness, into death. One can conquer by arms. Why does it have to be 
writing, why does one have to manage one's escapes and conquests by 
writing?".14 According to Sartre, the writer has just one single subject 
-  freedom. He writes as a free man to other free men (and it is here 
that writing meets democracy, like in Kundera, or Derrida with his 
strongly defended idea of tout dire, let us add). Thus to write -  means 
to desire freedom in a specific way. It means to speak to one's 
contemporaries, to stick to one's epoch, without wanting to lose 
anything from it. There may be more beautiful epochs, surely there 
are -  but this one is ours, Sartre will say in "Introducing Les Temps 
modernes". The task of the writer is to produce transformations in the 
surrounding society: both in man's situation as well as in his account 
of himself. The task of the writer is to provide the society in which he 
lives with an unhappy consciousness -  to present its picture to itself 
and calling it either to accept that picture as its own or to change it.
The place of the writer in society in the last three centuries has 
taken various forms, according to the evolution outlined by Sartre. In 
the eighteenth century, just before the revolution -  in the times of the 
Encyclopedists -  the writer was seen as a "guide and a spiritual 
leader" of society. The product of the intellect at that time was seen as 
action -  it produced ideas which brought about upheavals; one could 
contribute with one's pen to a "political emancipation of man in 
general". The writer appears to be a rebel, a rioter, a trouble-maker -  
he wants to change the world. Therefore the eighteenth century was 
for French writers the only "chance of paradise, soon lost" in history. 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are according to him a period 
of mistakes and declines. They brought about a growing rejection of 
ties between literature and society; starting with the "icy silence" of 
Mallarme, to Flaubert writing to "be free from people and things", to 
Proust who was supposed to feel no solidarity towards other people 
but merely notice their "coexistence", to Breton and the surrealists.
14 Jean-Paul Sartre, "What Is Literature?", op. cit., p. 48, emphasis mine.
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First writing was intended to destroy the world (1848-1918), then -  to 
destroy literature itself. The key slogan appears here -  the 
irresponsibility of literature and writers. "The temptation of 
irresponsibility" has belonged to the literary tradition for a century, 
Sartre will say in his "Introducing Les Temps modernes"'5, which 
roughly corresponds to my "textual" theme in French culture.
Sartre's thinking about philosophy and politics can be traced in an 
only recently published (1994) correspondence with Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty from 1953, the year of the abrupt end of their 
cooperation in Les Temps modernes. What is the place of politics with 
respect to philosophy, what would it mean to withdraw from the 
world towards philosophy and philosophical books, what should be 
the philosopher's attitude towards the "requirements of the moment", 
to current political events? How far, if at all, is the intellectual to be 
"committed"? It was a passionate and violent controversy that 
separated people who had been friends until then. Merleau-Ponty did 
not want to allow himself to be trapped within a framework of 
Sartre's simple opposition between philosophy and politics -  and put 
forward his account of what it was to practice philosophy. What was 
Sartre not willing to forgive his adversary? The point was not only to 
locate philosophical studies before politics; still more it was an 
attempt to justify such an individual gesture and generalize it for 
others. Let us listen to Sartre's reproaches directed to Merleau-Ponty:
But I reproach you with something far worse, with the fact that you 
withdraw in circumstances in which you ought to make a decision as a man, 
as a Frenchman, a citizen, and an intellectual -  taking your philosophy as an 
alibi.15 6
Merleau-Ponty makes use of his right to choose, and that is what he 
can do. But he cannot criticize anyone -  and Sartre in particular -  in 
the name of his apolitical position, according to Sartre. In Sartre's 
view, philosophy itself is a form of wasting time. One is a philosopher 
only after one's death -  in one's lifetime, he says, we are people who
15 Jean-Paul Sartre, "Introducing Les Temps modernes", op. cit., p. 249.
16 "Sartre/Merleau-Ponty: Correspondence", Magazine litteraire, 320, Avril 1994.
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among other things write philosophical books (which is perhaps not 
the most important activity).
The controversy between the two philosophers concerned the 
question whether and to what degree philosophy was taking an 
attitude towards the world, to what degree it was an activity. As 
Merleau-Ponty, clearly hurt, put it: "Philosophy, even if one does not 
choose between communism and anti-communism, is some attitude 
in the world rather than the withdrawal from it". The philosopher, an 
active member of society, does not necessarily have to face up to 
every event -  no matter whether that would be the Rosenbergs' 
execution, the war in Indochina or arrests made among French 
communists, for what he focuses on is the oscillation between an 
event (as a catalyst for thought) and a general reflection in the context 
of which a given event may be inscribed. Merleau-Ponty, defending 
himself against Sartre's accusations, makes it explicit that he does not 
want to be a "topical writer", similarly, incidentally, to Vladimir 
Nabokov who in his text "On a Book Entitled Lolita" -  as Richard Rorty 
reminds us -  says the following: "Lolita has no moral in tow. For me a 
work of fiction exists only in so far as it affords me what I shall bluntly 
call aesthetic bliss. There are not many such books. All the rest is either 
topical trash or what some call the Literature of Ideas". With all genre 
differences and proportions respected, Merleau-Ponty defended 
himself against being taken over by that topical trash, keeping faith in 
what paradigmatically was put by Julien Benda in The Betrayal of the 
Intellectuals and which in turn was described by Sartre as simply 
"abstract daydreaming" and "blabbering".
3 .
If we say at this particular moment that Barthes' "authors" are 
"Nietzschean" while his "writers" are "Hegelian" (in the sense of the 
opposition construed by Gilles Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy'17),
17 See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophic (Paris: PUF, 1962), where he says 
e.g. that "there can be no compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche", that Nietzsche's
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we will thereby step into a totally new complex of questions. That is, 
"Nietzschean" in the specific sense of the Nietzsche contrasted by the 
generation of Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault -  wanting to "flee from 
Hegel", as the latter put it in L'Ordre du discours18 -  with the Hegel as 
he was appropriated and sold to the French mainly by Alexandre 
Kojeve, but also Jean Hyppolite and the whole generation preceding 
the aforementioned one.19
Thus we can get the following opposition: Nietzsche, Barthes' 
authors, Sartre's poetry, textuality contra Hegel, Barthes' writers, 
Sartre's prose, communality. We thereby enlarge the stakes: no longer 
only literature, but also philosophy, no longer the man of letters, but 
also the philosopher -  which may have been clear since the very 
beginning of our considerations, as it was at the beginning of those 
put forward by Sartre in his "What Is Literature?". One French figure 
is Hegelian and Nietzschean at the same time -  Georges Bataille who 
read both of them together, who thought both dialectically and 
transgressively, who listened to Kojeve (although, some say, 
sometimes snored during his lectures), who belonged to and left the 
surrealists and then founded subsequent, secretive "communities".20 
Bataille's work, without going into too many details here, reveals two 
sides at the same time: in Summa atheologica it reveals Nietzsche, and 
in The Cursed Share it reveals Hegel and Marx.21 These are
philosophy is"absolute anti-dialectics" or that "Nietzsche's work is pervaded with 
anti-Hegelianism"; these ideas were also popularized in his Nietzsche, sa vie, son oeuvre 
in the "Philosophes" series (Paris: PUF, 1965).
18 Michel Foucault, appendix to Archeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 
1972), p. 235.
19 And perhaps it is no accident that both Foucault and Althusser, as well as 
Derrida, participated in Jean Hyppolite's seminars, and that the early works of the 
first two concerned only Hegel. Foucault's text is lost, while a part of Althusser's text 
can be found in a special Hegelian issue of Magazine litteraire (no. 293, Novembre 
1991).
20 On "communities" in Bataille, see especially Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable 
Community, op. cit.; also Allan Stoekl, Politics, Writing, Mutilation: The Cases of Bataille, 
Blanchot, Roussel, Leiris and Ponge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985).
21 See e.g. Jean-Michel Besnier, La Politique de I'impossible. L'intellectuel entre revolte 
et engagement (Paris: La Decouverte, 1988).
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diametrically opposed projects which cross over and nullify each 
other, if one could have a look at them from a single, higher, 
synthesizing perspective. Bataille does not choose between them, both 
communities -  a textual and a political one, the one that focuses on 
"writing", "negativity" as well as "poetry, laughter, and ecstasy" (that 
is, on what Hegel did not think over in his system in Bataille's 
account), and the one that focuses on economic and political "tasks" 
and "missions" -  remain in a state of war with each other. It is like 
two intellectuals in one person, as Allan Stoekl notes, and, 
furthermore, "this duality of Bataille's project, in one sense, is no 
different from the split we have seen running through French 
intellectual activity in general in the twentieth century".22 It is as if 
Bataille was at at the same time, both Zola and Flaubert, or both 
Maurice Blanchot who searches for a "community of readers" and 
Alexandre Kojeve who searches in reading Hegel "a work of political 
propaganda".23 As if both Rorty, the songster of self-creation, and 
Rorty, the songster of solidarity, loved alternately "Trotsky" and the 
"wild orchids"...
The Sartrian opposition between the aesthete and the committed 
writer, as well as its Barthesian inversion in the form of 
authors/writers, have not been seriously challenged until Michel 
Foucault -  whose intellectuel universel, to be replaced by intellectuel 
specifique, takes on the meaning of both parts of the said dichotomy. 
The point is writing, the writer and his place in French culture:
22 Allan Stoekl, Agonies of the Intellectual, op. cit., p. 295.
23 Which can be seen most clearly in the text "Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme" of 
1946 in which Kojeve makes it explicit that "every interpretation of Hegel, if it is more 
than idle talk, is nothing but a program of struggle and one of work ... And this means 
that the work of an interpreter of Hegel takes on the meaning of a work of political 
propaganda". "Hegel, Marx, and Christianity", Interpretation, vol. 1,1970, p. 42. Stanley 
Rosen in Hermeneutics as Politics notes about Kojeve's work that "it was not an act of 
philological scholarism, but an act of revolutionary propaganda". That opinion is also 
held by Vincent Descombes who writes in his Modern French Philosophy about Kojeve's 
"terrorist conception of history", by the aforementioned Jean-Michel Besnier or Shadia 
B. Drury in Alexandre Kojeve. The Roots of Postmodern Politics (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1994).
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the intellectual par excellence used to be a writer -  as universal 
consciousness, free subject, he was opposed to those who were just 
competences in the service of the State or the Capital -  as technicians, judges, 
teachers. Since then ... the threshold of writing (ecriture) as a sacralizing mark 
(marque sacralisante) of the intellectual has disappeared.24
The writer fighting to maintain his political privileges has become in 
Foucault's view a figure of the past -  all that "feverish theoretization 
of writing which we witnessed in the sixties was undoubtedly just 
a swansong"25, and besides, it produced "such second-rate 
(mediocres) literary works". It was no accident that Foucault -  as 
opposed to, for instance, Jacques Derrida -  often stressed that he 
had never felt to have a vocation of a writer. "I don't consider that 
writing", he said in 1978,"is my job and I don't think that holding a 
pen is -  for me, I am speaking only of myself -  a sort of absolute 
activity that is more important that everything else".26 Foucault's 
response to Sartre and Barthes, to the split present in French culture 
for over a hundred years -  and especially to the particular place 
accorded to the writer -  was to put forward the figure of the 
"specific intellectual" who is no longer derived from the jurist and 
the writer but from the savant and the expert (like in Oppenheimer 
or earlier already in Darwin).
Thus Foucault in my reading rejects both the traditional functions 
of writing (and writer): the avant-garde (textual) and the political 
(communal) one. So what is he left with? Not much, it seems, 
although at the same time there remains the unperformable: the local 
struggles described above and -  rather impossible, in the long run -
24 Michel Foucault, "Entretien avec Michel Foucault" in a monumental volume of 
Dits et ecrits 1954-1988, ed. by D. Defert and F. Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), vol. Ill, 
1976-1979, p. 155.
25 Ibidem, p. 155.
26 Michel Foucault, "On Power" in the volume Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. by 
L.D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 96. Let us add here, by way of contrast, 
that Derrida on numerous occasions wrote and talked about his passion as a writer, 
see e.g. "Une 'folie' doit veiller sur la pensee" in Points de suspension. Entretiens (Paris: 
Galilee, 1992), pp. 349-376 or in This Strange Institution Called Literature, ed. by 
D. Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 33-79.
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the struggles with one's own incarnation as the "universal 
intellectual". For how is one to make generalizations from local 
positions about precisely those positions, how is one to generalize 
without making reference to a recent role (whose clearly criticized 
representative is obviously Jean-Paul Sartre, the guru of post-war 
France), bashing it, showing its incoherence, invalidity, or even 
harmfulness? How to be both a local specialist and a theoretician of 
that local, intellectual specialization? How to convince others of that 
role, being oneself -  functionally -  a man from the previous epoch? 
Michel Foucault had to fight such a fight with himself, he had to 
promote in the name of universal reasons and in its terms a new -  
"specific" -  function of the intellectual. He was, to be sure, perfectly 
well aware of this contradiction and it is perhaps therefore that in his 
work -  like perhaps in no other work of a living contemporary French 
philosopher -  there are so many discussions about the place of the 
intellectual (or -  the philosopher -  depending of the period of his 
work) and his possible role in culture and society.
A careful tracing of Foucault's changing answers to that question 
would be a fascinating task that would throw additional light on the 
intellectual ruptures and subsequent new beginnings of the one who 
always wrote in order "to have no face" (Archeology o f Knowledge), 
to attempt to "think differently" (The Use o f Pleasure) -  starting with 
the early seventies, the famous conversation with Gilles Deleuze, 
genealogical struggles with Power, to the first volume of The History 
of Sexuality, its last two volumes as well as to dozens of texts 
and interviews from that feverish and extremely prolific period of 
his life. It was already in Archeology o f Knowledge that he said in an 
often referred to and commented on passage: "Do not ask me who I 
am, nor tell me to remain the same: that is the morality of a civil 
state; it rules our documents. Let it leave us in peace when we are to 
write".
Foucault often stated in his interviews that had never been a 
Freudian, Marxist, or structuralist: that he had been seen as an 
anarchist, leftist, disguised Marxist, nihilist, anti-Marxist, technocrat, 
and new liberal, but "none of these descriptions is important in itself; 
on the other hand, taken together, they nevertheless mean something.
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And I must admit I rather like what they mean".27 Precisely so, 
without consenting to any other's description of himself, he all the 
time kept looking for a paradefinition of what he was doing as a 
philosopher, sociologist, and finally, as a man. As Maurice Blanchot 
puts it:
what seems to me to be the difficult -  and privileged -  position of Foucault 
might be the following: do we know who he is, since he doesn't call himself 
(he is on a perpetual slalom course between traditional philosophy and the 
abandonment of any pretension to seriousness) either a sociologist or a 
historian or a structuralist or a thinker or a metaphysician?28
We still do not know "who he is", as he does not want to join known 
and respected traditional disciplines which he detests as long as he 
has not redefined them. Michel Foucault, looking for himself, for 
many years was asking, among other things, what the philosopher is 
doing when he is philosophizing. He kept asking about himself and 
others. He also kept asking about himself as opposed to others and in 
distinction to them, searching for some general meaning of his own 
work. Let us remember here at least several ideas that appear in his 
writings in this context.
4 .
In 1972 in a conversation with Deleuze -  later to be known as 
"Intellectuals and Power" -  Foucault said that during the May 1968 
events in France:
the intellectual discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain 
knowledge: they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better 
than he and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves. But there 
exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this
27 Michel Foucault, "Polemique, politique et problematisations", Dits et ecrits, op. dt., 
vol. IV, 1980-1988, p. 598 (published for the first time in English in P. Rabinow's volume).
28 Maurice Blanchot, "Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him" in Foucault/Blanchot, 
transl. by J. Mehlman and B. Massumi (New York: Zone Books, 1990), p. 93.
B etw een  the C o m m u n ity  and  the T ext 137
discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in the manifest 
authority of censorship, but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an 
entire societal network. Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of 
power -  the idea of their responsibility for "consciousness" and discourse forms part 
of the system. The intellectual's role is ... to struggle against the forms of power 
that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of 
"knowledge", "truth", "consciousness", and "discourse".29
So if the traditional intellectual is -  as we already know -  the writer, 
there is no possibility of resistance on the part of either ecrivants or 
ecrivains, either poetry or litterature engagee, against that "enigmatic", 
"at once visible and invisible, present and hidden, ubiquitous" Power. 
It can be said, exit the writer, but who enters the stage? The one who 
enters is precisely the one about whom it is known from Foucault's 
descriptions what he is supposed not to do and whom he is supposed 
not to be. Although the opposition of the two types of intellectuals is 
merely a "hypothesis"30, it is directed against the whole French 
intellectual tradition.
Theory in Foucault's account is not supposed to be a support for 
practice which, in turn, would be its application; theory does not 
serve practical applications, being local, regional and non-inclusive. 
"This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and 
undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious". The 
point, as Foucault explains to Deleuze, is "to sap power, to take 
power"; "it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle for 
power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A 'theory' is 
the regional system of this struggle".31 The writer's thinking of the 
world may have been universal, but in Foucault's vision suggested 
here the specific intellectual is reduced to playing the role of one of 
the many links in an ongoing struggle -  he is neither a spokesperson 
of the will of those who fight, nor is he their representative (which
29 Michel Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power" in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. by D.F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1977), pp. 207-208.
30 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power" in Power/Knowledge (Brighton: Harvester 
Press, 1980), p. 132.
31 Michel Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power", op. cit., p. 208.
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means drawing radical conclusions from questions of representation), 
nor is he even an interpreter of their struggles from a safe place 
behind his desk. Theory becomes practice. Those who until then had 
been accorded a specific place in culture -  of its "consciousness", 
"conscience" and "eloquence" -  become potential providers of tools 
for analysis, of that famous "toolbox" with the help of which one can 
make a topographical description of a battlefield... For Foucault, his 
own philosophy was not the theory of his practice, his political 
practice not being an application of theories presented in 
philosophical books of which he was the author. As Francois Ewald, 
Arlette Farge, and Michelle Perrot say in a moving commemorative 
volume entitled Michel Foucault. Une histoire de la verite: "there are 
only practices, theoretical practices or political practices, totally 
specific ones".32
The intellectual's work according to Foucault does not consist in 
shaping others' political will. It rather consists of conducting analyses 
on the grounds of disciplines familiar to him whose aim is, as he puts 
in a conversation with Francois Ewald,
to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb 
people's mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is 
familiar and accepted, to re-examine rules and institutions and on the basis of 
this reproblematization (in which he carries out his specific task as an 
intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (in which he has 
his role as a citizen to play).33
Michel Foucault is fully aware of the demise of the old, traditional, 
prophetic function of the intellectual. Those who speak and write 
today are still haunted by the model of a Greek wise man, Jewish 
prophet or a Roman legislator.34 (And it is important to note that it 
was also Sartre who in last years of his life considered breaking with
32 Michel Foucault. Une histoire de la verite (Paris: Syros, 1985), p. 54.
33 Michel Foucault, "The Concern for Truth" in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. by 
L.D. Kritzman, op. cit., p. 265.
34 See the interview with Foucault conducted by B.-Fl. Levy, recalled recently in 
the latter's Les Aventures de la liberte. Une histoire subjective des intellectuels (Paris: 
Bernard Grasset, 1991), p. 382.
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the conception of the "committed writer". In 1974 in a discussion with 
Herbert Marcuse he said that workers "can better express what they 
feel, what they think ... For me, the classical intellectual is an 
intellectual who ought to disappear".35) Foucault himself wants to 
take care of the present, as the most important question -  is the one 
about the present.36 And that is what he was doing, discussing in his 
books over the years the relationship between experience (madness, 
illness, transgression, sexuality), knowledge (psychiatry, medicine, 
criminology, sexology, psychology), and power (institutions 
connected with the control of the individual -  psychiatric or penal 
ones). As he said in Discipline and Punish, what was at stake there -  
and surely not only there -  was "writing the history of the present"37 
that would perhaps "make the present situation comprehensible and, 
possibly, lead to action".38 That large theme of the "ontology of the 
present" guided Foucault's thinking in the last years of his life and he 
found the protoplast of this way of thinking about philosophy (we 
have known at least since Borges that we produce our predecessors) 
in Kant from the text "What Is the Enlightenment?", about which he 
would write and lecture in the College de France. The task of 
philosophy is to describe the nature of the present and us in that 
present, he would say39, inscribing his thought in the tradition 
running from Kant to Weber to the Frankfurt School. The late 
Foucault made every attempt to inscribe himself in the Kantian 
tradition of making mature use of reason, but he read Kant through 
the Baudelairean figure of the dandy. In ethics as the aesthetics of 
existence in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self he seems to
35 Which is recalled by L.D. Kritzman in a "Foreword" to Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture, ed. by L.D. Kritzman, op. cit., p. xix. See also R. Goldhorpe, "Understanding 
the committed writer" in The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, ed. by Ch. Howells 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 140-177.
36 As Foucault said: "Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question 
posed in the present", "The Concern for Truth", op. cit., p. 262.
37 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, transl. by A. Sheridan (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1979), p. 31.
38 Michel Foucault, "On Power", op. cit., p. 101.
39 Michel Foucault, "Critical Theory/Intellectual History" in Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture, ed. by L.D. Kritzman, op. cit., p. 36.
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break with the opposition, difficult to maintain in practice, that we are 
still thinking here of. He moves towards himself, towards building his 
own ethics of self-transformation. Intellectual work seems not to go 
beyond the oppositions drawn by Sartre and Barthes, beyond our 
textualism and communitarianism, or romanticism and pragmatism. 
Foucault becomes Rorty's "knight of autonomy"40 when he notes (in 
1983)that for him
intellectual work is related to what you could call aestheticism, meaning 
transforming yourself. ... I know very well, and I think I knew it from the 
moment when I was a child, that knowledge can do nothing for transforming 
the world. Maybe I am wrong ... But if I refer to my own personal experience 
I have the feeling knowledge can't do anything for us and that political 
power can destroy us. All the knowledge in the world can't do anything 
against that.41
Thus it is not much that Foucault's intellectuel specifique, a new 
figure suggested for our postmodern times, can do. Local and 
regional struggles with power die out, theory is no longer like a 
fellow-traveller of the masses fighting to take power. Parasurrealistic 
-  that is, modernistic! -  transforming one's existence in a poetic 
manner has little to do with the Sartrian pole of "activism" and 
"commitment", with making laws, suggesting solutions valid always 
and everywhere, prophesizing about the future on the part of 
(intellectual and philosophical) legislators from a universal place 
accorded by culture in the past. But, on the other hand, that aesthetic 
of existence does not seem to go beyond the other pole of Sartre's and 
Barthes' oppositions -  aesthetic, narcissistic, dandyish, textual. The 
attempt to go beyond a framework imposed on writing and 
philosophizing some hundred years ago, as we try to outline it here, 
seems to be misguided and unsuccessful. The final acceptance of the 
fact that "my problem is my own transformation" and that what is at
40 See Richard Rorty, "Moral Identity and Private Autonomy: The Case of 
Foucault" in Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), pp. 193-198.
41 Michel Foucault, "The Minimalist Self" in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. by 
L.D. Kritzman, op. cit., p. 14.
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stake is the "transformation of one's self by one's own knowledge"42, 
that, to refer to the well-known citation, "we have to create ourselves 
as a work of art" (for our self is not pre-given to us and we may not 
discover its truth)43 -  seems to lead back to modernistic oppositions. 
The point is not merely "a certain amount of knowledgeableness", it 
is also "the knower's straying away from himself"; "There are times 
in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than 
one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely 
necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all", as he will 
say in the "Introduction" to the second volume of The History of 
Sexuality.
I would be willing to accept one such attempt of the said penser 
autrement, the conception of the specific intellectual, never developed 
and made more precise, never put into practice or experienced. The 
"aesthetic of existence" of the last two (published) volumes of The 
History of Sexuality and numerous interviews preceding them44 has 
shown difficulties in going beyond the pre-existing constant in French 
thinking. The intellectual in a classical sense, banned and 
criticizedreturned; that is to say, who returned was Foucault writing 
rather than ("locally and regionally") acting. It turned out that even 
the idea of ethics as the aesthetics of existence is an idea of a writer 
who obviously has a different place and different obligations in 
today's postmodern era, rather than an idea of one who was born out 
of the "expert" and "savant", i.e. of the specific intellectual. When the 
turmoil of the (post-May '68) struggles with power disappeared,
42 Ibidem, p. 14.
43 Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in 
Progress" in The Foucault Reader, ed. by P. Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 
p. 351.
44 Let us remember here the most important texts for the "aesthetics of existence": 
"Introduction" to The Use of Pleasure (which earlier functioned as a separate text), the 
"Qu'est-ce que les Lumieres?" text (from P. Rabinow's collection, and then for the first 
time in French in the Kantian issue of Magazine litteraire, Avril 1993), "L'ethique du 
souci de soi comme pratique de la liberte" (Dits et Merits, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 708-729), 
"Une esthetique de l'existence" (ibidem, pp. 730-735), as well an English interview 
given to Dreyfus and Rabinow and published as "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An 
Overview of a Work in Progress" (in The Foucault Reader, op. cit.).
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when consciousness of the moderate possibilities of the philosopher 
as a philosopher came, what remained was to seduce with one's pen 
and show oneself as an example for others: a classical idea of 
providing an exemplum for one's descendants. Some parts of The 
History of Sexuality are disarming in their sincerity, in their tone of 
personal confessions, in their seriousness of histories put down by a 
feverish hand. Foucault -  to return to Sartre -  was engaged 
("committed") in his writing: not in politics or ideology, but in a new, 
still being thought-out morality and ethics. For the idea of morality as 
obedience to a code of rules "is now disappearing", and as he says, 
"has already disappeared. To this absence of a morality, one responds, one 
must respond, with a research which is that of an aesthetics o f existence" :45
5 .
Numerous critics see in Michel Foucault the passion of a moralist (e.g. 
Richard Bernstein), with the reproaches often directed to him being 
precisely his "cryptonormativism" (e.g. Jurgen Habermas, Nancy 
Fraser), and his unwillingness to accept his indebtedness to the 
Enlightenment; for some commentators the philosophy of the late 
Foucault is the "philosophy of freedom" (John Rajchman).46 He is not 
exactly the communitarian or the textualist in the sense presented in 
this text. Who is he? Although in his theory he probably did not 
manage to transcend Sartre's opposition (Sartre, that "man of the 
nineteenth century who wished to conceive of the twentieth 
century"), in practice, in his written work, one can look for new ways 
of answering the latter's questions. Hence radically different
45 Michel Foucault, "An Aesthetics of Existence" in Foucault Live (Interviews, 1966- 
84), transl. by J. Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), p. 311.
46 See Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); 
Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1987); Nancy Fraser, "Michel Foucault: a 'Young Conservative'?" in Critique and Power. 
Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate, ed. by M. Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1994); John Rajchman, Michel Foucault. The Freedom of Philosophy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985).
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evaluations and interpretations of Foucault as a philosopher, a 
philosopher of politics or a moral philosopher exist.47 In practice, the 
author of The History o f Sexuality does not fit in on horizon of meaning 
outlined in the opposition discussed here, for although for some he is 
a dispassionate "aesthete", for others he is a passionate "moralist", a 
par excellence political philosopher, a radical critic of the status quo, 
an originator of a new politics of resistance, a new liberal etc.; for 
some he is a follower of Kant and the light side of sociologie de la 
modernite, for others a follower of the dark, irrational side of 
modernity, that of Nietzsche via Bataille, like in Habermas' or 
Ferry/Renaut's criticism.48 And the point is probably not that there 
are divergent interpretations, that is something we are quite used to -  
the point may be that we need new categories and new dichotomies 
to attempt to domesticate, to tame Foucault's thought.
A possibility was suggested by Foucault himself by way of a 
digression in a long conversation with an Italian communist, Duccio 
Trombadori, in 1978, almost totally unnoticed in literature devoted to 
him.49 He discusses there the question what kind of books he had 
been writing in his lifetime and draws a distinction between lime 
d‘exploration and livre de methode, or a still different one between livre- 
experience and livre-verite. Book-explorations and books on the 
method, book-experiences and book-truths, let us say. To be sure, in 
philosophy the downgraded ones have been and still are book- 
explorations and book-experiences -  those most precious to Foucault.
47 Arnold I. Davidson makes it explicit in summarizing sentences of his text: 
"Unless moral philosophers supplement their discussions of moral codes with ethics a 
la Foucault, we will have no excuse against the charge that our treatises suffer from an 
unnecessary but debilitating poverty". That is perhaps the strongest opinion about 
Foucault's ethics I managed to encounter. See "Archeology, Genealogy, Ethics" in 
Foucault. A Critical reader, ed. by D.C. Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 232.
48 See the (once) influential pamphlet of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French 
Philosophy of the Sixties. An Essay on Antihumanism, in which Foucault = Heidegger + 
Nietzsche (like Derrida = Heidegger + Derrida's style) (Amherst: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1990), a chapter on "French Nietzscheanism" or e.g. p. 123.
49 The exception to which I owe my awareness of that passage is Martin Jay in his 
splendid article "The Limits of Limit-Experience: Bataille and Foucault", Constellations, 
vol. 2, no. 2,1995.
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Books were as rich an experience as possible, so that the writer could 
come out of them as someone else, someone new and changed, 
precisely -  transforme. The book transforms both him and what he 
thinks: "Je suis un experimentateur en ce sens que j'ecris pour me changer 
moi-meme".50 The author is a writing experimenter who transforms 
himself rather than a theoretician. He does not know at the beginning 
of his road what he is going to think at the end of it. Thus, to the 
question about the sense of philosophical work, we get two possible 
answers -  we either explore the unknown and transform ourselves 
(and somehow incidentally -  we also change others, as a book is an 
invitation to a common participation), or we present truth and 
evidence for it to others.
Returning to alliances with power, returning to philosophy and 
politics, let us say that it is perhaps because book-truths were -  or 
potentially could be -  moving on the same tracks with power (with it 
or against it); communicating, proving, justifying, legitimizing, 
validating (like in the case of Barthes' "writers"). The question is 
whether the same can be said of philosophical book-explorations? It 
seems to me that the answer is in the negative, for they seem to be on 
a different plane, the plane of transforming oneself rather than the 
world (the plane of changing the world only after a round way of 
changing oneself). I fully agree here with Richard Bernstein -  
evidently far from being an enthusiast of postmodern thinkers -  who 
presented the following diagnosis of postmodern philosophy:
In the early writings of Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault and Rorty these 
questions [ethical-political -  MK] do not even seem to be considered. Yet as 
we follow the pathways of their thinking and writings something curious 
begins to happen -  for each of these thinkers begins to gravitate more and more 
to confronting the ethical-political consequences of their own thinking.51
I am personally convinced that it pertains to Derrida -  recently just a 
moralist, and no less so than to Rorty and Foucault. "Something 
curious begins to happen" and that "something" in question may be
50 Michel Foucault, Dits et ecrits, op. cit., vol. Ill, pp. 41-42.
51 Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation, op. cit., p. 11, emphasis mine.
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associated with a decline in the super-project of modernity that makes 
some questions suddenly appear to be more significant to a growing 
number of people.
I have not written here about Heidegger's and de Man's "affairs", 
as they are commonly referred to (about the debates of the greatest 
minds at the end of the century on the subject of the rectorate of the 
former in 1933 and his silence about the Holocaust and about the 
latter's youthful collaborationist and anti-Semitic writings and their 
potential connections with a literary theory developed later); nor have 
I written here about the violent, passionate discussions in France and 
in America about the questions of the "philosopher" and "politics", 
for that is what was finally at stake there (as Krzysztof Pomian so 
penetratingly put it, the problem of the relationship between 
philosophy and politics in the twentieth century has become "the one 
of 'to be or not to be' of philosophy"52). From that perspective, our 
century still remains unstudied and unthought, and -  to add a still 
new dimension to our considerations -  we have a feeling that 
whenever we speak of Heidegger, to use Pomian's words, de nobis 
fabula narratur... Perhaps not precisely about "us", but nevertheless 
the theme of the "boys of these (Stalinist) years" is worthy of being 
taken into account. So I have not written about all these discussions, 
as I am doing it elsewhere, but maybe it is worthwhile just 
mentioning that questions about these times, read perhaps not 
accidentally today -  will tell us more about ourselves, our current 
history, perhaps even about our future... For it may even be so that 
our discussions will not pertain to Heidegger himself or de Man 
himself, these could be left to Heideggerians and deconstructionists. 
Maybe it is worthwhile thinking about what the history of the 
aforementioned two thinkers can tell us about our history, about 
ourselves.53 What I see as important is what the history of the two can 
say us of our history, about ourselves here and now. For, I suppose, 
the thinking of past choices, attitudes, past silence, writing and acting
52 Krzysztof Pomian, "Heidegger and Bourgeois Values" in Heidegger dzisiaj 
[Heidegger Today], ed. by P. Marciuszuk, C. Wodzinski, Aletheia, 1,1990, p. 471.
53 See Jean-Luc Nancy, "Our History", Diacritics, 20.3, Fall 1990, pp. 97-115.
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is the thinking of the constitutive elements of our not so distant past 
rather than of some "aberrations", "mistakes", human "failings" or 
"weaknesses". If we left aside the general question: what to do with 
those biographical-philosophical discoveries?, we would place 
ourselves somehow somewhere else, next to Heidegger's or de Man's 
past, and in our calm, European, Mediterranean and civilized past. 
And what we mean here is the thought that deliberately served 
ideology, that hid behind it, profiting from it. That gap is very 
important -  we mean using ideology in promoting one's own thought 
in a naive belief that one (as an intellectual, as a philosopher) can be 
the "guide of leaders"... And that is the way we completed the cycle 
and, approaching the end of the story, returned to the Platonic theme 
-  "they should only follow the one who leads..."
Hannah Arendt in Between Past and Future says that nobody ever 
doubted that "truth and politics never remain in good relations with 
each other" (and Merleau-Ponty adds that "the relation between 
philosophy and politics has always existed, not for good, but for 
bad"). Truth and politics -  that is, philosophy and politics -  are "two 
opposite ways of living". For when a philosophical truth enters 
politics, it is almost certain that freedom will feel endangered. Who 
will dare to reject a -  transcendental -  truth of philosophers? Who 
will defy an all embracing, coherent and logical -  ideological -  vision 
of the world within which the philosopher provides us with all 
possible questions and all possible answers? Is the philosopher 
himself strong enough to resist the temptation to impose its truth on 
others as an obligatory norm? Hannah Arendt has found a congenial 
description for such a situation: the "tyranny of truth". Therefore in 
Arendt's account the philosopher is a recluse rather than a homo 
politicus-, a philosophical truth is apolitical by its very nature. It is 
disclosed by the philosopher -  in loneliness. Like the Foucault from 
The History of Sexuality, Arendt seems to appreciate learning by 
example -  "the only form of 'convincing' which a philosophical truth 
can afford without deforming its nature". The philosopher begins to 
"act" when he transforms a theoretical statement into truth included 
in an example which for him is a limiting experience. He cannot go 
any further, he does not have the right to. The philosopher's position
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is thus to be located outside of the political field, such a philosophical 
being alone cannot be associated with "any political commitment or 
devotion to any cause". The philosopher's truth does not mix -  
directly -  with the things of this world and if he wants to mix with it 
(which, incidentally, according to Sartre is a definitional task of the 
intellectual: se meler de ce qui ne le regardait pas), then he turns to 
tyrants and Fuhrers, from Plato to Heidegger, as she notes in her 
"Heidegger at Eighty".
Finally, it is not difficult to guess that, to a considerable extent, I 
agree with the author of Thinking, as in the Sartre/Merleau-Ponty 
debate I am taking the side of the latter, and from the opposition of 
communitarians and textualists, I prefer the textualists. But that is 
merely my "individual gesture" of which Sartre wrote in his letter to 
Merleau-Ponty, to which I can allow myself as long as I am not 
justifying it with respect to others and as long as I am not imposing it 
on anyone. In an endlessly polyphonic and colourful postmodernity, 
there is enough place for freedom and for individual gestures insofar 
as they do not -  in a Rortyan manner -  humiliate others and cause 
them pain. Nietzsche said -  "The philosopher means something for 
me as long as he is able to give an example". And perhaps the point 
today is to give the right to different examples, the right for them to 
be merely examples. Some of them will spread, some will not; some 
will be fashionable, others will quickly fall into oblivion; some will 
get through to the reading public, for others no one will ever be 
convinced. Philosophy today may teach us, as Zygmunt Bauman put 
it, "how to live wisely in a state of uncertainty"54 -  it may be, as Anna 
Zeidler-Janiszewska said in a conversation with Stefan Morawski, 
"not a love of Wisdom, but a love of many possible wisdoms none of 
which claims 'final' ambitions for itself..."55 That is what I mean when 
I speak of the multitude of possibilities of personal examples today.
54 Zygmunt Bauman, Ciato i przemoc w obliczu ponowoczesnosci [Body and Violence 
in the Face of Postmodemity] (Toruri: Wydawnictwo UMK, 1995), p. 31.
55 Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska in O filozofowaniu, perypetiach dzisiejszej kultury i rebus 
publicis [On Philosophizing, Vicissitudes of Our Culture and Rebus Publicis] (Torun: 
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek, 1995), p. 16.
Chapter 6
The French Hegel 
and Postmodern Thought
What we are interested in here -  within questions pertaining to the 
topicality of Hegel -  is the powerful and permanent influence he 
would exert on pre-war and post-war French thought (the years of 
1930-1960, roughly speaking) but only insofar as it became an object 
of sharp discord and wide criticism by the next generation of thinkers 
and philosophers, the postmodern generation. Thus we will be 
dealing here with the generation of Alexandre Kojeve, Jean Hyppolite 
and Georges Bataille, who interpreted and commented on Hegel -  
mainly from his Phenomenology of Spirit -  against which rose the likes 
of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. While for the 
former group Hegel was that master of thinking, the maitre a penser, 
for the latter group he was only (but not less than) the figure it was 
necessary to break free from. The paradigmatic shift of focus from 
Hegel to Nietzsche was revealed in the most powerful way in two 
books: Gilles Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962) and Pierre 
Klossowski's Nietzsche et le circle vicieux (1969). Since then, it has been 
Nietzsche rather than Hegel who seemed to provide French 
philosophical thought with a tone.1 1
1 Incidentally, some explicit enemies of postmodern thought -  like Luc Ferry and 
Alain Renaut -  in their (once) famous pamphlet French Philosophy of the Sixties (transl. 
by M.H.S. Cattani, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990) -  present 
the whole French "thought of difference" as only a radicalization of themes derived 
from German philosophy. Hence also comes the very structure of their book -  it is 
devoted to French Nietzscheanism (Foucault), Heideggerianism (Derrida), Marxism
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A question that needs to be asked here would be, for instance, the 
following: what was so peculiar about Hegel that a whole generation 
of Hyppolite pupils (including the most brilliant participants in his 
seminars -  such as Derrida and Foucault) turned against him with 
such solidarity? Who was this Hegel that would dominate French 
intellectual life for over thirty years, from Kojeve's initially small, 
irregular and elitist lectures in Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes from 
1933-1939, to the Hegelian seminars in the College de France at the 
turn of the sixties and seventies. The question about that Hegel -  read 
mainly from the famous Chapter Four of his Phenomenology devoted 
to the "dialectic of mastery and slavery" -  will help us in dealing with 
the issue of the complicated relationship between Hegel and 
postmodern thinkers in France today. We get the impression that the 
current (or perhaps -  recent, to which we shall return further in the 
text) French anti-Hegelian scene cannot be understood without asking 
the questions as to what that Hegel was, where he came from and 
what the circumstances of his appearance were.2
The point here is not to analyse French Hegelian studies from the 
pre-war and post-war periods, for it was not they that exerted such a 
powerful influence on the past and present cultural landscape of 
France, and especially its philosophical landscape. Hegel did not just 
dominate France after the war -  he tyrannized and paralysed it with 
his presence, his discourse and conceptuality, like all "masters of 
thinking".3 After the war, Hegel imposed the horizon of questions 
and answers, he was the single most serious philosophical authority. 
Michel Foucault expressed this thought in the name of his generation 
in The Discourse on Language, i.e. in his opening lecture at the College
(Bourdieu) and Freudianism (Lacan). From such a perspective, we all are merely 
repeating -  Plato...
2 The present text asks questions about the passage from Hegel to Nietzsche as 
well as about Hegel himself in French thought. The unavoidable questions, in this 
context, about Nietzsche -  "the new Nietzsche", according to the title of a collection of 
texts edited by David Allison, famous in the Anglo-Saxon world -  I consider 
elsewhere.
3 For "masters of thinking" as speciality de la maison of French philosophy, see Tom 
Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1995), the chapter 
"The Master Thinker in French Philosophy", pp. 18-39.
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de France in 1970 -  when the battle with Hegel carried out with 
Nietzschean weapons was already definitely won: "... our age, 
whether through logic or epistemology, whether through Marx or 
through Nietzsche, is attempting to flee from Hegel".4
But why should one "flee from Hegel" at all -  and is it possible to 
flee from him? How is one to break with Hegel if in philosophy one 
lives and breathes his dialectic, one thinks his language, argues with 
his arguments? That peculiar inability, that stiffening of the tongue 
when it attempts to oppose Hegel has perhaps been best expressed by 
Emmanuel Levinas (in the text "Hegel and the Jews" from the 
collection of essays Dificile liberte); he said the following: "it is surely 
not easy to oppose Hegel's speech. It is so not only because thought 
lacks audacity but because it is as if language becomes disobedient. 
There is hardly anything more deplorable than to 'express one's view 
on Hegel', to classify him..."5 It is as if language becomes disobedient, 
says Levinas, language becomes "completely mute", says Foucault, 
thinking somehow stops, not wanting, not being able, to find familiar 
points of departure... How can we avoid the situation, also mentioned 
by Foucault, whereby if we set out on an anti-Hegelian journey -  at 
the end of it there will be Hegel, who within his system, and 
especially within his dialectic, forecasts every opposition against 
himself? How can we be "other than Hegel" rather than anti- 
Hegelian, how can we avoid battles on the ground chosen by him, 
how can we take a non-Hegelian strategy? It is precisely the 
Nietzsche as presented by Derrida, Klossowski and Deleuze that 
came as the greatest help for the whole generation of French 
philosophers. He became, as the latter puts it, "the absolute opponent 
of dialectic", as Nietzsche's philosophy is the "absolute anti­
dialectic", and between the two, Hegel and Nietzsche, "there can be 
no compromise".6
4 Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language", appendix to Archaeology of 
Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972), p. 235.
5 Emmanuel Levinas, Dificile liberte (Albin Michel, 1963).
6 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophic [Nietzsche and Philosophy], (Paris: PUF, 
1962); in Polish as Nietzsche ifilozofia (transl. by B. Banasiak, Warszawa: Spacja/Pavo, 
1993, p. 205).
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Alexandre Kojeve is of interest to us here as the one who shaped -  
together with Jean Hyppolite -  the picture of Hegel in post-war 
France, influencing e.g. Bataille, Lacan and Merleau-Ponty through 
his lectures (in Spectres o f Marx Derrida says that nobody can deny the 
fact that the reading of Hegel by Kojeve "played a formative and not 
negligible role, from many standpoints, for a certain generation of 
French intellectuals",7 to which in turn Richard Rorty replies 
mercilessly -  "so what?", it is no reason for him to be of any interest 
today -  and that is a really meaningful and interesting difference8). 
Georges Bataille is of interest to us here insofar as in our account he is 
a figure at the philosophical crossroads, the philosopher who suits 
neither the former nor the latter French generation described here, a 
philosopher who is both Hegelian and Nietzschean, reading at the 
same time Hegel and Nietzsche and approaching the reading of one 
of them with conceptual tools taken from the other. And finally, 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida are the two postmodern figures 
in whom a retreat from Hegel (though in Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard it was 
a retreat from Marx9) -  with the help of Nietzsche read in a new way 
-  took the most clear forms.
The manifesto of the generation of Hyppolite students was Gilles 
Deleuze's book, Nietzsche and Philosophy, published in 1962. It was 
here that Nietzsche was for the first time presented as anti-Hegel and 
his anti-Hegelianism was recognized as his philosophical mark (such 
a reading was then widely accepted by two big Nietzschean 
conferences in Royaumont in 1964 and then in Cerisy-la Salle in 1972, 
the papers of which were published in two thick volumes, not 
accidentally entitled Nietzsche aujoud'hui). The Hegel/Nietzsche 
opposition needed by the whole generation is clear and simple: "... 
dialectic is work and empiricism is pleasure. And who said that there 
is more thoughts in work than in pleasure?", or, in Deleuze's words -
7 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the 
New International, transl. by P. Kamuf (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 72.
8 Richard Rorty, "A Spectre is Haunting the Intellectuals", European Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 3, December 1995, p. 295.
9 As I am trying to show in more detail in my Polish book Rorty and Lyotard. In the 
Labyrinths of Postmodernity (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 1994).
152 T h e F ren ch  H egel and  P ostm od ern  Thou ght
"Nietzschean 'yes' opposes Hegelian 'no', affirmation opposes -  
dialectical negation, difference -  dialectical contradiction, joy, 
pleasure -  dialectical work, lightness, dance -  dialectical heaviness, 
beautiful irresponsibility -  dialectical duties".10 1Let us remember: "II 
n'y a pas de compromis possible entre Hegel et Nietzsche" is 
Deleuze's fundamental conviction. It is impossible in his view to 
understand the whole of Nietzsche's work if one does not note 
"against whom" its main concepts are directed. And the enemy is 
Hegel. "Hegelian themes -  says Deleuze -  are present in his work like 
an enemy whom he fights".11 Nietzsche intended to reveal all 
"mystifications" which were to find their last refuge in dialectic, he 
intended to free Hegel's thought from the burden of its dialectic. 
Nietzsche's philosophy is just incomprehensible in Deleuze's account 
if one does not take into consideration its "fundamental pluralism": 
"pluralism is a purely philosophical way of thinking invented by 
philosophy: it is the only guarantee of freedom of a particular mind, 
the only principle of violent atheism. Gods dies, but they died of 
laughter hearing that some God said that he was the only one".12 
Nietzsche seen through Deleuze's eyes -  as well as through those of 
Pierre Klossowski in his book Nietzsche et le circle vicieux and of 
Jacques Derrida in Eperons. Nietzsche's Styles, and recently in America 
of Alexander Nehamas in Nietzsche. Life as Literature -  suggests a new 
way of thinking -  an affirmative thought which, finally, "excludes 
each negativity".13 Instead of the speculative elements of negation,
10 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, op. cit., pp. 13,13-14.
11 Ibidem, p. 171.
12 Ibidem, p. 8.
13 Ibidem, p. 14. Alexander Nehamas treats Nietzsche as a philosopher who 
creates an artwork -  we would say, in the manner of the late Foucault from his 
"aesthetics of existence" -  out of himself. "Nietzsche exemplifies through his own 
writings one way in which one individual may have succeeded in fashioning itself -  
an individual, moreover, who, though beyond morality, is not morally objectionable. 
The individual is none other than Nietzsche himself, who is a creature of his own 
texts. This character does not provide a model for imitation, since he consists 
essentially of the specific actions -  that is, of the specific writings -  that make him up, 
and which only he could write". Nietzsche. Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), p. 8.
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opposition and contradiction -  Nietzsche offers the elements of 
difference, affirmation and pleasure. Nietzsche's superman in 
Deleuze is to be directed against a dialectical conception of man, 
transvaluation -  against a dialectical elimination of alienation. 
Nietzsche's work, to sum up, is according to Deleuze "saturated with 
anti-Hegelianism".14
Alexandre Kojeve conducted his seminars in a mood of renaissance 
in Hegelian interests that he helped inspire that extended to the end of 
the twenties under the influence of e.g. Marxism and the Russian 
revolution. When Alexandre Koyre reported in 1930 during an 
international Hegelian congress "the state of Hegelian studies in 
France", he was forced to remark at the very beginning that his paper 
would be brief and poor in comparison with the others, for neither at 
that time nor earlier was there any Hegelian school, nor even an 
eminent student of Hegel.15 The reasons enumerated by Koyre are 
manifold: first of all, difficulties in comprehending Hegel, the total 
oblivion in to which he had fallen in the 1860's when the translations of 
his writings into French had been made, then -  a "return to Kant", and, 
finally, Hegel's Protestantism. They had led to a dominating "attitude 
of hostility", as Koyre remarks; Hegelianism was also degraded due to 
some highly unfavourable opinions expressed by the greatest 
philosophical authority in France after the first world war, Leon 
Brunschvicg.16 The turning point in the reception of Hegel was the 
book by Jean Wahl, Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel 
(1929) of which Jean Hyppolite was to write later that it had been a 
shock for all -  une sorte de revelation. Thus Hegel appeared in the France 
of the thirties -  as if from nowhere (incidentally, out of the three 
Hegelian pioneers -  Wahl, Kojeve, Koyre -  the latter two were Russian 
emigres whose interests and personal fates had thrown them, before 
their arrival in France, to the Husserlian-Heideggerian Germany of the 
twenties). So right after the second world war everything that was 
avant-garde, modem and progressive referred to Hegel and his
14 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, op. cit., p. 13.
15 Alexandre Koyre, "Rapport sur l'etat des etudes hegeliennes en France" in 
Etudes d'Histoire de la pensee philosophise (Paris: Libraire Armand Colin, 1961), p. 205.
16 Ibidem, pp. 207, 208.
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dialectic of "mastery and slavery" from Phenomenology.17 Finally, in the 
sixties, to paint to the end the picture that interests us here, the 
Hegelian page was turned once again -  the point was, as Foucault put 
it in the passage quoted above, to "flee" from Hegel. Vincent 
Descombes comments on this situation in his excellent (especially in the 
more historical passages) book Modern French Philosophy:
The difference separating the two generations [that of the three 'H's -  Hegel, 
Husserl, Heidegger -  and that which loved the three "masters of suspicion" 
-  MK] lies in the inversion of the sign that marked the relationship to Hegel: 
every minus was substituted by a plus. The reference point remained the same.18
Without going into too much detail about the evolution of 
Kojeve's views (as I am doing it elsewhere), and starting from his 
Hegelian lectures edited and published by Raymond Queneau as well 
as from some of his post-war texts (and especially the correspondence 
with his most serious philosophical adversary, Leo Strauss, published 
four years ago, which provides an additional dimension to their 
polemics about the figure of the "tyrant" and the "philosopher"), I 
would be inclined to say, agreeing with his numerous French and 
American commentators, that his work is a splendid example of the 
genius of propaganda. A genius which promotes Hegel, Marx and 
Heidegger -  as well as Kojeve -  at the same time as being a "very 
talented story-teller" (Descombes), who provides his revelational -  
and revolutionary -  interpretations as Hegel's message to France on 
the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution.19 The
17 German Herrschaft and Knechtschaft is English mastery and slavery and French -  
from Hyppolite and Kojeve -  maitre and esclave. A new French translator of 
Phenomenology, Jean-Pierre Levebvre (1991), referring to a biblical dimension of the 
pair Herr und Knecht, suggests still another possibility: maitre and valet, rendering 
Knechtschaft as servitude. In Poland, new proposals by Marek J. Siemek go in the same 
direction as these of Levebvre, presented in "L'oeuvre en mouvement" in a Hegelian 
issue of Magazine litteraire (nov. 1991, no. 293), p. 24 -  starting from different positions, 
they arrive at similar linguistic conclusions.
18 Vincent Descombes, Modem French Philosophy, transl. by L. Scott-Fox and J.K. 
Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1980), p. 12.
19 It is sometimes said that Kojeve gave France "interpretations" of Hegel, while 
Hyppolite gave it "commentaries", the former being subjective, often unfaithful and
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historical circumstances actually favoured such a prophetic reading 
and commenting: the period of Hegelian seminars reminds us in its 
intensity of the writing of the Phenomenology itself -  cannon sounds 
during the battle of Iena, Hegel competing his work, and Napoleon, 
that I'dme du monde a cheval, parading in front of Hegel's windows on 
his horse. The war, violence, interventions in Spain, and generally, a 
culmination of pre-war tensions in the form of the outbreak of the 
world war. Precisely -  "world" war, on a "world" scale, like the 
Napoleonic wars were "world" ones for the first time in history. Once 
again the clue to thinking about the world was History with a capital 
"H" (Czeslaw Milosz in a short text about Albert Camus, "Fraternal 
Interlocutor", wrote that in the forties and fifties French intellectuals 
were fascinated by History -  "we [here in Central Europe -  MK] were 
also fascinated by it, but in a different way. They longed for personal 
saturation with historicity. We were saturated with it in 
abundance...").
One of the participants in Kojeve's Hegelian seminars was 
Georges Bataille, who at the same time attempted to write about 
Nietzsche, becoming the first in France to protest against his 
appropriation by Nazi ideology.20 Sometimes it is said that Bataille's 
intention was anti-Hegelian right from the start and that the tool for 
his struggles with Hegel was to be Nietzsche read extremely intensely 
and personally.21 (As Bataille put it in On Nietzsche: "Except for a few
foreign to Hegel, the latter being an example of an objective, cold and modest 
philosophical work. It is no accident that in numerous contemporary works devoted 
to Hegel and written by French historians of philosophy -  Kojeve's book is not even 
mentioned... This is simply unbelievable considering the influence of the latter on 
post-war French thought. Jacques d'Hondt, an established French Hegelian authority, 
says that Hyppolite presented a deep commentary, while Kojeve merely interpreted 
some aspects and some chapters of the Phenomenology -  that he had specifically 
chosen. See Magazine litteraire, no. 293, p. 32.
20 For instance in such texts as "Nietzsche and the Fascists" or "Nietzschean 
Chronicle" translated into English in Visions of Excess. Selected Writings 1927-1939, 
transl. by Allan Stoekl (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).
21 See Bruno Karsenti, "Bataille anti-hegelien?", Magazine litteraire, nov. 91, no. 
293, pp. 54-57. For the deplorable results of reading Bataille as a mere sociologist see a 
very poor book by Michael Richardson, Georges Bataille (London: Routledge, 1994).
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exceptions, my company on earth is mostly Nietzsche" or "My life 
with Nietzsche as a companion is a community. My book is this 
community"22). But personally I share the view -  and I am not 
isolated in this respect as the same applies to e.g. Denis Hollier23 -  
that Bataille, being the only French philosopher of the period that 
interests us here, is neither Nietzschean nor Hegelian (staying close to 
both). It is perhaps that he is the only one who needed in his thinking 
both a transgressive as well as a dialectical element -  in his Summa 
atheologica (Inner Experience, Guilty, On Nietzsche) he revealed a 
Nietzschean part of his work and in The Accursed Share its Marxian- 
Hegelian side. Divided into two, Bataille wrote under the sign of both 
philosophers, rejecting at the same time a unambiguous and 
permanent subordination either to Nietzschean textuality (the 
"irresponsibility" of which Pierre Klossowski writes so much) or to 
everything that is brought about by socially-oriented thinking. One 
the one hand, he was looking in a Nietzschean manner for Hegel's 
non-knowledge, what remains un-thought in his system and what he 
found in "poetry, laughter, ecstasy" as blind spots of the system,24 
being distant from the community and the political and social mission 
of the philosopher and close to a transgression restricted to the text;25 
on the other hand, he was writing his counter-history of civilisation in 
which work was a mark of slavery rather than a road to emancipation 
and where social power was associated only with destruction, and not 
production.
The "dialectic of mastery and slavery" since Kojeve, through 
Bataille with his idea of a "general" rather than "restricted" economy, 
to Foucault and Derrida, was a constant in French thought, Descombes
From among a couple of books I know, the most philosophically interesting for me 
was Jean-Michel Besnier's La politique de Impossible (Paris: La Decouverte, 1988).
22 Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, transl. by B. Boone (New York: Paragon House, 
1992), pp. 3, 9.
23 See Denis Hollier, "Le Dispositif Hegel/Nietzsche dans la bibliotheque de 
Bataille", L'Arc, 38, pp. 35-47.
24 Georges Bataille, Inner Experience, transl. by L.A. Boldt (New York: SUNY Press, 
1988), p. 111.
25 See Allan Stoekl, Agonies of the Intellectual (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1992).
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says. Chapter Four of the Phenomenology became the most frequently 
discussed -  as well as appropriated and then digested -  passage from 
Hegel's writings. Not surprisingly, the opposition against Hegel's 
domination in the years of 1930-1960 appeared both in Foucault and 
Derrida e.g. in their considerations on the dialectical conception of 
history, on the place reason occupies in history as well as on the 
dialectic itself. Let us consider several texts representative of the period, 
leaving aside others, sometimes devoted to Hegel to a large extent 
(such as Derrida's Glas): Foucault's "A Preface to Transgression" and 
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" as well as Derrida's "Positions" and 
"Hegelianism Without Reserve". For what we mean is not so much, 
and not simply, to show the relation of the two thinkers to Hegel's 
philosophy but rather to indicate opposition to Hegel -  precisely with 
Nietzsche, and it is here that this can be seen most clearly. The 
atmosphere surrounding the "new Nietzsche" in question can be seen 
from the opening sentence from Klossowski's book on Nietzsche: 
"How is one to speak of 'Nietzsche's though' without ever referring to 
what has been said about him", besides, Nietzsche is supposed to have 
rejected the attitude of a "teaching philosopher", to give up writing "in 
care of the human condition".26 And it is no accident that Michel 
Foucault, when asked about his philosophical identity, said in "Le 
retour de la morale", his last interview -  given while he was correcting 
the last two volumes of his History of Sexuality -  that there were two 
fundamental experiences which had shaped his philosophical 
development: Heidegger and Nietzsche. Mentioning his "fundamental 
Nietzscheanism", he says precisely the following: "Je suis simplement 
nietzscheen" - 1 am just a Nietzschean.27
The homage Foucault paid to Bataille, the founder of Critique -  in 
"A Preface to Transgression" -  powerfully shows "the Nietzschean 
turn" in France:28 the author writes there about our falling "asleep in
26 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux (Paris: Mercure de France, 1969); 
in Polish as Nietzsche i bl(dne koto (transl. by B. Banasiak and K. Matuszewski, 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KR, 1996, p. 62).
27 Michel Foucault, Dits et ecrits 1954-1988, vol. IV (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 704.
28 One also speaks of the "aesthetic turn" -  see James J. Winchester, Nietzsche's 
Aesthetic Turn. Reading Nietzsche After Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida (New York: SUNY
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dialectic and anthropology" (which, I suppose, refers us back directly 
to Hegel and Kojeve) from which only Nietzsche can wake us up. 
Discursive language, however, like in the passage from Levinas cited 
above, becomes "ineffectual" and "nearly silent".29 There remain non- 
Hegelian, non-philosophical writers such as Klossowski and Blanchot 
(or also, in Foucault's view, Bataille) who were the only ones to find 
proper words to express the experience of transgression. Foucault 
says that "perhaps one day it [the experience of transgression -  MK] 
will seem as decisive for our culture, as much a part of its soil, as the 
experience of contradiction was at an earlier time for dialectical 
thought".30
If the experience of contradiction corresponds to Hegelian 
dialectical thinking, that of transgression must correspond to some 
totally new thinking -  maybe the thinking of Foucault himself? 
Philosophical language is to be characterized by "profound silence" 
and in a language stripped of dialectics, the philosopher is aware that 
"we are not everything". A new search for limits is to replace an old 
search for the whole, and transgression is to replace the Hegelian 
movement of contradictions. The language of philosophy remains 
"bound" as long as it is not able to think about the ultimate 
experience.31 The genealogist, as opposed to the historian, learns that 
"behind things" there is no timeless and essential secret but rather the 
secret that they have no essence.32 The Foucauldian genealogist is as 
anti-Platonic as Nietzsche and as anti-Hegelian as Deleuze.
And finally Jacques Derrida who always struggles with Hegel in 
different forms, stating explicitly about his relation to Hegel that "we 
will never be finished with the reading or rereading of Hegel, and, in
Press, 1994). Especially important, in my view, are the moral implications of this turn 
in French philosophy, discussed by Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
as an opposition between moralists and aesthetes.
29 Michel Foucault, "A Preface to Transgression" in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. by Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1977), p. 38.
30 Ibidem, p. 33.
31 Ibidem, p. 41.
32 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews, op. cit., p. 142.
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a certain way, I do nothing other than attempt to explain myself on 
this point".33 Hegelianism for him is "the ultimate reassembling of 
metaphysics",34 the culmination of the logocentric tradition running 
from Plato. Derrida does not create, however, a totally anti-Hegelian 
stance, being aware of the difficulties of philosophical thinking 
against Hegel. Referring to Levinas, and disclosing his own strategy 
towards Hegel, he says: "as soon as he speaks against Hegel, Levinas 
can only confirm Hegel has confirmed him already".35 The game with 
Hegel goes on the margins of Bataille's reading of him as presented in 
Derrida's Writing and Difference. Bataille took Hegel too seriously, he 
took absolute knowledge too seriously36 Comparing Hegel's 
"mastery" and Bataille's "sovereignty", Derrida comes to the 
conclusion that Hegel did not see the possibility of existence of 
anything outside his system -  for instance, poetry, laughter and 
ecstasy -  which are neither knowledge nor provide it. Excess, depense 
-  are beyond reason. And it is no accident that a considerable part of 
post-war French thought mentions the theme of Hegel's "madness" 
from the period before he had completed his system: namely, how is 
one to accept the fact of being the incarnation of the Absolute Spirit, 
of announcing the end of history, without being at the same time -  
God? Although there is no definition of the Derridean difference, if 
there were one, it might perhaps be the suppression of the Hegelian 
Aufhebung wherever it operates, as he says in Positions. Hence the 
affinity of the difference with all operations against Hegel's dialectical 
speculation. Both in Derrida, as well as in Foucault, the opposition to 
Hegel gives birth to the escape towards Nietzsche (and, incidentally, 
Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, the next generation of French
33 Jacques Derrida, Positions, transl. by Alan Bass (London: Athlone Press, 1987), p. 77.
34 Jacques Derrida, "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology" 
in Margins of Philosophy, transl. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982), p. 80.
35 Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas" in Writing and Difference, transl. by Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 120.
36 Jacques Derrida, "From Restricted to General Economy. Hegelianism Without 
Reserve" in Writing and Difference, op. cit., p. 253.
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philosophers and today's opponents of both Nietzschean post­
modernists and of their Nietzsche, who publish collective volumes 
entitled provocatively Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas nietzscheens (1991) 
-  why are we not Nietzscheans... So, who are we?)
To sum up this little stroll taken through French postmodern 
thought, let me say that I did not mean to deal in detail with any of 
the postmodern figures described here, or with any commentators of 
Hegel first and then Nietzsche. What I meant here was the topicality 
of Hegel today; and I merely attempted to outline his constant and 
permanent presence in subsequent generations of French phil­
osophers. From his explicit presence in the first generation to the 
presence-as-negation presence in the battle fought from new, 
Nietzschean positions. And whenever we open Popper's The Open 
Society and Its Enemies in its Hegelian passages, we have to bear in 
mind the fact that he wrote his book in a totally different culture, 
although at the same time as Kojeve, Hyppolite or Bataille -  nowhere 
in the world was Hegel so alive and so topical, so close as well as so 
controversial, as in post-war France.
C hapter 7
Knowledge and History.
The Postmodern French Humanities 
and Deleuze's Nietzscheanism
l.
The general context for this essay is the following: postmodern 
philosophy was strongly influenced by Nietzsche, especially in his 
postwar French readings from Bataille to Blanchot to Deleuze to 
Klossowski. It was Nietzsche in these readings who provided the 
basic contours of a new self-image of the philosopher (or the 
humanist, more generally): instead of (modern) thinking about 
changing the social and political world, philosophers now found new 
terrains for thought, no longer associated with history, and less and 
less associated with politics. From the perspective of this essay, it is 
interesting to think about philosophy through the lenses of the self- 
images philosophers (more or less consciously) assume. Any 
transformation in the self-image of philosophers entails a gradual 
transformation of the role and place of philosophy in culture. For 
what philosophy is, in its broadest terms -  is what philosophers 
regard (regarded, or will regard) as acceptable as philosophy. The 
passage from the Hegelian to the Nietzschean self image in France in 
recent decades heralded the advent of postmodernity -  if we accept 
the idea that what philosophers think about themselves while 
practicing philosophy is culturally significant.
What remains to be done, and what is still left to be done here, is 
to reconsider the postmodern (or Nietzschean) vision of the
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philosopher's role in society in the face of what is increasingly called 
the Global Age: is there a new self-image currently sought that could 
respond to the challenges that globalization theory and practices 
bring about? What is the place of philosophy in the rapidly changing 
Academe, and what is the place of the Academe itself (from the 
traditional university to higher education in general, or "tertiary 
education" in more recent terms) in a rapidly changing social 
environment? What remains to be done is also to trace the 
interconnections between (cultural, philosophical, intellectual) 
postmodernity and the (economic, political, social) Global Age. It was 
much easier to think of the "postmodern turn" before globalization 
became a dominant social concept in the 1990s; now, it might be safer 
to avoid the term "turn" altogether.
To start with the Nietzschean spirit in philosophy: Gilles 
Deleuze's contribution to the appearance and development of the 
postmodern orientation in the humanities and social sciences is still 
undervalued. Instead of writing about the unique themes he 
introduced to postmodern discourse (such as e.g. rhizomes and trees, 
difference and repetition, schizoanalysis, minor languages, war 
machines or nomad art), I would like to focus on his Nietzscheanism 
which, I suppose, has turned out to be the most useful in the 
humanities generally today. I appreciate his impressive monographs 
on Hume, Bergson, Kant, Spinoza and Leibniz, as well as the books he 
co-authored over the years with Felix Guattari; but it was his book on 
Nietzsche -  Nietzsche et la philosophie -  that exerted the greatest, 
although hidden influence, on French, and subsequently American 
thinkers over the last three decades. It was Deleuze who introduced 
to the intellectual arena a new figure of the philosopher: called 
Nietzschean first and then merely postmodern. It was in Deleuze's 
book(s) and articles that a whole generation of seminal writers such as 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Frangois Lyotard found 
their much less socially-bounded, much more individualistic, self- 
creational and relativistic self-images. Nietzsche as read by Deleuze 
provided a powerful impetus for a generational change in France in 
the sixties, which continues to affect us today, in the account of the 
role, place and tasks of the humanist -  be it the philosopher,
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sociologist, historian, literary critic etc. -  in culture and society. The 
example provided by Nietzsche, and read for current purposes by 
Deleuze, turned out to be very appealing indeed. Both of them show 
what can and what cannot be expected from today's humanist. 
Deleuze is inspiring, brilliant, and far-reaching in his conclusions. He 
combines the analytic talent of a philosophical reader with the 
visionary talent of a philosophical prophet.
Few participants in current discussions about postmodernity 
actually refer to the early Gilles Deleuze (neither to the early Pierre 
Klossowski, frankly speaking) or from their fundamental books about 
Nietzsche; much more is written in this context about Michel 
Foucault's or Jacques Derrida's Nietzscheanism. But, and this is the 
main point of the present essay, the "postmodern turn" we may be 
currently witnessing also results from the "Nietzschean turn" the 
humanities took in recent decades: in the passage from the Hegelian 
(surely, as read more by Alexandre Kojeve than as read by Jean 
Hyppolite) to the Nietzschean self-image of the philosopher, came the 
change of expectations directed toward the philosopher (and 
philosophy as a discipline itself) by the Nietzschean in spirit, the 
change of his or her awareness of participation in culture, history, and 
politics that occurred in the sixties in the French humanities. If there 
had been no new Nietzsche-inspired self-image of the philosopher in 
France, suddenly growing and suddenly more and more appealing to 
philosophers' imagination, there would have probably not been the 
books by Foucault, Derrida or Lyotard in the forms we know them 
today. A powerful impulse questioning the (modern) role of the 
philosopher as the one who changes the world of public and political 
affairs originated in a specifically reinterpreted (French) Nietzsche by 
a new generation of thinkers opposed to a specifically reinterpreted 
(French) Hegel. And that was done in a powerful manner by Gilles 
Deleuze.
The generation of Foucault and Derrida, Deleuze and Klossowski 
thought that between Hegel and Nietzsche there could be no 
compromise. But they still meant a postwar French Hegel and a new 
Nietzsche read in France, two intellectual constructs, needed 
especially by the second generation of French thinkers to settle their
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philosophical and intellectual relations with their predecessors. 
Vincent Descombes is basically right when he says in his Modern 
French Philosophy that the signs put next to Hegel and next to 
Nietzsche got changed in the sixties: wherever there was a "minus", 
there appeared a "plus", and vice versa.1
One can discover a number of parallel interpretations of the 
Hegelian-Nietzschean shift regarding the re-evaluation of the role 
and place of the philosopher in culture and society that took place in 
French thought in the sixties with the help of the aforementioned 
thinkers: Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, and Klossowski.1 2 Each of them 
take as their point of departure a different aspect of the "change of 
sign" from plus to minus mentioned by Descombes. For even in the 
fifties Nietzsche was a rarely explored margin in French philosophy 
(and were it not for Georges Bataille or Maurice Blanchot, he might 
have been hardly heard of). So what was so appealing about 
Nietzsche in the sixties? He attracted philosophers with his otherness, 
methodophobia, idiosyncrasies, personal overtones, vividness of 
metaphoric, versatility of styles, multitude of genres, as well as, more 
philosophically speaking, with his criticism of oppositional (binary) 
thinking, stressing the role of style in philosophical discourse, 
underlining the significance of perspectivalism, the possibilities of 
judging without criteria etc. etc.
2.
Before we pass on to the, in this respect, fundamental book by Gilles 
Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, let me say a few words about the 
book by Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux, by way of an
1 Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), p. 12
2 The general context for the present essay -  philosophy seen through the lenses of 
the self-images philosophers assume in culture and society -  is provided by my book 
Dylematy tozsamosci. Wokot autowizerunku filozofa iv powojennej mysli francuskiej 
[Dilemmas of Identity. On the Self-Image of the Philosopher in Post-War France] 
(Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 1999).
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introduction to his problem. The two books together provide a brand 
new perspective in reading Nietzsche. It is obvious right from in its 
opening statement that the book by Klossowski was conceived as a 
challenge to several generations of Nietzsche's readers, commentators 
and scholars: "This is the book that may testify to rare ignorance: how 
are we to talk about 'Nietzsche's thought' without ever referring to 
anything said about him before?"3 Even in his text "Nietzsche, le 
polytheisme et la parodie" (dating from 1957) Klossowski, probably 
without thinking about the approaching Nietzschean turn in the 
French humanities, wrote about Nietzsche "we always tell him to say 
more and to say less than he said; we actually tell him to say more 
when we ally with him, and less -  when we reject or distort him".4 
Bataille and Blanchot, Klossowski and Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault, 
Lyotard and Barthes, all of them clearly "ally with Nietzsche" in a 
powerful strategic and anti-Hegelian alliance, and clearly "tell him to 
say more". Some members of this alliance produced works of 
commentary, others produced works that merely used him, hardly 
ever mentioning him.5
Thus Nietzsche in extreme versions is either an object of a 
thorough deliberation (Klossowski, Deleuze) or is a silent accomplice, 
a tacitly assumed and never fully expressed horizon of thought 
(Foucault). Nietzsche's thought in Deleuze is presented as an ordered, 
anti-Hegelian system; in Klossowski, in turn, Nietzsche does not 
present his philosophy but his "variations on personal themes" that 
rotate "around madness as if it were its own axis".6 Klossowski's 
energetic interpretation, following Nietzsche, asks the question who 
the philosopher could be. In a violent, anti-Hegelian move Nietzsche, 
as read by him, is not willing either to think from the perspective of 
the "care for the human condition", or to be a traditional "teaching" 
philosopher.
3 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux (Paris: Mercure de France, 1969), p. 1.
4 Pierre Klossowski, "Nietzsche, le polytheisme et la parodie" in Un si funeste desir 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1963), p. 188.
5 This division is widely used by Alan D. Schrift in his very interesting book, 
Nietzsche's French Legacy. A Genealogy of Poststructuralism (London: Routledge, 1995).
6 Pierre Klossowski, "Nietzsche, le polytheisme et la parodie", op. cit., p. 188.
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Who is the adversary, who is the enemy one is to defeat? The more fully 
thought is able to nail him, Klossowski says, the more powerful it becomes. 
To determine its adversary is to produce one's own space, to expand it, to 
breathe with it.7
And it is precisely in this question that I can see the clue to the 
Nietzschean turn in French philosophy and it is by means of this 
question that I am going to show the role played by Gilles Deleuze in 
this turn. Hegel in the late fifties and early sixties became the enemy 
of a whole generation; it was the Hegel mainly from the 
Phenomenology of Spirit in an influential interpretation popularized in 
France by Alexandre Kojeve's Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, and 
it was mainly against this Hegel that arguments were presented and 
misreadings were shown; it was the young Hegel who was being 
attacked. Let us remind ourselves of Foucault's words from his 
opening lecture delivered at the College de France in 1970 -  when the 
battle with Hegel fought with Nietzschean weapons had already been 
won: "the whole of our epoch ... attempts to flee from Hegel".8
3.
In Gilles Deleuze's study Nietzsche and Philosophy the enemy and the 
adversary in question is the same Hegel.9 Nietzsche's philosophy 
supposedly forms "an absolute anti-dialectics"; "anti-Hegelianism 
runs through his work as its cutting edge", his pluralism is for 
dialectics its "most ferocious enemy" and "its only profound 
enemy".10 Between Hegel and Nietzsche "there is no compromise".
7 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux, op. cit., p. 54.
8 Michel Foucault, L'ordre du discourse (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 74.
9 In Difference and Repetition Deleuze praises Klossowski for "renewing the 
interpretation of Nietzsche" referring to two his texts: "Nietzsche, le polytheisme et la 
parodie" and "Oublie et anamnese dans l'experience vecu de l'etemel retour du 
Meme", read at the conference in Royaumont in 1964. See Difference and Repetition, 
transl. by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 312.
10 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, transl. by Hugh Tomlinson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 195, 8, 8, 8.
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Or still differently: "we will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche's 
work if we do not see 'against whom' its practical concepts are 
directed. Hegelian themes are present in this work as the enemy 
against which it fights".11
Thus the context is quite clear: the common enemies for Nietzsche 
and Deleuze are dialectics and Hegel.1 2 Nietzsche in Deleuze is 
lightness, pleasure, affirmation, joy, irresponsibility; Hegel and 
dialectics, in turn, mean heaviness, work, negation, duty and 
responsibility. Nietzsche replaces a "speculative element of negation" 
with a "practical element of difference: the object of affirmation and 
pleasure".13 Deleuze attempts to make Nietzsche more "dialectic" in 
his reading and is not willing to fight Hegel on the terrain chosen by 
him, hence Nietzschean pairs of oppositions seem paradoxical and 
non-philosophical. If on the one hand we have dialectical negation, on 
the other we have differentiating affirmation and the "ethics of joy" 
corresponding to it. Thought is supposed to become "light", 
"affirmative", "dancing" -  finally, it is supposed to "exclude any 
negativity".14
11 Ibidem, p. 162.
12 In various interpretations of of the Deleuze/Hegel/Nietzsche relationship at 
least two positions can be indicated: according to the one, Deleuze reads Nietzsche as 
a characterization of his own philosophical stance and he is against Hegel and 
dialectics (see Ronald Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, London: Routledge, 1989; Michael 
S. Roth, Knowing and History, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); according to the 
other, simultaneously with the strategy of total opposition against Hegel, he chooses 
another path: he "refuses to descend and struggle on Hegel's own terrain" and 
attempts to "move away from the dialectic, to forget the dialectic" (see Michael Hardt, 
Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993, pp. 27, 53). Deleuze in the latter account is seen as attempting to destroy 
the binary character of his and Nietzsche's position with Hegel's, so that Nietzsche as 
"anti-Hegel" should not suggest the beginning of a new dialectical process. Alan 
Schrift in his previously mentioned Nietzsche's French Legacy chooses a version of full 
opposition between Hegel and Nietzsche in Deleuze. But the problem I mean here -  
the problem of Nietzscheans writing "against Hegel" -  is most clearly put in a brilliant 
book by Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire. Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
13 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 9.
14 Ibidem, p. 41.
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Deleuze attacks dialectics with Nietzschean weapons claiming e.g. 
that it avoids putting the fundamental question: "Who is to perform 
critique, who is capable of it?" We are told about reason, spirit, self- 
knowledge, and man; but who is in question in all these concepts? The 
question "who?" is the most important one -  dialectics makes use of 
the pairs universal/particular, general/specific, infinite/finite which 
are merely symptoms, and the question to be asked is: who is 
particular, specific, and finite. Who is the subject in question, what are 
the forces in play? The solutions presented by dialectics are fictitious, 
Deleuze says, for its problems are fictitious because it treats 
symptoms in an abstract manner. Nietzsche in the comprehensive, 
not to say systematic, account presented by Deleuze15 is against any 
thought referring to the negative, opposes any thought that makes 
use of the power of the negative, any thought that moves within an 
element of the negative and uses negation as a driving force, power 
and quality. Nietzsche opposes the famous power of positivity of the 
negative with his own discovery: the negativity of the positive, 
according to Deleuze. It is not difficult to identify the enemy fought 
by Nietzsche in Deleuze's account: philosophy is to become the art of 
interpretation and judgement, asking with respect to everything the 
question "who?" The meaning of Nietzsche's philosophy in Deleuze 
is the affirmation of multitude, becoming and chance. "The lightness 
of what affirms against the heaviness of the negative; joys of will to 
power against dialectics; affirmation of affirmation against the 
famous negation of negation", he writes at the end of his book. (The 
figure of the philosopher found and highly valued in Nietzsche was 
subsequently supported by a series of fragments in a more popular 
book about Nietzsche. In the first part of the aforementioned 
fragments there is a section entitled "Who is the Philosopher?". Let us 
just remind ourselves of the exact titles of the fragments chosen by 
Deleuze in this popularization: le philosophe masque, le philosophe 
critique, le philosophe intempestif, le philosophe physiologiste et medecin as 1
15 Some commentators accuse Deleuze of oversystematization of Nietzsche's 
thought. See e.g. James J. Winchester, Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn. Reading Nietzsche after 
Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 72.
K n o w led g e an d  H istory 169
well as le philosophe, inventeur de possibility de vie and le philosophe 
legislateur16 It can be seen from the very titles what model of 
philosopher -  from among the many possible ones -  will be promoted 
by this popular guide to Nietzsche. To refer to Ecce Homo: "the very 
last thing I would promise is to make humanity 'better'".16 7
4.
Let us summarize the above fragment. First, a clearly marked enemy 
of both Deleuze and Nietzsche as read by him is the Hegel from the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit, especially from the chapter on the dialectics of 
mastery and slavery; that is to say, the Hegel read and popularized in 
France by Alexandre Kojeve in his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. 
Dialectics is "popular speculation", and under the Hegelian picture of 
the master there is always the slave, just like below the Deleuzian 
picture of Hegel there is always the dialectic, foundational for post­
war French thought, about "mastery and slavery" by Hegel, although 
read by means of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals.18 Second, the crucial 
words of this brilliant study are decidedly anti-Hegelian: affirmation, 
lightness, dance, joy, irresponsibility, i.e. the words leading directly to 
the next generation of French philosophers, the philosophers of 
difference (which for the first time had probably appeared on the 
margins of Hegel and Nietzsche in Georges Bataille19). Third, what is 
most important to us is not the slow change in the French "master of 
thinking"; the new readings of Hegel by Klossowski and Deleuze, or 
previously by Bataille and Blanchot (with the notion of ecriture 
fragmentaire in Nietzsche suggested by the latter) show that no
16 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche: sa vie, son oeuvre (Paris: PUF, 1965), pp. 49-58.
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, transl. by Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 
1967), Foreword, p. 2.
18 See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, transl. by H. Tomlinson and 
B. Habberjon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 14-15.
19 On Deleuze's influence on French readings of Nietzsche, see the introduction to: 
Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, transl. by D. Large (London: Athlone Press, 
1993), pp. vii-xl.
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intellectual hegemony is long-lasting, as is evident in French culture; 
they do show, however, the new terrain later on boldly explored by 
postmodern thought.
To an extent, the eccentricity of Deleuze's (and Klossowski's) 
reading of Nietzsche will be treated as a model and source of 
inspiration for Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard in their philosophical 
investigations. Although Foucault explicitly devoted to Nietzsche 
only two short pieces ("Nietzsche, Genealogy and History" and 
"Nietzsche, Freud, Marx"), all his thought is immersed in 
Nietzscheanism; Lyotard in his Libidinal Economy merely mentions 
him, but the book is considered as a violent explosion of his 
Nietzscheanism; Derrida uses Nietzsche in his long-lasting struggles 
with Heidegger and indirectly with the whole body of "metaphysics" 
with Plato and Hegel as its main proponents. But what is important in 
my view is something else: it is the first time that a brand new 
attitude of the philosopher in culture was so highly and explicitly 
valued: from Deleuze's (and Klossowski's) reading of Nietzsche one 
can read a certain coherent proposal concerning the place of the 
philosopher in culture.
5.
If we are talking about current philosophical descriptions (narratives, 
histories or micrologies) as being precisely about "philosophical" 
descriptions, then the evolution of the very notion of "philosophy" 
must be seen as a very deep and thorough one indeed. And it is after 
Nietzsche that one has to locate a large part, if not the whole body, of 
so-called postmodern thought. In many respects, perhaps, the very 
notion of "Nietzschean" could be synonymous with that of 
"postmodern". Postmodern thinkers are in such a close relationship 
with Nietzsche that they are often not willing to see it, or are not 
capable of seeing it thoroughly. Perhaps the most fully aware of this 
affinity was Michel Foucault who did not want, like Derrida, to 
"overcome" Nietzsche and to leave him behind in a closed chapter of 
"Western metaphysics". "The only sign of the affinity with such
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thought as Nietzschean is precisely to use it, to distort it, to make it 
shiver and cry", Foucault once said in an interview. I would like to 
stress once again that postmodern thinkers are Nietzschean in the 
sense ascribed to Nietzsche by Deleuze (also in the sense ascribed to 
him two decades later in a famous interpretation presented by 
Alexander Nehamas in his Nietzsche: Life as Literature20). What does it 
mean, without the burden of philosophical descriptions?
The philosophical choice we are talking about here, made in the 
sixties, was also a moral and political choice made on the margins of 
the political, social, and ideological events in France at the beginning 
and middle of the sixties: the philosopher no longer recognized as his 
or her own the "Hegelian" (in Kojeve's version) mission of his 
necessary participation in vast historical transformations. Together 
with the passage from Hegel to Nietzsche (as well as to Freud and 
Marx, the other two "masters of suspicion"), there occurred a 
significant change of the self-image of the philosopher in culture. The 
response provided by Nietzsche (called "the New Nietzsche" in 
America following a pioneering publication by David B. Allison) in 
readings presented by his new interpreters is extremely important 
from the perspective of questions about this self-image, and the first, 
most significant moves were made by Deleuze (and Klossowski) who 
drew a picture of a newly interpreted, specifically French Nietzsche.
The Hegel in the Phenomenology o f Spirit was primarily to link 
philosophy to transformations occurring in the surrounding world: 
the idea was to show that certain political proposals may be 
legitimated by certain philosophical proposals, and thereby 
philosophical knowledge may and should lead to political changes. 
Philosophy stood close to history and to politics. But the link in 
question was not satisfactory for the younger generation of French 
philosophers, currently called postmodern. The questions about 
progress in history, about a single "History" with its meaning 
deciphered by philosophers, emanated from postwar French 
Hegelianism; on the other hand, Nietzsche's vision could provide
20 See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985).
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merely a multitude of separate and never realizable small-scale 
"histories" produced on the basis of different "perspectives". On the 
questions of historical change, progress, and a clear account of the 
relation between philosophical thinking and political activity in 
Hegelianism, there began a debate in which a newly-coined 
Nietzscheanism furnished arguments against the institutionally 
entrenched Hegelianism after the second world war. The opposition 
between Hegel/Nietzsche with respect to the role of the philosopher 
and philosophy in history (that is, in what Emil Cioran called faire 
VHistoire, "doing History", in his History and Utopia) is clear: it is 
about the philosophers' responsibility for history consisting in giving 
or refusing legitimization to political programmes and choices that 
became more and more difficult to support. The passage to Nietzsche 
and the turn against Hegel can also be seen as a turn against a certain 
place of the philosopher in culture and history supported by (a 
specifically read) Hegel. In modern times, philosophy has several 
times tried to stay close to power; in postwar France, philosophy tried 
to stay as close to power as possible, and the ideal of the philosopher 
as a totally "committed writer" in the manner of Sartre, and 
supported by the powerful account of Hegel as provided by his new 
commentators, was very strong indeed. Philosophy was supposed to 
change the social world, and philosophers were supposed to 
legitimate History. The responsibility of this self-image of the 
philosopher was supposedly too heavy to bear. So there appeared 
intellectual space for Nietzsche in his interpreters. And when 
Nietzsche came, the road to postmodernity was opened (incidentally, 
were it not Nietzsche, there would have been someone else, I 
suppose).
6.
The attack launched by Deleuze on Hegelian negativity -  and on its 
"work" -  was an attack on Hegel's vision of history within which all 
events under the philosopher's gaze gain some meaning in the course 
of history. Without the belief in the power of negativity and the
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power of the philosophical gaze, the homogeneous and 
retrospectively realized history could turn out to be a contingent web 
of events -  of unknown hierarchy of significance and undisclosed 
meaning in history.21 Negativity led in Hegel to change, and change 
has always been progressive. A philosophical account of history 
could only show its subsequent manifestations occurring along a 
single route; progress by negation was supposed to lead to the end of 
history. The gaze of the Hegelian philosopher provided a clear picture 
of those events that were significant from a philosophical point of 
view. History, philosophy, politics, and knowledge were interrelated 
with one another. It must have given additional power to philosophy 
and its representatives, philosophers; it must have influenced the 
social and political image of the philosopher.
The Deleuzian Nietzsche brings about a new relationship between 
the philosopher and History, for he also brings about a new vision of 
history. The Hegelian philosophy of history was to look back, to give 
meaning to the past so that the present could have its meaning. 
Philosophers who put the present in a meaningful and always 
progressive series of events, as Kojeve wanted to convince his 
readers, were responsible for the future. In the Deleuzian account of 
Nietzsche (as well as in the neo-Nietzschean account of Deleuze), 
philosophy is gradually deprived of this increasingly heavy burden of 
social and political responsibility.
Deleuze refers to what he calls "pluralism" in Nietzsche's 
philosophy; genealogy is opposed to dialectics, and histories about 
the world are opposed to a single History about it. But as there are 
many of them, they can no longer be legitimate judgements on 
politics, morality or aesthetics, for they cannot be subsumed under a 
single superior vision, with the figure of Reason in the background. In 
Hegelian dialectics there is no room for a constant interplay of 
different driving forces on which depended the meaning of a given 
object, just like there is no room for the previously mentioned 
genealogical question "who?" Let me add right now that a different
21 See discussions about Hegel in: Michael S. Roth, Knowing and History. Appropriations 
of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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account of history leads to different conduct in the present: while the 
Hegelian "work of negativity" gave meaning to history as a narrative 
about progress; the Nietzschean genealogy sees all attempts to 
present a mere sequence of events as one, single history unfolding 
through its numerous manifestations as reactionary thinking: 
thinking that comes directly from the perspective of the slave rather 
than from that of the master, to refer to the master/slave dialectics 
again, as in the Hegelian view of history it is the slave and his vision 
of history that counts. On the one hand we have a grand narrative, on 
the other a multitude of little narratives written from various 
perspectives and under the influence of many forces.22
The elimination of negativity for Deleuze (and for Nietzsche in 
this reading) becomes a crucial point on which the sense of their 
history depends (the "new way of thinking" means affirmative 
thought, that is to say such thought that finally "excludes any 
negativity"). As negativity is deprived of its power, it is deprived of 
the possibility of work (and let us remember here Bataille's 
"unemployed negativity", negativite sans etnploi) and the change 
associated with it disappears, and hence progress itself. The 
questioning of negation as the driving force of history at the same 
time changes history as a sequence of historical events, and deprives 
the philosopher of his or her Hegelian role of providing these events 
with meaning, putting them in order and coming to conclusions with 
respect to present and future actions. The web of close relationships 
between history/knowledge/action is broken. And what follows is 
the separation of those who act from the justification taken by them 
hitherto, the knowledge of history provided by philosophers. Hegel 
gave us the possibility of understanding the world and to exert an 
influence on the changes it undergoes; the French Nietzsche appeared 
at the moment when the understanding of a less and less 
understandable world (in which it was more and difficult to explain 
and philosophically legitimize the dramas of the surrounding world,
22 As Clement Rosset writes: "Deleuze's thought is not in the service of any 
thought, any purpose, any particular theme". "Secheresse de Deleuze", L'Arc, 49,1987, 
p. 91.
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with the Holocaust at the forefront) was becoming an increasingly 
heavy burden.
Nietzsche, to put it briefly, provided the opportunity to separate 
philosophy from politics, leaving engagement in historical change to 
the private choices of thinkers rather than to duties automatically 
ascribed to the community of philosophers. Political change no longer 
had philosophical legitimization on the basis of the new 
Nietzscheanism, for Nietzsche (i.e. in the reading by Deleuze) 
brought about une nouvelle conception de la philosophic, une nouvelle 
image du penseur et de la pensee.73 What is most important for me is the 
second part of the statement, the "new image of the thinker". The 
thinker in question no longer legitimates political change, no longer 
attempts to decipher and to give sense to the surrounding political 
world by means of providing a homogeneous history -  but he does 
not go as far in his aspirations as (Roland Barthes') "pleasure of the 
text" yet either.
7.
The most important point for me here is the following: in the new 
French readings of Nietzsche some postwar philosophers sought 
ways to free themselves from "history" and from responsibility 
toward its past, present and future events, sought a new self-image, 
the aforementioned Deleuzian nouvelle image which, with the passage 
of time, they could see as their own. And Francois Ewald was not 
exaggerating when he wrote recently about Deleuze's Nietzsche and 
Philosophy: "Nietzsche would not have been for us what he has 
become for us today without the first Nietzsche [et la philosophic]".23 4 
I would be willing to add in this context: the same thing happened 
with the newly born self-image of the philosopher. Without Deleuze 
and his Nietzsche, the self-image of interest to us here would have 
been (at least slightly?) different.
23 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche: sa vie, son oeuvre, op. cit., p. 13.
24 Francois Ewald, Magazine litteraire, avril 1992, p. 20.
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One is surely entitled to ask at this point whether such deep 
transformations of the self-image of the philosopher originated only 
and exclusively from reading Nietzsche? Obviously they did not. 
Nietzsche so seen was merely a point of convergence for some 
thoughts and some attitudes in culture, probably unavoidable in 
postwar France. (Hegel's response would be easy: it was the "cunning 
of reason" that helped to give birth to a temporary interest in, as well 
as appropriation and reinterpretation of, Nietzsche for particular 
French needs; it was not an individual gesture of a group of 
philosophers but a wide and meaningful world-historical gesture). It 
was not that the knowledge of Nietzsche distorted and corrupted the 
traditional picture of the philosopher, infecting the French humanities 
with a new vision of what the philosopher as a cultural hero could be; 
it was rather that the philosopher in question, wanting to flee from a 
burdensome arena of social obligations, was looking for and finally 
found, his or her new philosophical patron. The fact that the 
humanities found its patron in Nietzsche resulted from a web of 
contingent events as well as from the appearance at more or less the 
same time of "strong readings" of his philosophy. Gilles Deleuze's 
works gave the French humanities their first impulses, later on 
maintained and brilliantly used by the whole of postmodern thought.
8.
What will happen with the Nietzsche-inspired postmodern self-image 
of philosophers provided by Deleuze and Klossowski in the 21st 
century cannot even be guessed at; the transformations the modern 
university is undergoing right now -  in the face of the challenges of 
globalization, in the face of the possibility of the decline of the nation­
state and the general collapse of the cultural, political, social and 
economic project of modernity -  will surely change not only the self- 
image of philosophers, but of all academics as well. Philosophy gave 
rise to the modern institution of the university two hundred years ago 
and now it will have to find its new niche in the Academe, as the 
general move is increasingly toward an entrepreneurial and
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managerial institution no longer based on philosophical Humboldtian 
and Kantian foundations. The self-image of philosophers will sooner 
or later become altered -  hopefully, not entirely out of the modern 
context of the Hegelian/Nietzschean debate, part of which were 
Deleuze and the postmodern way of practicing philosophy.
Part II

C h a p t e r  8
Globalization and Higher Education
l.
In this article, the question of the role of higher education in general, 
and of the university in particular, in contemporary society and culture, 
is linked to two parallel processes: first, the questioning of the role of 
the nation-state in the global age, and, second, the gradual 
decomposition of the traditional welfare state in the majority of OECD 
countries. The first theme is much more historical and philosophical; 
the second, much more sociological and public policy oriented. The 
point of departure that is assumed is that the university in its modern 
form was closely linked with the nineteenth-century political invention 
of the nation-state and that the university in the last half of the 
twentieth century has been increasingly dependent on the welfare state 
as it gradually began to pass from its elite to its mass (and in current 
predictions) to its near-universal participation model. What is 
happening right now, in very broad terms, is, first, a major redefinition 
of both the general responsibilities of the state vis-a-vis society, 
according to the familiar model of the welfare state, and, second, a 
major revision in thinking about the role of the state in contemporary 
politics and economics brought about by globalization processes (and 
hence the possible weakening, if not demise, of the nation-state).
Few institutions in the contemporary world are being affected, at 
the same time, by both reconfigurations, for there have been few 
institutions so closely dependent, at the same time, on the two 
fundamental paradigms, the welfare state and the nation-state. 
Certainly, the modern German-inspired university in the form in
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which it exists in Europe, as well as with some modifications in 
America,1 is one of them.
As a recent American publication, Challenges and Opportunities Facing 
Higher Education: An Agenda for Policy Research, states in its conclusions, 
"first, policy for the coming decade cannot be fashioned successfully by 
fine-tuning policies that are currently in place; policy makers need an 
entirely new conceptual approach to policy frameworks and 
subsequently to the individual components of policy. Second, policy -  
and policy research -  must be conceived holistically. Although policy is 
likely to be implemented piecemeal, it must be designed within the 
context of a broader perspective".1 2 This article attempts to provide that 
broader perspective, the main question being the possible impact of 
globalization on higher education, or globalization as a new paradigm 
for rethinking higher education policy.
The most general point of departure is the conclusion that hard 
times have come for higher education all over the world. It is not 
accidental that following the end of the Cold War, the collapse of 
communism in the Central and Eastern European countries, and along 
with the further spread of free-market economies and neo-liberal 
economic views all over the world, public higher education institutions, 
and the universities in particular, are under siege worldwide. The 
current problems of public higher education are connected with the 
much more profound problems of the public sector in general.
The financing and the management of higher education 
institutions was at the top of the agenda worldwide in the 1990s. 
Interestingly, the patterns of reforms and the directions brought about 
were similar in countries with different political-economic systems 
and different higher education traditions, not to mention their 
different technological levels and cultural outlooks.3 No matter what
1 Christopher J. Lucas, American Higher Education: A History (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1996).
2 Dennis Jones, Peter Ewell and Aims McGuinness, The Challenges and 
Opportunities Facing Higher Education: An Agenda for Policy Research (Washington, DC: 
The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, 1999), p. 25.
3 D. Bruce Johnstone, The Financing and Management of Higher Education: A Status 
Report on Worldwide Reforms (UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education, 1998), 
p. 1, available on-line.
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level of fiscal prosperity might be expected, the general conclusion 
has been expressed in numerous recent educational policy reports, 
that hard times are coming for educational institutions and their 
faculties.4 Budgets are going to be squeezed, state support, already 
small, is expected to become even smaller, owing to other huge social 
needs, to the universalization of higher education, to its expanded 
scope, diversity, and numbers, and owing to growing social 
dissatisfaction with the public sphere in general, higher education 
included5 (as Philip G. Altbach recently phrased it with reference to 
the academic faculty: "the [academic] profession's 'golden age' ... has 
come to an end"6).
4 See Harold A. Hovey, "State Spending for Higher Education in the Next Decade: 
The Battle to Sustain Current Support" (Washington, DC: The National Center for 
Public Policy and Higher Education, 1999); Chester E. Finn, Jr., A Different Future for 
Higher Education? (New  York: Fordham Foundation, 2000), available on-line.
5 There are very few social scientists who discuss the issue of higher education 
and the emergent knowledge society and believe that globalization may actually press 
for increases in spending for education from the public purse, at the expense of other 
programs of the welfare state. One of them is Vito Tanzi who in his recent paper on 
"Taxation and the Future of Social Protection" claims that "globalization may create 
pressures for increased spending for education, training, research and development, 
the environment, infrastructures, and for institutional changes partly to increase 
efficiency and partly to comply with international agreements. These expenditures are 
consistent with the traditional or basic role of the state in its allocation function. Thus, 
expenditure for social protection, which is a newcomer in the role of the state, could be 
squeezed between falling revenue and increasing needs for more traditional types of 
spending. In such a situation, the state will need to rethink its role in economy (in The 
Global Third Way Debate, ed. by Anthony Giddens, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p. 
196). This approach is very rare indeed. Although theoretically it is possible to claim 
increases in the share of the public funds for national public higher education systems 
using the "knowledge-based society" argumentation, in practice it has never worked 
in any of the major OECD countries or European transition countries. The situation of 
financing higher education reminds that of raising taxes for the sake of raising the 
standards of welfare provisions: everyone would like to have better public universities 
but no one is willing to pay higher taxes for this reason (compare the generally 
supportive attitude towards welfare opposed to the unwillingness to be taxed 
accordingly).
6 Philip G. Altbach, "An International Academic Crisis? The American 
Professoriate in Comparative Perspective", Daedalus, 126,4, Fall 1997, p. 315.
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So the global direction taken by governments worldwide, with 
huge intellectual backups provided by international organizations,7 is 
favoring lifelong learning for all and a near-universal participation in 
increasingly market-oriented, financially independent, higher 
education institutions. This direction is currently very explicit, 
especially in Anglophone countries. As Harold A. Hovey claims in a 
penetrating report, "State Spending for Higher Education in the Next 
Decade: The Battle to Sustain Current Support",
higher education in the United States is generally not competing successfully 
with the attractions of other demands on state spending. In his account the 
underlying question about spending will be whether, at the margin, higher 
education spending is contributing more than spending at the margin in other 
programs. This question will be raised in a political dimension with the adverse 
electoral consequences of cuts in higher education compared with cuts affecting 
public schools, health care providers, and others active in state politics.8
Generally speaking, the fiscal predictions for public higher education 
spending are bad; merely maintaining the current level of services, in 
this case, in the United States, seems very difficult.
2.
Thus, to open a wider perspective, globalization processes and fierce 
international competition have brought back to the world agenda the 
issue of the role of the state in the contemporary world. As the World 
Bank publication, The State in a Changing World (1997) states in its
7 See, for example, Universities under Scrutiny (Paris: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1987); Education and the Economy in a Changing Society 
(Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1989); Financing 
Higher Education: Current Patterns (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1990); Redefining Tertiary Education (Paris: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1998); Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994); The State in a Changing World. World Development 
Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997).
8 Harold A. Hovey, "State Spending for Higher Education in the Next Decade: 
The Battle to Sustain Current Support", op. cit., p. 17.
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opening paragraph: "around the globe, the state is in the spotlight. 
Far-reaching developments in the global economy have us revisiting 
basic questions about government: what its role should be, what it 
can and cannot do, and how best to do it".9 It is necessary to 
understand that rethinking the university today is inseparable from 
first rethinking the state, for the modern university was put, by its 
German philosophical founders, at the disposal of the nation-state, 
and, second, the university is traditionally a vast consumer of public 
revenues. Thus, rethinking the state moves in two parallel directions: 
the nation-state today and the welfare state today. Both ideas are 
clearly linked to the modem institution of the university, and 
fundamental reformulations of both will surely affect it, at least in the 
long run. Generally, the state is increasingly perceived in a global 
context as a "facilitator", a "regulator", a "partner", and a "catalyst" 
rather than as a direct provider of growth or of social services. What is 
being evoked is a redefinition of the responsibilities of the state 
towards society and a high level of selectivity in regard to the activities 
to be supported with public funds. "Choosing what to do and what not 
to do is critical", as the World Bank publication phrases it -  and in this 
context, hard times are ahead for higher education worldwide.
The 1998 OECD publication, Redefining Tertiary Education, speaks 
of a "fundamental shift" and a "new paradigm" of tertiary education 
for all, as well as about a "historic shift" and a "cultural change". The 
author fully agrees with the statement that "it is an era of searching, 
questioning, and at times of profound uncertainty, of numerous 
reforms and essays in the renewal of tertiary education".10 The 
question of the university today cannot be answered in isolation, even 
though this question goes hand in hand with questions about cultural 
and civilizational changes brought about by the Internet and 
information technology, with the issues of globalization, the welfare 
state, the nation-state, etc.
As a result of all these changes, it may happen that certain 
activities traditionally viewed as belonging to the sphere of social
9 See the World Bank publication, The State in a Changing World, op. cit., p. 1.
10 Redefining Tertiary Education, op. cit., pp. 3 ,15, 20,37.
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responsibility of the state might no longer be viewed in this way. 
Higher education is certainly a serious issue in this context, 
particularly in regard to a trend suggested in public policy towards 
subsidizing consumers rather than providers, that is to say, students 
rather than institutions of higher learning (or "the client perspective" 
in OECD terminology) as well as a shift not only away from 
government, but also away from the very higher education 
institutions and their faculties toward their "clients".11
Thus, there are serious indications that the nation-state as a 
political and cultural project is in retreat in surroundings determined 
by the processes of globalization, which in itself is a subject of heated 
debates. As Dani Rodrik, an influential American political economist, 
put it recently,
we need to [be] upfront about the irreversibility of the many changes that 
have occurred in the global economy. ... In short, the genie cannot be stuffed 
back into the bottle, even if it were desirable to do so. We will need more 
imaginative and more subtle responses.1 2
Responses of this sort are also needed in the domain of higher 
education policy issues. Capital, goods, technologies, information, 
and people cross borders in ways that were unimaginable only a 
few years ago. The power of the state as such is increasingly viewed 
as mere administration and less as the governance of (national) 
spirit.13 Sociologists describe the current situation as a "partial 
shift of some components of state sovereignty to other institutions,
11 D. Bruce Johnstone, The Financing and Management of Higher Education: A Status 
Report on Worldwide Reforms, op. cit., p. 4.
12 Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 1997), p. 9.
13 See, for instance, the chapter about the gap between the state and the 
economy in the era of declining nation-states ("After the Nation-State-What?") 
in Zygmunt Bauman's excellent study, Globalization. The Human Consequences 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) as well as the book by Martin Albrow written 
from the perspective of the end of the nation-state in the confrontation with 
globalization, The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1996).
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from supranational entities to the global capital market".14 The 
possible decline of nation-states brings about vast social, economic, 
and political consequences of a global nature. Susan Strange in her 
book The Retreat o f the State writes that the state is undergoing a 
metamorphosis and "can no longer make the exceptional claims and 
demands that it once did. It is becoming, once more and as in the 
past, just one more source of authority among several, with limited 
powers and resources"15 Martin Albrow goes even further when he 
states that society and the nation-state have "pulled apart". Thus, 
national identity seems to be ceasing to play the crucial role in the 
social lives of contemporary technologically advanced, free 
countries in the late modern era. And, again, it is necessary to 
remember that national identity laid at the foundations of the 
modern university in its German formulation.
3.
It is necessary to ask two questions. Does the current passage to late 
modernity and to the information age as well as the decline of the role 
of the nation-state and the increasing power of globalization 
processes and the (possible and gradual, at least in its most lavish 
forms) decomposition of the welfare state mean that the radical 
reformulation of the social mission of the university is unavoidable? 
Will the university (in North America and in Central Europe alike) be 
able to come through the transitory crisis of public trust and of its 
founding values as well as through the dramatic crisis of its own 
identity in a radically new global order? In the face of globalization 
and its social practices, are the processes of the "corporatization" of 
the university and the accounting for its activities in terms of business
14Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), p. xii; see also Saskia Sassen, Globalization and its 
Discontents (New York: The New Press, 1998).
15 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 73; Martin Albrow, The Global Age: 
State and Society Beyond Modernity, op. cit., p. 164.
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rather than of education irresistible? Is the response to decreasing 
public trust and decreasing state financial support to be found in new 
ideas (by once again reformulating the philosophical foundations of 
the modem university) or in new management? Surprisingly enough, 
these questions are of equal significance for North America and for 
Central and Eastern Europe in its period of vast social and economic 
transformation. The significance of the transformations of universities 
in the global age cannot be fully captured outside the context of the 
changes that the economic order, the welfare state, and the nation­
state are currently undergoing.
The modem university derives from the intellectual work of 
German philosophers: from Kant and Fichte to Schleiermacher and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt.16 Its concept is relatively new and was born, 
along with the rise in national aspirations and the rise in the 
significance of nation-states, in the nineteenth century. A tacit deal 
made between power and knowledge, on the one hand, provided 
scholars with unprecedented institutional possibilities and, on the 
other, obliged them to support the national culture and to help in the 
shaping of national subjects, the citizens of nation-states. The alliance 
between modern knowledge and modern power gave rise to the 
foundations of the modern institution of the university.
The place, social function, and role of the university as one of the 
most significant institutions of modernity were at that time clearly 
determined. But currently it is no longer known what the exact place 
of the university in society is, for society itself has substantially 
changed. As the late Bill Readings observed in his breathtaking 
reflections about the "post-historical university": "... the wider social 
role of the University as an institution is now up for grabs. It is no 
longer clear what the place of the University within society nor what 
the exact nature of that society is".17
16 See Albert Blackwell, Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Founding of the University of 
Berlin (Lewiston, Edwin Mellen Press, 1991); Hermann Rohrs, The Classical German 
Concept of the University and its Influence on Fligher Education in the United States 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995).
17 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), p. 2.
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The uncertainty regarding the future location of the institution of 
the university in culture is growing step by step along with structural 
changes occurring in the economy and in politics today. The nation­
state as a political and cultural project seems to be declining in the 
surroundings determined by globalization.18 One could risk making 
the following statement: in the age of globalization, national identity 
ceases to be the most important social glue and therefore its 
production, cultivation, and inculcation -  that is, the ideals that stood 
behind the modern project of the university as conceived by its 
German intellectual founders -  ceases to be a crucial social task.19
The university, in its traditional modern form, is no longer a 
partner of the nation state; therefore, along with the decline of 
modernity as a social, political, and cultural project,20 the political and 
economic role of the nation-state decreases in the global circulation of 
capital. And the decreasing role of the state goes hand in hand with 
the decreasing role of its modern ideological arm -  the university.21 
While these transformations are easy to perceive in economics and
18 Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh (Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and 
the New World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, p. 19) write: "...no political 
ideology or economic theory has yet evolved to take account of the tectonic shift that 
has occurred. The modern nation-state ... looks more and more like an institution of a 
bygone era." See also Saskia Sassen (Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of 
Globalization, op. cit.), as well as Jean-Marie Guehenno (The End of the Nation-State, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995). Guehenno clearly links the year 
1989 with the collapse of the nation-state: "1989 marks the twilight of a long historical 
era, of which the nation-state, progressively emerging from the ruins of the Roman 
Empire, was the culmination" (p. xii).
19 See Marek Kwiek, "The Nation-State, Globalization, and the Modem Institution 
of the University", Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Studies, 96, December 2000.
20 See Marek Kwiek, Rorty’s Elective Affinities: The New Pragmatism and Postmodern 
Thought (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF UAM, 1996); Dylematy tozsamosci. Wokol 
autowizerunku filozofa w powojennej mysli francuskiej [Dilemmas of Identity: On the Self- 
Image of the Philosopher in Post-War France] (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe IF 
UAM, 1999).
21 Andy Green (in Education, Globalization, and the Nation State, London: 
Macmillan, 1997, p. 3ff.) asks about the role of education in the "post-national era" and 
claims that, according to globalization theories, the system of national education 
becomes "defunct, at once irrelevant, anachronistic, and impossible."
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politics,22 the situation is a bit different in the other pole of the 
power/knowledge relationship, that of knowledge. Power and its 
character get changed and therefore, out of necessity, knowledge and 
its character get changed.
Awareness of the fact that the university, invented and proposed 
to the world by the nineteenth-century German thinkers, is therefore 
a culturally and historically determined product, is increasingly 
common. Nothing determines in advance its shape, tasks, and 
functions, as well as the expectations directed at it and the 
requirements imposed on it by the culture and society in which it is 
immersed. The university in its modern form is a child of modernity; 
it ages along with modernity and is susceptible to political, economic, 
and social transformation as much as any other (modern) institution. 
Or, as Peter Scott put it recently, "[gjlobalization is perhaps the most 
fundamental challenge faced by the university in its long history ... 
more serious even than the challenge posed by totalitarianism in our 
own century".23
New cultural, social, political, and economic surroundings 
brought about by globalization seem to require a totally new 
language, which, surely enough, is at nobody's disposal right now. So 
the old measures and vocabularies continue to be used to describe 
phenomena of the new world (of "new global order", or "new global 
disorder", some commentators argue). Generally speaking, there
22 As Janice Dudley claims (in Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives, ed. 
by Jan Currie and Janice Newson, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1998, p. 27): "The 
state is cast as increasingly irrelevant when confronted by the 'reality' of ungovernable 
intemational/global market forces. Nation-states are essentially ineffective in the face 
of global market forces, so that the era of the powerful nation-state would appear 
effectively to be over. National economic management and national political and 
social policies are becoming increasingly irrelevant. International markets and 
international capital markets operate outside of the control of national governments. 
... The state is reduced to the role of the 'night watchmen' of classical liberalism- 
maintaining law and order, protecting the sanctity of contract, and providing only the 
level of welfare necessary to protect property and facilitate the free operation of 
capitalist markets."
23 Peter Scott, "Globalization and the University", CRE -  Action, 115,1999, p. 35.
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seems to be common agreement that globalization, as a wide set of 
social and economic practices, introduces to our social world a brand 
new quality: "a sense of rupture with the past pervades the public 
consciousness of our time", as Martin Albrow writes.24 Ulrich Beck in 
What Is Globalization? describes the passage from the "first" (national) 
to the "second" (global) modernity in sociological terms as "a 
fundamental transformation, a paradigm shift, a departure into the 
unknown world of globality".25 One can justifiably claim to be 
witnessing, right now, "the end of the world as we know it".26 
Evidently, the significance of the transformations of universities in the 
global age cannot be fully captured outside the context of changes 
that the world economic order and the nation-state are currently 
undergoing, which, to turn to more philosophical grounds, is 
paralleled by the possible collapse of modernity.
The uncertainty about the future location of the institution of the 
university in culture grows along with structural changes occurring in 
the economy, culture, and politics. It is often the case that small 
nation-states are no longer equal partners for big capital.27 The nation­
state as a political and cultural project -  but, unfortunately, not 
nationalism -  seems to be declining in the surroundings determined 
by globalization, which in itself is a topic of a heated debate in 
political science (these processes can be clearly observed both in the 
countries of the European Union, in the Central and Eastern 
European countries, as well as in the countries of both the Americas). 
One has to agree with Ulrich Beck, who claims that one constant 
feature of globalization is the overturning of the central premise of 
modernity, "the idea that we live and act in the self-enclosed spaces 
of national states and their respective national societies".28
24 Martin Albrow, The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity, op. cit., p. 1.
25 Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 125.
26 Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 158ff.
27 See Richard. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1998), pp. 81-107; Richard J. Barnet and J. Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial 
Corporations and the New World Order, op. cit.; Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the 
Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).
28 Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization?, op. cit., p. 20.
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Globalization is "the time/space compression", the "overcoming of 
distance", la fin de la geographie (Paul Virilio), as it enables people, 
goods, and information to travel freely.
4.
One could risk the following statement: in the age of globalization, 
national identity may cease to be the most important social glue and 
therefore its production, cultivation, and inculcation -  that is, the 
ideals that stood behind the modem project of the university -  may 
cease to be crucial social tasks. The traditional, modem social mission 
of the university as an institutional arm of the nation-state has been 
unexpectedly questioned after two centuries of cultural dominance. 
The university as we know it -  the modem university29 -  is in a 
delicate and complicated position at the moment: the great cultural 
project of modernity that has located the university at the very center 
of culture -  in partnership with the institution of the nation-state -  
may be gradually outliving itself. After 200 years -  merely 200 years! 
-  it is no longer known to what, if any, great regulatory idea the 
university in search of its present raison d'etre might refer.30 In its 
modem beginnings, as Bill Readings31 shows, echoing Kant in The 
Conflict of the Faculties, the regulatory idea in question was 
Enlightenment reason;32 then, in Schleiermacher and Humboldt, the 
idea was culture in an active sense of Bildung, cultivating oneself as a
29 See Sheldon Rothblatt, The Modern University and its Discontents (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Sheldon Rothblatt and Bjorn Wittrock, The 
European and American University since 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993).
30 The texts about the institution of the university written by German 
philosophers of the turn of the nineteenth century were gathered in the French 
volume, Philosophies de VUniversite: Vldealisme allemand et la question de VUniversite, ed. 
by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut (Paris: Payot, 1979).
31 See Bill Readings, The University in Ruins, op. cit.
32 See the splendid English-German edition of Kant's The Conflict of the Faculties 
(New York: Abaris Books, 1979).
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subject of the nation-state.33 Should we thus today, as Alain Renaut 
puts it, oublier Berlin?34
The university seems no longer to be capable of maintaining its 
modern role as a cultural institution closely linked to the nation-state 
of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Europe. In the globalizing 
world of today, references made to national culture as the raison d'etre 
of the university sound less and less convincing, especially if one 
considers that the state itself, the partner and the other side of the 
agreement, is itself undergoing transformation, and disregarding its 
past, that is, its modern obligations35 with respect to the university.
The academic world perfectly well understands that there will 
probably never be a return to the level of public funding of 
universities (both in the natural sciences and in the humanities) of the 
Cold War era, a period of tough (inter)national competition.36 The 
United Europe, for instance, does not seem to need narrowly national 
universities, for teaching and research are expected to aim at 
harmonization rather than at the isolation of particular national 
traditions37 And references to reason or culture with respect to 
universities are no longer persuasive in society.
These ideas are no longer politically (and economically) resonant 
because the global configuration of politics and economy has 
changed. Within the new global configuration, paradoxically enough, 
the economy is increasingly less dependent on politics. It is 
worthwhile to consider, once again, the thesis suggested by Dani 
Rodrik that "the most serious challenge for the world economy in the
33 Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Founding of the University of Berlin. The Study of 
Religion as a Scientific Disipline, ed. by Herbert Richardson (Lewiston, New York: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1984).
34 Philosophies de VUniversite: Vldealisme allemand et la question de VUniversite, ed. by 
Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, op. cit., p. 138; Claude Allegre, L'Age des savoirs: pour une 
renaissance de VUniversite (Paris: Gallimard, 1993).
35 See The University and the City: From Medieval Origin to the Presen, ed. by Thomas 
Bender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
36 See Harold A. Hovey, "State Spending for Higher Education in the Next 
Decade: The Battle to Sustain Current Support", op. cit.
37 See Chapters 10 and 13.
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years ahead lies in making globalization compatible with domestic 
social and political stability -  ... in ensuring that international 
economic integration does not contribute to domestic social 
disintegration". The power of the state as such is increasingly viewed 
merely as administration and less and less often as the governance of 
national spirit.38
5.
As the idea of "culture" (and especially, but not exclusively, 
"national" culture) may cease to be effective for the functioning of the 
institution of the university, that is, the idea of "culture" worked out 
by German philosophers and accepted all over the world as a 
regulatory idea standing behind the functioning of the university,39 
new ideas may have to be sought. It turns out, however, that grand 
ideas like those that might resist being deprived of social reference are 
very difficult, if not impossible, to find in the set of ideas that are 
currently available. At the same time, the ruthless logic of 
consumerism brings forth the idea which was greeted warm by the 
best American universities: "excellence in education", behind which 
there are the ideals of the most useful, best-selling, and most rapidly 
attained knowledge (or merely certification). As numerous 
commentators of the phenomenon write, it is appropriate that the 
university, as an institution, become a bureaucratically governed,
38 See Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, op. cit., pp. 55-76; 
Martin Albrow, The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity, op. cit., pp. 163-183.
39 See, for example, Friedrich Wilhelm Johann Schelling, On University Studies 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1963); Friedrich Schleiermacher, Occasiional 
Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense. With an Appendix Regarding a University 
Soon to Be Established (1808), transl. by T.N. Tice, with E. Lawler (San Francisco: 
EMText, 1991); Immanuel Kant, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970); Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit.; Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, "Uber die innere und aussere Organisation der hoheren 
wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin" in Philosophies de VUniversite: Vldealisme 
allemand et la question de VUniversite, op. cit.
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consumer-oriented corporation.40 To quote just one recommendation: 
"the only thing that higher education has to do, it seems, is sell its 
goods and services in the marketplace like other businesses..."41
From this perspective, the crucial words for the description of the 
university are the following: managerial, corporate, entrepreneurial,42 
as well as corporatization, marketization, and "academic 
capitalism".43 The questions to be asked can be formulated in the
40 The late Bill Readings wrote with great accuracy about the "University of 
Excellence". From a more practical perspective, two other works are more significant: 
David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell Jr., Wise Moves in Hard Times: Creating and Managing 
Resilient Colleges and Universities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), and Reinventing the 
University: Managing and Financing Institutions of Higher Education, ed. by Sandra L. 
Johnson and Sean C. Rush (New York: JohnWiley, 1995) which do not leave a shadow 
of a doubt about the general direction in which the university as an institution is 
moving. Its aim is "providing an attractive product at a fair price-giving society value 
for its money" (David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell Jr., op. cit., p. 26). In the second 
book one can find such statements as the following: "Higher education will never be 
the same. Political and corporate America have already responded by fundamentally 
restructuring the way universities operate" (Reinventing the University: Managing and 
Financing Institutions of Higher Education, ed. by Sandra L. Johnson and Sean C. Rush, 
op. cit., p. 22). The time has come for the universities to respond...
41 David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell, Jr., Wise Moves in Hard Times: Creating and 
Managing Resilient Colleges and Universities, op. cit., p. 31.
42 It is important to note two significant books that have appeared within a decade: 
Janice Newson and Howard Buchbinder, The University Means Business: Universities, 
Corporations, and Academic Work (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988), and Universities and 
Globalization: Critical Perspectives, ed. by Jan Currie and Janice Newson. Both present 
precise reports and detailed interpretations by sociologists and political scientists of the 
phenomena occurring in the anglophone universities. They explain the ways the 
ideology of the free market enters the university in the form of practices drawn directly 
from the corporate world (high-level management, rectors as CEOs, nominated rather 
than elected deans; accountability, privatization, performance indicators, etc.).
43 "Academic capitalism" is the term coined by Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. 
Leslie. The diagnosis they present is fully correct: "globalization of the political 
economy at the end of the twentieth century is destabilizing patterns of university 
professional work developed over the past hundred years. Globalization is creating 
new structures, incentives, and rewards for some aspects of academic careers and is 
simultaneously instituting constraints and disincentives for other aspects of careers" 
(Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the 
Entrepreneurial University, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 1).
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economic integration does not contribute to domestic social 
disintegration". The power of the state as such is increasingly viewed 
merely as administration and less and less often as the governance of 
national spirit.38
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Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense. With an Appendix Regarding a University 
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allemand et la question de TUniversite, op. cit.
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consumer-oriented corporation.40 To quote just one recommendation: 
"the only thing that higher education has to do, it seems, is sell its 
goods and services in the marketplace like other businesses.. ."41
From this perspective, the crucial words for the description of the 
university are the following: managerial, corporate, entrepreneurial,42 
as well as corporatization, marketization, and "academic 
capitalism".43 The questions to be asked can be formulated in the
40 The late Bill Readings wrote with great accuracy about the "University of 
Excellence". From a more practical perspective, two other works are more significant: 
David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell Jr., Wise Moves in Hard Times: Creating and Managing 
Resilient Colleges and Universities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), and Reinventing the 
University: Managing and Financing Institutions of Higher Education, ed. by Sandra L. 
Johnson and Sean C. Rush (New York: JohnWiley, 1995) which do not leave a shadow 
of a doubt about the general direction in which the university as an institution is 
moving. Its aim is "providing an attractive product at a fair price-giving society value 
for its money" (David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell Jr., op. cit., p. 26). In the second 
book one can find such statements as the following: "Higher education will never be 
the same. Political and corporate America have already responded by fundamentally 
restructuring the way universities operate" (Reinventing the University: Managing and 
Financing Institutions of Higher Education, ed. by Sandra L. Johnson and Sean C. Rush, 
op. cit., p. 22). The time has come for the universities to respond...
41 David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell, Jr., Wise Moves in Hard Times: Creating and 
Managing Resilient Colleges and Universities, op. cit., p. 31.
42 It is important to note two significant books that have appeared within a decade: 
Janice Newson and Howard Buchbinder, The University Means Business: Universities, 
Corporations, and Academic Work (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988), and Universities and 
Globalization: Critical Perspectives, ed. by Jan Currie and Janice Newson. Both present 
precise reports and detailed interpretations by sociologists and political scientists of the 
phenomena occurring in the anglophone universities. They explain the ways the 
ideology of the free market enters the university in the form of practices drawn directly 
from the corporate world (high-level management, rectors as CEOs, nominated rather 
than elected deans; accountability, privatization, performance indicators, etc.).
43 "Academic capitalism" is the term coined by Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. 
Leslie. The diagnosis they present is fully correct: "globalization of the political 
economy at the end of the twentieth century is destabilizing patterns of university 
professional work developed over the past hundred years. Globalization is creating 
new structures, incentives, and rewards for some aspects of academic careers and is 
simultaneously instituting constraints and disincentives for other aspects of careers" 
(Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the 
Entrepreneurial University, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 1).
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following manner: What is the future of the university deprived of its 
modern culture-, state-, and nation-oriented mission? Does the 
university really have to drift towards the model of a better and better 
managed corporation, a bureaucratic structure fighting in the 
marketplace with other, similar, isolated bureaucratic structures in 
search of consumers of the educational services they want to keep 
selling (i.e., to drift "from the collegial academy to corporate 
enterprise", as Ian McNay44 describes the process? What, in a social 
sense, would a (potential) university of mere consumers be like?45).
Or, as is evident in a splendid volume, Universities and 
Globalization, already referred to here, the questions could be the 
following: Are we in danger of having practices at universities drawn 
directly from the world of business? Will the university under these 
circumstances be able to maintain its critical judgments about society? 
Will scholars become entrepreneurs ("academic capitalists")? Is 
academic activity still unique in our culture? Is globalization a 
"regime of truth" in Foucault's sense,46 a new fundamentalism, the 
impact of which on higher education will be revolutionary? Finally, is 
higher education merely a private commodity or is it still a public 
good?47 At the same time, a less cultural and philosophical context 
and a more economic and political one could be described as follows:
Most Western democracies are now in the throes of a reform of their welfare 
state institutions. The modem university, as a significant claimant on public 
resources, is part of [the welfare state]. ... [T]he overriding influence in all
44 Ian McNay, "From the Collegial Academy to Corporate Enterprise: The 
Changing Cultures of Universities" in The Changing University? ed. by Tom Schuller 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press and Society for Research into Higher 
Education, 1995).
45 See especially discussions about the "unique" place of higher education in 
society contrasted with its current "survivalist" mood in The Postmodern University? 
Contested Visions of Education in Society, ed. by Anthony Smith and Frank Webster 
(London: Open University Press, 1997). The only option still open for the university to 
defend itself today is to stress the unique nature of the university experience as such 
which, to tell the truth, is not sufficient.
46 See Stephen J. Ball, Foucault and Education: Disciplines and Knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 1990).
47 All these questions underlie this extremely useful collective volume.
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countries is that the state can no longer afford to pay the escalating claims,
especially in light of the increasing internationalization of the economy.48
To return for a moment to the question of the use of the university 
today if it no longer provides the legitimization of power by building 
national identity: perhaps the university could play an important role, 
for instance, in supporting the (already partially forgotten) ideals of 
civil society?49 The question arises: Who needs these ideals? Society, 
surely, since, paradoxically enough, society now has no good place 
from which to learn them. But how to pass from national ideals to 
civil ideals that would in principle be deprived of merely local 
references? The process of the passing of American universities from 
the ideal of (American) culture to the ideal of a financially 
independent (educational) corporation -  commonly referred to as 
their "corporatization"50 -  is surely not worth being copied without 
further discussion of its implications. The only question is to what 
extent there is still any choice in our increasingly homogeneous 
world. If there were such a choice, and let us assume this possibility 
optimistically, the university could become a center for pluralistic, 
multiperspective thought that would deal with the ideals of civil 
society in an increasingly corporate-like world of global capital.51 
A university that consented to function within a framework 
determined purely by the logic of the (neo-liberal) economy would, 
with the passage of time, become a mere corporation (and it would 
find no consolation in the fact that it was an "educational"
48 William Melody, ''Universities and Public Policy" in A. Smith and F. Webster, 
The Postmodern University? Contested Visions of Higher Education in Society, op. cit., p. 76.
49 It is very interesting to read together, in this context, two texts by Stanley 
N. Katz: "Can Liberal Education Cope?" (an address he delivered in 1997) and "The 
Idea of Civil Society" (one he delivered in 1998), the former available at his Princeton 
University Web site, the latter published in The University, Globalization, Central Europe, 
ed. by Marek Kwiek (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Peter Lang, 2003).
50 Janice Newson, "The Corporate-Linked University: From Social Project to 
Market Force", Canadian journal of Communication, 23,1998, p. 108ff.
51 See Lawrence C. Soley, Leasing the Ivory Tower: The Corporate Takeover of 
Academia (Boston: South End Press, 1995); Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization? op. cit.; 
Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, op. cit.
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corporation). That would be the end of the university as a modern 
institution. Therefore, one has to agree with Slaughter and Leslie,52 
who argue that "higher education as an institution and faculty as its 
labor force face change unprecedented in this century". Such a 
situation would obviously not mean the end of the university as such; 
merely the end of a certain way of conceiving of itself, a conception 
with which, over a period of two centuries, society has become 
familiar. The university without its state- and nation- orientation (that 
is, de-ideologized) seems to be forced by external circumstances to 
look for a new place for itself in culture, for if it does not find such a 
place, it will become an educational corporation tasked with training 
specialists rapidly, cheaply, and efficiently -  preferably very rapidly, 
very cheaply, and very efficiently.
Social and cultural changes today take place with a speed that was 
unimaginable a few decades ago. The world is changing more and 
more rapidly, but the university has increasingly less influence on the 
direction these changes take (if it ever, indeed, had any influence). It 
is no longer a partner in power (of the nation-state); it has become one 
among several budgetary items that, preferably, should be cut or 
reduced. One thing is certain: nothing is permanent or guaranteed in 
culture, neither is any status nor any place, role, or social task. This 
fact is well known by all those whose influence in culture has been 
radically reduced (and let us refer here to the figure of the 
"intellectual" discussed in Part I of the present volume).
6.
Thus, the potential decline of the cultural, political and philosophical 
project of modernity and of the nation-state entails the potential 
decline of the institution of the modern university, requiring the latter 
to search for a new place in culture and new ideas to support the 
organization of its functioning at the very moment when the 
harmonious co-operation of power and knowledge -  or, more
52 Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the 
Entrepreneurial University, op. cit., p. 1.
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precisely, of the politics of the nation-state and the national 
consciousness provided by the university -  has ended. Globalization 
brings about the devalorization of all national projects, one of them 
being the institution of the (nation- and state-oriented) university. If 
behind the university there are no longer the ideas of nation, reason, 
and (national) culture, then either new ideas have to be discovered or 
the university is doomed to surrender to the all-encompassing logic of 
consumerism. Within this logic, the university, free of its associations 
with power, devoid of modern national and state missions, exists 
merely to "sell" its educational and research "products" as a 
bureaucratic educational and research corporation. The study of the 
future of the institution of the university is inseparable from the study 
of it within the large cultural, philosophical, and political project of 
modernity with its ideas of the nation-state and, later on, of the 
welfare state.
To sum up, rethinking the social, political, and cultural 
consequences of globalization is a crucial task for social sciences 
today. The weakening, if not the decline, of the nation-state, viewed 
even as giving only some terrain of power to new transnational 
political and economic players, is strictly linked with violent 
globalization processes which, consequently, may lead to the 
redefinition of such notions fundamental to the social sciences as 
democracy, freedom, and politics. It may also lead to the redefinition 
of the social role of the university. In the situation generated by the 
emergence of the global market, the global economy, and the 
withdrawal of the state (also called the decomposition of the welfare 
state), a constant deliberation is needed about new relations between 
the state and the university in the global age.
For the moment, one of the tentative conclusions for the author 
would be the following: one should avoid looking at higher education 
issues in isolation from what is going on in the public sector generally 
and, nowadays, in the institution of the state. These changes do and 
will influence thinking about higher education; so, it is necessary to 
know the turns they are making. It is no use to keep referring to the 
rights gained by the university during the period of modernity (the 
rights gained in the times of national states), as modernity in its
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classical form may no longer be with us. Redefined states may have 
somewhat different obligations and somewhat different powers, and 
it is not quite certain that national higher education systems, as well 
as universities, will belong to its most basic sphere of social 
responsibility. The state, worldwide, is itself fighting to find its own 
place in a new global order, and, no matter what it declares to the 
general public, higher education issues may seem to it to be of 
secondary importance.
Academics are living in a period of revolutionary change. 
Although they know the point of departure, the point of arrival still, 
fortunately, remains unknown. The challenge is to try to influence the 
changes so that academic institutions can thrive as in the past.
Chapter 9
Social and Cultural Dimensions 
of the Transformation of Higher Education 
in Central and Eastern Europe
l .
The purpose of this article is to show the necessity of grounding 
current discussions about higher education reforms in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe in a wider context of global social, 
economic, and cultural change. Its working assumption is that any 
thinking about reforms in higher education in general, outside a 
particular context of reforming the whole public sector (within a 
reformulation and a revision of the principles of functioning of the 
welfare state in its traditional formulation), remains incomplete. 
Similarly, any thinking about the institution of the university in 
particular (i.e., about a small and elitist part of higher education) 
while disregarding the past context of its modern, nation-state- 
oriented, social role, place, and function, provided by the 
Humboldtian model in the new post-national global age, remains 
incomplete.
The thesis of this article is that the main factors contributing to the 
need to rethink higher education institutions today are linked to the 
advent of the global age. Although the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe are not yet feeling the full force of the ensuing 
pressures, higher education here is likely to be affected very soon by 
globalization-related processes. Higher education all over the world, 
including Central and Eastern Europe, is no longer the unique part of
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the public sector that it used to be, either in explicit political 
declarations, in public perceptions, or in practical terms (including 
funding). Higher education in CEE countries is doubly affected by the 
local post-1989 transformations and by more profound and more 
long-lasting global transformations. To neglect either of the two levels 
of analysis is to misunderstand a decade of failed attempts to reform 
higher education systems in this part of the world.
2.
With regard to higher education, several working assumptions can be 
made. First of all, the transformation of higher education seems 
inevitable worldwide, as much in the wealthy OECD countries, 
including some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as in 
the developing countries, the forces behind change being global in 
nature. These forces are similar, even though their current influence 
varies from country to country and from region to region. The scope 
of the transformation is unclear, though.
The main forces that are driving the transformation of higher 
education today are old forces (governmental and public pressure for 
transparency and accountability, the focus on costs, effectiveness, 
productivity, quality assurance, etc.) and new ones (new providers of 
higher education, rapid advances in technology, changing social 
demands for renewable skills in the global age, etc.). The old forces call 
only for the changing of policies, but the new forces may require new 
ways of thinking about policy scholarship and policy making as well. In 
a non-American setting, the new forces of change in higher education 
would also include the internationalization of higher education research 
and teaching (including the predominance of English in the terms of the 
Internet and electronic communication) and globalization viewed, 
among other important aspects, as a renewed and critical focus on the 
services of the welfare state, the declining role of the nation-state in the 
global economic and cultural surroundings, and the corporate 
culture/business attitude invading the academic world today in an 
increasingly competitive and market-oriented global environment.
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This article does not develop the theme of old forces driving 
transformations of higher education. These forces have been 
sufficiently covered in current research, both from a global 
perspective as well as from that of the Central and Eastern European 
region (a vast majority of the publications available on the subject of 
the reform of higher education in this region concern these 
traditionally important issues). The focus here is on the forces driving 
the transformation of higher education systems that are completely 
new and that require a wider context for research analysis. The forces 
of globalization are of primal importance, yet they appear to be 
underestimated in current higher education policy and research, 
especially in continental Europe, including Central and Eastern 
Europe, as compared with policy and research in Anglophone 
countries. These forces are undoubtedly bound to change the nature 
of the academic enterprise to a degree that today seems almost 
unimaginable. In order to demonstrate the power of the forces of 
globalization that are transforming higher education, it is important 
to evoke the political, economic, and social contexts of globalization- 
driven transformations in thinking about the nation-state and the 
welfare state, as the author has done elsewhere.1
In the American context, new forces for change mean new 
providers, new technologies, and a new society. Here the whole 
globalized underpinning of higher education transformations is 
already taken for granted.1 2 In the context of Central and Eastern 
Europe, however, these forces need to be supplemented with more 
basic ones, those of globalization and internationalization. In the 
American context, the decline of the role of the nation-state in the 
economy that has been determined by powerful transnational players 
and the reformulation of the principles of the functioning of the 
welfare state along neo-liberal lines, as well as the corporate way of
1 Marek Kwiek, "The Nation-State, Globalization, and the Modem Institution of 
the University", Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Studies, 96, December 2000.
2 See Frank Newman, "Intellectual Skills in the Information Age", The Futures 
Project: Policy for Higher Education in a Changing World, A. Alfred Taubman Center 
for Public Policy and American Institutions (Providence, Rhode Island: Brown 
University, 1999), www.futuresproject.org.
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thinking about traditional public services, come naturally as part and 
parcel of the American social and economic transformations of the 
1990s. But in the context of Central and Eastern Europe, an area that is 
much more dependent on the European political and economic scene, 
especially in the case of the countries about to enter the European 
Union, these issues in connection with higher education reforms may 
still seem irrelevant. The point made in this article is that the most 
powerful forces to affect higher education in the region are the new 
forces, not the old forces with which European higher education 
research and policy, at both national and European level, seem to be 
predominantly concerned.3
3 Formally speaking, the "European social model" has not been defined as such in 
any single place. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 includes a social chapter and the 
"Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union" adopted in Nice in 2000 
includes a chapter on "solidarity". The Charter consists of seven chapters: Dignity, 
Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens' Rights, Justice and General Provisions. 
Chapter four on "solidarity" (articles 27 through 38) includes articles on e.g. right to 
collective action and bargaining (28), to fair and just working conditions (31), rights 
related to family and professional life (33), right to social security and social assistance 
(34), healthcare (35), environmental protection (37), and consumer protection (38). 
Overview to the article 34 states that "The right to social security is a traditional 
fundamental right recognized for everyone. It involves receiving from society (the 
public authorities) the means to satisfy the rights of an individual that are essential to 
his or her dignity and the free development of his or her personality. At source it is 
linked to the right to an adequate standard of living. This necessitates the 
implementation of social services to protect individuals in the situations mentioned in 
article 34: maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependence or old age, and loss of 
employment. This right is applied in accordance with the rules laid down by 
Community law and national laws and practices, but where the social services 
mentioned do not exist, there is no obligation as a result to create them". Further on it 
is stated that "Poverty and the social exclusion to which it leads are today recognized 
as a breach of human dignity, and a hindrance to the enjoyment and exercise of the 
fundamental rights of the person. In paragraph 3, the combat of social exclusion and 
poverty are set out as objectives for the public authorities. The right to a minimum 
income and the right to housing are not expressly set out here, but can be deduced 
from the right to social and housing aid which must be respected and implemented in 
the context of the combat against social exclusion, in accordance with the rules laid 
down by Community law and national laws and practices" (Overview to art. 34). If we 
see how this particular article is implemented in Central and Eastern Europe, it is 
evident that the acquis communautaire of the EU does not include the social acquis.
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Thus, in discussing the setting for higher education reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe, it is not sufficient merely to cite old 
forces in operation (and quantitative changes resulting from them). 
The new forces (and qualitative changes resulting from them) are 
even more important. The older forces result from several decades of 
steady growth of higher education institutions to the point of the 
near-universalization of higher education in the affluent countries of 
the West. New forces, by contrast, come from the new political, 
economic, and social contexts (post-modern, post-industrial, global, 
post-Cold-War, postnational, etc.), possibly bringing about a 
revolution in higher education of an unprecedented scale and nature. 
Although both types of forces are important, the new forces appear to 
be underestimated in higher education policy writing in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The author, however, is in full agreement with Sheila 
Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, the authors of Academic Capitalism: 
Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University, who claim that "the 
changes taking place currently are as great as the changes in academic 
labor which occurred during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. ... [T]he globalization of political economy at the end of the 
twentieth century is destabilizing patterns of university professional 
work developed over the past hundred years" and conclude that 
"higher education as an institution and faculty as its labor force face 
change unprecedented in this century".4
Globally, we might be on the threshold of a revolution in thinking 
about higher education. Higher education is asked to adapt to new 
societal needs, to be more responsive to the world around it, to be 
more market-, performance-, and student oriented, to be more cost 
effective, accountable to its stakeholders, as well as competitive with 
other providers. Traditional higher educational institutions seem 
challenged -  and under assault -  all over the world by new teaching 
and research institutions that claim to do the same job better, cheaper, 
and with no (or little) public money involved. New providers, 
responding to a huge societal demand for new skills, conveniently 
delivered, include for-profit educational firms, for-profit arms of
4 Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the 
Entrepreneurial University (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 1.
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traditional non-profit universities, virtual institutions, franchised 
institutions, corporate universities, etc. (and their extensive use of 
new technologies). The traditional basic structure of higher education 
seems unable to cope with growing and unprecedented workforce 
requirements in the West, especially in America. Locally, in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, academics are not prepared 
for these global challenges at all as they are customer driven rather 
than institution- or government driven, and the region is far away 
from the American spirit of consumerism with respect to public 
services. But the American model of the state is bound to become 
increasingly attractive, considering its power and its promotion by 
American and, especially, transnational institutions.
3.
Another working assumption of this article is that public policy in 
Central and Eastern European higher education needs to be especially 
aware of the global context of current worldwide transformation. It is 
certainly not sufficient to understand today that reformed institutions 
are needed. The point is to perceive why it is that they need to be 
changed and what the role of the state, the public services it provides, 
including higher education, will become. The message of this article 
could also be that it is impossible to understand transformations in 
higher education today without understanding the concurrent 
transformations of the social world, including transformations of the 
state and of citizenship in the global age. As one of the most striking 
features of the new world is its increasingly global nature, neither policy 
makers nor policy scholars in higher education can ignore the huge 
social, economic, political, and cultural consequences of globalization.
Thus, generally speaking, in analyzing the changing social, 
political, and economic context of the functioning of higher education 
in Central and Eastern Europe, a double perspective should be taken 
into account: a local (post-1989) context and a global one. The issue 
becomes increasingly important given that after a decade of various 
attempts at reform, on the one hand, in many countries of the region 
the system is on the verge of collapse and that, on the other hand,
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there is increasing political, economic, and social pressure to rethink 
globally the very foundations of higher education in contemporary 
societies. The final result of current tensions will inevitably be the 
introduction of new legal contexts regarding the functioning of higher 
education and the implementation of new higher education policies. 
The impact of the resulting transformations is likely to be severe, 
considering the role higher education is currently playing in the 
countries undergoing transition and that knowledge generally is 
likely to play in future "knowledge-based societies". It is important to 
move back and forth between the two contexts.
As a British sociologist, John Urry stated in general terms, there 
are two implications of globalization for higher education institutions: 
"attempts to defend their position as 'publicly' owned and funded 
bodies will mostly fall on deaf ears and one can expect further uneven 
privatization" and what we will have is "an increased regulation of 
higher education somewhat comparable to that experienced by many 
other industries and occupations".5 In a new social and political 
environment introduced by theories and practices of globalization, it 
is not only the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD), and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), from among transnational organizations,6 that are 
extremely interested in stimulating new varieties of higher education 
on a global scale. Most recently, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
has been concerning itself with the unrestricted importing and 
exporting of higher education within a set of complex rules deriving 
from the WTO protocols.7 The issue, in the long run, is especially vital
5 John Urry, "Locating Higher Education in the Global Landscape", Higher 
Education Quarterly, December 1998, p. 6.
6 See Universities under Scrutiny (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, 1987); Education and the Economy in a Changing Society (Paris: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1989); Financing Higher 
Education: Current Patterns (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1990); Redefining Tertiary Education (Paris: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1998); Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994); The State in a Changing World. World Development 
Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997).
7 As Susan L. Robertson suggests in her introduction to a special issue of 
Globalisation, Societies and Education (vol. 1, no. 3, November 2003), "there is clearly a
208 S o cia l and  C u ltu ral D im en sio n s
for poor and developing countries, including those of Central and 
Eastern Europe. As Philip G. Altbach observes in his recent article in 
International Higher Education: "with the growing commercialization of 
higher education, the values of the marketplace have intruded onto 
the campus. One of the main factors is the change in society's attitude 
toward higher education -  which is now seen as a 'private good' 
benefiting those who study or do research. In this view, it seems 
justified that the users should pay for this service as they would for 
any other service. The provision of knowledge becomes just another 
commercial transaction. The main provider of public funds, the state, 
is increasingly unwilling or unable to provide the resources needed 
for an expanding higher education sector. Universities and other post­
secondary institutions are expected to generate more of their funding. 
They have had to think more like businesses and less like educational 
institutions". The conclusion of the attitude Altbach summarizes, 
clearly favored by transnational organizations, is the following: "in 
this context a logical development is the privatization of public 
universities -  the selling of knowledge products, partnering with 
corporations, as well as increases in student fees".8
great deal at stake, and it is critically important that a wider ranging debate takes 
place in a range of communities, including the academy, about what GATS means for 
national education systems, of whether these developments are desirable or not and 
for whom, and what might be done to, slow down, halt or even reverse decisions that 
have already been made. So what is the WTO, what is GATS, and what does including 
education in GATS mean for particular countries and their education systems? Whose 
interests are promoted by the WTO, and what is the consequence for education 
systems of redefining education, not as a public service regulated by the state, but as 
an industry regulated by the rules of global trade?" ("WTO/GATS and the Global 
Education Services Industry", p. 260). See also papers by Jane Kelsey ("Legal 
Fetishism and the Contradictions of the GATS") and by Mark Ginsburg et al. 
("Privatisation, Domestic Marketisation, and International Commercialisation of 
Higher Education: vulnerabilities and opportunities for Chile and Romania within the 
framework of WTO/GATS") in the same volume. For further commentaries, see the 
whole section on globalization and education in Globalisation and Competition in 
Education, ed. by Jan De Groof, Gracienne Lauwers, and Germain Dondelinger 
(Antwerpen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2003), pp. 69-257.
8 Philip G. Altbach, "Higher Education and the WTO: Globalization Run Amok", 
International Higher Education, 23, Spring 2001, p. 3.
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The main factors contributing to the need to rethink higher 
education institutions today are connected with the advent of the 
global age and with globalization pressures. Although the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe are not yet feeling these pressures in 
higher education, they are soon likely to be affected by globalization- 
related processes. Higher education worldwide, including higher 
education in Central and Eastern Europe, is no longer a unique part of 
the public sector. Higher education in Central and Eastern Europe is 
doubly affected by the local post-1989 transformations and by deeper 
and more long-lasting global transformations. To neglect any of the 
two levels of analysis is to misunderstand a decade of failed attempts 
("ten lost years", as Tomusk puts it explicitly9) to reform higher 
education. Public higher education (except for elite research 
universities) in a decade is increasingly expected to be focused on 
teaching rather than on research, and on the needs of students rather 
than on those of academics. There will be a clear shift from the 
question, "what is it that higher education needs from society" to the 
opposite question, "what is it that society needs from higher 
education".10 1That puts higher education in a new position vis-a-vis 
society. Within a decade, Central Europe and the Baltics will most 
likely be part of the European Union, as parts of Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe will probably also be. The implication for these 
states is more market orientation11 and full exposure to globalization 
processes that still appear to be irrelevant. The fundamental 
assumption about the globalizing and globalized world is the 
primacy of economics over politics and culture, and the primacy of 
the private (sector) over the public (sector); hence, in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, despite the existence of the so-called 
"European Welfare Model", the expectation is of a dramatic 
diminution of the public sector and of the scope of the public services
9 Voldemar Tomusk, The Blinding Darkness of the Enlightenment: Towards the 
Understanding of Post State-Socialist Higher Education in Eastern Europe (Turku: 
University of Turku Press, 2000), p. 278.
10 See Frank Newman, "Intellectual Skills in the Information Age", op. cit.
11 See Voldemar Tomusk, "Market as Metaphor in Central and East European 
Higher Education", International Studies in Sociology of Education, 8, 2,1998.
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provided by the state (much more along neoliberal Anglo-Saxon lines 
than along traditional Continental welfare lines).
Globalization is the political and economic reality with which the 
countries of the region will have to cope. It will not go away; it will 
come to the region and stay, as Jan Sadlak rightly remarks (without, 
however, making reference to Central Europe): "the frank
acknowledgement that globalization has become a permanent feature 
of our social, economic, and cultural space is essential in order to take 
advantage of what it can offer as well as to avoid the perils it may 
involve".12 Consequently, public finances, including the maintenance 
of public services, will be under increasing scrutiny in Central and 
Eastern Europe, following globalization (meaning primarily 
economic) pressures and the reform of the welfare state worldwide, 
with significant consequences for the public sector. (Strange as it may 
sound today, some contemporary public policy analysts compare the 
reform of public higher education with the reform of the energy 
sector, telecommunications, and the health care system. Within a 
decade in the region, that line of thinking, with analogies with other 
"deregulated" sectors, will in most probability be generally accepted 
among policymakers.) What is expected is that the idea of the 
uniqueness of higher education in general, and of the university in 
particular, will finally -  under strong financial pressures resulting 
from the universalization of higher education accompanied by the 
decomposition of the traditional welfare state ideals -  be rejected, 
closing the chapter opened two hundred years ago in Germany with 
the modern university invented by Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
Schleiermacher, and others.
Thus the re-invention of higher education in the region should be 
accompanied by both conceptualizations and activities of the 
academy itself. Otherwise unavoidable -  and necessary -  changes will 
most likely be imposed from the outside. This eventuality calls for 
critical thinking. The world is changing radically, and there are no
12 Jan Sadlak, "Globalization and Concurrent Challenges for Higher Education" in 
The Globalization of Higher Education, ed. by Peter Scott (London: Open University 
Press, 1998), p. 106.
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indications that higher education institutions will be spared the 
consequences of these deep changes. They will most likely have to 
change radically too. The academy must start thinking about its 
future, drawing on its human resources. Currently, in Central and 
Eastern Europe, draft laws and discussions about reforms are being 
neglected by the academic community at large. And a new legal 
context for the functioning of higher education, rather than 
corrections to old laws on higher education, are of utmost importance 
in bringing about the necessary transformations. It would be useful 
for the academic community to have a comparative view of three 
legal, economic, and cultural contexts in which it used to operate, 
currently operates, and will operate: the first being the 1980s (the 
communist period), the second being the 1990s (the transition period), 
and the third being the opening of the new century in which changes 
to come are most probably unavoidable. Although it is necessary to 
realize that "things will never be the same", it is also necessary to 
attempt to envisage how they might actually be.
Rethinking the social, political, and cultural consequences of 
globalization is today a crucial task for the social sciences. The decline 
of the nation-state -  which is viewed as a transfer of power to new 
transnational political and economic players -  is strictly linked to 
violent processes of globalization which, consequently, may lead to 
the redefinition of such fundamental notions as democracy, 
citizenship, freedom, and politics.13 It may also lead to the 
redefinition of the social role of the university. In the situation 
generated by the emergence of the global market, the global economy, 
and the withdrawal of the state, a constant deliberation is needed 
about new relations between the state and the university in the global 
age.14 For the moment, a tentative conclusion could be the following: 
let us not look at higher education issues in isolation from what is 
currently going on in the public sector and in the institution of the
13 See Thomas L. Friedman, Understanding Globalization: The Lexus and the Olive 
Tree (London: HarperCollins, 1999).
14 See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World 
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and World Bank's report, 
The State in a Changing World, World Development Report, op. cit.
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state. It is important to understand this reality and to use the critical 
thinking inherent to the academic world to make another attempt to 
think through higher education in a new social environment.
4.
What influences higher education today? Following what was stated 
above, the main global factors contributing to the transformation of 
higher education can be summarily labeled as "globalization". They 
can be put into three separate categories: first, the collapse of the 
crucial role of the nation-state in current social and economic 
development, with its vision of higher education as a national 
treasure contributing to national consciousness; second, the 
reformulation of the functions of the welfare state, including new 
scope for public-sector activities to be funded by the state; and, third, 
the invasion of the economic rationality/corporate culture into the 
whole public sector worldwide. Higher education is no longer to be 
viewed as a unique part of the public sector, nor are the problems of 
reforming higher education in Central and Eastern Europe unique. 
These are global problems for which global solutions are sought by 
global organizations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and OECD, as 
well as, most recently, the World Trade Organization, which are more 
than ever before interested in higher education. Moreover, the 
following other factors are determining a new situation for higher 
education: new technologies, new student bodies (increasingly 
diversified ages, returning and working students, learners involved in 
life-long learning), new higher education providers: for-profit, 
corporate universities, virtual universities, mixed (traditional/virtual) 
providers, new -  increasingly global -  student expectations, and 
increasingly competitive, market-oriented, success-greedy social 
environments, and phenomena.15
15 See Frank Newman, "Policies for Higher Education in the Competitive World", 
A. Alfred Taubman Center for Public Policy and American Institutions (Providence, 
Rhode Island: Brown University, 2000).
S o cia l an d  C u ltu ra l D im en sio n s .'I »
Pursuant to the idea that higher education is no longer a unique 
part of the public sector in Central and Eastern Europe, one should 
ask who the competitors of public higher education institutions are. 
They are of a twofold nature: first, they are the newcomers in the field 
of higher education and, second, other public institutions and public 
services provided today by the state.
Other educational providers are, for instance, private national 
institutions, private foreign institutions, national and foreign 
corporate certification centers, national and foreign virtual education 
providers, and mixed education providers. In an increasingly market- 
oriented social environment, prospective students (and their families) 
may be increasingly market oriented as well (that fact is confirmed by 
sociological research in postcommunist transition economies). The 
unreformed institutions may not be able to face the pressure, and may 
either be reformed on a day-to-day basis suggested by economic 
rationality, or may lose their students to other market-oriented 
providers.
The second group of competitors are other public institutions and 
public services such as, for instance, primary and secondary 
education, pension systems and organizations caring for the aged, 
basic health care, social insurance, institutions of law and order, 
prison systems, public administration, etc.16 The competition with 
other sectors of the public sphere is generally a zero-sum game. Even 
though some sectors win, others must lose. At the same time, the total 
amount of public money received in taxes is likely to be smaller rather 
than larger, following the trend in all major OECD countries.17
Thus another thesis is that public higher education institutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe will be increasingly under public 
scrutiny. The reasons are manifold. The following are the most 
important of them. First, there is the widespread public perception of 
the academic community as still being immune from public criticism,
16 Harold A. Hovey, "State Spending for Higher Education in the Next Decade: 
The Battle to Sustain Current Support" (Washington, DC: The National Center for 
Public Policy and Higher Education, 1999).
17 See Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization?, transl. by P. Camiller (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2000).
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as elitist, non-transparent, and non-accountable to society -  hence, 
decreasing public support is accompanied by declining public trust in 
higher education institutions generally. Second, the public funding of 
higher education and research is, in general, decreasing. There are 
other pressing new societal needs that require high levels of funding, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe during the times of social 
transformation.
To give a Polish example, in 1999-2001 Poland was introducing 
and running four major reforms. These concerned the health care 
system, the administration and administrative division of the country, 
social security, and primary education. At the same time, there is 
currently no pre-given model for the services that are accepted for 
funding from the public purse. Neither Western European models, 
nor the previously used planned-economy models, nor most recent 
transnational models constructed along neoliberal lines, are fully 
accepted. The public is witnessing a general failure of the current 
education system in terms of helping young people to adapt to the 
world around them. Academic knowledge in a filtered form, rather 
than skills and knowledge of the surrounding world, is what is being 
transferred in higher education systems to the students today. What 
also supports the thesis that public higher education will be under 
severe scrutiny is the fact that all (public and private) institutions, 
including governmental agencies, the corporate world, the 
institutions of civil society, and the core institutions of the public 
sector, are being currently forced to change. In general terms, all this 
change is a reflection of the end of the stable world governed by 
modern traditions. In this context, the inherited prestige of higher 
education in general, and of the institution of the university, in 
particular, is unlikely to be able to resist change.18
The increasing public scrutiny is also the final consequence of the 
enlightening mission of higher education. Members of the public are 
finally able to judge their higher education institutions (awareness of 
the performance of higher education institutions has become 
widespread, accompanying the massification of the systems in Central
18 See Peter Scott, "Globalization and the University", CRE -  Action, 115,1999.
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and Eastern Europe). The region is beginning to witness a new 
generation of students with a new, often fundamentally consumerist, 
attitude, especially in the private sector of higher education. The cost of 
higher education (and research) in an increasingly mass model of its 
functioning requires an enormous amount of funding that most 
probably none of the countries in the region are able to provide. Higher 
education is already one of the most expensive public services financed 
by the state today (a direct consequence of advanced research and 
rapidly growing numbers of students). Finally, two different reasons 
need to be mentioned. In the global, increasingly post-national age, the 
national pride that used to guide the public attitude to higher 
education is not of prime importance any more. The end of the Cold- 
War competition also means the end of the international race in the 
sciences and the end of the space race as a part of a larger confrontation 
within a bi-polar world of hostile superpowers. There is also growing 
public awareness of the tax money spent for the state in general, and 
for its specific public services, including, in particular, public higher 
education. The awareness in question is at the same time accompanied 
by a general avoidance of taxes on the part of both transnational and 
local corporations. It is most likely that public higher education 
institutions in the region will soon have to account for every penny 
spent, every research project conducted, every course offered, every 
new department created and old department maintained, as well as for 
every PhD student and full-time tenured professor. The institutions 
may have to considerably increase the workloads of their faculty 
members, reduce the scope of their research agendas, and shift their 
priorities to teaching -  mainly undergraduate teaching. In the long run, 
most higher education institutions in Central and Eastern Europe 
except for top-ranking universities may increasingly be teaching 
institutions. These changes may be accompanied by the lowering of the 
social prestige of institutions and their faculties and by the relative 
lowering of salaries (compared to other professions) and of social 
understanding for the need for non-applied research. Research 
activities may in part move to corporate laboratories, think tanks, and 
wealthy private as well as selected state-supported elite research 
universities.
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5.
What is important to understand is that in the past decade of mainly 
failed higher education reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
social and economic surroundings have changed dramatically. The 
state has sharply reduced the level of funding of public higher 
education and has begun to reform the public sector generally.19 And 
what is extremely important is that very significant transformations 
in thinking about higher education in particular (and the public sector 
in general) have in the meantime occurred worldwide, especially in 
Anglophone countries. It appears that worldwide tendencies in a 
rapidly globalizing world can no longer be disregarded, especially in 
those regions, to which Central and Eastern Europe belongs, that are 
undergoing vast social and economic transformations. While it was 
acceptable, ten years ago, to disregard the global context in thinking 
about higher education, it is impossible to do so now. The world is no 
longer what it used to be, for processes of globalization have 
apparently brought about transformations of an unprecedented 
nature and scale. The world about which we have been thinking in 
philosophy, sociology, political science, and political economy (that is 
to say, depending on the discipline: the modern world founded on 
reason and rationality, social communication, and dreams of a social 
order, the world separated into national entities and closed in the 
formula of the "nation-state", the world of a social contract in which 
there is a strict connection between welfare state, capitalism, and 
democracy, finally, the world in which there is a clear priority of 
politics with regard to economics) is disintegrating along with its 
gradual passage to the global age.
Thus, again, it is important to view the changing academic 
surroundings and the current problems of higher education in Central 
and Eastern Europe in a more global context, for it is in this context 
that higher education systems here will be operating sooner or later. 
The problems faced by Central European academe are not exactly -
19 See Voldemar Tomusk, The Blinding Darkness of the Enlightenment: Towards the 
Understanding of Post State-Socialist Higher Education in Eastern Europe, op. cit.
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and not distinctly -  Central European problems. These may be 
reinforced by local issues, but the main structure of the transformations 
going on is common to large, especially developing, parts of the world 
(and still quite uncommon in Continental EU countries). The changes 
in higher education are going hand in hand with the changes in the 
public sector generally, and the issue of the massification of higher 
education -  and hence rapidly growing costs and generally a declining 
level of education -  is global. The German-inspired nation-state- 
oriented and welfare-state-supported university, in the long run, is 
most probably beyond reach in any part of the world today.
Thus, no clear and consensual model for the reform of higher 
education in Central and Eastern Europe has been found after almost 
a decade of permanent reforms or attempts at reform (in Poland, to 
give a local example, there were a dozen of draft laws on higher 
education in the last decade). The models provided are divergent; the 
very world is in the process of being made. The exact features of the 
global world being entered are still unknown; hence, the nature of 
higher education of the future is equally unknown. A number of 
persuasive visions of the future exist, but their usefulness depends on 
the direction that the reform of the state will take globally. It is this 
reform that will, in the final analysis, affect the region as well. The 
state's functions, role, and tasks have been under severe scrutiny. The 
state in its new global surroundings may be forced to shift its 
priorities, and state-supported massified higher education may not be 
among them. The redefinition of the responsibilities of the state in a 
deregulated, globalized world may be a very painful process, not only 
for higher education, but for the larger part of the traditionally 
conceived public sector, especially, but rather later than sooner, in 
welfare states of Western Europe.20
20 Higher education is certainly not among the priorities of the slimmed 
minimalist state (supported by transnational organizations) and state support in 
general, and from short-term to long-term perspectives in the transition countries, 
does not have to be among "core tasks" of the state. Consequently, the ideal suggested 
by e.g. the World Bank leads not only to downsizing (dubbed also "rightsizing") of the 
state but also to setting new spending priorities. Changes in the role of the state 
require shifts in spending patterns: "the aim is to make the composition of
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The fundamental issue is whether or not the state, in times of harsh 
economic competition, will be able to finance public higher education 
institutions in light of its unavoidable further massification and the 
constantly rising costs of advanced research activities. In most general 
terms, the issue is whether or not higher education is still viewed as a 
public good or is already seen as a private commodity, and how 
successfully higher education can compete with other publicly funded 
services today. Although it is always theoretically possible that the states 
in the region will dramatically increase their support for higher education 
and research, considering the current situation described above, including 
the pressures of globalization, it seems very unlikely indeed.
The issue of free higher education guaranteed by constitutions in 
certain Central and Eastern European countries (including Poland -  
art. 70 of the Constitution) is a hot political issue. For the faculty, the 
status quo seems acceptable, for it is known. Reforms and their 
consequences are unknown, i.e., potentially threatening. The general 
direction in favor of greater accountability and heavier workloads 
(accepted as a future reality) is evident. As far as the public is
expenditures consistent with the tasks of government in a market economy and 
conductive to long-run growth. Indeed, robust empirical evidence supports the view 
that government spending tends to be productive and to promote economic growth 
where it corrects proven market failures and truly complements private activity ... but 
rarely otherwise" (World Bank's World Development Report 1996, From Plan to 
Market, Washington DC: Author, 1996, p. 115). Policy options suggested (this time not 
to transition countries but on a more global scale) by World Bank's State in a Changing 
World are basically following the same direction. The role of the state in economic and 
social development is increasingly seen as that of a "partner, catalyst, and facilitator" or 
a "facilitator and regulator" rather than as that of a direct provider of growth. The report 
takes as its point of departure the conclusion that "the world is changing, and with it our 
ideas about the state's role in economic and social development". Markets and states are 
complementary and consequently the state is essential for "putting in place the 
appropriate institutional foundations for markets". There is growing recognition that in 
many countries the monopoly public providers of infrastructure, social services, and 
other goods and services "are unlikely to do a good job" (World Bank's World 
Development Report 1997, Washington DC: Author, 1997, p. 144). The new 
responsibilities of the state need to be redefined and societies need to accept them. 
What is needed is a "strategic selection of the actions" that states will try to promote, 
coupled with greater efforts to "take the burden off the state", "more selectivity" in 
state's activities and "greater reliance on the citizenry and private firms" (p. 3).
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concerned, reforms are not, for a number of reasons, perceived as 
pressing. It is still relatively easy and cheap to earn higher education 
degrees. However, the public awareness that reforms will raise 
standards, make studies more competitive, and most probably more 
expensive, is correct. It is also important to note that currently the 
students are not particularly market-oriented (there is a limited 
correlation between the types of studies and the type of future 
employment); hence, credentials are still viewed as a fetish. Another 
stakeholder in higher education, industry, is eliciting only a very 
limited need for advanced research owing to a difficult economic 
situation. Therefore, there is still only light pressure, on the part of 
industry, for highly qualified workforce. Finally, on the part of 
transnational institutions that are traditionally viewed as supporting 
reforms in the region, there is still only light pressure for reforms in 
public higher education. Other public-sector areas are viewed as more 
important and more in need of reform today (especially the health 
care system, the pension systems, and social security).
The attitude of the public, of the industry/business community, 
and of transnational institutions is likely to change soon. That of the 
state and of the faculties (of higher education institutions themselves) is 
unlikely to change. Reform will come as the result of a long process 
given that the main stakeholders involved, the state and higher 
education institutions (the staff), are unwilling/unable to proceed with 
reforms. But as the result of public debate and business community 
requirements for the labor market, as well as supranational 
recommendations to cut public expenses generally, the state and the 
institutions (faculty) will be forced to introduce far-reaching changes in 
order to avoid the possible loss of social credibility.
6 .
Given that because of the current global ideological climate and 
powerful globalization pressures public higher education institutions 
(except for top-ranking universities) in Central and Eastern Europe do 
not have much of a chance to avoid the processes of privatization (in the
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long run and in various senses of the term21), they should be well aware 
of current stakes rather than ignoring them in a "business as usual" 
attitude. In order to avoid being merely an object of future 
transformations, the academic world, in the current situation, should 
understand the general direction of the changes affecting their 
institutions and try to influence the transformation. They should 
participate in the creation of, and in the debates about, the legal contexts 
of the functioning of higher education and mobilize themselves along 
with the personnel of think tanks in order to lobby for the best choices 
available. They should form coalitions of experts, legislators, and 
academics in order to influence both the state and public opinion in favor 
of their views, make use of international recommendations when 
reasonable, but oppose them when not, and always remember that the 
old, golden era of the academy will never return.
It is of primal importance, nowadays, to be able to keep a thin 
balance between looking backward and looking forward, between taking 
the past (the modem idea of the university) and taking the future as 
points of reference in discussing the condition of higher education in the 
region. It is important not to be retroactive and past-oriented. The world 
is in a period of history in which the traditional, philosophy-inspired, 
nation-state-oriented, and welfare-state-supported, modem university, 
for a variety of reasons, may be no longer culturally, socially, and 
economically acceptable. These are facts that cannot be changed. The 
future of higher education is taking shape right before our eyes, and it is 
the task of the academic community not only to analyze these 
transformations but to influence them as much as possible.
21 As Gary Teeple in Globalization and the Decline of the Social Reform (Toronto: 
Garamond Press, 1995) reminds, privatization of the welfare state can take different 
routes: "One route, for instance, involves government attempts to transfer the 
production of a service or a good from the public to the private sector while 
maintaining public financing. ... Another avenue of privatization takes the route of 
state-regulated services and benefits that are mandatorily provided by the private 
sector. ... The least visible and yet a widely taken route of privatization is the policy of 
incremental degradation of benefits and services" (pp. 104-105). In the context of the 
last route, it is worth mentioning the case of public higher education in many 
transition countries; suffice it to analyze the national statistics concerning public 
investment in higher education and research and development in the last decade.
Chapter 10
The Institution of the University:
The Current Discourse on the European Higher 
Education and Research Space
l .
The institution of the university is playing a significant role in the 
processes of the emergence of the common European higher education 
and common European research spaces. What is clear, though, is that in 
neither of them, is the university seen in the traditional way we know 
from the debates preceding the advent of globalization, the speeding 
up of the process of European integration and the passage from 
industrial and service societies to postindustrial, global, knowledge and 
information societies.1 The institution, in general, has already found it 
legitimate, useful and necessary to be evolving together with radical 
transformations of the social setting in which it functions. The new 
world that is approaching assumes different names in different 
formulations and the social, cultural, and economic processes in 
question are debated in multiple vocabularies of the social sciences: for 
some theorists, the processes of the last two decades or so are referred 
to as "postmodernity" (Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard, Zygmunt Bauman), for 
others -  as "the second modernity" (Ulrich Beck), "reflexive 
modernization" (Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash), 
"globalization" (Roland Robertson) or the "global age" (Malcolm 
Waters); still other descriptions include the "network society" (Manuel
1 See Marek Kwiek, "The Nation-State, Globalization, and the Modem Institution of 
the University", Theoria. A Journal of Social and Political Theory, vol. 96, December 2000.
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Castells), the "knowledge and information society" (Peter Drucker) or, 
on more philosophical grounds, the "postnational constellation" 
(Jurgen Habermas). For almost all of these analyses, globalization is 
widely understood to be of primary importance. As the German 
sociologists, Ulrich Beck, vividly describes current transformations:
A new kind of capitalism, a new kind of economy, a new kind of global order, 
a new kind of society and a new kind of personal life are coming into being, all 
of which differ from earlier phases of social development.2
In this new global order, universities are striving for their new 
place as they are increasingly unable to maintain their traditional role 
and tasks. Both the official discussions on the common European space 
in higher education and research as well as a large part of the 
accompanying academic debates on the subject, increasingly 
acknowledge that the current role of universities could be that of 
engines of economic growth for countries and regions, contributors to 
the economic competitiveness of nations or suppliers of highly- 
qualified and well-trained workers for the new knowledge-driven 
economy -  which is undoubtedly a radical reformulation of the 
traditional3 account of the role of the university in society. Without 
much discussion on the principles (such as those accompanying the 
emergence of the Humboldtian model of the university in the 
beginning of the 19th century or the major 20th century debates about 
the "idea" of the university), the university in the European context 
seems to be about to enter, willy-nilly, a new era of its development.4
From among a plethora of factors, some should be especially 
emphasized here: the pressures of globalization on nation-states and its 
public services and the strengthening of the common European 
political and economic project at the turn of the 20th century; the end of
2 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 2.
3 See Jan Sadlak, "Globalization versus the Universal Role of the University", 
Higher Education in Europe, vol. XXV, no. 2, 2000.
4 See Marek Kwiek, "The Social Functions of the University in the Context of the 
Changing State/Market Relations (The Global, European Union, and Accession 
Countries' Perspectives)" in Globalisation and Competition in Education, ed. by Jan De 
Groof and Gracienne Lauwers (Antwerp: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2003).
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the "Golden age" of the Keynesian welfare state (so positively inclined 
towards national public research and strong national public higher 
education systems) that we have known it in the almost three decades 
of the second half of the 20th century; and the emergence of 
knowledge-based societies (and economies) in the countries of the 
affluent West. In more general terms, the processes directly or 
indirectly affecting the institution of the university today would be the 
gradual individualization (and recommodification) of our societies, the 
denationalization (and desocialization) of our economies, as well as the 
universalization of higher education and the commodification of 
research. The recent European discussions under scrutiny here leave no 
doubt about the direction of these changes in the role and social and 
economic tasks of the institution in emergent societies.
The present paper focuses on the recent debates about common 
European higher education and research spaces. Their emergence will 
have far-reaching consequences for both the EU-15, as well as the 
enlarged Europe and other postcommunist transition countries. The 
ideas of both European spaces are evolving and are still not clearly 
defined. One thing is certain, though: we are confronting a major 
redesign of what research and teaching in the European public sector 
are supposed to be; of how public higher education institutions, 
including universities, are supposed to function and be financed (at 
least from EU funds); and what roles students and faculty, under 
increasing pressure, should assume in European higher education 
systems. At the moment, the European Higher Education Area is 
much more of a desired ideal to be achieved within the ongoing 
Bologna process, with very limited funding available for its 
implementation in particular countries; the ideal of the European 
Research Area (ERA), by contrast, has already determined the shape 
of the 6th Framework Programme of Research -  the biggest source of 
EU research funds, totaling 17.5 billion EUR for 2002-2006 -  and the 
ways in which research activities in Europe are currently funded from 
EU sources. Thus while the effects of the ideal of the European Higher 
Education Area still remain largely at the level of governmental good 
wishes about the direction of change in particular national higher 
education systems in the years to come, the effects of the ideal of the
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European Research Area are already visible on the practical level of 
where clusters of research funds are to be channeled and what new 
research-funding instruments are available. The European Research 
Area is at the same time an operational component of a 
comprehensive "Lisbon agenda" of the European Union agreed on in 
2000 which aims at redefining both the European economy, as well as 
the welfare and education systems by 2010. Over the last couple of 
years, the vocabularies used in the processes of the integration of 
higher education5 and of the integration of research in Europe have 
become increasingly similar; the visions of the future of our public 
universities -  on the European level -  have become more convergent 
than ever before; and the more or less tacit agreement on the different 
speeds at which different parts of Europe will be changing their 
educational and research and development landscapes is becoming 
increasingly clear (with the major dividing line between the EU-15 
and accession countries, or the transition countries more generally).
2.
The first communique about the European Research Area published 
by the European Commission in 2000, Towards a European Research 
Area, hardly ever mentions universities (actually the term is used 
three times or so in connection with the situation of research in North 
America). Higher education is not mentioned in the document at all. 
On reading the document, it is clear that neither European 
universities nor European higher education in general have been 
significantly taken into account at the outset of thinking about a 
common research space in Europe. What figures prominently instead 
is dynamic private investment in research, intellectual property rights 
and effective tools to protect them, the creation of companies and risk 
capital investment, research needed for political decision-making, and 
more abundant and more mobile human resources, or in other words 
"a dynamic European landscape, open and attractive to researchers
5 See Chapter 13.
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and investment".6 It is symptomatic for the initial period of the 
development of the European Research Area that while describing the 
situation of research in Europe, their traditional location at 
universities is not commented on at all. The opening paragraph of the 
paper states that
even more so than the century that has just finished, the 21st century we are 
now entering will be the century of science and technology. More than ever, 
investing in research and technological development offers the most promise 
for the future. In Europe, however, the situation concerning research is 
worrying. Without concerted action to rectify this the current trend could 
lead to a loss of growth and competitiveness in an increasingly global 
economy. The leeway to be made up on the other technological powers in the 
world will grow still further. And Europe might not successfully achieve the 
transition to a knowledge-based economy. Why such a negative picture?7
So the problem crudely stated is that "the situation concerning 
research is worrying". What are the main reasons for this, according 
to the communique? The principal reference framework for research 
activities in Europe is still "national" and the static structure of 
"15+1" (Member States and the Union) leads to "fragmentation, 
isolation and compartmentalisation of national research efforts and 
systems".8 There is no "European" policy on research, and "national 
research policies and Union policy overlap without forming a 
coherent whole". What is needed is a "genuinely European research 
agenda" that will "go beyond filling the gaps of national research 
programmes to include concerns which are of a Europewide 
relevance and which will address a number of problems that 
contemporary European societies are faced with".9 What is therefore 
needed is a "real European" research policy, a "more dynamic 
configuration".10 As was explained three years later, „the nature and
6 European Commission. Towards a European Research Area (Brussels: 
COM(2000)6), p. 18.
7 Ibidem, p. 4.
8 Ibidem, p. 7; see also Angelos Agalianos, Olivier Brunet and Barry McGaw, "Is 
There an Emerging European Education Research Space? Roundtable", European 
Educational Research journal, vol. 2, no. 1,2003, p. 184ff.
9 Ibidem, p. 186.
10 European Commission, Towards a European Research Area, op, cit., p. 7.
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scale of the challenges linked to the future of the universities mean 
that these issues have to be addressed at European [rather than 
national -  MK] level".11
It should come as no surprise that the initial reaction of the 
Confederation of EU Rectors' Conference (of May 2000) to the first 
communique about the European Research Area was more than 
reserved:
The Confederation finds it a source of concern that the central role of 
universities in research and training is not included in considerations 
concerning a European research area. Public research efforts which take place 
in universities are not recognized in the Communication. Not once are 
universities mentioned as places of research; not once are universities 
recognized as the institutions where the researchers of the future are being 
educated and trained; not once are universities represented as centres of 
national, regional or local acquisition and transfer of knowledge, nor is this 
function promoted.1 2
The Confederation criticized the limited view of what constitutes 
"research", the view that led to the downplaying of the role of 
universities in research activities. Research was limited to mean only 
research and development. It stressed the fact that universities are the 
places where most public research takes place and the most by far of 
basic research. Leaving out universities in discussions means "cutting 
out a very large part of the innovative and creative facets of research, 
as it means leaving out almost all basic research; and it means 
ignoring the education and training of future researchers".13 As 
evidenced by further documents, especially following the 
communique on the role of universities of 2003, the reactions of the 
academic world to the initiative to work towards a common 
European research space were much more favorable.
11 European Commission, The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge 
(Brussles: COM(2003)58), p. 10.
12 Statement of the Confederation of EU Rectors' Conference, 5 May 2000. The 
Communication from the European Commission, "Towards a European research area" (2000, 
available on-line), p. 1.
13 Ibidem, p. 2.
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3.
The documents of the European Commission devoted to the European 
Research Area rarely refer to the Bologna process of the integration of 
higher education systems, but if the they do, they do so very 
approvingly: to give an example, as European higher education 
institutions are very diversified, "the structural reforms inspired by the 
Bologna process constitute an effort to organize that diversity within a 
more coherent and compatible European framework, which is a 
condition for the readibility, and hence the competitiveness, of European 
universities both within Europe itself and in the whole world".14
At the same time while documents of the Bologna process refer to 
the ERA, the documents of the European Union related to the "Lisbon 
agenda" in general clearly refer to the Bologna process (to give an 
example from Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council:
The European Council calls for further action in this field: to introduce 
instruments to ensure the transparency of diplomas and qualifications (ECTS, 
diploma and certificate supplements, European CV) and closer cooperation 
with regard to university degrees in the context of the Sorbonne-Bologna- 
Prague process prior to the Berlin meeting in 200315.
Finally, the 2003 Berlin communique of the ministers of education 
involved in the Bologna process emphatically calls the European 
higher education area and the European research area "two pillars of 
the knowledge based society", mentions "synergies" between them 
and sends a clear message to institutions of higher education: 
"Ministers ask HEI [higher education institutions -  MK] to increase 
the role and relevance of research to technological, social and cultural 
evolution and to the needs of society".16 Comparing the Berlin
14 European Commission. The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge, op. cit.,
p. 5.
15 Presidency Conclusions. Barcelona European Council (2002, available on-line), art. 44.
16 Realising the European Higher Education Area. Communique of the Conference of 
Ministers Responsible for Higher Education in Berlin on 19 September 2003. Berlin 
Communique (2003), p. 7.
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communique with the most recent documents about the ERA, apart 
from the necessary and unavoidable lip-service on both sides, a 
general convergence of views can be shown. The divergence in views 
is growing in respect to one issue in particular, though: while the 
European Commission (following the Lisbon agenda) uses an 
increasingly economic perspective, the Bologna process confirmed 
again in Berlin the role of the "social dimension" in the process of 
integration of European higher education systems; consequently, as 
the Berlin communique states it, the need to increase competitiveness 
"must be balanced with the objective of improving the social 
characteristics of the European Higher Education Area, aiming at 
strengthening social cohesion and reducing social and gender 
inequalities both at national and at European level. In that context, 
Ministers reaffirm their position that higher education is a public 
good and a public responsibility".17
Documents of the European Commission rarely refer to the 
classical models of the university; if they do, they do not label them 
explicitly as outmoded but rather indicate trends undermining their 
significance. On the Humboldt tradition, the communique about the 
role of universities states the following:
European universities have for long modelled themselves along the lines of 
some major models, particularly the ideal model of university envisaged 
nearly two centuries ago by Wilhelm von Humboldt in his reform of the 
German university, which sets research at the heart of university activity and 
indeed makes it the basis of teaching. Today the trend is away from these 
models, and toward greater differentiation.18
The communication, as is obvious from the Commission's documents, 
takes a much more economic than cultural or social perspective (the 
latter seeming closer to the Bologna process documents) towards 
universities: "Given that they live thanks to substantial public and 
private funding, and that the knowledge they produce and transmit
17 Ibidem, p. 1.
18 European Commission, The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge, op. cit., 
pp. 5-6.
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has a major impact on the economy and society, universities are also 
accountable for the way they operate and manage their activities and 
budgets to their sponsors and to the public".19 (How similar it is to 
what can be heard on the other side of the Atlantic: "colleges and 
universities are thoroughly dependent on the goodwill of the public 
and of their elected representatives in state and federal 
government"20). The tone and the perspective of the documents 
related to the higher education area and to the common research area 
differ here considerably.
4.
Another issue raised by the European Commission is the following: 
are transformations facing European universities radical -  and if so, 
why? As a recent (2003) communication on investing in education 
and training puts it, "the challenge in education and training is likely 
to be even bigger than envisaged in Lisbon". The challenge can be 
summarized in the following way:
Providing an engine for the new knowledge-based European economy and 
society; overcoming accumulated delays and deficits in relation to key 
competitors; accommodating a severe demographic constraint; and 
overcoming high regional issues that will be exacerbated by enlargement 
during the vital transition period. ... Simply maintaining the status quo or 
changing slowly would clearly be hugely inadequate in the face of such a massive 
challenge.21
Thus the European Union needs "a healthy and flourishing university 
world"; it needs "excellence" in its universities. At present, though, 
just as the situation of research is "worrying", the situation of the 
universities is bad as universities are "not trouble-free" and are not
19 Ibidem, p. 9.
20 David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell, Jr., Wise Moves in Hard Times. Creating and 
Managing Resilient Colleges and Universities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), p. 283.
21 European Commission, Investing Efficiently in Education and Training: an 
Imperative for Europe (Brussels: COM (2002)779), p. 11, emphasis mine.
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"globally competitive ... even though they produce high quality 
scientific publications".22 European universities generally "have less 
to offer" than their main competitors. Following criticism of the first 
communications about the common European research space on the 
part of the academic community, this time the European Commission 
is trying to be as careful as possible about the role of universities, 
stating, inter alia, that universities -  although not in general but only 
"in many respects" -  still "hold the key to the knowledge economy 
and society";23 universities are also "at the heart of the Europe of 
Knowledge".24 At the same time the stakes are very high and 
universities in the form they are functioning now are not acceptable. 
The largely economic perspective is quite clear. The idea is conveyed 
in many passages in fairly strong formulations.
So universities face an imperative need to "adapt and adjust" to a 
series of profound changes.25 They must rise to a number of challenges. 
They can only release their potential "by undergoing the radical 
changes needed to make the European system a genuine world 
reference".26 They have to increase and diversify their income in the 
face of their worsening underfunding. The great golden age of 
universities' Ivory Tower ideal (not mentioned) is over: "after 
remaining a comparatively isolated universe for a long period, both in 
relation to society and to the rest of the world, with funding guaranteed 
and a status protected by respect for their autonomy, European 
universities have gone through the second half of the 20th century 
without really calling into question the role or the nature of what they should 
be contributing to society".27 But it is clearly over now, and no one should 
be surprised. Thus the "fundamental question" is the following: "can 
the European universities, as they are and are organised now, hope in the 
future to retain their place, in society and in the world?".28
22 European Commission, The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 2.
23 Ibidem, p. 5.
24 Ibidem, p. 4.
25 Ibidem, p. 6.
26 Ibidem, p. 11.
27 Ibidem, p. 22, emphasis mine.
28 Ibidem, p. 22.
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It is a purely rhetorical question in the context of the whole 
communication, the universities in Europe -  as they are and as they 
are organized today -  will not be able to retain their place. 
Restructuring is necessary, and a much wider idea of European social, 
economic and political integration applied to the higher education 
sector, expressed in the ideals of a common European higher 
education area, comes in handy. Let us remember the goal of the 
common research area in another formulation: "the creation of a 
frontier-free area for research where scientific resources are used 
more to create jobs and increase Europe's competitiveness".29
5.
Universities are responsible to their "stakeholders"; university 
training does not only affect those who benefit directly from it; 
inefficient or non-optimum use of resources affects the society at 
large. Thus the objective, the Commission argues, is to "maximise the 
social return of the investment" or "to optimise the social return on 
the investment represented by the studies it [i.e. society -  MK] pays 
for".30 The communique sets three major objectives in creating a 
Europe of knowledge and in making European universities "a world 
reference". Let us discuss them briefly.
The first objective is "ensuring that the European universities 
have sufficient and sustainable resources". The communication 
acknowledges that the worsening under-funding of universities 
makes it difficult to maintain a high profile in both teaching and 
research. It is difficult to keep and attract the best talent. In 
comparison with American universities, the means available in 
Europe, on average, per student are two to five times lower. 
Universities have to find new ways of increasing and diversifying 
their income, have to use available financial resources more
29 European Commission, "Strategy for a Real Research Policy in Europe" 
(Brussels, 2000, IP /00/52), p. 1.
30 European Commission, The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge, op. cit., 
p. 14.
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effectively ("the objective must be to maximise the social return of the 
investment"), and they have to apply scientific research results more 
effectively, it is argued. The Commission identifies four main sources 
of university income: public funding for research and teaching in 
general (traditionally the main source of funding), private donations, 
income by selling services (including research and lifelong learning) 
and using research results and, finally, contributions from students 
(tuition and enrolment fees). It realistically acknowledges that "given 
the budgetary situation in the Member States and the candidate 
countries, there is a limited margin of maneuver for increasing public 
support" which we can read as highly improbable, if not impossible.31 
Private donations are not fiscally attractive to potential donors and 
universities are not able to amass private funds. Selling services and 
research results is not attractive to universities as regulatory 
frameworks do not encourage them to do so (e.g. royalties are paid to 
the state). As to tuition fees, they are "generally limited or even 
prohibited" in Europe (again some countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe are exceptions). As far as the inefficiencies of the system are 
concerned, the communication mentions the high dropout rate among 
students (40 per cent on average), a mismatch between the supply of 
qualifications and the demand for them, the differing duration of 
studies for specific qualifications, the disparity of status and 
conditions of recruitment and work for pre and post-doctoral 
researchers, and the lack of a transparent system for calculating the 
cost of research. European universities do not create technological 
("spin-off") companies and do not have well-developed structures for 
managing research results.
The second objective is "consolidating the excellence of European 
universities". There is a need for long term planning and financing in 
creating the right conditions for achieving excellence in research and 
teaching, the paper argues. "Excellence does not grow overnight", 
and yet governments still budget on an annual basis and do not look 
beyond a limited number of years. There is also a need for efficient 
management structures and practices: universities should have an
31 Ibidem, p. 13.
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effective decision-making process, developed administration and 
financial management, and have the ability to match rewards to 
performance. There is a need for developing European centers and 
networks of excellence. Areas in which different universities have 
attained or can be expected to attain excellence should be identified -  
and research funds should be focused on them.
And the third objective is "broadening the perspective of 
European universities". European universities are functioning in an 
increasingly "globalized" environment, the paper acknowledges. But 
the European environment is less attractive. Compared with the USA, 
"financial, material, and working conditions are not as good; the 
financial benefits of the use of research are smaller and career 
prospects are poorer". Another important dimension for universities 
is serving local and regional development and strengthening 
European cohesion. Technology centers, science parks, local 
partnerships between universities and industry should be 
encouraged.32 The three objectives sound very reasonable but are 
merely sketched out in the present document. Given their importance, 
and often controversial character (tuition fees, "spin-off" companies, 
transformations of the academic profession etc), each of the objectives 
rightly deserves separate treatment in the future.
6.
Let us refer briefly to a booklet published by the European 
Commission, Education and Training in Europe: Diverse Systems, Shared 
Goals for 2010. The introductory picture of the European higher 
education systems is as follows:
The Europe of education and training reflects the diversity of languages, 
cultures and systems that are an inherent part of the identity of its member 
countries and their regions. Education and training have for a long time 
developed within national contexts and in relative isolation from each other. 
Countries and regions have a wide variety of education and training
32 Ibidem, pp. 11-21.
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institutions, apply different admission rules, use different academic 
calendars, award hundreds of different degrees and qualifications reflecting 
a wide variety of curricula and training schemes. This diversity is valued 
very highly by nations as well as citizens: diversity is one thing all Europeans 
have in com m on.... In the European Union the organisation of education and 
training systems and the content of learning programmes are the 
responsibility of the Member States -  or their constituent regions as the case 
may be.33
But the Lisbon Council of 2000 and its aftermath brought about a 
dramatic shift in thinking about national vs. European levels of 
competence in higher education: "at its meeting in Lisbon in March 
2000, the European Council (the Heads of State or Government of the 
EU countries) acknowledged that the European Union was 
confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the 
knowledge-driven economy, and agreed a strategic target for 2010: To 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion. These changes required not only a radical 
transformation of the European economy, but also a challenging programme 
for the modernisation of social welfare and education systems. The 
European Council called on the Education Council (the education 
ministers of the EU countries) and on the European Commission to 
undertake a general reflection on the concrete objectives of education 
systems, focusing on common concerns while respecting national 
diversity".34
Current developments, especially the creation of the European 
Research Area, are the consequences of this shift of interest which has 
signaled Europe is taking the idea of knowledge-based economies 
very seriously (the term "knowledge-based economy" was apparently 
first defined in 1996 in an OECD book of that title; the description 
runs as follows: "the term 'knowledge-based economy' results from a 
fuller recognition of the role of knowledge and technology in 
economic growth. Knowledge, as embodied in human beings (as
33 European Commission, Education and Training in Europe: Diverse Systems, Shared 
Goals for 2010 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications, 2002), p. 5.
34 Ibidem, p. 7.
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'human capital') and in technology, has always been central to 
economic development. But only over the last few years has its 
relative importance been recognized, just as that importance is 
growing. The OECD economies are more strongly dependent on the 
production, distribution and use of knowledge than ever before".35 
What followed with both the common European higher education 
and research areas, must be viewed in this context.
European universities have not been the focus of reflection at the 
European Union level since 1991, when Memorandum on Higher 
Education in the European Community was published. The 
competencies of the European Commission for higher education 
policy are limited. As Towards a European Research Area puts it, "the 
Treaty [of Maastricht, 1992 -  MK] provides the European Union with 
a legal basis for measures to help to support European cooperation in 
research and technological development. However, the principal 
reference framework for research activities in Europe is national".36
The Treaty of Maastricht introduced two new articles in the 
section on "Education, vocational training and youth": article 149, 
point 1, states that "the Community shall contribute to the 
development of quality education by encouraging cooperation 
between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and 
supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of 
the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of 
education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity". The 
authority of the EU is limited by statements that the Community shall 
support and supplement the action of the Member States "while fidly 
respecting the responsibility o f the Member States for the content and 
organisation of vocational training". At the same time, the EU shall
35 OECD, The Knowledge-Based Economy (Paris: Author, 1996), p. 9. See Michael 
Peters, "National Education Policy Constructions of the 'Knowledge Economy': 
Towards a Critique", Journal of Educational Enquiry, vol. 2, no. 1, 2001, and Michael 
Peters, "Classical Political Economy and the Role of Universities in the New 
Knowledge Economy", Globalisation, Societies and Education, vol. 1, no. 2, July 2003; see 
also Gerard Delanty, Challenging Knowledge. The University in the Knowledge Society 
(London: SRHE & Open University Press, 2001).
36 European Commission, Towards a European Research Area, op. cit., p. 7, emphasis
mine.
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adopt measures to contribute to the achievement of the objectives 
referred to in this Article, "excluding any harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States".37 It is certainly a good point to 
remember the principle of subsidiarity and its scope of application:
the Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not 
fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.38
Higher education is one of those areas which do not fall within the 
exclusive competence of the European Union; the involvement of the 
EU is strictly defined and limited to some actions only.39
In the most general terms, the new (Draft) Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, submitted to the President of the European 
Council in Rome (and then rejected in December 2003) follows the 
same lines of thinking about education and training. Section 4, 
"Education, Vocational Training, Youth and Sport", consisting of two 
articles (art. III-182 and III-183), does not introduce any major 
changes. The Union is supposed to contribute to quality education by 
"encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, 
by supporting and complementing their action". In the spirit of the 
previous formulation of the issue, the Union shall "fully respect the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the 
organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic 
diversity".40
37 The Treaty on European Union, 1992, art. 149,150.
38 Ibidem, art. 5.
39 Kurt De Wit and Jef C. Verhoeven, "The Higher Education Policy of the 
European Union: With or Against the Member States?" in Higher Education and the 
State. The International Dimension of Higher Education, ed. by Jeroen Huisman, Peter 
Maassen and Guy Neave (Amsterdam: Pergamon, 2001).
40 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003), art. III-182.
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7.
Following the European Council meetings in Lisbon in 2000 (which 
gave rise to the "Lisbon agenda" of transformations in the European 
economy, welfare, and education) and in Barcelona in 2002 (the 
Barcelona European Council set the goal of European universities 
becoming "world quality reference" by 2010), the European 
Commission is clearly "enlarging its field of operation and policy 
implementation in education".41
The reason is clearly stated by the Commission: while 
responsibilities for universities lie essentially at national (or regional) 
level, the most important challenges are "European, and even 
international or global".42 The divergence between the organization of 
universities at the national level and the emergence of challenges 
which go "beyond national frontiers" has grown and will continue to 
do so. Thus some shift of balance is necessary, and the Lisbon agenda 
combined with the emergence of the European Research Area 
provides new grounds for policy work at the European level no 
matter what particular Member States think of it and no matter how 
they view the restrictions on engagement in education issues imposed 
on the EU by the Maastricht Treaty.
The Lisbon European Council of 2000 described the new economic 
and social challenge of the following decade as a "quantum shift 
resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge- 
driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people's 
lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy". 
Reaching a "strategic goal" (already quoted) for the next decade 
requires setting programs for building knowledge infrastructure, 
enhancing innovation and economic reform, and -  of most interest to 
us here -  "modernising social welfare and education systems" 43 The 
shift to a digital, knowledge-based economy will be a powerful 
engine for growth and competitiveness, the communication argues.
41 Marijk Van der Wende, "Bologna Is Not the Only City That Matters in European 
Higher Education Policy", International Higher Education, no. 32, Summer 2003, p. 16.
42 European Commission, The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 9.
43 Presidency Conclusions. Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 (2000), p. 1, 
available on-line.
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Consequently, the idea of a European Area of Research and 
Innovation was affirmed, with research and development's role in 
"generating economic growth, employment and social cohesion" 
mentioned. The communication evoked the full exploitation of "the 
instruments under the Treaty and all other appropriate means".44
It is interesting to note that in the case of presidency conclusions 
of the Lisbon Council and of the Barcelona Council (of 2002), both 
stressing the role of education, research and development, 
universities are not mentioned at all; the word is absent except for 
two minor contexts: university degrees and an enhanced 
communication network for libraries, universities and schools. The 
necessary steps mentioned in Lisbon include mechanisms for 
networking, improving the environment for private research 
investment, the benchmarking of national R&D policies, a high speed 
transeuropean communication network, taking steps to increase the 
mobility of researchers and introducing Community-wide patents.45 
Again, neither higher education institutions nor universities appear as 
subjects, or objects, of these steps.
Let us remember here Roger Dale's argument about the 
selectivity of the shift in educational policies from the national to the 
European level: "as the politics of education moves to a European 
level as national economies become increasingly Europeanised, the 
education sector settlement -  the arena on which the agenda for 
education comes into contact with the means of achieving the 
agenda -  shifts selectively from the national to the European level". 
Very broadly, we might suggest that those elements linked directly 
to the reproduction of national social formations will remain at the 
nation-state level, while those more directly associated with the 
extended reproduction of the mode of production will move to the 
European level (increasingly the site and focus of that extended 
reproduction)".46 The shift Dale evokes is seen in subsequent 
communiques about the ERA.
44 Ibidem, p. 3.
45 Ibidem, pp. 3-4.
46 Roger Dale, "The Construction of an European Education Space and Education 
Policy" (2003), p. 5, available on-line; see also Susan Robertson and Roger Dale,
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8.
The European Commission, except for the 2003 communique on 
"universities", prefers a much wider reference to "education and 
training". In Investing Efficiently in Education and Training: an Imperative 
for Europe (2003), the role of higher education is relatively simple, as an 
introductory sentence puts it: "education and training are crucial to 
achieving the strategic goal set for the Member States at the Lisbon 
European Council to make the European Union the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy (and society) in the world". 
No mention of "more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" is 
made this time47 which clearly shows that the second part of the ideal is 
somehow inferior to the first. Consequently, it comes as no surprise 
that what provides the perspective for looking at higher education is 
the "relevance of education/training to the Lisbon goal" rather than 
relevance to anything else or anything more general.48 Making Europe 
a leading knowledge-based economy would be possible "only if 
education and training functioned as factors of economic growth, 
research and innovation, competitiveness, sustainable employment and 
social inclusion and active citizenship".49 What is needed today is a 
"new investment paradigm" in education and training -  what is going 
to change are not only the variables of the investment model but also 
the underlying parameters.50 The communication mentions briefly the 
Bologna process (and the Bruges process in vocational training) as 
examples of moves in the right direction but hastens to add that "the 
pace of change does not yet match the pace of globalization, and we 
risk falling behind our competitors if it is not increased".51 Again, it is
"Changing Geographies of Power in Education: the Politics of Rescaling and Its 
Contradictions" (2003), available from GENIE -  the Globalisation and Europeanisation 
Network in Education website.
47 European Commission, Investing Efficiently in Education and Training: an 
Imperative for Europe (Brussels. COM(2003)779, p. 4.
48 Ibidem, p. 6.
49 Ibidem, p. 6.
50 Ibidem, p. 9.
51 Ibidem, p. 10.
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interesting to note the extent to which the phenomenon of globalization 
is present in the documents related to the common European research 
space while being largely neglected in the Bologna process documents.
In terms of financing, generally, in several recent communiques, 
the issue of private investment in both research and higher education 
was raised. More Research for Europe. Towards 3% of GDP makes it clear 
that the increase in R&D investments in the EU (from current 1.9% to 
3% of GDP in 2010) is expected to come largely from private rather 
than public funds. Thus the main challenge is "to make R&D 
investment more attractive and profitable to business in the European 
Research Area".52 And what is needed is "boosting private 
investment in research" as another communique calls one of its 
subsections.53 Still another communique reminds us that
it is very important to realize that the largest share of this deficit stems from 
the low level of private investment in higher education and research and 
development in the EU compared with the USA. At the same time, private 
returns on investment in tertiary education remain high in most EU 
countries.54
Consequently, if we take together low private investment levels in 
higher education (low private share of the costs of studying) and high 
private returns on university education (higher professional status 
combined with higher salaries), the answer provided is to add to 
public funding by "increasing and diversifying investment in higher 
education".55 As Henry and colleagues have described the apparent 
paradox, "though education is now deemed more important than 
ever for the competitive advantage of nations, the commitment and 
capacity of governments to fund it have weakened considerably".56
52 European Commission, More Research for Europe. Towards 3% of GDP (Brussels: 
COM (2002)499), p. 5.
53 Ibidem, pp. 12-13.
54 European Commission, Investing Efficiently in Education and Training: an 
Imperative for Europe, op. cit., p. 13.
55 Ibidem, p. 13.
56 Miriam Henry, Bob Lingard, Fazal Rizvi and Sandra Taylor, The OECD, 
Globalisation and Education Policy (Amsterdam: Pergamon, 2001), pp. 30-31.
T h e In stitu tion  o f th e U niv ersity 241
It is obvious that the idea conveyed to universities is that they 
should "do more (teaching and research) with less (public money)" 
but possibly with more private funds; though when and how private 
investment is to finance the research activities of universities is a 
much more pressing issue in Central and Eastern Europe than in the 
EU-15; it is enough to review the statistical data about business 
sector's share of funding for research in both parts of Europe. From 
the perspective of the transition countries, "boosting" private 
investment in research seems largely unrealistic today, as opposed to 
boosting private investment in studying which has already happened 
in hundreds of both public and private institutions with a 
considerable percentage of fee-paying students.57 For most accession 
countries, though, to reach the EU goal -  a level of 3% of their GDP on 
research and development by 2010 -  is largely impossible, especially 
taking into account current levels of funding in most of them. It is also 
interesting to note that the policy of the revenue diversification in 
higher education in less industrialized countries (including some 
parts of Central and Eastern Europe) may be not effective.58
9.
How do the documents about the European Research Area refer to 
universities in Central and Eastern Europe? They emphasize the 
"frequently difficult circumstances of universities in the accession 
countries as regards human and financial resources",59 "the
57 See Voldemar Tomusk, "The War of Institutions, Episode I: the Rise, and the 
Rise of Private Higher Education in Eastern Europe", Higher Education Policy, 16, 2003; 
see also The University, Globalization, Central Europe, ed. by Marek Kwiek (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2003) and Marek Kwiek, "The Missing Link: Public Policy for the 
Private Sector in Central and East European Higher Education", Society for Research 
into Higher Education International News, 2, June 2003.
58 D. Bruce Johnstone, "Cost Sharing in Higher Education: Tuition, Financial 
Assistance, and Accessibility in Comparative Perspective" (International Comparative 
Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project, SUNY-Buffalo, 2003), available 
on-line.
59 European Commission, The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 3.
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worsening of these factors [divergence between national organization 
of universities and the European challenges they face -  MK] which 
will come with the enlargement of the Union, owing to a greater level 
of heterogeneity of the European university landscape which will 
ensue".60 Similarly, a communique on More Research for Europe 
reminds us that the share of business funding is very low in most 
accession countries and concludes: "the diversity of situations in 
Europe calls for differentiated but co-ordinated policies to establish a 
common upward momentum to reach the 3% objective".61 Even 
though we may be not especially fond of describing the catastrophic 
situation of both private and public funding for research activities in 
most accession countries by way of euphemisms like the "difficult 
circumstances of universities", the "heterogeneity of the European 
university landscape", and the "diversity of situations in Europe", we 
must acknowledge the fact that huge gaps between the EU-15 and 
most of the accession countries are clearly recognized in the 
documents about the emergent European Research Area. The Bologna 
process documents, by contrast, do not use even euphemisms to 
describe the different points of departure in the integration project. 
Not a single official document acknowledges the massive difference 
between universities in the affluent countries of the West and 
universities in transition countries, all signatories of the Bologna 
process (which now comprises 40 European countries). What is 
widely acknowledged instead is a wide linguistic and cultural 
diversity among European institutions. Let me quote here a passage 
from the Salamanca Convention's message, "Shaping the European 
Higher Education Area":
European higher education is characterized by its diversity in terms of 
languages, national systems, institutional types and profiles and curricular 
orientation. At the same time its future depends on its ability to organise this 
valuable diversity effectively to produce positive outcomes rather than 
difficulties, and flexibility rather than opacity.62
60 Ibidem, p. 10.
61 European Commission, More Research for Europe. Towards 3% of GDP, op. cit., p. 8.
62 "Message form the Salamanca Convention of European Higher Education 
Institutions. Shaping the European Higher Education Area" (2001), p. 2, available on-line.
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While the documents related to a common European research area at 
least mention the problems faced by transition countries (or rather by 
the ten accession countries), the Bologna documents do not 
acknowledge or try to conceptualize this important issue.
10.
The Bologna process is based on the underlying assumptions (not 
really formulated in a single place63); that both Europe and the world 
are entering a new era of knowledge-based and market-driven 
economies competing against each other; Europe as a region will have 
to struggle against its two main competitors in higher education and 
research and development: the USA and Japan (Australasia); the 
knowledge society depends for its growth on the production, 
transmission, dissemination, and use of new knowledge, or as the 
Towards ERA communication described it: "in the final years of the 20th 
century we entered a knowledge-based society. Economic and social 
development will depend essentially on knowledge in its different 
forms";64 the underlying goal behind the current transformations of 
educational systems and research and development, whether 
expressed directly (in documents about the common European 
research area) or indirectly (and accompanied by the "social 
dimension" in the Bologna process documents), is more or less to meet 
the target set out by the European Council in Lisbon (in 2000): Europe 
by 2010 must become "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge- 
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion". The creation of 
the European Higher Education Area must also be completed by 2010
63 See the substantial criticism in Guy Neave, "Anything Goes: Or, How the 
Accommodation of Europe's Universities to European Integration Integrates -  an 
Inspiring Number of Contradictions" (Paper delivered at EAIR Forum, Porto, 
September 2001); see also his paper on "The European Dimension in Higher 
Education: An Excursion into the Modem Use of Historical Analogues" in Higher 
Education and the State. The International Dimension of Higher Education, ed. by Jeroen 
Huisman, Peter Maassen and Guy Neave (Amsterdam: Pergamon, 2001).
64 European Commission, Towards a European Research Area, op. cit., p. 5.
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(how to develop the benchmarks of success and what is going to 
happen after the deadline are other issues). Europe is at the crossroads; 
it is trying to combine higher competitiveness and social cohesion in an 
increasingly globalized world and it is in the process of transition 
towards a "knowledge society". Thus knowledge will become the key 
issue in the years to come. As a Third European Report on Science & 
Technology Indicators 2003 argues,
of course knowledge per se is not a new asset; it has always been a basis for 
human activity. However, what is radically new is the pace of its creation, 
accumulation and diffusion resulting in economies and society following a new 
knowledge-based paradigm. Working and living conditions are being 
redefined; markets and institutions are being redesigned under new rules and 
enhanced possibilities for the exchange of information. Moreover, knowledge is 
not only becoming the main source of wealth for people, businesses and 
nations, abut also the main source of inequalities between them.65
With respect to the Bologna process, even though the Trends III 
report prepared for the Berlin summit mentions "globalization" no 
more than five times in total, it states overtly that ministers and 
higher education institutions should "ride the tiger of globalisation 
rather than hope it will disappear".66 In general, though, the 
underlying assumptions are not developed in more detail in any of its 
documents or reports.
11.
To conclude, let us repeat briefly our initial claims: the recent European 
discussions (exemplified here mainly by the documents of the 
European Commission) leave no doubt about the direction of these 
changes in the in role and social and economic tasks of the institution in
65 European Commission, Third European Report on Science & Technology Indicators. 
Towards a Knowledge-Based Economy (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications, 
2003), p. 1.
66 Sybille Reichert and Christian Tauch, Trends in Learning Structures in European 
Higher Education III (European University Association, 2003), p. 57.
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emergent societies. The institution of the university seems already to 
have found it legitimate, useful and necessary to evolve together with 
radical transformations of the social setting in which it functions. For in 
the new global order, against the odds, universities are striving to 
maintain their traditionally significant role in society. The role of 
universities as engines of economic growth, contributors to economic 
competitiveness and suppliers of well-trained workers for the new 
knowledge-driven economy is more and more often acknowledged -  
which is undoubtedly a radical reformulation of their traditional social 
roles. The university in the European context seems about to enter, 
willy-nilly, a new era of its development. The main reasons worth 
mentioning here include the pressures of globalization on nation-states 
and its public services, the strengthening of the project for a "common 
Europe", the end of the "Golden age" of the Keynesian welfare state as 
we have known it, and the emergence of knowledge-based societies 
and knowledge-driven economies. More generally, under both external 
(like globalization) and internal pressures (like changing 
demographics, the aging of societies, the maturation of welfare states, 
post-patriarchal family patterns etc), the processes affecting the 
university today are not different from those affecting our world today: 
the processes in question being the individualization (and 
recommodification) of our societies and the denationalization (and 
desocialization) of our economies. On top of that, we are beginning to 
feel the full effects of the universalization of higher education and the 
commodification of research.
Chapter 11
Gone with the Modem Wind? 
National Identity, Democracy, 
and the University in the Global Age
l .
Let us start with a very general statement: the widely observed 
processes of globalization are bringing about transformations of an 
unprecedented nature and scale. The modern world we have been 
thinking about in philosophy, sociology, political science or political 
economy (founded on reason and rationality, social communication 
and dreams of the social order, nation-state, and the priority of 
politics over the economy) is disintegrating right in front of our eyes 
along with the gradual passage to a global age.
Therefore today, the questions about democracy may require 
deliberations in a different vocabulary: a vocabulary that would be 
able to break away from the less and less socially appealing myth that 
was at the foundations of modern social sciences, according to which 
we keep analyzing the world from a standpoint in which the primary 
point of reference is the territorially-bound nation-state. As Zygmunt 
Bauman, the eminent Polish and British sociologist, put it with 
reference to sociology:
the model of postmodernity, unlike the models of modernity, cannot be 
grounded in the realities of the nation state, by now clearly not a framework 
large enough to accommodate the decisive factors in the conduct of 
interaction and the dynamics of social life.1 1
1 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodemity (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 65.
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It is an enormous challenge to the social sciences to adapt 
themselves conceptually to the new world in which, perhaps, the 
nation-state may not play the decisive role ascribed to it by 
modernity. Perhaps a globalized world will require a brand new 
theory of the state and a renewed theory of democracy in a situation 
in which the nation-state is declining, although it has not yet 
disappeared and surely will not disappear, but nevertheless is 
becoming weaker and weaker in its confrontation with the new global 
political entities, such as e.g. supranational political entities, or in its 
confrontations with international organizations, transnational 
corporations, nongovernmental and independent systems of 
commercial arbitration, ratings provided by international rating 
agencies or with the limitations of various military, political and 
economic treaties and unions. In the face of a seemingly unavoidable 
giving way, at least partially, to the new political players (including 
transnational corporations, no matter how they view themselves), 
classical questions concerning freedom, democracy, the state and 
politics may in my view require a radical reformulation.
The key question would be about the chances of creating a new 
form of social justice and the possibility of accepting a new social 
contract in a situation in which the connections between the nation­
state and society are becoming weaker and the choices made in the 
traditional political structures of the state are being replaced by 
nongovernmental choices of an increasingly economic character. 
Ulrich Beck, the influential German sociologist, warns us that in the 
case of globalization "political freedom and democracy in Europe are 
at stake".2 I would add, following Beck -  in Europe, and not only 
there. The issue has become really global.
In the face of globalization on the one hand and the cultural 
passage to late modernity on the other, the questions about the 
decline of the nation-state are being asked continuously by 
sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, economists and 
historians. The nation-state as a product of modernity is under
2 Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization? transl. by Patrick Camiller (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2000), p. 62.
248 G o n e w ith  the M o d e m  W in d ?
question: in this context, the crucial oppositions are for instance those 
between "national disintegration" and "international integration", 
"globalization" and "national social stability", "market" and 
"society", "market" and "state", "economics" and "politics", 
"economics" and "democracy" etc. The current question about the 
nation-state is at the same time a question about the future of 
capitalism, the future of a market economy, as well as the future of 
democracy and the welfare state; it is also a question about political 
freedom and the still binding, modern social contract according to 
which there is a clear connection between social and material safety 
and political freedom. It was Ulrich Beck who strongly formulated the 
thesis about the broken historical bond between capitalism, welfare 
state, and democracy. "If global capitalism in the highly developed 
countries of the West dissolves the core values of the work society, a 
historical link between capitalism, welfare state and democracy will 
break apart. Democracy in Europe and North America came into the 
world as 'labour democracy' in the sense that it rested upon 
participation in gainful employment. Citizens had to earn their 
money in one way or another, in order to breathe life into political 
rights and freedoms. Paid labour has always underpinned not only 
private but also political existence. What is at issue today, then, is not 
'only' the millions of unemployed, nor only the future of the welfare 
state, the struggle against poverty, or the possibility of greater social 
justice. Everything we have is at stake".3 The association of capitalism 
with basic political, social and economic rights, in Beck's view, is not 
"'some favour' to be dispensed with when money gets tight". Rather, 
"socially buffered capitalism" was an answer to the experiences of 
fascism and challenges of communism. Therefore, "the simple truth is 
that without material security there is no political freedom and no 
democracy, only a threat to everyone from new and old totalitarian 
regimes and ideologies".4
3 Ibidem, p. 62.
4 Ibidem, pp. 62-63. As Anthony McGrew formulated the point: "For if state 
sovereignty is no longer conceived as indivisible but shared with international 
agencies; if states no longer have control over their national territories; and if 
territorial and political boundaries are increasingly permeable, the core principles of
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The question about the possibility of the decline of the nation-state 
in my account is parallel to that about the human and social 
consequences of globalization and that about the end of modernity 
(and, at the same time, about the possible decline of the institution of 
the university in its modern formulation). These questions form a 
web that modern thought, without modifying its guiding premises, 
seems unable to cope with. The new cultural, social, political 
and economic surroundings brought about by the processes and 
practices of globalization seems to require a brand new vocabulary. 
As we obviously do not possess it yet, we keep approaching the 
phenomena of a new (global) world with old measures and 
outmoded language.5
Speaking in the most general terms: there is quite an astonishing 
degree of consent to the view that the specter of globalization and its 
social and economic practices introduce a new quality to our world: 
"a sense of rupture with the past pervades the public consciousness of 
our time"6, and Ulrich Beck describes in sociological terms the current 
passage from the "first" (national) to the "second" (global) modernity
democratic liberty -  that is self-governance, the demos, consent, representation, and 
popular sovereignty -  are made distinctly problematic". See his "Globalization and 
Territorial Democracy" in The Transformation of Democracy? he edited (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 12.
5 One of the most radical positions recently taken in the globalization/welfare 
state debates is that of Ramesh Mishra presented in his controversial book 
Globalization and the Welfare State (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999). In most general 
terms, for Mishra the collapse of the socialist alternative is a cause of globalization and 
the decline of the nation-state is its effect. Consequently, "globalization, which must 
be understood as an economic as well as a political and ideological phenomenon, is 
without doubt now the essential context of the welfare state" (p. 15). His general 
description runs as follows: "three major developments in recent decades have altered 
the economic, political and ideological context of the welfare state in important ways. 
They are: the collapse of the socialist alternative, the globalization of the economy, and 
the relative decline of the nation state. Although overlapping and interrelated, each of 
these has implications for the welfare state which require us to reconsider some of the 
basic ideas and assumptions which have guided thinking about social policy and 
social welfare since the Second World War" (p. 1).
6 Martin Albrow, The Global Age. State and Society Beyond Modernity (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996), p. 1.
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as a "fundamental transformation, a paradigm shift".7 It can be said 
that we are facing the decline of the world we have been accustomed 
to.8 The question of the role played by the nation-state in the 
contemporary world and of its future in the face of globalization is a 
crucial one.
2.
The questions I would see as the most important in this context 
would be the following: is Francis Fukuyama right, after almost a 
decade has passed since he formulated his initial stance, when he says 
in his The End of History and the Last Man that the vast part of the 
world does not know any ideology that could "challenge liberal 
democracy", and, which is still more difficult to accept casually, when 
he says that we are unable to envisage a world "essentially different" 
from our own world, and better at the same time? Is George Soros, a 
successful practitioner of capitalism, right when he mentions in his 
recent Crisis of Global Capitalism the "weak" and "difficult" relations 
between capitalism and democracy? Can the increasingly advanced 
processes of international integration lead to national political and 
social disintegration? To what extent has the nation-state participated 
in, and still participate in, the increasing disintegration of itself by 
liberalization of the economy, reducing duty barriers, privatization, 
deregulation and giving bits and pieces of it sovereignty to various 
political entities by introducing new legal regulations? Is the nation­
state still a necessary guarantor of contracts signed and economic 
promises made? Is it possible for democracy to exist without classical 
social guarantees, that is to say, in separation from what Beck has 
called the "work society" -  a society that to a lesser or greater degree 
guarantees material safety to its working citizens?9 Does globalization
7 Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization, op. cit., p. 125.
8 See Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 
p. 158ff.
9 See Ulrich Beck, The Brave New World of Work, transl. by P. Camiller (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001).
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necessarily introduce a zero-sum game -  for someone to win, 
someone else has to lose? And if it does, who will be the winners and 
who the losers of globalization?
And let us ask further questions: to what extent is the nation-state 
still a socially relevant point of reference through which the state can 
claim the loyalty of its citizens? What is the authority of the state that, 
unavoidably, in face of increasing competition on the market for 
goods and services, gradually retreats from the functions that once, 
at the time of their emergence in the cultural surroundings 
of modernity, were its raison d'etre? What is the current resonance 
of such notions as the "nation" or the "national interest" and where 
does "national identity" come from? What will the social and political 
consequences be of the state's retreat from participation in and 
governance of these most basic, and until recently strategic, domains of 
the economy or the last domains of social services (e.g. healthcare or 
higher education)? What are the consequences of the parallel existence 
of political multi-powers and of the separation of power from the 
traditional authority of the state? Is the change of balance of power 
from a relatively autonomous nation-state towards an anonymous, 
international market as long-lasting as ideologues and followers of 
neoliberalism want it, or we just have a temporary imbalance from 
the hitherto existing state-market equilibrium?
And to go even further: is it really the case that the events of "1989" 
(in Central and Eastern Europe) determined the fate of modernity as a 
certain cultural and political project? Is the end of modernity -  or, as 
some commentators have put it, the passage to late modernity (Anthony 
Giddens), and the shift to the "second, global modernity" and the "new 
Enlightenment" (Ulrich Beck) or, finally, to "postmodemity" (Zygmunt 
Bauman) -  unavoidable, or it was determined by economic globalization 
and most advanced inventions of high technology? Do we still live in the 
modem world of national states and, equally, national societies, or have 
we already found ourselves in a "postnational" world in which there are 
new rules of the game in every social and political domain, as well as in 
the economy? Is it really so that the stakes in the current globalization 
processes are the redefinition of the most essential notions from political 
philosophy, as some sociologists, political scientists and philosophers
252 G on e w ith  the M o d em  W ind ?
want (from freedom to democracy to the state, market and politics), or 
we can observe a merely exaggerated attempt to conceptualize a 
seemingly new world in seemingly redefined terms? In other words, do 
we face the necessity of working out a new formula of the social contract
-  guaranteed so far by the nation-state -  or we are entering an 
increasingly globalizing new world without any wider social 
agreements, in the form that we used to have in the modem age? Where 
does the fear of integration take its roots from all over the world?
Is globalization, neoliberalism and the social, political, economic 
and cultural processes strictly associated with them an expression of a 
"new totalitarianism", a "two-headed monster of technology and 
finance", a "cancer" in the healthy social fabric, a "new faith" and the 
"good word" as preached by the most important international 
monetary and economic institutions, as the influential French leftist 
critic, Ignacio Ramonet, described them recently?10 1Is globalization a 
"social process" or "political rhetoric"?11 Is -  and if yes, to what extent
-  globalization a vast political project promoted in the form of the 
neutral language of economics and the social sciences? Or maybe 
neoliberalism is a political project (with almost Marxian aspirations) 
that is engaged in constructing a new "metaphysics of the free 
market" (as mentioned by Beck)? Is it the case that after God, Reason, 
and History -  the time has come for the Market, free and 
deregulated? All the signs indicate that this may be the case.
3.
Thus, there are serious indications that the nation-state as a political 
and cultural project is in retreat right now in surroundings 
determined by the process of globalization, which in itself is a subject 
of heated debates. As Dani Rodrik, an influential American political 
economist, put it recently: "we need to be upfront about the 
irreversibility of the many changes that have occurred in the global
10 Ignacio Ramonet, "A New Totalitarianism", Foreign Policy, Fall 1999, pp. 117,119.
11 The Limits of Globalization. Cases and Arguments, ed. by Alan Scott (London: 
Routledge, 1997), Introduction, p. 2.
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economy".12 I have to agree once again with the diagnosis suggested 
by Ulrich Beck who says that the only constant feature of 
globalization is the overturning of the central premiss of the "first" i.e. 
national modernity: the rejection of the idea that "we live and act in 
the self-enclosed spaces of national states and their respective 
national societies".13
Capital, goods, technologies, information and people cross 
borders in a way that was unimaginable even a couple of years ago: 
therefore globalization is called "the contraction of time and space" 
(Bauman) and "the overcoming of distance" (Beck). Within a new 
global configuration, the economy becomes less and less dependent 
on politics. Therefore I suppose it is interesting to think about the 
thesis put forward by the above mentioned Dani Rodrik in his book 
Has Globalization Gone Too Far?:
the most serious challenge for the world economy in the years ahead lies in 
making globalization compatible with domestic social and political stability - 
... in ensuring that international economic integration does not contribute to 
domestic social disintegration.14
The power of the state as such is increasingly seen as merely 
administration and less and less often as the governance of (national) 
identity.15 Saskia Sassen, an American sociologist of globalization, 
describes the current situation as the "partial denationalizing of 
national territory" and as a "partial shift of some components of state 
sovereignty to other institutions, from supranational entities to the 
global capital market"16).
12 Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 1997), p. 9.
13 Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization, op. cit., p. 20.
14 Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? op. cit., p. 2.
15 See the chapter about the gap between the state and the economy in an era of 
declining nation-states in Zygmunt Bauman's excellent Globalization. The Human 
Consequences (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
16 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), p. xii.
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4.
The potential decline of nation-states will bring about vast social, 
economic, and political consequences of a global nature. But what 
does it actually mean: the decline of the nation-state? This common 
expression finds numerous explanations. Just to give several of the 
most recent examples: Susan Strange in her book The Retreat of the 
State refers to the "reversal of the state-market balance of power" and 
says that the state is undergoing a metamorphosis brought on by 
structural change in world society and the economy. "... [I]t can no 
longer make the exceptional claims and demands that it once did. It is 
becoming, once more and as in the past, juts one more source of 
authority among several, with limited powers and resources".17 
Martin Albrow goes even further when he states that "effectively the 
nation-state no longer contains the aspirations nor monopolizes the 
attention of those who live on its territory. The separation of the 
nation-state from the social relations of its citizens is by no means 
complete, but it has advanced a long way" or, to put it in a nutshell, 
"society and the nation-state have pulled apart".18 Ulrich Beck 
describing the "second modernity" claims that
the advent of globalization involves not only an erosion of the tasks and 
institutions of the state, but also a fundamental transformation of its 
underlying premisses. The second modernity brings into being, alongside the 
world society of national states, a powerful non-state world society different 
from previously existing forms of political legitimization, which is made up 
of transnational players of the most diverse kinds.19
Globalization in his account brings about a society that is 
multidimensional, polycentric and contingent, and in which the 
national and the transnational coexist with each other. What is at
17 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in World Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 4, 73.
18 Martin Albrow, The Global Age. State and Society Beyond Modernity, op. cit., 
pp. 170,164.
19 Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization? op. cit., p. 103.
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stake in the globalization campaign is not only the fate of the nation­
state: it is also political freedom, democracy and the substance of 
politics, for if global capitalism dissolves the core values of the work 
society, "a historical link between capitalism, welfare state and 
democracy will break apart".20 Welfare state was an integrated 
national state in which there was no big difference between wealth 
and national wealth -  which may no longer be the case, which in the 
most dramatic way was presented by Robert B. Reich in The Work of 
Nations and by the passage from the metaphor of the citizens being in 
the same large boat (called "the national economy") to the metaphor 
of the citizens being increasingly in different, smaller, individual 
boats. In Reich's view, Americans (or citizens of any other nations, for 
that matter) are no longer in the same economic boat, there is no 
longer any common economic fate of citizens of a given nation. The 
centrifugal forces of the global economy tear at the ties binding 
citizens of national states together.21
Finally, in thinking about the nation-state today it is important to 
avoid the global/national duality, as Saskia Sassen keeps reminding 
us both in her Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age o f Globalization and 
in the recent Globalization and Its Discontents: it is not simply that the 
national state is just losing significance, it is not simply that "what one
20 Ibidem, p. 62.
21 Robert B. Reich's theses seemed very radical in the beginning of the 1990s 
when his Work of Nations. Preparing Ourselves for the 21s' Century (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1992) was published. After a decade, in the (unknown then) context of the 
"knowledge societies" (and knowledge economies), they seem much more plausible: 
"We are living through a transformation that will rearrange the politics and 
economics of the coming century. There will be no national products or technologies, 
no national corporations, no national industries. There will no longer be national 
economies, at least as we have come to understand that concept. All that will remain 
rooted within national borders are the people who comprise a nation. Each nation's 
primary assets will be its citizens' skills and insights". And further on: "Underlying 
all such discussions is the assumption that our citizens are in the same large boat, 
called the national economy. There are different levels of income within the boat, of 
course ... Yet all of us are lifted and propelled along together. The poorest and the 
wealthiest and everyone in between enjoy the benefits of a national economy that is 
buoyant, and we all suffer the consequences of an economy in the doldrums (pp. 3-4, 
emphasis mine).
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wins, the other loses", because "the state itself has been a key agent in 
the implementation of global processes, and it has emerged quite 
altered by this participation"22 and it is engaged in "the production of 
legality around new forms of economic activity".23 In this light the 
alternatives of "states or markets"24 may not be as sharp as it looks at 
first sight and thinking about the nation-state, national identity and 
democracy leads us to thinking about globalization and the question 
whether we regard it as still a "choice" or already a "reality".25 To the 
question of whether the state will disappear, my answer would be it 
will not; but what remains will certainly not be the state as we know 
it. It will no longer be a provider of public and social services and it 
will become more of an arbiter between competing, mainly economic, 
forces, guaranteeing fair play for all the participants of the game.
Thus, national identity, as we have indicated, seems to have 
ceased to play a crucial role in the social life of contemporary 
technologically advanced, free countries of our late modern society 
(as Susan Strange puts it: "today it is much more doubtful that the 
state ... can still claim a degree of loyalty from the citizen substantially 
greater than the loyalty given to family, to the firm, to the political 
party or even in some case to the local football team"26).
5.
Finally, to move on to the contemporary "question of the modem 
university" (as can be seen from such splendid volumes as Currie and 
Newson's Universities and Globalization or Peter Scott's The Globalization
22 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, op. cit., p. 29.
23 Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: The New Press, 1998),
p. 200.
24 See States or Markets? Neo-liberalism and the Development Policy debate, ed. by 
Christopher Colclough and James Manor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
25 See the exchange between Thomas L. Friedman and Ignacio Ramonet in Foreign 
Policy, Fall 1999, which shows the difference between French and American attitudes 
toward globalization.
26 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in World Economy, 
op. cit., p. 72.
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of Higher Education27), the questions asked above could be reformulated 
with respect to this institution: is the university in danger of 
introducing practices of management taken directly from the world of 
business together with the Geist of globalization? Will the university in 
its late-modern version still be able to give birth to judgements that are 
critical of society and to provide a haven for their authors? Are scholars 
about to become -  to use two descriptions from American sociology of 
the academic profession -  "entrepreneurs" and "academic capitalists"? 
Is academic activity destined to have an exceptional status, and the 
university as an institution an exceptional place in our changing 
culture? Is globalization, to draw the picture a bit larger again, a 
(Foucauldian) "regime of truth", a new intellectual fundamentalism, as 
one can hear e.g. in France? And, finally, is higher education merely a 
private and individual good or still a public and social good?
At the same time a less cultural and philosophical and more 
economic and political context could be described in the following 
manner: Western democracies are in the process of a vast 
reformulation of their institutions of the welfare state; and the 
modern university, as a significant user of public resources, is a part 
of it. The state, it seems, is unable to satisfy the growing needs of the 
Academy if it wants to satisfy a large number of other needs with 
decreasing financial resources at its disposal.28
Social and cultural changes today occur with a speed that was 
unimaginable to us a few decades ago. The world is changing faster 
and faster and the university has a smaller and smaller influence on 
the direction these changes take. It is no longer a partner for power (of 
the nation-state); it has become one among several claimants with 
budgetary needs. Participants in the current debate about the future 
of the university certainly have to avoid the survivalist mentality;
27 See the first two books linking the university with the challenges of 
globalization, Universities and Globalization: Critical Perspectives , ed. by Ian Currie and 
Janice Newson (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998) and The Globalization of Higher Education, 
ed. by Peter Scott (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998).
28 See William Melody, "Universities and Public Policy" in The Postmodern 
University? Contested Visions of Higher Education in Society, ed. by Anthony Smith and 
Frank Webster (Buckingham: Open University Press & SRHE, 1997), p. 76.
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otherwise what Zygmunt Bauman says about globalization in general 
-  "it is not about what we a ll ... wish or hope to do. It is about what is 
happening to us all"29 -  will, in particular, come true in respect of the 
globalization of higher education. The logic of consumerism provides 
us with the (American) idea of "excellence in education", behind 
which there are the ideals of the most quickly acquired, most useful 
and best-selling knowledge. As numerous commentators of the 
phenomenon write -  it is right here that the university as an 
institution becomes a bureaucratically-governed, consumer-oriented 
corporation.30
6.
To sum up: rethinking the social, political and cultural consequences 
of globalization is a crucial task for the social sciences. The decline of 
the nation-state -  even seen as only existing to give some of its 
powers to new transnational political players -  is inextricably 
connected to the violent globalization processes, which, consequently, 
may lead to the redefinition of such fundamental social science 
notions as democracy, freedom and politics. In the situation 
generated by the emergence of the global market and the global 
economy, a constant dialogue is needed about the new relationship 
between capitalism and democracy, as much as about new 
relationship between the economy and politics. Philosophically 
speaking, the decline of the nation-state goes hand in hand with the 
end of modernity, and postmodernity, philosophically seen as the end 
of the political and cultural project of the Enlightenment (called "The 
Modern Project" by Habermas), may turn out to be merely the
29 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization. The Human Consequences, op. cit., p. 60.
30 From a practical perspective, see: Wise Moves in Hard Times. Creating and 
Managing Resilient Colleges and Universities by David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell, Jr. 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996) which does not leave a shadow of a doubt about the 
general direction in which the university as an institution is moving. Its aim is 
"providing an attractive product at a fair price -  giving society value for its money"
(p. 26).
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vanguard that points to processes leading in a more or less 
unavoidable direction towards a new, unknown, global age. The 
philosophy that gave a conceptual framework to modernity and the 
Enlightenment (and at the same time to the modern institution of the 
university and the modern figure of the intellectual) should try to 
prepare its instruments to meet the brand new challenges brought 
about by globalization: it is its prime social responsibility today.
C h a p t e r  12
The Identity Crisis?
Philosophical Questions about the University 
as a Modern Institution
The university in the form we are familiar with -  the modern 
university -  derives from the intellectual work of German phil­
osophers: from Kant and Fichte to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von 
Humboldt. Being a modern institution, it is relatively new and was 
born together with the rise in national aspirations and the rise in the 
significance of nation-states in the 19th century.1 A tacit deal made 
between power and knowledge provided scholars, on the one hand, 
with unprecedented institutional possibilities and, on the other, 
obliged them to support national culture and to help in fostering 
citizenship among the people of nation-states. The alliance between 
modem knowledge and modern power gave rise to the foundations 
of the modern institution of the university. Both European, as well as 
American universities were either founded or transformed1 2 on the
1 See Bjorn Wittrock, "The Modem University: the Three Transformations" in The 
European and American University since 1800, ed. by Sheldon Rothblatt and Bjorn 
Wittrock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): "Universities form part and 
parcel of the very same process which manifests itself in the emergence of an 
industrial economic order and the nation-state as the most typical and most important 
form of political organisation" (p. 305).
2 On the complicated relationship between the German Humboldtian model and 
its American counterparts, see an already classic book by Frederick Rudolph, The 
American College & University: A History, published in 1962 (new edition: Athens:
T h e Id en tity  C risis? 261
basis of the project written by Wilhelm von Humboldt for the 
University of Berlin (1808).3
The place, social function and role of the university as one of the 
most significant modern institutions were clearly determined. But 
currently, when the cultural, political, and philosophical project of 
modernity is undergoing radical transformations (toward late- 
modernity, or even postmodernity), it is no longer certain what the 
exact place of the university in society is, for society itself is changing. 
As Bill Readings has observed penetratingly in his reflections about 
the "posthistorical university": "... the wider social role of the 
University as an institution is now up for grabs. It is no longer clear 
what the place of the University within society nor what the exact 
nature of that society is".4 The uncertainty about the future position of 
the institution of the university in culture (as well as -  in the 
economy) is growing together with the structural changes occurring 
in the economy, culture, and politics: small nation-states are often no 
longer equal partners with global capital.5 The nation-state as a 
political and cultural project -  but unfortunately not particular 
nationalisms -  is declining in the surroundings determined by 
globalization6 (these processes can be clearly seen both in the case of
University of Georgia Press, 1990) and a recent book by Christopher J. Lucas, American 
Higher Education: A History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), or, much more 
detailed, Carl Diehl's Americans and German Scholarship 1770-1870 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1978).
3 Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Uber die innere und aussere Organisation der 
hoheren Wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin" in Philosophies de I'Universite. 
L'idealisme allemand et la question de I'Universite, ed. by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut et 
al. (Paris: Payot, 1979). The most important exceptions were universities following the 
French (Napoleonic) model and universities following the Anglo-Saxon tradition.
4 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1996), p. 2.
5 See e.g. Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams. Imperial 
Corporations and the New World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).
6 As Ulrich Beck explains, while transnational corporations are growing in number 
and diversity, what is decisive about them is that, in the course of globalization, they are 
able "to play off national states against one another". Beck goes on to argue that "looked 
at from outside, everything has remained as it was. Companies produce, rationalize, hire 
and fire, pay taxes, and so on. The crucial point, however, is that they no longer do this
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the countries from the European Union and the Central and Eastern 
European countries entering it, as well as in the countries of the two 
Americas).7
One could risk the following statement: in an age of globalization, 
national identity ceases to be the most important social glue and 
therefore its production, cultivation and inculcation -  that is, the 
ideals that stood behind the modem project of the university -  ceases 
to be a crucial social task. And let us remember here what Humboldt 
wrote in his "Deductive Plan of an Institution of Higher Learning to 
be Founded in Berlin": what is at stake is "an essential matter of 
national Bildung" 8
The traditional, modern social mission of the university as an 
institutional arm of the nation-state has been seemingly unexpectedly 
questioned after two centuries of cultural domination. The university 
as we know it -  the modern university -  is in a delicate and 
complicated position at the moment: it may be that the great cultural 
project of the Enlightenment that has located the university in the 
very center of culture -  in partnership with the institution of the 
nation-state -  has finally outlived itself. After two hundred years it is 
no longer certain what the great regulatory idea could be to which the 
university in search of its present raison d'etre could refer. In its 
modern beginnings, in Kant in The Conflict of the Faculties, the 
regulatory idea in question was the Enlightenment concept of reason,9
under rules of the game defined by national states, but continue to play the old game while 
nullifying and redefining those rules. It thus only appears to be a question of the old 
game of labour and capital, state and unions". Consequently, "while one player 
continues to play the game within the framework of the national state, the other is 
already playing within the framework of world society ... It is as if employees, unions, and 
government were still playing draughts, while the transnational corporations had moved on to 
chess (What Is Globalization?, op. cit., pp. 64-65, last emphasis mine).
7 As the above mentioned Barnet and Cavanagh say: "... no political ideology or 
economic theory has yet evolved to take account of the tectonic shift that has occurred. 
The modem nation-state ... looks more and more like an institution of a bygone era", 
Global Dreams, op. cit., p. 19.
8 Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Uber die innere und aussere Organisation der 
hoheren Wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin", op. cit., p. 351.
9 See the English-German edition of The Conflict of the Faculties (New York: Abaris 
Books, 1979).
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then, in Schleiermacher and Humboldt, the idea was culture (in an 
active sense of Bildung, cultivating oneself as a subject of the nation­
state, that is as a just citizen of the German nation-state about to be 
born).10 1
The university seems to be no longer capable of maintaining its 
modern role of a cultural institution closely connected (sometimes 
very closely, or too closely, which would require additional 
comments) with the nation-state of the Enlightenment and post- 
Enlightenment Europe and with the welfare state of the second half of 
the 20th century.11 In the increasingly globalized world of today
10 See in this context Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Founding of the University of 
Berlin, ed. by Herbert Richardson (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984). The texts 
about the institution of the university written by German philosophers of the turn of 
the 19th century were gathered in the French volume Philosophies de VUniversite. 
L'idealisme allemand et la question de FUniversite, op. cit.
11 The golden era of the Western European welfare state seems to be over and 
nation-states have fewer and fewer policy options open to them today; there is no 
discussion with facts, data and their interpretations. Jurgen Habermas in his 
Postnational Constellation. Political Essays (transl. by M. Pensky, Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2001) is in agreement here with Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, Scott Lash 
and Zygmunt Bauman as well as many other contemporary thinkers: "the welfare 
state mass democracies on the Western model now face the end of a 200-year 
developmental process that began with the revolutionary birth of modem nation­
states" (p. 60). He dubs the new reality the "postnational constellation" and presents 
his diagnosis: "the phenomena of the territorial state, the nation, and a popular 
economy constituted within national borders formed a historical constellation in 
which the democratic process assumed a more or less convincing institutional form". 
What happened today is that "developments summarized under the term 
'globalization' have put this entire constellation into question" (p. 60). The dilemma 
national governments face today derives from the zero-sum game into which they 
have been forced and is described by Habermas in the following manner: "necessary 
economic objectives can be reached only at the expense of social and political 
objectives". The dilemma is elaborated in the form of two theses: "first, the economic 
problems besetting affluent societies can be explained by a structural transformation 
of the world economic system, a transformation characterized by the term 
'globalization'. Second, this transformation so radically reduces nation-states' capacity 
for action that the options remaining open to them are not sufficient to shield their 
populations from the undesired social and political consequences of a transnational 
economy" (p. 51). Habermas acknowledges the significance of the impact of current 
global transformations on the traditional European welfare state models and on the
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references made to national culture as the raison d'etre of the 
university sound less and less convincing, especially considering the 
fact that the state itself, the partner upholding the other side of the 
agreement, together with the transformations it is undergoing under 
global pressures, is disregarding -  out of necessity? -  its past 
obligations with respect to the university.
The whole (university) world is perfectly aware of the fact that 
there will probably never be a return to the level of financing 
universities (both in the natural sciences and in the humanities) from 
the Cold War era. A United Europe, it seems, does not need a 
narrowly defined national university, for teaching and research are to 
aim at harmonization rather than isolation of particular national 
traditions (in a widely understood "European" or sometimes "global" 
identity -  that is to say, more or less "American", although some 
reservations may have to be introduced here). References to reason, 
culture or to mere practice, usefulness and effectiveness are no longer 
persuasive in culture. These ideas are no longer politically and 
economically resonant because the global configuration of politics 
and the economy has changed: within the new configuration, the 
economy is increasingly less dependent on politics. Power as such is 
increasingly seen as merely administration and less and less often as 
the governance of (national) identity.12 References made to 
(Humboldt's) culture and (Kant's) rationality as regulatory ideas 
standing behind the functioning of the present institution of the 
university no longer ring social and political bells as they do not seem 
necessary anymore in an era of globalized capitalism: the idea of
capacity of national governments to conduct national policies, traditionally ascribed to 
the nation-states. His conclusions are clear-cut and reflect a deeply historical 
perspective in seeing recent half a century in Europe: "no matter how one looks at it, 
the globalization of the economy destroys a historical constellation that made the 
welfare state compromise temporarily possible. Even if this compromise was never the 
ideal solution for a problem inherent within capitalism itself, it nevertheless held 
capitalism's social costs within tolerable limits" (p. 52).
12 See for instance Zygmunt Bauman's excellent Globalization. The Human 
Consequences (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) as well as the book by Martin Albrow 
written from the perspective of the end of the nation-state in the face of globalization, 
The Global Age. State and Society Beyond Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
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national culture ceases to be crucial for the present functioning of the 
state and the state as such, also out of necessity (for instance, out of 
the fear of economic isolation) seems to be increasingly less national 
in the classical sense of the term.
Thus, the raison d'etre of the university as a significant partner of 
the nation-state has exhausted itself. The university, in its traditional 
modern form, can no longer be the partner of the nation-state as this 
is incompatible with the development of global consumerism. 
Therefore, together with the decline of modernity as a social, political 
and cultural project there has been a decline in the political and 
economic role of the nation-state, brought about by the global 
circulation of capital, and the decreasing role of the state goes hand in 
hand with the decreasing role of its modern ideological arm -  the 
university.13 While we can see quite easily the transformations in the 
economy and politics,14 it is a bit more difficult to see the changes 
occurring at the other end of the power/knowledge relationship, the 
one of knowledge. Power and its character have changed and 
therefore, out of necessity, knowledge and its character had to 
change. (The historicity of the two projects was perhaps most fully 
presented in Michel Foucault's historical-philosophical accounts of 
modernity: human sciences and social sciences in their current forms
13 Andy Green in his Education, Globalization and the Nation-State (London: 
McMillan Press, 1997) asks about the role of education in a "post-national era" and 
claims that according to globalization theories the system of national education 
becomes "defunct, at once irrelevant, anachronistic and impossible" (p. 3ff.).
14 As Janice Dudley claims in a collective volume Universities and Globalization. 
Critical Perspectives ed. by Janice Newson and Jan Currie (London: Sage, 1998): "The 
state is cast as increasingly irrelevant when confronted by the 'reality' of ungovernable 
intemational/global market forces. Nation-states are essentially ineffective in the face 
of global market forces, so that the era of the powerful nation-state would appear 
effectively to be over. National economic management, and national political and 
social policies are becoming increasingly irrelevant. International markets and 
international capital markets operate outside of the control of national governments ... 
The state is reduced to the role of the 'night watchmen' of classical liberalism -  
maintaining law and order, protecting the sanctity of contract, and providing only the 
level of welfare necessary to protect property and facilitate the free operation of 
capitalist markets" (p. 27).
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appeared by reason of the powerful demand of modern states already 
born or about to be born. Although Foucault only talked about 
criminology, psychology, psychiatry, medicine etc. -  perhaps similar 
genealogical questions could be asked about the institution of the 
university?)
Perhaps the institution of the modem nation-state and that of the 
modern university have so far remained in harmonious and fruitful 
equilibrium because the modern centres of power and knowledge 
have remained in equilibrium? Two parallel products of modernity, 
the nation-state and the modern university, have been in an amazing 
and long-term symbiosis (and it is worth keeping in mind that before 
the appearance of the modern university it was not easy for scholars 
and philosophers to live: as Krzysztof Pomian claims in his The Past as 
an Object o f Knowledge, there was no institutional place for them unless 
they were directly useful to monarchies or churches. Describing 
scholars' main activity in pre-revolutionary France he said: "writing 
letters was one of the most important actions taken by any 
erudite...").
An awareness of the fact that the university, invented and 
presented to the world by nineteenth century German thinkers, is a 
culturally and historically determined product is increasingly 
common. Nothing determines in advance its shape, tasks and 
functions, or the expectations made of it and the requirements 
enforced on it by the culture and society it is immersed in. The 
university in its modern form is a child of modernity, it grows older 
together with it and is susceptible to political, economic and social 
transformation as much as any other (modem) institution. The 
tradition of twenty five centuries of Plato's Academy, or of eight 
centuries of the University in Bologna, seems irrelevant.
Modern university would not have been invented if 
Enlightenment thinkers had not been able to show, for the first time 
in the history of European consciousness, that the progress of 
knowledge and the progress of politics go hand in hand (as shown by 
Allan Bloom in his controversial The Closing of the American Mind). 
According to Bloom, the Enlightenment was a brave philosophical 
undertaking because its aim was to restructure political and
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intellectual life in such a way that in its totality it should fall under 
the supervision of philosophy and science. Thus, higher education 
provided the foundations for liberal democracy and was a reservoir 
of its principles. But what happens, we may ask, when the traditional 
political architecture is changed, silently and irresistibly, by the 
processes of globalization? What happens when political progress 
does not seem to be strictly connected with the progress of 
knowledge? What happens when knowledge in the sense of 
knowledge developed at the traditional modern university, according 
to the best German ideals of the dyad of teaching and research, ceases 
to be politically crucial? When its past social necessity is replaced 
with merely possibility? What I mean here is the case of classical 
studies: they were necessary, perhaps even crucial for the arts and 
sciences, as long as the social world was seen from the perspective of 
comparisons with, or debates about, antiquity. As long as eyes were 
turned backwards in search of a new model (and the model 
supposedly was ancient Greece at the time of Pericles). But when the 
perspective changed, the importance of classical studies decreased 
considerably and what remained was classical philology. Perhaps a 
similar story could be told about the modern university.
The question may be the following: what universal legitimizing 
set of ideas can be found for the university when the grand narrative 
(Lyotard's metarecit), within which the university was useful for the 
fostering of liberal, reasonable citizens of the nation-state, seems to be 
over? Is it possible at all in these increasingly postmodern times to 
find such a firm (and convincing) grand narrative? The scientist -  as 
well as the humanist and the philosopher -  has long ago ceased to be 
the historical hero he or she used to be in the Enlightenment, and, to 
an extent, in Positivism.15
Perhaps, as the idea of "culture" (and especially, but not 
exclusively, "national" culture) ceases to be effective for the 
functioning of the institution of the university -  the idea of culture 
worked out by German philosophers and accepted all over the world
15 Among philosophers, this decline in the social role of these figures is most 
notably shown by Richard Rorty. See Chapters 1 and 2.
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as a regulatory idea standing behind the functioning of the university 
-  new ideas have to be sought. It turns out, though, that finding such 
grand ideas, ones not deprived of social reference, is very difficult, if 
not impossible, in the set of ideas we currently have at our disposal. 
At the same time the ruthless logic of consumerism provides us with 
the idea of "excellence in education" (where the university as an 
institution goes over to the side of bureaucratically-governed and 
consumer-oriented corporations,16 the crucial words for the 
description of the university becoming "managerial", "corporate", 
and "entrepreneurial".17
Thus the university is increasingly free to teach and do research, 
as it has ceased as an institution to function in an ideological manner. 
Therefore its attractiveness for the state has decreased. The direct link 
that has existed in the last two centuries, and the direct contract 
between the state and university, has been broken. It is difficult to say 
by which side of the contract: one side is afraid to speak it out loud, 
the other is never willing to ask so as not to lose its last illusions. The 
university seems no longer required for the preparation of citizens of 
nation-states for reliable service to the nation as the service itself is 
becoming increasingly less important, and the state itself in the form 
we know it is becoming less and less significant.18
Thus: national consciousness, as we have already indicated, has 
ceased to play a crucial role in the social life of current technologically
16 The late Bill Readings writes precisely about the "University of Excellence".
17 It is important to note two significant books that have appeared within a 
decade: Janice Newson, Howard Buchbinder, The University Means Business. 
Universities, Corporations and Academic Work (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988) and 
Universities and Globalization. Critical Perspectives , ed. by Jan Currie and Janice Newson 
(London: Sage, 1998). Both present a precise report and detailed interpretation by 
sociologists and political scientists of the phenomena occurring at anglophone 
universities. They show the way the ideology of the free market is entering the 
university in the form of practices drawn directly from the corporate world (high-level 
management, rectors as CEO's, nominated rather than elected deans; accountability, 
privatization, performance indicators etc.).
18 The modem institution of the university in Poland does not fall under the 
evolution described here for obvious historical reasons. But it may face, or already 
does face, the same challenges that globalization and its ideology bring about.
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advanced states, and national identity has ceased to be the most 
important social glue of the late-modern society. The hitherto existing 
social task, taking care of the intellectual life of the inhabitants of the 
rational nation-state, no longer suffices for the present functioning of 
the institution of the university. The university, surely enough, still 
functions, but in an increasingly defective manner: it either refers to 
the logic of production and consumption (of knowledge), that is to 
say, it sells its products with better or worse results; or struggles 
violently against the state, which is generally, all over the world, less 
and less willing (and able) to support the university, which in turn 
refers to its rights gained in modern culture. (The fact that the state, in 
practice rather than in theory, is less and less concerned about the fate 
of the university derives from a cold calculation that is rarely affected 
by a deeper consciousness of the cultural changes I am writing about 
here: the university is no longer a partner with the state; it has become 
a petitioner, and is treated like a petitioner. As the editors of an 
important recent book Higher Education Under Fire sadly remark: we 
are no longer a high priority...19).
The questions to be asked could be formulated in the following 
manner: what is the future of the university if deprived of its modern 
culture-, state-, and nation-oriented mission? Does the university 
really have to drift toward the model of a better and better managed 
corporation, a bureaucratic structure fighting in the marketplace 
against the competition of other, similar, isolated bureaucratic 
structures in search of consumers for the educational services they 
want to sell? Is help in gaining professional knowledge as significant 
a social mission as, until recently, the help in gaining national 
consciousness was? What, in a social sense, would a (potential) 
university of mere consumers be like?20
19 See Higher Education Under Fire. Politics, Economics, and the Crisis of the 
Humanities, ed. by Michael Berube and Cary Nelson (New York: Routledge, 1995), 
p. 7ff.
20 See especially discussions about the "unique" place of higher education in 
society contrasted with its current "survivalist" mood in The Postmodern University? 
Contested Visions of Education in Society, ed. by Anthony Smith and Frank Webster 
(London: Open University Press, 1997). The only option still open for the university to
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The university in its modern form was invented in order to 
transform the social world into a more reasonable one with the help 
of the state and without revolution. What is today's university to do? 
What can it change when we hear about the non-alternative character 
of the present world and when some, like Francis Fukuyama already 
a decade ago, mentioned the "end of history" in this context? Is the 
university merely to cultivate a tradition and be a source of older 
knowledge and older wisdom on the one hand, and on the other to 
train the so-called professionals in the most profit-making and most 
marketable fields?
The present questions about the university can be derived once 
again from the "foundational" texts of this institution: the texts by 
German Idealists and Romantics. In this context it is worthwhile 
returning to texts by Newman and Dewey, and closer in time to Allan 
Bloom, E.D. Hirsch and Richard Rorty in America or to Nietzsche, 
Jaspers, Heidegger, and more recently Jurgen Habermas, Jean- 
Fran^ois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Zygmunt 
Bauman in Europe (and in Poland to texts by Kazimierz Twardowski, 
Wladyslaw Strozewski, Sergiusz Hessen, Florian Znaniecki, Klemens 
Szaniawski, and most recently, by Zbigniew Drozdowicz, Lech 
Witkowski and Jerzy Brzezinski). It would be interesting to study in 
this context also Rousseau's attacks on academia and Nietzsche's 
attacks on the institution of the university.
The questions about the modern university are inseparable from a 
more general question about modernity as a large cultural, social and 
political project. It is only in this context, I suppose, that we can reach 
the intentions that modernity ascribed to the university, and try to 
reformulate it for the purposes of today's, changed and still changing, 
world of late-modernity. It is surely possible to pretend that nothing 
has happened (and nothing will happen) but the state no longer sees 
its direct interest in more seriously financing an institution that may 
have already lost its state- and nation-oriented role in society.21
defend itself today is to stress the unique nature of the university experience as such 
which, to tell the truth, is not enough.
211 am leaving aside in this text the fascinating, although ideological, discussions 
that took place in the USA in the 1990s about the university. They mirror the current
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The institution of the university is not the only one that is affected, 
or may be soon affected, by the gradual completion of the project of 
modernity. Another modern product, the figure of the intellectual in 
the form we are familiar from Zola to Sartre (and perhaps even to 
Foucault) in France, is undergoing an equally radical crisis of identity. 
It is also the intellectual that turns out to be closely, for better or for 
worse, associated with modernity. Doubts about modernity, 
incredulity towards it (and towards its metanarratives -  the 
paradefinition of postmodernity according to Lyotard) go hand in 
hand with doubts about the figure of the intellectual. Therefore, 
incidentally, one can often hear that "the confidence of intellectuals in 
their own activities has been reduced and there is no one available to 
speak for the university".22 Undoubtedly, in this context it would be 
interesting to study the relationship between the figure of the 
intellectual and the institution of the modern university -  from the 
perspective of the tasks imposed on both by the project of modernity.
The decline of modernity turns out to be a painful process for 
culture: once again it has to reformulate the aims of its social 
institutions and the tasks of its cultural heroes. If it is successful, the 
institutions and cultural heroes in question will regain their cultural 
vitality; if it is not, they will fall into cultural sterility. The traditional 
figure of the intellectual seems untenable in a more and more 
postmodern cultural surrounding (it was the already several times
struggles for intellectual hegemony between conservatives and the left, and from that 
perspective either attacked or defended the university. From a philosophical point of 
view they are not important, although from the point of view of American culture and 
society they proved crucial for the process of gradually changing the attitude of the 
American public to the institution of the university. Let me mention three of them 
here: Martin Anderson, Impostors in the Temple (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); 
Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals. How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1992), and Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education. The Politics of 
Race and Sex on Campus (New York: The Free Press, 1991). Philosophically, more 
important seems to be Bruce Wiltshire's The Moral Collapse of the University (New York: 
SUNY, 1990) and, especially, Allan Bloom's best-selling and controversial The Closing 
of the American Mind, published in 1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster).
72 Anthony Smith and Frank Webster, "Changing Ideas of the University" in The 
Postmodern University?, op. cit., p. 5.
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mentioned French theorist, Jean-Frangois Lyotard who gave us a 
"tomb for the intellectual"23). The modern institution of the university 
may face a similar fate: either it is going to accept the rules of 
bureaucratic, consumer-oriented corporations, or it will have to try 
once again to find a new regulative idea or a totally new role in 
culture about which little is known at the moment and which would 
have to be as transformative as the role suggested for the university 
by Kant, Humboldt, Fiche or Schleiermacher (the differences between 
them notwithstanding).24 The breakthrough in the conception of the 
university two hundred years ago was an event equal in importance 
to the vast social and cultural transformations of that time. It is hard 
to tell whether there will appear new ideas about the university 
comparable in significance to the ideas of German Idealists.
We have to bear in mind in this context that the role of the 
institution of the university proposed by German thinkers at the turn 
of the 19th century was strictly connected with what was going on in 
the surrounding world of that time. The idea of a modem university 
was not born out of nowhere. It can be called the alliance of power 
and knowledge, following Michel Foucault; it can also be called the 
alliance of science and politics (the ultimate consequence of which 
was the relationship of American science with American politics 
during the Cold War, about which Noam Chomsky recently writes as 
about the blank pages of the American academia25). But the idea of 
the modern university can also be recognized as making perfect sense 
in terms of the needs of newly or about to be born nation-states and a 
natural intrusion of the sciences into the changing social 
surroundings.
23 See Jean-Frarujois Lyotard, Tombeau de I'intellectuel et autres papiers (Paris: 
Galilee, 1984).
24 Let us remember what was the situation of the university before German ideas 
became accepted. As Bjorn Wittrock in "The Modem University: the Three 
Transformations" says, "there can be little doubt that radical German philosophy 
helped resurrect the very notion of a university at a time when the university in 
Europe had been more threatened than perhaps at any time before or afterwards" (op. 
cit., p. 314).
25 The Cold War & the University. Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years, 
ed. by Noam Chomsky (New York: The New Press, 1997), p. 171ff.
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Following this theme, one could ask the following: what can the 
basis be today for the university as an institution, in a world that is 
more and more disenchanted and pluralistic, cosmopolitan, 
multicultural and multiethnic (and I mean here a strictly determined 
institution defined by the Great Charter of European Universities 
signed in 1988 in Bologna26).
Suddenly, after two centuries of standing arm in arm with the 
nation-state, the modern institution of the university has to look for a 
new raison d'etre, a new justification, a new legitimization of its -  
extremely high -  place in culture. Obviously, it can be said that 
nothing has changed, because firstly, the processes I am mentioning 
here, as can be seen from the accounts of American sociologists and 
political scientists, take many years; and secondly, they have not 
necessarily appeared here, in Central Europe. But we do know 
anyway that the evolution of the social world in Central Europe is 
very fast indeed and it may turn out that in a moment we will face 
similar problems to those that the university already faces in 
Anglophone countries from New Zealand and Australia to Canada 
and the USA. It is a good idea, I suppose, to think about them in 
advance, and look for possible solutions even before the precise 
problems are present.
It would be possible to escape the traps of globalization with 
respect to the institution of the university if the university found 
some great idea (and a great narrative standing behind it) that it 
could see as its own. The idea of reason and the idea of (national) 
culture were such ideas, perhaps the ideals of civil society could 
become such an idea. But we need to make sure these ideals are not 
too "grand", so that they will not be rejected together with a general 
rejection of (or "incredulity toward", as Lyotard put it) the grand 
narratives of modernity. How are the ideals of civil society to be
26 It was Zbigniew Drozdowicz who reminded us about the contents of that 
charter in his book Excellentia Universitatis. Szkice o uniwersytecie [Excellentia 
Universitatis. Essays on the University] (Poznan: Humaniora, 1995) and it was Jerzy 
Brzezinski who commented on this charter in a Polish context in his "Considerations 
about the University" in Edukacja i zmiana spoleczna [Education and the Social Change], 
ed. by Jerzy Brzezinski and Lech Witkowski (Toruh: UMK, 1994).
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recontextualized so that they do not appear too modern, that is to say, 
too enchanted and ideological? How are the ideals of civil society to 
be worked through so that they do not disappear together with the 
large social projects brought about by the Enlightenment and French 
Revolution? If such a direction of thinking fails, the probable outcome 
for the university would be a conversion to the pure logic of gains 
and losses, production and consumption, from which there is no 
escape towards its traditional roles and tasks. One could ask about 
the relevance of discussions about the university presented at the 
university itself, that is, from the inside. No matter who asks, though, 
it is worthwhile to ask because the discourse of globalization does not 
take into account the subtleties of tradition that indicate the 
fundamental place of the university in culture.
What is important is to look at the status of the university through 
the status of its most ideologically (or culturally) significant 
disciplines in modernity: philosophy, history or literary studies 
(depending on the period of time and the country in question). It is no 
accident that these disciplines are in the deepest ferment and that it is 
in them that the most important debates about postmodernity and 
modernity (as well as its other product -  the figure of the intellectual) 
are held. Present cultural, political and economic transformations 
seem to undermine the foundations of the modern model of the 
university. It seems to face a radical reformulation of its founding 
ideas. For two hundred years no identity crisis of the university has 
been so serious, but after two hundred years a tectonic shift may be 
coming in the fundamental role played so far by the nation-states that 
contributed to the appearance of the modern university in the form 
we know it. Therefore the questions about the cultural future of 
"Europe" are -  in a small part -  also questions about the future of the 
university, a child of modernity born from the inspiration provided 
by German philosophy.
Chapter 13
The Emergent European Educational Policies 
Under Scrutiny.
The Bologna Process from a Central European
Perspective
l .
The Bologna process of creating the European Higher Education Area 
and the simultaneous, gradual emergence of the European Research 
Area can be viewed as two sides of the same coin: that of the 
redefinition of the roles, missions, tasks, and obligations of the 
institution of the university in Europe's rapidly changing and 
increasingly market-driven and knowledge-based societies and 
economies. Both teaching and research are undergoing substantial 
transformations today and the institution of the university, that until 
fairly recently had been an almost exclusive site for hosting these two 
interrelated activities, in all probability will not be able to avoid the 
process of substantial, in part planned and in part chaotic, 
transformations of its functioning.
Whatever view we share about the two parallel processes, they 
are already relatively well advanced in some countries and being 
promoted all over Europe, including Central and East European 
accession countries and the Balkans (called here most often, for 
the sake of brevity, the "transition countries" or "the region"). While 
the effects of the emergence of the European Research Area are 
basically restricted to the beneficiaries of research funds available 
from the EU, the Bologna process may potentially influence the
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course of change in the national higher education systems of its 
40 signatory countries. Some may call the process a true European 
integration of the various higher education systems, 
notwithstanding their huge differences; though official documents 
usually refer to the "diversity" of countries and institutions 
involved -  but one thing is certain: the Bologna process in its present 
geographical, economic and political composition faces the 
tremendous challenge of keeping to a single pace of changes in all 
the countries involved. Judging from the experience of well over a 
decade of social and economic changes in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans, to keep the process going at one speed is 
going to be very difficult; in the coming years, most probably, 
further developments in the process will require separate tracks 
accompanied by recommendations for the most urgent parts of the 
reforms, separate recommendations for future challenges and, most 
importantly, separate sets of policy recommendations for clusters of 
countries implementing reforms at different speeds -  if the reforms 
are not going to become just a theoretical exercise for a number of 
countries in the region.
Even though there were separate tracks in the setting up of the 
European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and the European Research 
Area (ERA), there has been clear convergence between them recently. 
(We can distinguish between three tracks in recent developments: the 
Magna Charta Universitatum signed in Bologna in 1988 by rectors of 
European universities initiated the track of higher education 
institutions, followed by the Salamanca and Graz Conventions in 2001 
and 2003; the Sorbonne -  Bologna -  Prague and Berlin meetings have 
been all on the track of national ministers of education/governments; 
and the last track is that at EU level which consists of various 
communiques by the European Commission as well as other 
documents, the first being Towards a European Research Area in 2000, 
the two most recent being The Role of Universities in the Europe of 
Knowledge and Researchers in the European Research Area: One Profession, 
Multiple Careers, both of 2003). Recently, the supranational, 
intergovernmental and inter-institutional levels are being increasingly 
mixed. As Pavel Zgaga stresses in his recent report, in the light of EU
T h e E m erg en t E u ro p ean  E d u cation al P o lic ies U n d er S cru tin y 277
enlargement, the convergence between the Bologna process and EU 
educational policy-making will be even more visible.1
The whole process might come to a halt if the academic 
profession is not convinced of the new opportunities it provides, 
and is not supported by new incentives to implement it. On the 
other hand, I have to agree with Albert Amaral and Antonio 
Magalhaes's warning signal that "If the Bologna convergence 
process gets out of the control of academics and becomes a feud of 
European bureaucracy, then one may well see a process of 
homogenization, and this represents another factor endangering the 
traditional role of the European universities".1 2 There is a danger that 
the Bologna process may turn out to be a theoretical exercise in the 
region. But the two parallel processes of creating a common 
European higher education area and a common European research 
area, the practices of "core" European countries, are not theoretical 
at all: what already occurs is the rechannelling of European research 
funds, changing research and development policies, as well as the 
recognition of diplomas for educational and professional purposes 
and mobility for academic and professional purposes on the 
increasingly integrated European labor market. The danger is that 
there may those who are in it (and may be winners) and those who 
will potentially be out of it (and may be losers), especially as far as 
EU funding for research activities (as a consequence of the 
emergence of the ERA) are concerned. As Guy Neave put it in his 
thought-provoking paper on European integration in higher 
education, "the 'Bologna process' has now reached the stage when 
principles begin to assume institutional form".3 What he meant, 
I believe, was that it is high time to review the Bologna process 
before practical decisions are made.
1 Pavel Zgaga, Bologna Process Between Prague and Berlin. Report to the Ministers of 
Education of the Signatory Countries (2003), p. 7, available on-line.
2 Alberto Amaral and Antonio Magalhaes, "Epidemiology and the Bologna Saga". 
CHER 15th Annual Conference, Vienna, September 2002, p. 9.
3 Guy Neave, "Anything Goes: Or, How the Accommodation of Europe's 
Universities to European Integration Integrates -  an Inspiring Number of 
Contradictions". Paper delivered at EAIR Forum, Porto, September 2001, p. 2.
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2.
On reading documents and reports, the Bologna process in its present 
form seems relatively closed to global developments in higher 
education: it may be perceived as largely inward-looking, focused 
mostly on European regional problems and European regional 
solutions, in the relative absence of references to global changes in 
higher education and the huge political and economic changes 
underlying them.4
There are many issues in which Bologna has been (until recently) 
relatively uninterested, for example the GATS negotiations and the role 
of "borderless" education, the emerging private and for-profit sectors 
in higher education, the role of powerful market forces in higher 
education, the clearly declining public funds which governments are 
able and willing to spend on higher education,5 the differences in the 
challenges faced by the EU-15 and the transition countries etc. Some 
recommendations provided by the Trends III report seem abstract, 
especially with respect to the transition countries.
The general feeling one gets while reading the Bologna documents 
is that they talk about relatively homogeneous higher education and 
research structures with fairly similar problems and facing fairly 
similar challenges for the future. Despite numerous references to the 
"diversity" of systems, cultural and linguistic differences, varying 
degrees in the implementation of the process in various countries so 
far, it is very difficult to read the Bologna documents as if it applies to 
the same degree to Germany or France on the one hand, and Albania, 
Macedonia and Russia on the other, to give the most striking 
examples of Bologna signatory countries. What level of generality in 
describing challenges and providing recommendations for action is
4 For a broader view, see Universities and Globalization. Critical Perspectives, ed. by 
Jan Currie and Janice Newson (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998).
5 As Henry et al. sadly remarked, "though education is now deemed more 
important than ever for the competitive advantage of nations, the commitment and 
capacity of governments to fund it have weakened considerably". Miriam Henry, Bob 
Lingard, Fazal Rizvi, and Sandra Taylor, The OECD, Globalisation and Education Policy 
(Amsterdam: Pergamon, 2001), p. 31.
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needed if they are to refer to the countries in question? What do these 
contrasted national systems of higher education have in common 
today the moment we leave the most general level of analysis? The 
relevant analysis comprising both the EU-15 and the transition 
countries is going to be a huge challenge for the future.
Certainly, it is possible to introduce changes in these second tier 
countries on an official, especially legislative level. It may be 
relatively easy, compared with other spheres of action, to change the 
laws on higher education and its accompanying legal framework, 
especially if the Bologna process assumptions of catching up with the 
West are used for promotional purposes. Who in the region, at least 
declaratively, would not want to be integrated with (West) European 
universities in common higher education and research "areas"? But 
certainly changing the law is not the only way to reach the objectives 
of the Bologna process although it may be understood in this way by 
many officials, especially at a governmental level. This attitude is 
summarized by Trends III,
before Bologna, everyone knew that national higher education systems were 
indeed as different and incompatible as they looked. Bologna must avoid the risk 
of producing seemingly converging and compatible structures that could turn 
out to be, in spite of common terminology, just as irreconcilable as the old ones.6
Consequently, it is going to be another huge challenge for Bologna to 
avoid a reform on paper, and especially to go beyond national laws in 
many transition countries.
3.
The Magna Charta Universitatum (signed by European university 
rectors in Bologna in 1988) which precedes the Bologna process per se 
by a decade and is referred to in both the Bologna Declaration and the 
Salamanca Convention message, is a document in a different register 
than that of all later declarations and communiques; it is general and
6 Sybille Reichert and Christian Tauch, Trends in Learning Structures in European 
Higher Education III (European University Association, 2003), p. 73.
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humanistic, and from the perspective of current global and European 
developments in higher education it is very vague indeed.
Being a general declaration, it obviously contains few details on 
how to proceed; but most of all, it is written in the vocabulary of a 
pre-knowledge economy and a pre-globalization era. Consequently, 
and not surprisingly, there is no mention of globally competitive 
knowledge economies and societies, the drivers of economic growth, 
more and better jobs, social cohesion and social exclusion/inclusion, 
external pressures on higher education, emerging market forces, 
changing European (or any other) labor market requirements, long­
term risks for private investment in public research etc. -  all of which 
are mentioned in later ERA and EHEA documents. Instead, there are 
some traditional ideas of universities' roles and tasks. It is interesting 
to note how hard it is today to give a meaning to such statements as 
e.g. "centres of culture, knowledge and research" are "represented by 
true universities". The idea that the university is an institution which 
"produces, examines, appraises and hands down culture by research 
and tradition" (emphasis mine)7 would find very few followers 
among promoters of either the ERA or the EHEA (a counter example 
from the new vocabulary comes to mind from the European 
Commission's Communique on the role of universities: "the 
knowledge society depends for its growth on the production of new 
knowledge, its transmission through education and training, its 
dissemination through information and communication technologies, 
and on its use through new industrial processes or services",8 or from 
a World Bank framework policy paper on Constructing Knowledge 
Societies: "the ability of a society to produce, select, adapt, 
commercialize, and use knowledge is critical for sustained economic 
growth and improved living standards".9 From the perspective of 
developments of the recent decade, the Magna Charta Universitatum 
comes somehow as a remembrance of things past. In the context of the 
ERA developments, it is hard to find the continuation of ideas about the
7 The Magna Charta Universitatum (Bologna, 1988), p. 1, available on-line.
8 European Commission, The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge (2003), p. 2.
9 World Bank, Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary 
Education (Washington DC: Author, 2002), p. 7.
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university as an institution whose "constant care is to attain universal 
knowledge" and which is a "trustee of the European humanist 
tradition" in current discussions about the "Europe of Knowledge".
It looks like it is not only no longer possible to talk about 
European integration of higher education and research as 
exemplified by the Bologna process and the ERA initiative in the 
language of the founders of the modern German research university 
(von Humboldt, Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher and others), but it 
is also no longer possible to use solely the language used by rectors 
of European universities 15 years ago for a description of the recent 
course of events in both the global and European spheres. The 
working vocabulary used for debates on the future of the university 
-  the vocabulary of the ERA, EHEA and global accounts of higher 
education and research (including those provided by UNESCO, 
OECD, and the World Bank) -  has changed substantially since 1988, 
and this shift in vocabulary underlies the shift in the way we 
evaluate the roles and tasks of our educational institutions in 
society.
The next document along the path of academic institutions' 
declarations and responses is the Graz Declaration on the role of 
universities in 2003. It is a direct response to the European Commission's 
communique on the subject. Generally, it shows how the emphases of 
the association of universities has moved away from The Magna Charta 
Universitatum and toward both EU (ERA) and governmental (Bologna) 
lines of thinking. Although the preamble sounds fairly traditional 
(cultivating European values and culture, European cultural and 
linguistic diversity, fostering a stronger civic society across Europe etc.), 
as we move on in the text, the problems discussed are those of Bologna 
and ERA, with the same level of practicality. A good example is a new 
way of thinking about resources for universities:
universities should be encouraged to develop in different forms and to
generate funds from a variety of sources. However, higher education remains
first and foremost a public responsibility .. .10
10 Graz Declaration. Forward form Berlin: the Role of Universities (Brussels: EUA, 
2003), p. 2.
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The shift in vocabulary is also significant, just to mention 
"negotiated contracts of sufficient duration to allow and support 
innovation" between governments and universities. It is interesting to 
note how the specificity of EU and governmental documents bring 
about new concepts and a new level of specificity in university 
declarations. This brings about both good and bad consequences; 
good, as similar issues are discussed in similar language; bad, as the 
university begins to view its most sensitive issues from the 
perspective of its potential funding opportunities. The balance 
between long- and short-term perspectives in thinking about 
universities is currently certainly shaken; the moment the market 
vocabulary enters the discourse on universities' responsibilities 
towards society, any long-term perspective is hard to maintain on the 
part of the universities. Not surprisingly, in the final paragraphs 
about "universities at the centre of reforms", universities declare full 
support for changes but make it implicitly conditional on 
acknowledging their current and future role.11
Power and knowledge (to use this traditional parlance) already 
seem to speak the same language; so the time has come for mutual 
guarantees for the future (by the way, I am not entirely sine that under 
present conditions there is any other option possible in the long run, 
especially in the region). It may be concluded that today, and maybe 
especially today, the struggle between the "idea of the university"1 2
11 See ibidem, p. 5.
12 Karl Jaspers in his famous The Idea of the University (transl. by H.A.T. Reiche and 
H.F. Vanderschmidt, Boston: Beacon Press, 1959) describes the university as an 
institution "uniting people professionally dedicated to the quest and transmission of 
truth in scientific terms" (p. 3). The modem founding fathers of the German research 
university (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, von Humboldt), introduced a 
radically new perspective: "uniting people" (students and professors working 
together for the sake of science, rather than professors working merely for students), 
"professionally" (rather than in an "amateurish" way characteristic of the institutions 
of Enlightenment), "the quest and transmission" (rather than merely transmission to 
students, i.e. instruction becomes accompanied by research) of truth and "in scientific 
terms" (originally referred to the German ideal of Wissenschaft). So almost all 
components of the definition contrast the new idea of the university with the old, 
Medieval, one. The aim of instruction and research is the "formation of the whole 
man", "education in the broadest sense of term" -  Bildung (p. 3).
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and the possible cuts in financial support, including public support, is 
fought on very uneven terms indeed. This is clear to all stakeholders, 
and that is one of the reasons for the changes in the tone, vocabulary 
and emphasis in university declarations and communications between 
The Magna Charta Universitatum of 1988 and today.
4 .
One of my tasks in the present paper is to analyze whether and how 
the Bologna process may affect national higher education systems in 
the region. The Bologna process occurs within interrelated spheres: the 
official sphere of ministers of education/governments, conferences of 
rectors and university associations, and the accompanying changes in 
laws on higher education, laws on for-profit, laws on (educational and 
other) non-profit associations, on research funds etc.; the official sphere 
of particular higher education institutions, namely that of senior 
university management; and finally the practical sphere of particular 
institutions and their faculty. There is a huge gap between the good 
will (and good intentions) of ministers of education in the majority of 
those countries of the region which are officially members of the 
Bologna process and the reality of the functioning of higher educational 
systems in these countries. There is a huge gap between the intentions 
expressed by the officials and the capabilities to act they -  and the 
institutions themselves -  can currently offer for the integration project 
(also, the motivation for joining the Bologna process seems often more 
"political" than "educational").13
Higher education in the region, generally and with a few 
exceptions, has been in a state of permanent crisis since the fall of 
Communism,14 from the paralysis of substantial research functions
13 Voldemar Tomusk, "Higher Education Reforms in Eastern Europe 1989-2002. 
Lessons Learned and Recommendations for the Future", Europaeum, 2002, available 
on-line.
14 For case studies of success stories, see Andrei Marga, "Reforming the 
Postcommunist University", Journal of Democracy, 8.2, 1997; Ten Years After and Looking 
Ahead: A Review of the Transformations of Higher Education in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Bucharest: UNESCO-CEPES, 2000).
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through steadily decreasing public funds, the mushrooming of both 
public and private diploma mills and corruption, to a lowering of the 
professional ethos and morale, with the combination of the above 
depending on the country. There has not been enough general 
reflection on the transformation of higher education systems in the 
region over the last decade.
Paradoxically enough, in the majority of countries in question the 
position of the universities, in areas other than academic freedom, 
institutional autonomy, and the international mobility of students and 
faculty, has severely declined in the last decade. Even though it may 
be quite possible to go on with the Bologna process in these countries 
in terms of legislation, it is much more difficult to go on with it in 
terms of implementing the ideas at the institutional level (leaving 
aside for the moment the whole idea as to what extent it is beneficial 
to the countries in question to follow all the recommendations of the 
process).
Let us remind ourselves again that the Bologna process is based 
on the underlying assumption (not really formulated in a single 
place) that both Europe and the world are entering a new era of 
knowledge-based and market-driven economies competing against 
each other; Europe as a region has to struggle with its two main 
competitors in higher education and research and development: the 
USA and Japan (Australasia); the knowledge society depends for 
its growth on the production, transmission, dissemination, and use 
of new knowledge; the underlying goal behind current 
transformations of educational systems and research and 
development, whether expressed directly (in ERA documents) or 
indirectly (accompanied by the "social dimension" in Bologna 
documents), is more or less to meet the target set out by the 
European Council in Lisbon (in 2000): Europe by 2010 must become 
"the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion". Also the creation of the 
European Higher Education Area must be completed by 2010 (how 
to develop benchmarks of success and what is going to happen after 
the deadline are other issues). Europe is at the crossroads; it is trying
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to combine higher competitiveness and social cohesion in an 
increasingly globalized world and it is in the process of transition 
towards a "knowledge society". Thus knowledge, and consequently 
the knowledge rich and the knowledge poor, becomes the key issue in 
the years to come.15
The Bologna process seems somehow inward-looking: while 
globally, the impact of globalization on higher education policies is 
widely acknowledged, none of the official documents -  from 
Sorbonne to Bologna to Prague to Berlin, and none of the 
accompanying declarations (Salamanca and Graz) -  even once uses 
the word "globalization". (Even though the Trends III report prepared 
for the Berlin summit mentions "globalization", it does so no more 
than five times in total, which is a reflection of its descriptive rather 
than analytical ambitions, it states overtly that ministers and higher 
education institutions should "ride the tiger of globalisation rather 
than hope it will disappear".16) In general, though, the underlying 
assumptions are not developed in more detail in any of its documents 
or reports. Unquestionably, though, globalization is one of the main 
driving forces behind current transformations of the public sector, 
welfare state model and educational policies worldwide,17 much
15 To refer here to an interesting distinction drawn recently by a European 
Commission's communication on Investing Efficiently in Education and Training; as it 
argues, “with an increasing premium on skills, the polarisation between the knowledge 
rich and the knowledge poor puts strains on economic and social cohesion. Access to 
employer funded training is often limited to those who are already well qualified and 
some groups get locked into the lower end of the labour market. An important 
challenge is to develop education and training throughout life in such a way that 
change and restructuring in the economy have no adverse effects on social cohesion" 
(Brussels. COM (2002)779, p. 8). Although European social policies are very much 
focused on making increasing use of educational opportunities throughout life for 
their citizens, in most if not all transition countries, this dimension seems largely 
absent, despite efforts of governments to promote lifelong learning. The educational 
offer is still tailored for the student of 19-24 years of age.
16 Sybille Reichert and Christian Tauch, Trends in Learning Structures in European 
Higher Education III, op. cit., p. 57.
17 For strong supporters of the view, see Ramesh Mishra, Globalization and the 
Welfare State (Chettenham: Edward Elgar, 1999); Gary Teeple, Globalization and the 
Decline of Social Reform (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995).
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weaker;18 globalization is also one of the main reference points in the 
overall EU Lisbon strategy.
Consequently, the Bologna process so far seems relatively weak 
on the analytical level. It may be worrying that the main and 
supporting documents of a huge intellectual and institutional 
undertaking which aims at changing the way our universities 
function do not attempt to present a wholesale analytical approach to 
current challenges and solutions based on perspectives wider than 
European ones. As Erkki Berndtson in a paper on Bologna rightly 
remarks,
the goals of the Bologna Declaration (and of the Prague communique) have 
been presented as solutions to the problems which have never been outlined 
systematically. This may have been one of the reasons for the fast 
development of the process, but without a systematic analysis of problems 
and challenges which the European Higher Education Area faces today, there 
is a danger that the cosmetic features of the reform will be strengthened.19
The ambivalence of the Bologna process concerns the process of 
globalization itself: roughly, following Dirk Van Damme, there may 
be at least two contrasting (and simplified) global views of Bologna. 
The first view may present it as merely an introduction to a much 
wider-reaching integration of national educational systems in the 
future, resulting from competitive pressures from other parts of the 
world resulting in turn from global liberalization in the operations of 
higher education institutions worldwide (especially in the two biggest 
"exporters" of educational services, North America and Australasia). 
The second, contrasting, view may present Bologna as a large-scale 
defensive mechanism to avoid the pitfalls of globalization as seen 
(and mostly disliked) globally today and to stay together in Europe
18 See The New Politics of the Welfare State, ed. by Paul Pierson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Gosta Esping-Andersen, Duncan Gallie, Anton Hemerijck and 
John Myles, A New Welfare Architecture for Europe? Report Submitted to the Belgian 
Presidency of the European Union (2001), available on-line; United Nations, World Public 
Sector Report. Globalization and the State (New York: Author, 2001).
19 Erkki Berndtson, "The European Higher Education Area: to Change or Not to 
Change?". Paper presented at the epsNet General Conference, Paris, June 2003, p. 10.
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against the global odds. Thus the first view may imply a strong 
convergence between Bologna and the globalisation processes on a 
regional scale, especially in the future, while the second may imply an 
attempt to make national educational systems stronger against the 
forces of globalization and to stay away from whatever is seen as its 
excesses in higher education, especially the processes of privatization, 
commercialization, commodification etc. Due to the ambivalence of 
the process, I find it difficult to say which of the views would be a 
more accurate description of it today. The two threads are certainly 
very much interwoven in the Bologna documents. Both 
"protectionist" threads for the European model (especially in 
references to education as a public "good and responsibility" which 
means mostly calls for public funding from national states in the 
future) and "expansionist" threads of attracting foreign students and 
researchers in a global competition for talent can be found. As Van 
Damme put it convincingly, "Europe is seeking its own way out 
between the Scylla of academic capitalism and the Charybdis of 
protectionism".20
5.
Concerns may be raised about "cosmetic" changes to be introduced 
by the Bologna Process; but others, including myself, are more 
concerned about potentially misguided policy decisions which might 
be taken in some transition countries based on either regionally- 
irrelevant analyses or recommendations. There may also be concerns 
about various senses of "harmonization" for higher education, some 
of which may potentially lead to some still unspecified core 
(European) curricula, as evidenced by such pilot projects as "Tuning 
Educational Structures in Europe" (now in the second phase). There 
are strong semantic differences between "convergence", "harm­
onization" and finally "uniformity" but at the same time there are
20 Dirk Van Damme, "Convergence in European Higher Education: Confronting 
or Anticipating the Global Higher Education Market?" (typescript, 2003), p. 6.
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concerns that traditional semantic differences might get increasingly 
blurred as Bologna progresses.21
Another issue is the following: are the problems facing most of the 
current EU-15 countries and their higher education systems the same 
as the problems facing the countries in transition? I believe the most 
important aspect of the Bologna process in its current geographical, 
economic and social scope is its analytical (and consequently 
practical) blindness to some of the most pressing problems in 
transition countries today. The analytical flaw of documents and 
reports may be the lack of any description of old challenges that the 
transition countries still face, and consequently the lack of clear 
recommendations on how to proceed in these countries plagued by 
two different sets of challenges at the same time, old and new ones.
To put it in a nutshell, while the affluent European countries face 
merely new challenges brought about by the emergence of the 
knowledge-based economy, globalization pressures on higher 
education and research activities, life-long learning etc., almost a 
dozen of the transition countries, to varying degrees, face old 
challenges as well. A recent report by the World Bank (Constructing 
Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education) rightly says 
that developing and transition countries are confronted with a "dual 
task": "a key concern is whether developing and transition countries 
can adapt and shape their tertiary education systems to confront 
successfully this combination of old and new challenges".22 The 
report states that tertiary education can indeed play, in developing 
and transition countries, a catalytic role in rising to the challenges of a 
knowledge-based economy but
21 The concern is the traditional diversity of European universities. As Zygmunt 
Bauman stressed well before the Bologna declaration was signed, "it is the good luck 
of the universities that despite all the efforts of the self-proclaimed saviours, know- 
betters and well-wishers to prove the contrary, they are not comparable, not measurable 
by the same yardstick and -  most important of all -  not speaking in unison. Only such 
universities have something of value to offer to the multivocal world of uncoordinated 
needs, self-procreating possibilities and self-multiplying choices". See Zygmunt 
Bauman, "The Present Crisis of Universities" in The Idea of the University, ed. by Jerzy 
Brzeziriski and Leszek Nowak (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), p. 25.
22 World Bank, Constructing Knowledge Societies, op. cit., p. 2.
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this is conditional on these countries' ability to overcome the serious 
problems that have plagued tertiary education systems and have pushed 
some systems into a situation of severe crisis.23
The Bologna process seems to focus on new challenges and new 
problems (i.e. the problems of Western countries); but the countries of 
the region, in contrast, are still embedded in challenges and problems 
of the old type generated mostly in the recent decade by the process 
of shifting from elite to mass higher education under severe resource 
constraints.24 Even though the way Western Europe has dealt with the 
passage from elite to mass higher education has been well 
documented, the global environment in which the process took place 
will not recur. It was a process which took place under different 
political, economic, and social constraints. Both higher education and 
research and development had totally different reference points; the 
universities were still national treasures lavishly funded by nation­
states in the period of the consolidation of the expanded welfare state 
model, politics still mattered more than the economy, national 
prestige often more than particular decisions about resource 
allocations.25
23 Ibidem, p. 45.
24 See Marek Kwiek, "Social and Cultural Dimensions of Current Transformations 
of the Institution of the University" and "Globalization and Higher Education", both 
in the present volume.
25 As Gosta Esping-Andersen put it recently, "most European social protection 
systems were constructed in an era with a very different distribution and intensity of 
risks and needs than exist today. ... The problem behind the new risk configuration is 
that it stems primarily from weakened families and poorly functioning labor markets. 
As a consequence, the welfare state is burdened with responsibilities for which it was 
not designed" ("A Welfare State for the 21st Century" in The Global Third Way Debate, 
ed. by Anthony Giddens (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001). Ulrich Beck calls ours the 
"post work" society which turns upside-down all major assumptions of the postwar 
Keynesian welfare state. Ramesh Mishra in Globalization and Welfare State comments on 
the European (Continental) welfare from an American perspective: "True, many 
European nations have inherited a large welfare state from the golden age and, for the 
moment, seem to be able to hold on to them. But can they hold out against global 
pressures?" (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999, p. 70). This is a crucial point, especially 
in medium-term and long-term perspectives. The answer is negative in the case of the
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But this time is over. It is a real challenge in some European 
transition countries today to undergo the passage from elite to mass 
higher education, to have steadily declining public funds almost each 
consecutive year and develop higher education systems towards the 
"Bologna goals" which have to be met by "knowledge-based 
economies"; with no external funds, and virtually no, on average, 
government funds. The Trends III report makes it clear that it is 
unrealistic to believe that the Bologna reforms are costless: public 
funds have to come if the reforms are to succeed. For the countries of 
the Region, it is almost guaranteed, again on average, that the funds 
will not come from any source. The chronic underfunding of higher 
education, widely documented by any statistical data we want, taken 
in any way we want (such as the percentage of GDP devoted to 
higher education, the percentage of GDP devoted to research, funding 
per student etc., compared to the USA, the EU-15 or the OECD) 
makes it very difficult to implement the Bologna recommendations in 
any other than a theoretical way.26 It makes it difficult to face old and 
new challenges.27 There are no specific recommendations or
eight new EU postcommunist transition countries which in fact never had a chance to 
have Western-style welfare systems.
26 Let us remember Martin Camoy's advice, though: „To what extent public 
resources for education in a particular country really cannot be increased, and to what 
extent the 'shortage' of public funding represents an ideological preference for private 
investment in education is crucial to educational policy-making in the new global 
environment. It does make a major difference to educational delivery how the role of 
the public sector in education expansion and improvement is played out" 
(Globalization and Educational Reform: What Planners Need to Know, Paris: UNESCO -  
International Institute for Educational Planning, 1999, p. 51).
27 Higher education has to compete with other forms of state spending; other 
social needs are growing rapidly and higher education has not been competing 
successfully with other programs in recent decade in most CEE countries. The chances 
for increasing public funding for it are low. Seeing higher education policies in 
isolation from larger welfare state policies would be taking a short-sighted 
perspective: as significant (and funds-consuming) part of the public sector and part of 
the traditional welfare state, it is right now under severe pressures, even though 
pressures may not be as strong as pressures on reforms of healthcare and pensions. 
Knowing the zero-sum game character of fiscal decisions of national governments, it is 
useful to view higher education through the debates about welfare state reforms and 
transformations of the public sector.
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prescriptions for the transition countries on how to proceed based on 
the experiences that the EU-15 or OECD countries had during the 
same process of passing from elite to expanded models of higher 
education two-three decades ago.
It is a crucial point in educational policy for the countries in 
transition: how to combine educational reforms pressed by two types 
of challenges, old and new, traditional and knowledge economy- and 
globalization-related? How to weigh their relevance today -  should 
transition countries look to past or current experiences of other 
advanced and affluent countries in thinking about their higher 
education systems? How to progress in basic reforms related to much 
higher demand and the consequent massification of higher education 
if the material basis for these reforms, the welfare state, is either 
already dismantled or in the process of decomposition or even never 
had a chance to exist?28
28 One of the major differences between affluent Western democracies and the 
European transition countries is that the point of departure of welfare transformations 
is different. Paul Pierson, one of the leading welfare scholars, rightly notes that "in 
most of the affluent democracies, the politics of social policy centers on the 
renegotiation and restructuring of the terms of the post-war social contract rather than 
its dismantling" ("Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in 
Affluent Democracies", op. cit., p. 14). In CEE countries, in most general terms, there is 
no social contract to renegotiate and welfare provisions need to be defined from the 
very beginning. Consequently, an already "dismantled" welfare state may be built 
along neoliberal lines without actually renegotiating the postwar European social 
contract. Ideologically, there is an important difference between the potential 
dismantling of the welfare state (in Western Europe) and the actual dismantling of the 
remnants of bureaucratic welfare of the ancient regime CEEs. Christiane Lemke 
rightly assumes that emerging patterns of social support and social security in CEEs 
"diverge from the typology described in the comparative welfare state literature 
inasmuch as the transformation of postcommunist societies is distinctly different from 
the building of welfare states in Europe" („Social Citizenship and Institution Building: 
EU-Enlargement and the Restructuring of Welfare States in East Central Europe", 
Center for European Studies Program for the Study of Germany and Europe. Working 
Paper Series 01.2, 2001, p. 5). She seems to be wrong, though, when stating that the 
applicant countries had to adapt to the rules and regulations of the EU, "including the 
social acquis" and that the idea of European-wide social standards "gained a higher 
profile" in CEEs (p. 14). It was not the case.
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6.
Not surprisingly, both the Trends III report and official documents 
from Sorbonne to Berlin generally disregard market forces in higher 
education; whenever the reports uses the word "market", it is almost 
always "labour market". Not only in its descriptions but also in its 
projections and recommendations for the future. GATS negotiations is 
a different and complicated issue which I am not going to develop 
here. What I want to stress, though, is the fact that the sole passage in 
the Trends III report where the possible market orientation of 
(segments of) higher education and research are mentioned, is a short 
passage on GATS. Its brief criticism will not make the emergence of 
market forces in higher education slow down or stop; it will not annul 
global trends with respect to the relations between the state and the 
market and will not stop public sector reforms already undertaken 
worldwide.29
It is especially interesting to note the omission of market forces in 
higher education in the context of the reference point for the Bologna 
process (as well as for the ERA) being the USA, "the prime 
competitor", where market forces are increasingly important. 
Obviously market-driven and market-oriented higher education does 
not go in tandem with the European social model, but in such an 
overarching integrating initiative as Bologna, with the objectives of 
the ERA behind it -  the plain political and economic goal of making 
the European Union "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge- 
based economy (and society) in the world"30 -  it is a flaw to disregard 
the theme altogether.
The EU-15 (with notable exceptions) is one of the last places in the 
world which is relatively resistant to market forces in education and 
research; again, some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for a
29 See The University, Globalization, Central Europe, ed. by Marek Kwiek (Frankfurt 
am Main: Peter Lang, 2003); Hans W. Weiler, "States, Markets, and University 
Funding: New Paradigms for the Reform of Higher Education in Europe", Compare, 
vol. 30, no. 3, 2000.
30 Presidency Conclusions. Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 (2000), 
available on-line.
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variety of institutional, political and economic reasons, are much 
more influenced by market forces and their higher education 
institutions are already operating in highly competitive, market- 
driven and customer-driven environments. At the same time, from a 
global perspective, there are no doubts about the direction of change. 
My guess is that no matter if the Bologna process wants it or not, or 
Bologna process documents and analyses mention the phenomenon 
or not, the change is taking place everywhere and market forces will 
come, and in numerous places have already come, to European 
higher education institutions. It is a fact, whether we like it or not. 
The world today is too strongly interrelated (globalization!) to assume 
that although market forces are affecting higher education globally, 
the last bastion of resistance will be the signatory countries of the 
Bologna process (especially that market forces have already come as 
part of a much wider package of institutional changes to the welfare 
state model and they will not go away31). We may not care about the 
market; but we have to care about the universities increasingly 
exposed to its forces.32
31 Paul Pierson reminds us that the pressures on the state are structural and will 
not easily go away: "the welfare state now faces a context of essentially permanent 
austerity. Changes in the global economy, the sharp slowdown in economic growth, 
the maturation of governmental commitments, and population aging all generate 
considerable fiscal stress. There is little reason to expect these pressures to diminish 
over the next few decades. If anything, they are likely to intensify". Paul Pierson, 
"Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent 
Democracies" in a book he edited, The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 411.
32 While Paul Pierson admits that welfare states face an unprecedented budgetary 
stress today, he claims that it is related to "post-industrial" changes characteristic of 
affluent democracies. Perhaps the most important is the question whether in the 
absence of globalization welfare states would be in a radically different situation. His 
answer is negative ("Post-Industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare States" in a book 
he edited, The New Politics of the Welfare State, op. cit., p. 82). I believe Pierson's theses 
are very strong, but I am not sure we get from him the convincing arguments that 
globalization just does not matter. The affluent industrialized countries are strongly 
influenced by global pressures, as is the selection of policy options at their disposal; 
there is an interplay of international and domestic factors and it is very hard to distill 
them in today's world. For it is not only the real impact that globalization is having on
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Both the private sector in European (and especially Central and 
East European) higher education systems and the emergence of 
powerful market forces in the educational and research landscape in 
Europe will have to be further analyzed, discussed and incorporated 
into the Bologna process if it is not to turn into a "theoretical" 
exercise, especially but not exclusively in the region. Knowing the 
high stakes for both Bologna and ERA initiatives, I am sure this 
omission will soon be corrected.
7.
My concern about Bologna is that it is not trying to raise to the 
conceptual level which would be required to assist higher education 
systems in the region with integration into Western European systems 
within the European Higher Education Area. My perspective is that 
Bologna might be a good chance -  a useful policy agenda -  to assist 
with reforming those national higher education systems in the region 
which need reform most; it might provide clear recommendations on 
what to do and how, presenting almost a blueprint for reforms, even 
though their scope would be quite different in different countries. In 
this respect though, Bologna does not meet the expectations of the 
academic world in the region; it is still unclear in its visions and 
recommendations for action with respect to the region. At the same 
time, which is understandable, there is no way to use it as a lever for 
external, additional funds for educational reforms. Although the 
success of the process is conditional on public funding for the project, 
it is obvious to many that no public funding will accompany further
societies; it is also the way social, economic, and political problems are actually 
perceived as problems. Pierson may be right about the real influence, in measurable 
terms, of the internationalization of economy on the welfare state. He is very much 
correct about the growing domestic pressures common to all major affluent welfare 
states. But the way they are perceived by policy makers, the way they are framed for 
public discussions, the way they enter the social world through the social sciences, 
experts and the media -  seems crucial. In this sense, globalization is much more than a 
simple economic phenomenon.
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steps in the process ("the Bologna reforms cannot be realised without 
additional funding").33 So what should be done, that is the question.34
Today, there are crucial differences in thinking about reforms in 
Western Europe and in transition countries generally. Reforms to be 
undertaken in Western Europe are much more functional (fine-tuning, 
slight changes etc.); reforms to be undertaken in some countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and of the Balkans, by contrast, should be 
much more substantial (or structural). There is little common ground 
between the two sets of reforms, except for technical details, and the 
Bologna process in its official documents so far has not drawn a clear 
distinction between functional and structural reforms, and the regions 
for their future implementation. The differences between the condition 
of higher education systems in these parts of Europe are very 
substantial indeed; and so, surely, should be the analyses, descriptions, 
and policy recommendations. The problems and challenges, and 
consequently the depth of the reforms required, are different in the 
transition countries; fine-tuning and small adjustments undertaken
33 Sybille Reichert and Christian Tauch, Trends in Learning Structures in European 
Higher Education III, op. cit., p. 29.
34 It is interesting, in the context of our discussions about the "intellectual" in Part I, 
to cite Voldemar Tomusk's recent harsh criticism the Bologna Process (in his paper on 
"Three Bolognas and a Pizza Pie: notes on institutionalization of the European higher 
education system"); he reminds us that "hardly anybody involved in the Bologna 
Process does not consider her- or himself an intellectual, perhaps even of the highest 
calibre. Still, it is hard to see these individuals experiencing any moral dilemma about 
what they are doing, although there seem to be more than enough reasons for them to 
be afraid for their reputation. It suffices to mention the European Commission 
aggressively hijacking a sector without a mandate for doing so, academic activists 
writing political reports filled with contradictions, and knowledge workers contracted 
by the Commission producing knowledge for which they themselves have created a 
need and which they themselves consume in order to create more such knowledge". 
He continues his criticism with the statement that „it is unfortunate that one 
particular logic has gained near-complete dominance over the European higher 
education project, and those whose calling is normally to problematize such issues 
and expose them to public scrutiny have either found this particular topic irrelevant 
for them, perhaps for the reason that no funding has been made available for critical 
studies, or have assumed the role of messengers of a particular agency" (International 
Studies in Sociology of Education, vol. 14, no. 1, 2004, p. 93).
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within the Bologna process are perfectly suitable for many Western 
institutions, but without any accompanying structural transformation 
in East and Central European institutions they may lead to merely 
theoretical or cosmetic changes when what is needed is a 
transformation of the underlying structures in higher education 
systems, at least in some countries of the region.
8.
My concerns about Bologna are both general and specific and they 
refer to the process as a whole and to its potential impact in the 
region. They are based on theoretical assumptions (such as e.g. the 
traditional "idea of the university" and the universal role of the 
university35) on the one hand and a practical knowledge of the 
functioning of higher education in many countries of the region on 
the other. Some concerns derive from traditional notions of the 
sovereignty of nation-states and their sovereignty over educational 
policies,36 and from irreconcilable differences between educational 
systems arising from different cultures, languages, traditions and 
inheritance from the past; but other concerns derive from a more 
technical and pragmatic understanding of the global picture of 
changes in higher education whose role is downplayed in Bologna. 
Still other concerns derive directly from an awareness of the 
budgetary situation of the public sector in many countries of the 
region, and trends that have emerged there over the last decade or so 
(often towards welfare state retrenchment rather than towards a 
"European Social Model" as emphasized in the EU Lisbon Strategy).
Martin Carnoy draws a very useful distinction between the three 
factors that in practice are crucial to the approach governments take 
in educational reform, and hence in educational responses to 
globalization:
35 Jan SadJak, "Globalization versus the Universal Role of the University", Higher 
Education in Europe, vol. xxv, no. 2, 2000.
36 See Jurgen Enders, "Higher Education, Internationalisation, and the Nation- 
State: Recent Developments and Challenges to Governance Theory". Paper for the 
CHER conference, Vienna, September 2002.
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Their objective financial situation, their interpretation of that situation, and 
their ideological position regarding the role of public sector in education. 
These three elements are expressed through the way that countries 
"structurally adjust" their economies to the new globalized environment.37
Even though, as we have emphasized here, the dimension of 
globalization's challenges to higher education is certainly severely 
underestimated in Bologna documents, the phenomenon is one of the 
underlying factors behind the wider Lisbon strategy of the European 
Union: its role is crucial for understanding the whole package of 
reforms, including those in the education and R&D sectors. It is 
interesting to apply the above statement to transition countries 
involved in Bologna and make comparisons with the EU-15. All the 
three parameters are drastically different: the objective financial 
situation does not require any statistical data, it may be taken for 
granted in the majority of transition countries; secondly, as a 
consequence of the mostly objectively disastrous financial situation, the 
interpretations of the differences in objective financial situations may 
be even more dramatic; finally, in a number of transition countries 
escaping the model of command-driven economies, the ideological 
position regarding the role of the state in the public sector differs 
considerably from the position taken, with few national exceptions, on 
a European level: the ideal of the state about to emerge once the chaos 
of the transition period is over is the American model of cost- 
effectiveness and self-restraint rather than the "European social model" 
of the current EU-15 -  which, by the way, is also testified to in recent 
EU progress reports about accession countries.38 There are several
37 Martin Carnoy, Globalization and Educational Reform: What Planners Need to Know 
(Paris: UNESCO -  International Institute for Educational Planning, 1999), p. 47.
38 As Zsuzsa Ferge shows, "the EU suggestions for some reforms of social security 
may steer these countries in a more American than European direction" („European 
Integration and the Reform of Social Security in the Accession Countries", a paper 
submitted to The Journal of Social Quality, p. 1). Based on careful reading of the Accession 
Reports from the Community to the ten applicant countries, Ferge finds a "hidden policy 
agenda" there: "the Union has a different social security agenda for the accession countries than 
for the EU members. ... The hidden agenda suggests to the accession countries measures 
contrary to the European model, such as the privatization of pensions and health, or the 
cutback of already low social expenditures" (p. 1, emphasis mine).
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determinants of this but certainly a general dissatisfaction with the 
inefficiency and incompetence of state bureaucratic bodies is one of 
them, another being the increased role of market mechanisms in public 
sector reforms already undertaken (ranging from healthcare to pension 
systems to the decentralization of primary and secondary education) 
and the role of the private sector in the economy in general. Again, it 
would be interesting to see how the Bologna process documents are 
going to conceptualize these crucial differences.
To use another set of Carnoy's distinctions -  between 
"competitiveness-driven reforms", "finance-driven reforms", and 
"equity-driven reforms" in higher education39 -  it is possible to argue 
that not only are two speeds of reforms necessary (as some of the 
reforms required are merely functional, and others are structural), but 
also the current drivers of reforms are different: while in the EU-15 it 
is competitiveness (decentralization, improved standards and 
management of educational resources, improved teacher recruitment 
and training), in at least some transition countries, by contrast, it is 
mostly the wish to change the "business climate", to make use of 
structural adjustments and reduce public spending on education 
(which results equally from the objective situation, its interpretation, 
and the ideological stance governments take). These complications in 
the picture of "European" higher education systems are not discussed 
in Bologna documents, and I believe they should be.
Concerns may be raised about the potential bureaucratization of 
the process and the potential transfer of power concerning higher 
education policies to some supranational European body; but at the 
same time, the Bologna process provides opportunities for improving 
-  and hopefully reforming -  inefficient, outmoded, and in some 
places sometimes corrupted, institutions which should really play a 
central role in the new "knowledge economy" coming to the region.40
39 Martin Carnoy, Globalization and Educational Reform: What Planners Need to Know, 
op. cit., p. 37; see also Martin Carnoy, "Structural Adjustment and the Changing Face 
of Education", International Labour Review, vol. 134, no. 6,1995.
40 See John Houghton and Peter Sheehan, A Primer on the Knowledge Economy 
(Victoria: Center for Strategic Economic Studies, 2000) and OECD's The Knowledge- 
Based Economy: A Set of Facts and Figures (Paris: Author, 1999).
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Concerns may be raised about the break with traditional tasks and the 
roles of higher education institutions as evidenced by the roles and 
tasks suggested for them by both Bologna and the ERA (as Jurgen 
Enders remarks, universities today are "rather vulnerable 
organizations that tend to be loaded with multiple expectations and 
growing demands about their role and functioning in our knowledge- 
driven societies"41). But on the other hand, the traditional rhetoric 
may cover institutional or professional interests rather than a genuine 
love of the search for truth, disinterested research and other 
traditional ideals of the university.
The new vocabulary in which both higher education and research 
is cast in both Bologna and ERA initiatives may be worrying; but at 
the same time, especially in connection with the ERA, the vocabulary 
used, and the concepts employed, are standard in current global 
discussions about higher education and research and development, 
from UNESCO to the OECD to the World Bank. It is hard to use any 
other vocabulary today and be engaged in meaningful contemporary 
debates on the future of higher education and research. Concerns 
should be raised about the apparently economic definition of the role 
of higher education in ERA discussions. Although the ideals behind 
Bologna are cast in a slightly different vocabulary, the message is 
similar: we need practical results from our institutions; universities 
will have to change and the kind of research they do as well as the 
kind of teaching they offer will have to change too; the responsibility 
of universities is no longer the search for truth in research and for 
teaching moral and civic constitution (Bildung of the traditional 
German model of the university) to students/citizens; it is more like, 
if not exclusively, competitiveness, mobility, and the employability of 
graduates; the responsibility of universities is towards the economic 
growth of Europe as a whole, supporting a knowledge-based 
economy, contributing to new skills for the new emerging workforce 
of the emerging competitive, global age.
41 Jurgen Enders, "Governing the Academic Commons. About Blurring 
Boundaries, Blistering Organisations, and Growing Demands" in The CHEPS 
Inaugurals 2002 (Enschede: CHEPS, 2002), p. 71.
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The Bologna process has a bi-polar character: it derives from the 
ideas of cooperation (or solidarity) and competition. The Trends III 
report is very explicit about that while acknowledging that the 
initiation of the Bologna process has to do with "a sense of threatened 
competitiveness vis-a-vis prime competitors like the US, rather than 
from sheer enthusiasm for the increasing intensity of cooperation 
within European higher education".42 From my perspective, it is 
equally important to remember about a play of interests within the 
emergent European Higher Education Area, and the competition 
among European higher education institutions. Some countries are 
already global players in higher education; some are already 
exporters of higher education to Central and Eastern Europe in 
various, but mostly highly lucrative, disciplines. It is hard to combine 
the competitive spirit presented to non-European global competitors 
and the solidarity spirit presented at the same time to (Central) 
European partners. Can we imagine total cooperation and solidarity 
as driving motives in contacts with the countries of the region on the 
part of institutions from countries with strong market traditions and a 
good share in the global educational market (like e.g. the UK or the 
Netherlands)? My guess is that the motive of cooperation may be 
stronger in the region and that of competition may be stronger in 
Western Europe. Finally, within national systems and between 
national institutions, the competition motive is bound to be on the 
rise, proportionate to the increase in competition for shrinking 
national (public) funds.
9.
Finally, what I am concerned about is the potential use of the Bologna 
process in the region compared with its use in Western Europe. I am 
very much afraid that while Bologna may be quite successful in 
promoting its agenda in Western Europe (especially combined with the
42 Sybille Reichert and Christian Tauch, Trends in Learning Structures in European 
Higher Education III, op. cit., p. 52.
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funding and resources already available and the additional incentives 
already included in the implementation of the European Research 
Area), it might fail in the transition countries. That would mean that the 
gap between the higher education systems of East and West will get 
even wider. While Western European institutions seem to be much 
more afraid of losing their autonomy, freedom to teach and do research 
in the way their national priorities and funding allocations still lavishly 
allow them to do, for educational institutions in several transition 
countries the Bologna process might be the last coherent reform 
agenda, should it be further developed to include this purpose. I hope 
the "transition" dimension will be developed in the future so that the 
countries of the region could use the Bologna process for their benefit 
and the gap in question might finally at least stop getting wider.43
43 This article is a part of the project coordinated by Voldemar Tomusk (Open 
Society Institute, Budapest) and its full version will be available in the forthcoming 
book he is editing, The Bologna Process -  Voices from the Peripheries (Kluwer Scientific 
Publishers, 2004).
DIA-LOGOS
Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften 
Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences
Herausgegeben von 
Edited by
Tadeusz Buksiriski & Piotr W. Juchacz
Bd./Vol. 1 Piotr W. Juchacz / Roman Koziowski (Hrsg.): Freiheit und Verantwortung. Moral, Recht 
und Politik. 2002.
Bd./Vol. 2 Norbert LeSniewski / Ewa Nowak-Juchacz (Hrsg.): Die Zeit Heideggers. 2002.
Bd./Vol. 3 Marek Kwiek (ed.): The University, Globalization, Central Europe. 2003.
Bd./Vol. 4 Ewa Czerwirtska-Schupp: Philosophie an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts. Geschichte 
der Philosophie, Philosophische Anthropologie, Ethik, Wissenschaftstheorie, Politische Phi­
losophie. 2003.
Bd./Vol. 5 Danuta Sobczyriska / Pawel Zeidler / Ewa Zielonacka-Lis (eds ): Chemistry in the Philoso­
phical Melting Pot. 2004.
Bd./Vol. 6 Marek Kwiek: Intellectuals, Power, and Knowledge. Studies in the Philosophy of Culture 
and Education. 2004.
www.peterlang.de
Two modern achievements, the modern figure of the intellectual and the modern 
institution of the university, have been undergoing a radical crisis of identity. 
The decline of the philosophical project of modernity is turning out to be a 
painful process for modern culture: once again it has to reformulate the aims of 
its social institutions (the university) and the tasks of its cultural heroes (the 
intellectual). The traditional modern figure of the intellectual seems untenable 
in our increasingly postmodern cultural surrounding. The modern institution of 
the university may face a similar fate in our increasingly globalized surround­
ing: either it is going to accept the rules of bureaucratic consumer-oriented 
corporations, or it will have to try once again to find a new regulative idea. 
Thus, the history of the university and the history of the intellectual in the 20th 
century being parallel, the present volume consists of essays in the philosophy 
of culture (devoted to the intellectual) and in the philosophy of education 
(devoted to the modern university) and attempts to link the two modern themes 
together.
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Center for Public Policy at the University of Poznan (Poland). He is a philosopher, 
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Chapter 2
Agents, Spectators, and Social Hope: 
Richard Rorty and American Intellectuals
Rorty wrote his Achieving Our Country as a philosopher, intellectual, 
academic and citizen, and each of these perspectives leads to a 
different emphasis in reading his book, and to a different story (and 
"storytelling" is one of the themes of the book). The emergent pictures 
vary: the philosopher tells a story of the growing isolation and 
cultural sterility of analytic philosophy in the United States of 
America after the Second World War; the intellectual tells a story of 
the political bareness and practical uselessness of (the majority of) 
American leftist intellectuals in the context of the emerging new 
global order at the turn of the 21st century; the academic tells the 
story about humanities' departments at American universities, 
especially departments of literature and cultural studies, and their 
students, and contrasts their possible future fate with the past fate of 
departments of analytical philosophy and their students; and, finally, 
the citizen tells a story about the nationhood, politics, patriotism, 
reformism (as well as the inherent dangers and opportunities of 
globalization). Rorty plays the four descriptions off against one 
another perfectly and Achieving Our Country represents him at his 
very best: Rorty is passionate, inspiring, uncompromising, biting and 
very relevant to current public debates. Owing to the intelligent 
combination of the above perspectives, the clarity and elegance of his 
prose, and (although not revealed directly) the wide philosophical 
background provided by his new pragmatism, the book differs from a
Agents, Spectators, and Social Hope: Richard Rorty and American Intellectuals 49
dozen others written in the 1990s about the American academy and 
American intellectuals. It also sheds new and interesting light on 
Rorty's pragmatism, providing an excellent example of the 
application of his philosophical views. One has to note that, generally, 
it is almost impossible to think of any piece written by Rorty outside 
of the context of his philosophy, and Achieving Our Country is no 
exception to this rule.
There are a number of themes on which I want to focus my 
attention in the present paper. Most of them are interrelated, some are 
political and economic, some academic, and many merely 
philosophical. They include: the issue of patriotism, global citizenship 
and what I would call "parallel" national/regional/global loyalties in 
the context of Rorty's view of loyalty to America as a nation state; the 
theme of "telling stories", both in philosophy, history, and politics, by 
philosophers, intellectuals, historians, artists and novelists; the 
extremely harsh criticism of what he calls the "cultural Left" or 
"academic Left" in the context of his philosophical disagreement with 
postmodern French philosophy (especially with Michel Foucault and 
Jean-Francois Lyotard) from which the American Left's overall 
intellectual strategies originated and which Rorty has discussed on 
many occasions in the past; the theme of social "hope" (and 
optimism) as opposed to "knowledge" (and pessimism) in the context 
of Rorty's romantic and heroic version of pragmatism; the issue of 
"real politics" opposed to "cultural politics" on the part of the 
academic Left in the context of the roles and tasks of the institution of 
the university, in modernity, and, increasingly in the global age1; 
Rorty's resistance to "theory" and scientific methods, both in 
philosophy and in political leftist reformism; and, finally, the 
transformations about to be brought by globalization to the 
functioning of the academic community and Rorty's view of the 
process. I find these themes crucial for understanding Rorty's sense of 
the public sphere today.
1 See Marek Kwiek, "The Nation-State, Globalization, and the Modem Institution 
of the University", Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, vol. 96, 2000 (New 
York: Berghahn Books).
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nostalgia for a revolution; and certainty versus permanent doubts. 
Philosophy in America and France has been the intellectual product 
of two different cultures; one was fed by the utopia of unlimited 
freedom and unlimited possibilities; the other was plagued by 
the spectres of nationalisms, totalitarianisms, and hence was 
seduced by faith in the emancipation of humanity, to put it in very 
general terms.69 In Rorty's image of the past, America had 
the feeling that it was "the country of the future".70 There was no 
such a feeling in the Europe of the twentieth century generally 
speaking, with the exception of the "new" Italy, Germany or Soviet 
Russia.71 Therefore, it is difficult to speak of any social "hope" in 
today's French postmodern philosophy in any sense Rorty gives to 
the term.
In Rorty, the belief in the role of "hope" in philosophy and social 
criticism is considerable and allows him to distance himself from 
Foucault and Lyotard, for example. In politics, "hope should replace 
the sort of knowledge which philosophers have usually tried to 
attain". Besides, the most important distinction for the American 
pragmatists was that between the past and the future and which "can 
substitute for all the old philosophical distinctions".72 It is useful to 
sketch a brief overall comparison of Rorty's criticism of (mainly 
postmodern) French philosophy with his criticism of the academic 
Left in Achieving Our Country. Criticism of the latter combined with 
the former is even more devastating as it is based on Rorty's strong 
philosophical beliefs. It is not accidental that the words "academic" 
and "Foucauldian" with reference to the Left are often inter­
changeable.
69 See Francois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion. The Idea of Communism in the 
Twentieth Century, transl. by D. Furet (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); 
Tony Judt, Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992).
70 Rorty in Giovanna Borradori, The American Philosopher (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), p. 109.
71 See Bemard-Henri Levy, Adventures on the Freedom Road: The French Intellectuals 
in the 20th Century, transl. by R. Veasey (London: The Harvill Press, 1995).
72 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, op. cit., p. 24.
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Rorty claims in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity that Foucault is 
excluded from the circle of his beloved "liberal ironists" by virtue of a 
lack of "hope" for a change for the better in the present and a lack of 
chances given to the future. The liberal ironist in Rorty's account 
should combine two projects: his private project of self-creation and 
his public project of expanding the range of consciousness of the 
common "we".73 It does not suffice to recognize evil in Rorty's view; 
one also has to participate in the development of a moral 
consciousness that would fight that evil in the future. Thus hope must 
be present -  the hope that evil and cruelty can be overcome, the hope 
that is apparently absent in Foucault. According to Rorty, Foucault 
does not provide us with reasons to choose a social direction in the 
potential development of society. Rorty sees Foucault as a stoic, "a 
dispassionate observer of the present social order, rather than its 
concerned critic".74 He lacks the "rhetoric of emancipation" and his 
work can be characterized by "extraordinary dryness" produced 
through a lack of identification with any social context on his part.75 
By saying that he would like to write so as "to have no face" (a 
memorable expression from Archeology of Knowledge) Foucault 
excludes himself from membership of Rorty's utopia. As Rorty says 
about Foucault in "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity":
He forbids himself the tone of the liberal sort of thinker who says to his
fellow-citizens: "We know that there must be a better way to do things than
this; let us look for it together". There is no "w e" to be found in Foucault's
writings, nor in those of many of his French contemporaries.76
In the same text there is a memorable and indeed very unfair 
argument that Foucault writes "from a point of view light-years away 
from the problems of contemporary society". Let us remember, 
however, that pragmatism is the philosophy of "solidarity" rather 
than that of "despair"77 and the criteria applied to other thinkers are
73 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, op. cit., p. 64.
74 Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, op. cit., p. 173.
73 Ibidem, p. 174.
76 Ibidem, p. 174.
77 Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativity, and Truth. Philosophical Papers, op. cit., p. 33.
